Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine to Shiites: Integrate Into Your States

Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine during an event with Amal Movement military commander Akel Hamiyeh (Getty). 
Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine during an event with Amal Movement military commander Akel Hamiyeh (Getty). 
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Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine to Shiites: Integrate Into Your States

Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine during an event with Amal Movement military commander Akel Hamiyeh (Getty). 
Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine during an event with Amal Movement military commander Akel Hamiyeh (Getty). 

Asharq Al-Awsat begins publishing an extended text in the form of a dialogue held in 1997 between the late Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, then head of Lebanon’s Higher Islamic Shiite Council, and figures close to Hezbollah’s milieu.

The text is of exceptional importance, as it addresses the situation of Shiites in their countries and the need for them to integrate into their states rather than become part of a project subordinate to Iran.

As is well known, Shamseddine was marginalized for many years by supporters of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. He was displaced from Haret Hreik in Beirut’s southern suburbs and lived outside it because of positions that conflicted with those of Iran-aligned forces in Lebanon.

The dialogue is scheduled to be published by Ibrahim Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, the cleric’s son, in a book titled Lebanese Shiites and Arab Shiites: The Relationship with Others and the Relationship with the Self. Asharq Al-Awsat is publishing lengthy excerpts from the text on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Lebanese Shiite cleric’s death, which falls today, Saturday, January 10.

Ibrahim Shamseddine: Why now?

Ibrahim Shamseddine introduces the publication with a preface explaining why he chose to reveal the contents of the dialogue after all these years. He writes that he decided to publish the text marking 25 years since his father’s passing in order to honor him, revive his thought, and recall his deep insight, courage and firmness in expressing what he believed to be the truth — truth that safeguards people and preserves the nation and the state for all.

Central to this vision, he notes, was placing the unity of the national political community above any particularism, without exception, including that of Lebanese Shiites and Arab Shiites, who are part of the broader national, Arab and Islamic collectives.

The text is the outcome of a dialogue session, preserved on audio recordings, lasting more than four hours on the night of Tuesday, March 18, 1997. It brought together Sheikh Shamseddine and a large group of cadres from the “Islamic movement” in Lebanon, closely linked to the party-based Shiite political current that emerged in the mid-1980s under direct and sustained Iranian sponsorship.

Ibrahim Shamseddine explains that he was especially motivated to publish this previously unpublished text because it addresses highly sensitive and contentious issues — particularly relations between Lebanese Shiites and their fellow citizens, their national framework, their Arab and Islamic surroundings, and, most notably, their relationship with Iran.

He adds that these same issues remain at the heart of today’s debates, charged with urgency and tension, and continue to interact with shifting regional and global geopolitical dynamics. For this reason, he argues that the document is not a relic of the past but a living text that speaks directly to a volatile and uncertain present. The full text, with an expanded summary, will later be published in the aforementioned book.

Lebanese Shiites and Arab Shiites

The dialogue opens with a question from one of the young participants, who tells Shamseddine that he had long been regarded as a leading figure of the Islamist movement, but that over time a distance had emerged between him and part of its base. The questioner suggests this may be due to Shamseddine’s position and proximity to official authority, and asks whether he now speaks in the name of state necessities or the choices of the people.

Shamseddine replies that he remains in his original position, unchanged “by even a hair’s breadth,” but rather deeper, broader and more mature. What some perceive as distance, he insists, did not originate from him but from certain clerics and those influenced by them, driven by a purely partisan spirit he describes as almost idolatrous. Barriers were erected, through suspicion or inducement, leaving him personally surprised by developments he had not planned.

He speaks of hidden maneuvering rooted in the pursuit of status and influence, noting that such dynamics have existed within Shiism since the era of the infallible imams. He recounts how the Lebanese Union of Muslim Students, which he helped establish and nurture, was later taken out of his hands, eventually aligning with partisan currents that later fed into Hezbollah. He stresses that many were innocent or misled, while responsibility for others he leaves to divine judgment.

Shamseddine affirms that assuming the presidency of the Higher Islamic Shiite Council did not alter his religious understanding or commitments formed since the 1950s. He reiterates his well-known formulation distinguishing between “the necessities of regimes and the choices of Al-Umma (the community),” stressing that the council has always expressed the latter. Disagreement over whether a given stance falls under necessity or choice, he says, is legitimate.

He laments deliberate distortions portraying him and the council as aligned with the state, exploiting Shiite sensitivities toward authority. While a few acted knowingly, he says the majority were misled. He declares that he harbors no personal grievance, leaving judgment to God.

