Report: Israel Faces Possible Shortage of Interceptor Missiles

An Arrow II missile interceptor is displayed in front of journalists at an Israeli air defense command in the Palmahim military base south of Tel Aviv May 12, 2011. (Reuters)
An Arrow II missile interceptor is displayed in front of journalists at an Israeli air defense command in the Palmahim military base south of Tel Aviv May 12, 2011. (Reuters)
TT
20

Report: Israel Faces Possible Shortage of Interceptor Missiles

An Arrow II missile interceptor is displayed in front of journalists at an Israeli air defense command in the Palmahim military base south of Tel Aviv May 12, 2011. (Reuters)
An Arrow II missile interceptor is displayed in front of journalists at an Israeli air defense command in the Palmahim military base south of Tel Aviv May 12, 2011. (Reuters)

Israel is encountering a potential shortage of rocket and missile interceptors in its air defenses, reports revealed on Tuesday a day after the country’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant admitted Israel needs US support in air armament.

The Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper said that during the security review presented to Israeli ministers Monday, Gallant was asked about armaments.

He replied that there was a large gap when he entered the Defense Ministry, which he instructed to be filled before the start of the war.

Gallant said, “We are still dependent in air armaments and American planes,” but he clarified that “we are working with all our might to promote blue-white production and the development of independence” on the issue of armaments.

Gallant’s comments were confirmed by the London-based Financial Times, which on Tuesday said that Israel faces a severe shortage of interceptor missiles, detailing how the US is rushing to help close the gaps.

According to the report, the Pentagon on Sunday announced the deployment of the THAAD system that will arrive in Israel, in preparation for the expected attack in Iran, which could lead to further regional escalation.

“Israel’s munitions issue is serious,” Dana Stroll, a former senior official at the US Department of Defense, responsible for the Middle East, explained to the newspaper.

“If Iran responds to an Israel attack [with a massive air strike campaign], and Hezbollah joins in too, Israel air defenses will be stretched,” she said, adding that US stockpiles are not limitless. “The US can’t continue supplying Ukraine and Israel at the same pace. We are reaching a tipping point,” she added.

Replenishing stocks

Boaz Levy, chief executive of Israel Aerospace Industries, a state-owned company which makes the Arrow interceptors used to shoot down ballistic missiles, told the newspaper he is running triple shifts to keep production lines running.

“Some of our lines are working 24 hours, seven days a week. Our goal is to meet all our obligations,” Levy said, adding that the time required to produce interceptor missiles is “not a matter of days”.

While Israel does not disclose the size of its stockpiles, he added: “It is no secret that we need to replenish stocks.”

The British newspaper explained that until this week, Israel's three-tiered air defense systems have succeeded in intercepting most of the UAVs and missiles fired by Iran and its proxies at the country.

The Iron Dome system intercepted short-range rockets and UAVs fired by Hamas from Gaza, while the David Slingshot intercepted heavier rockets fired from Lebanon, and the Arrow system stopped ballistic missiles from Iran.

During the Iranian attack in April, according to the Israeli army, a 99% interception rate was achieved against the barrage, which included 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 ballistic missiles.

Israel reportedly had less success in repelling the second barrage, that took place at the beginning of the month, which included more from 180 ballistic missiles.

Intelligence sources told the newspaper that nearly 30 missiles hit the Nevatim Airbase in southern Israel near Be'er Sheva.

200 missiles

The FT report stirred heated debate in Israel. Brigadier General Zvika Chaimovitz, former commander of the air defense system, told Ynet on Tuesday: “The THAAD system is a significant force component and I don't want to compare it with the Arrow system, but in the end, you add dozens more interceptors.”

“It is a significant force that joins our forces, and we have seen scenarios of 200 missiles. It is assumed that if the conflict with Iran continues, we are expected to see more here.”

“The US is a great power. When you look at capabilities, it's not a numbers game. In the end it's a combination of defense and attack,” he remarked.

Yedioth Ahronoth commentator Ron Ben Yishai pointed out in a recent piece that the agreement being formed with the US to place THAAD in Israel is as much a result of American coercion as it is of Israeli necessity.

“The Israeli army’s need is clear: It needs the addition of American interceptor missiles and launchers to deal with the hundreds of missiles that the Iranians may launch, if and when Israel responds to the attack against it on October 1,” he said.

