Report: Israel Faces Possible Shortage of Interceptor Missiles

An Arrow II missile interceptor is displayed in front of journalists at an Israeli air defense command in the Palmahim military base south of Tel Aviv May 12, 2011. (Reuters)
An Arrow II missile interceptor is displayed in front of journalists at an Israeli air defense command in the Palmahim military base south of Tel Aviv May 12, 2011. (Reuters)
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Report: Israel Faces Possible Shortage of Interceptor Missiles

An Arrow II missile interceptor is displayed in front of journalists at an Israeli air defense command in the Palmahim military base south of Tel Aviv May 12, 2011. (Reuters)
An Arrow II missile interceptor is displayed in front of journalists at an Israeli air defense command in the Palmahim military base south of Tel Aviv May 12, 2011. (Reuters)

Israel is encountering a potential shortage of rocket and missile interceptors in its air defenses, reports revealed on Tuesday a day after the country’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant admitted Israel needs US support in air armament.

The Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper said that during the security review presented to Israeli ministers Monday, Gallant was asked about armaments.

He replied that there was a large gap when he entered the Defense Ministry, which he instructed to be filled before the start of the war.

Gallant said, “We are still dependent in air armaments and American planes,” but he clarified that “we are working with all our might to promote blue-white production and the development of independence” on the issue of armaments.

Gallant’s comments were confirmed by the London-based Financial Times, which on Tuesday said that Israel faces a severe shortage of interceptor missiles, detailing how the US is rushing to help close the gaps.

According to the report, the Pentagon on Sunday announced the deployment of the THAAD system that will arrive in Israel, in preparation for the expected attack in Iran, which could lead to further regional escalation.

“Israel’s munitions issue is serious,” Dana Stroll, a former senior official at the US Department of Defense, responsible for the Middle East, explained to the newspaper.

“If Iran responds to an Israel attack [with a massive air strike campaign], and Hezbollah joins in too, Israel air defenses will be stretched,” she said, adding that US stockpiles are not limitless. “The US can’t continue supplying Ukraine and Israel at the same pace. We are reaching a tipping point,” she added.

Replenishing stocks

Boaz Levy, chief executive of Israel Aerospace Industries, a state-owned company which makes the Arrow interceptors used to shoot down ballistic missiles, told the newspaper he is running triple shifts to keep production lines running.

“Some of our lines are working 24 hours, seven days a week. Our goal is to meet all our obligations,” Levy said, adding that the time required to produce interceptor missiles is “not a matter of days”.

While Israel does not disclose the size of its stockpiles, he added: “It is no secret that we need to replenish stocks.”

The British newspaper explained that until this week, Israel's three-tiered air defense systems have succeeded in intercepting most of the UAVs and missiles fired by Iran and its proxies at the country.

The Iron Dome system intercepted short-range rockets and UAVs fired by Hamas from Gaza, while the David Slingshot intercepted heavier rockets fired from Lebanon, and the Arrow system stopped ballistic missiles from Iran.

During the Iranian attack in April, according to the Israeli army, a 99% interception rate was achieved against the barrage, which included 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 ballistic missiles.

Israel reportedly had less success in repelling the second barrage, that took place at the beginning of the month, which included more from 180 ballistic missiles.

Intelligence sources told the newspaper that nearly 30 missiles hit the Nevatim Airbase in southern Israel near Be'er Sheva.

200 missiles

The FT report stirred heated debate in Israel. Brigadier General Zvika Chaimovitz, former commander of the air defense system, told Ynet on Tuesday: “The THAAD system is a significant force component and I don't want to compare it with the Arrow system, but in the end, you add dozens more interceptors.”

“It is a significant force that joins our forces, and we have seen scenarios of 200 missiles. It is assumed that if the conflict with Iran continues, we are expected to see more here.”

“The US is a great power. When you look at capabilities, it's not a numbers game. In the end it's a combination of defense and attack,” he remarked.

Yedioth Ahronoth commentator Ron Ben Yishai pointed out in a recent piece that the agreement being formed with the US to place THAAD in Israel is as much a result of American coercion as it is of Israeli necessity.

“The Israeli army’s need is clear: It needs the addition of American interceptor missiles and launchers to deal with the hundreds of missiles that the Iranians may launch, if and when Israel responds to the attack against it on October 1,” he said.

In this case, the quantities and numbers speak for themselves, noted Ben Yishai. “The more missiles are launched in one or two small volleys in order to saturate the defense systems - the more launchers, interceptor missiles and radars are needed,” he continued.

Yair Katz, the head of the workers union at Israel Aircraft Industries, dismissed the claims, stating that “The Financial Times headline is wrong. Israel has enough interceptors to maintain a war on multiple fronts.”



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.