The relationship with regimes

Responding to a question about the cordiality shown during his visits to Arab states and whether it served the interest of avoiding escalation, Shamseddine dismisses the premise. Affection, he says, is natural and mutual among Muslims, whether in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, India or Pakistan. He notes that during his visits he met governments and oppositions alike, including Islamist groups critical of their own states.

He rejects the suggestion that cordiality implies submission, stressing that shared causes, above all the broader Islamic cause and opposition to the Zionist project, create common ground and understanding.

Shamseddine then addresses what he calls a deep-seated Shiite psychological complex: the belief of being universally rejected. While acknowledging that Shiites do face hostility at times, he argues that the deeper problem is self-isolation rooted in a siege mentality cultivated through poor social and political upbringing. This mindset, he says, has been cynically exploited by some Shiite leaders, particularly after the rise of Islamist movements, to mobilize followers without ethical restraint.

He adds that conflict is not unique to Shiites. Sunnis fight Sunnis in Algeria, Sudan and Afghanistan, just as Shiites have fought Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon. Social struggle, he says, is a universal reality.

“Integrate into your states”

Shamseddine then lays out his central message. His overriding concern, he says, is for the blood, dignity, freedom and honor of Shiites. To protect these, Shiites must be accepted within their homelands and not perceived as a threat or contagion.

“I say this openly,” he declares. “Integrate into your states. Integrate into your societies. Integrate into your systems of shared interests. Do not create a separate system of interests. Do not arouse suspicion. Respect your laws.”

He insists this position is grounded in firm religious conviction, stressing that stealing public funds is forbidden regardless of whether a state is Sunni or Shiite. He argues that acceptance should come from being a constructive citizen, not from acting as a proxy or protected extension of another state.

Shamseddine warns against behavior that seeks to intimidate others through transnational partisan threats, recounting instances where individuals exploited partisan affiliations to evade accountability abroad. Such conduct, he says, ultimately harms the broader Shiite community.

He concludes that his mission is to make Shiites accepted within their societies and the wider Islamic world, accepted as they are, in their religious practices and traditions. Portraying Shiites as a distinct, abnormal case within Islam, he argues, is both false and dangerous. He says that his religious and intellectual duty is to pull Shiites out of this predicament, a task he believes he had already achieved to a significant extent.

Below are some of the key issues addressed by Shamseddine in the dialogue, revealed for the first time:

• When you do not threaten others’ system of interests with your own, few people will stand in your way.

• I say: integrate into your states, integrate into your societies, integrate into your systems of interests. Do not create a separate system of interests. Do not arouse the suspicions of others. Respect your laws.

• My message is to make Shiites acceptable within their societies and within the wider Muslim community. I want them to be accepted in their own right, not because they represent a “protectorate” of another state, meaning to be accepted because Iran protects me.

• The secret group that was formed in Egypt as the nucleus of a party or grouping, including that wretched creature “Shehata” and others like him, does not concern us, whether they are sincere or charlatans.

• The psychological complex among Shiites, that they are ostracized, stems from the fact that they themselves ostracize others. The world is not against us. We are against the world. One of the tasks of my mission is to remove Shiites from a posture of being against the world.

• If Iran is building a party for itself in Egypt and wants to build work upon it, that is not my business. Iran manages its own affairs.

• Shiites make up one-fifth of Muslims compared with four-fifths. My role is to create a state of friendship between them and their societies, far from any political sectarianism.

• I am not speaking only about Arab Shiites. Shiites in Türkiye or Azerbaijan belong to Türkiye and Azerbaijan, not to Iran. Shiites in the Indian subcontinent belong to their homelands, ethnicities and peoples. Iran represents neither a political nor a religious authority for them.

• It is impermissible for there to be a separate project for Shiites within their homelands.

• What interest do Shiites have in killing the emir of Kuwait? Why do we conspire against this or that regime or official? Managing Shiite affairs begins with integration.

• I moved into besieged Beirut in 1982 and said: Shiites will not leave Beirut. Their glory and dignity lie in being besieged alongside Sunnis and Palestinians inside it.

• Shiites are not in danger. If there is any danger to them, it comes from themselves, not from others.

• Had I wanted to flatter the Iranians, I would have mentioned them, praised and lauded them, and you would then have heard applause from Iran and Hezbollah.

• The state cannot deal with secret systems of interests, as some are trying to create here or elsewhere.