In this case, the quantities and numbers speak for themselves, noted Ben Yishai. “The more missiles are launched in one or two small volleys in order to saturate the defense systems - the more launchers, interceptor missiles and radars are needed,” he continued.

Yair Katz, the head of the workers union at Israel Aircraft Industries, dismissed the claims, stating that “The Financial Times headline is wrong. Israel has enough interceptors to maintain a war on multiple fronts.”



Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
TT
20

Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-affiliated media accounts posted a video showing several of the group’s prominent leaders outside Gaza falling into a “prostration of thanks” as they watched on television the start of the unprecedented assault on Israel -- what Hamas called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.”

The video, recorded in a spacious office, appeared to show Hamas’s top brass monitoring an event they clearly anticipated. Figures like Ismail Haniyeh, then head of the political bureau; his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri; and senior leaders Khaled Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya were all seen in the footage. At the time, the scene fueled speculation about whether the political leadership had prior knowledge or direct involvement in planning the attack.

Yet, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, many of those in the video were unaware of the operation’s exact timing or scope. They knew the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, were preparing a preemptive strike in response to Israeli plans for a limited military campaign -- but the leaders abroad had not been briefed on the final execution.

The sources revealed that the video was filmed in Hamas’s office in Türkiye, where leaders were preparing to travel to Iraq, part of a broader diplomatic initiative. The delegation, which had recently visited Lebanon, was set to engage with other Arab and Islamic countries, including Iran, Kuwait, and Oman, in an effort to widen Hamas’s political footprint. This diplomatic offensive was seen by some in the Palestinian Authority as an attempt to position Hamas as an alternative to the PA and the PLO --an accusation the group denied.

However, without the knowledge of most of the political wing, Hamas’s military leadership in Gaza had a different agenda -one that was kept tightly guarded and may have contributed to the operation’s initial success. In the early hours of the attack, leaders outside Gaza scrambled to contact counterparts in the Strip, asking, “What’s happening?” Some of those asked reportedly responded with confusion or claimed ignorance.

Only a small inner circle knew the full scope of the plan, and even among Gaza-based leadership, not all were informed. Some received instructions before the attack to leave their homes and relocate to secure areas.

As Israel’s war on Gaza enters its twentieth month and continues to target Hamas leaders, the question now is: who remains from the core of October 7, and who truly knew what?

While most of Hamas’s political leadership was excluded from operational details, some senior figures had given strategic backing to the idea of a preemptive strike. Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Mahmoud al-Zahar were among those who supported military action to derail reported Israeli assassination plans targeting Hamas figures.

The name most closely linked to the attack remains Yahya Sinwar, who headed Hamas in Gaza at the time. Though not the originator of the idea, he was the operation’s chief engineer and maintained strict control over its planning. He handpicked those who were fully briefed and sanctioned the final plan.

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, Sinwar was elevated to head of the political bureau -- a symbolic challenge to Israel. But just months later, in October 2024, Sinwar was killed in a surprise clash in Tel al-Sultan, western Rafah, alongside members of his inner circle.

Haniyeh, for his part, had been focused on expanding Hamas’s diplomatic reach. He had only a vague idea about the October 7 operation, believing it would be limited. He was assassinated in Tehran as well, in the same month as his successor.

Khalil al-Hayya, now leading the political bureau and negotiations, was better informed than many of his peers but not to the extent of the military planners. Ruhi Mushtaha, one of the few civilians aware of the operation’s breadth and timing, was killed in July 2024, as was Saleh al-Arouri, who was targeted earlier that year in Lebanon.

Nizar Awadallah, who left Gaza shortly before the attack, remains active in back-channel negotiations and is considered a hardline figure inside Hamas. Though largely behind the scenes, he was reportedly better informed than most on the political level.

On the military front, few names carry as much weight as Mohammed Deif, long-time commander of the Qassam Brigades. Deif, who survived numerous Israeli assassination attempts over the years, was finally killed in July 2024. Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s younger brother, was considered the true mastermind of the operation and played a central role in its planning and execution. He too was killed in a targeted strike in Khan Younis, alongside his brother.

Other key figures, like Marwan Issa, who had long served as Deif’s deputy, died in March 2024 after being sidelined by illness. Several brigade commanders who oversaw preparations and joint drills with other factions, including the Islamic Jihad, were also eliminated. Only one high-ranking commander, Ezzedine al-Haddad of Gaza City, is believed to still be alive. Known as “The Fox” for his ability to evade Israeli intelligence, he continues to operate underground.