• Shiites have no interest, regionally or nationally, in establishing a separate system of interests and linking it to Iran.

• Shiite strength lies in integrating into the body of Islam, not in becoming a special community affiliated with Iranians.

• I call for citizenship without deceit. If one of the turbaned pretenders issues a fatwa saying that stealing the property of a Sunni or a Christian is permissible, absolutely not. This is forbidden.

• The concept of an unjust system or an unjust ruler no longer exists. The modern state has legitimate ownership. We issue religious rulings forbidding the embezzlement of public funds, the betrayal of laws and the undermining of public order.

 

 



Netanyahu Says Palestinian Authority in for 'Big Surprise'

Israeli troops patrol in the West Bank city of Nablus, 24 October 2026. EPA/ALAA BADARNEH
Israeli troops patrol in the West Bank city of Nablus, 24 October 2026. EPA/ALAA BADARNEH
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Netanyahu Says Palestinian Authority in for 'Big Surprise'

Israeli troops patrol in the West Bank city of Nablus, 24 October 2026. EPA/ALAA BADARNEH
Israeli troops patrol in the West Bank city of Nablus, 24 October 2026. EPA/ALAA BADARNEH

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the Palestinian Authority (PA) was in for a "big surprise" after he ordered a major military operation in response to an attack on soldiers in the West Bank.

Netanyahu, days ahead of elections, declined to answer directly when he was asked if he would dismantle the Palestinian Authority but said he favored "ruse and surprise.”

"We transformed the Middle East. I said that we would change things and we have," Netanyahu told i24News in an interview conducted late Friday.

"There is a very big surprise for the Palestinian Authority as well."

Netanyahu on Friday promised a massive military response after Palestinian militants killed two Israeli soldiers near Hebron in the occupied West Bank.

One of his far-right allies called after the attack for Israel to bring down the Palestinian Authority, the semi-autonomous body that governs parts of the West Bank in cooperation with Israel as part of peace accords in the 1990s.

No evidence suggests that the PA was connected to Friday's attack.


700 Square Kilometers Under Israeli Occupation in Lebanon: What Does the ‘Security Belt’ Mean?

700 Square Kilometers Under Israeli Occupation in Lebanon: What Does the ‘Security Belt’ Mean?
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700 Square Kilometers Under Israeli Occupation in Lebanon: What Does the ‘Security Belt’ Mean?

700 Square Kilometers Under Israeli Occupation in Lebanon: What Does the ‘Security Belt’ Mean?

Israel’s expanding operations in southern Lebanon are raising questions about how much territory its forces actually occupy, and how much they control through surveillance, firepower and the ability to launch attacks from forward positions.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has repeatedly cited an area of roughly 700 square kilometers. But developments on the ground paint a more complex picture: Israeli control varies from troops stationed at fixed positions to mobile incursions and firepower dominance over much wider areas.

Military assessments suggest the area is far from a uniform security belt stretching from the Mediterranean coast to Mount Hermon. Its depth varies sharply across sectors, shaped by terrain, commanding heights and routes of movement.

Israeli troops and military vehicles are stationed in some areas. Others have no permanent Israeli military presence but remain under aerial surveillance or within striking range, allowing forces to operate there without maintaining troops on the ground.

Single Front

Defense and security expert Riad Kahwaji told Asharq Al-Awsat that Israel views Lebanon and the Golan Heights as "a single front" stretching from Mount Hermon to the Mediterranean coast at Naqoura and Bayada, despite crossing two countries.

"From its perspective, Israel is establishing a security belt along its northern border," Kahwaji said, adding that the belt is "no longer confined to areas south of the Litani River but has extended north of it in some locations."

Geography helps explain why.

"The geographical scope has effectively expanded beyond the area south of the Litani, particularly from the direction of Metula, where the river is only about seven kilometers away, compared with roughly 30 kilometers between Naqoura and the Litani," he said.

That difference, Kahwaji explained, means the security belt can extend north of the Litani in some areas without maintaining the same depth across the entire border.

The river, therefore, is not a uniform dividing line between northern and southern operational zones. Distances vary, and geography dictates how far Israeli troops or firepower can reach.

Israeli bulldozers carve roads through the mountainous al-Shaqif region in southern Lebanon (AFP)

Firepower

Kahwaji drew a distinction between occupying territory and controlling it through surveillance and firepower.

He said Israel relies on about 20 military positions, each capable of accommodating a small force, while drones continuously monitor movements deeper inside the area.

"Each position could accommodate a company-sized force, while drones operate continuously farther behind these positions to monitor movements," he said.

"When drones detect movement, it is targeted by artillery or an airstrike. Alternatively, a patrol can be dispatched from one of these positions toward the location where the movement was detected within what is known as the yellow belt."

That, he said, is what control through firepower means.

"It does not require an extensive military presence throughout the entire belt. Instead, it relies on specific military positions, continuous surveillance through drones and firepower, and the ability to target any movement or dispatch a patrol."

The result is a military footprint that extends well beyond the positions troops physically occupy.

From elevated or fortified positions, forces can monitor surrounding roads and towns, strike targets or send patrols without establishing permanent bases in every location.

From the Coast to Beaufort Castle

The pattern is visible across southern Lebanon.

In the west, Israeli operations extend from Naqoura and the coastal sector into areas that have recently faced incursions, demolitions and repeated shelling, including Mansouri and its surroundings.

Farther east, central-sector towns such as Beit Yahoun, Hadatha, Haris and Aita al-Jabal have experienced varying degrees of Israeli military activity or attacks, though the level of troop presence differs.

The reach of operations extends farther inland toward Beaufort Castle and the Ali al-Taher heights.

There, elevated terrain offers commanding views over wider areas toward Nabatieh, Iqlim al-Tuffah and surrounding movement routes.

The result is a zone of control shaped less by a continuous border strip than by strategic elevations and the areas they overlook.

Could Israeli Operations Reach the Awali River?

Retired Brigadier General Fadi Daoud offered a broader assessment of where Israeli operations could extend, arguing that control of high ground may determine the limits of any advance.

"What is clear in southern Lebanon is that the expansion could reach the Awali River. Even if it does not, forces will remain positioned on the heights overlooking the river," Daoud told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He said such a deployment could also encompass Rihan and areas around Jezzine, particularly Kfarhouna.

"The western boundary will be the Awali River," he said, identifying geographical control, especially over commanding heights, as the key factor shaping military movements.

Holding elevated positions, he argued, would allow Israeli forces to dominate lower-lying areas with firepower without maintaining troops throughout them.

"Geographical control will enable Israel to control the western Bekaa from the right flank because it is already present on Mount Hermon. The western Bekaa has effectively become a pocket between Mount Hermon and Rihan," Daoud said.

"Israel will establish positions there to control the Bekaa."

Dense clouds of dust cover the hills of Arnoun and al-Shaqif surrounding Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjayoun in southern Lebanon (AFP)

The Strategic Heights of Rihan and Iqlim al-Tuffah

Daoud said the potential advance could stretch from Mount Rihan toward the heights of Iqlim al-Tuffah, including Mount Safi.

"It will move from Mount Rihan to the heights of Iqlim al-Tuffah, including Mount Safi, where it will establish control over Hezbollah's stronghold in Iqlim al-Tuffah, as well as Sidon, eastern Sidon and the Awali River," he said.

For Daoud, terrain is the determining factor.

"Geography is fixed, and Israel will follow it," he said, stressing that forces positioned on high ground can control areas below through firepower without deploying throughout them.

He argued that Israeli control of Mount Hermon would leave the western Bekaa militarily exposed as far as Qaraoun.

"Its control of Mount Hermon makes the western Bekaa militarily vulnerable as far as Qaraoun," he said.

Mount Hermon, he explained, overlooks two major areas: the western Bekaa to the west and Daraa in Syria to the east.

Both, he said, "will form pockets" on either side of the mountain.

The two military assessments point to a central distinction in the debate over the 700-square-kilometer area: the territory Israel can monitor, strike or enter is not necessarily territory it physically occupies.

Commanding heights, observation posts, fields of fire and the ability to deploy patrols can extend military control far beyond fixed positions, even as the scale of Israel's actual troop presence varies from one sector to another.

Israeli Drone Strike, Demolitions Hit Southern Lebanon

Meanwhile, Israeli military operations continued across southern Lebanon on Friday.

An Israeli drone struck a roundabout in Kfar Tebnit, in the Nabatieh district, with preliminary reports indicating casualties.

At the same time, Israeli troops carried out two demolitions, one on the outskirts of Kfar Tebnit and another in Mansouri in the Tyre district.

Israeli forces also set fire to wooded areas in Qantara and swept Wadi al-Hujeir with machine-gun fire.

An Israeli drone dropped a stun grenade near Kfarshouba, while low-flying drones were reported over Beirut's southern suburbs, Tyre and surrounding areas.


Khartoum Denies Army Role in ‘Abyei Massacre’

UN peacekeeping forces (UNISFA) attempting to extinguish fires in Al-Na'am market in the Abyei area (United Nations - Facebook)
UN peacekeeping forces (UNISFA) attempting to extinguish fires in Al-Na'am market in the Abyei area (United Nations - Facebook)
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Khartoum Denies Army Role in ‘Abyei Massacre’

UN peacekeeping forces (UNISFA) attempting to extinguish fires in Al-Na'am market in the Abyei area (United Nations - Facebook)
UN peacekeeping forces (UNISFA) attempting to extinguish fires in Al-Na'am market in the Abyei area (United Nations - Facebook)

Sudan’s government denied army involvement in a drone strike that killed more than 150 people at a market in the disputed Abyei region bordering South Sudan, according to local reports, as drone warfare intensified across Darfur and Kordofan.

The army, meanwhile, said it had recaptured military positions in Blue Nile state near the Ethiopian border and shot down a drone that crossed into Sudan from Ethiopia.

In a statement issued late Thursday, Sudan’s Foreign Ministry expressed deep regret over the civilian deaths, categorically denying “any connection between the Sudanese Armed Forces and this unfortunate incident.”

Aftermath of the fire that targeted a civilian truck in Abyei market (United Nations - Facebook)

The ministry said the attack bore similarities to atrocities blamed on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), citing a December 2025 strike on a United Nations peacekeeping headquarters in Kadugli, South Kordofan, that killed peacekeepers, as well as attacks on humanitarian aid convoys.

The denial followed the army’s publication of images on Facebook in recent days indicating it had struck RSF command centers in the area.

An army officer also told the Associated Press that the strikes targeted fuel trucks heading to the RSF, denying that civilians had been targeted. The army leadership has made no official admission of responsibility.

South Sudan’s Foreign Ministry summoned Sudan’s ambassador in Juba to protest the attack, amid growing fears that the war’s fallout could spill across the border.

Peacekeeping forces in Abyei (UNISFA) participating in rescuing victims from Al-Na'am market (United Nations - Facebook)

UN, African Union Condemn Strikes

Oil-rich Abyei remains a flashpoint between Sudan and South Sudan, with sovereignty over the territory disputed since South Sudan’s independence in 2011. A UN peacekeeping force is deployed in the area.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres strongly condemned Monday’s drone attacks on Abyei, which killed dozens of civilians, including women and children, urging Khartoum and Juba to prevent further strikes and uphold the region’s demilitarized status.

African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf also condemned the attacks, citing local and medical reports of more than 150 deaths.

He urged the warring sides to avoid actions that could inflame the conflict or threaten neighboring countries and reaffirmed support for mediation efforts to secure an immediate humanitarian ceasefire.

Elsewhere, the RSF-led parallel government, known as Tasis, accused the Sudanese army of striking a hospital in El Daein, the capital of East Darfur, with a drone on Thursday, killing three people and wounding dozens, according to its account.

In a statement Friday, Tasis said further airstrikes hit the government secretariat in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, where the RSF runs its administration of territories under its control.

Pro-army social media platforms reported heavy airstrikes on RSF positions in Nyala, El Daein, El Fasher and parts of West Kordofan.

Local reports said the strikes hit fuel depots and military vehicles in the oil-producing Abu Jabra area of East Darfur, as well as positions in Babanusa, West Kordofan.

A military source cited in the reports said the raids aimed to cripple RSF logistics ahead of possible ground operations.

Image published by the Sudanese Army of a command post belonging to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Abyei (its Facebook page)

Army Reports Gains in Blue Nile

On another front, Sudan’s army said Thursday evening it had retaken Bakori and Aklili in southeastern Blue Nile state near the Ethiopian border after clashes with an alliance of the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu.

The army’s 4th Infantry Division, based in Damazin, said on Facebook that its troops had “liberated” both areas, inflicting heavy losses on opposing forces.

Bakori holds strategic military importance as the site of a 13th Brigade base along a route to Damazin, the state capital. RSF-allied forces had seized the area in August.

The army also said it had downed a drone it described as “strategic” over Bakori, claiming it had tracked the aircraft from the moment it crossed the Ethiopian border. It said the drone targeted fuel trucks believed to be heading to the RSF.

Sudan has accused Ethiopia of allowing the RSF to use its territory to launch drone strikes and ground operations inside Sudan, allegations Addis Ababa denies.