UN Resolution 1701 at the Heart of the Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire

An empty United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower on the Israel-Lebanon border, near the southern Lebanese city of Al-Khiam, as seen from northern Israel, 26 November 2024, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. (EPA)
An empty United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower on the Israel-Lebanon border, near the southern Lebanese city of Al-Khiam, as seen from northern Israel, 26 November 2024, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. (EPA)
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UN Resolution 1701 at the Heart of the Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire

An empty United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower on the Israel-Lebanon border, near the southern Lebanese city of Al-Khiam, as seen from northern Israel, 26 November 2024, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. (EPA)
An empty United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower on the Israel-Lebanon border, near the southern Lebanese city of Al-Khiam, as seen from northern Israel, 26 November 2024, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. (EPA)

In 2006, after a bruising monthlong war between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah armed group, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for a resolution to end the conflict and pave the way for lasting security along the border.

But while relative calm stood for nearly two decades, Resolution 1701’s terms were never fully enforced.

Now, figuring out how to finally enforce it is key to a US-brokered deal that brought a ceasefire Wednesday.

In late September, after nearly a year of low-level clashes, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah spiraled into all-out war and an Israeli ground invasion. As Israeli jets pound deep inside Lebanon and Hezbollah fires rockets deeper into northern Israel, UN and diplomatic officials again turned to the 2006 resolution in a bid to end the conflict.

Years of deeply divided politics and regionwide geopolitical hostilities have halted substantial progress on its implementation, yet the international community believes Resolution 1701 is still the brightest prospect for long-term stability between Israel and Lebanon.

Almost two decades after the last war between Israel and Hezbollah, the United States led shuttle diplomacy efforts between Lebanon and Israel to agree on a ceasefire proposal that renewed commitment to the resolution, this time with an implementation plan to try to reinvigorate the document.

What is UNSC Resolution 1701? In 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from most of southern Lebanon along a UN-demarcated “Blue Line” that separated the two countries and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in Syria. UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeepers increased their presence along the line of withdrawal.

Resolution 1701 was supposed to complete Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and ensure Hezbollah would move north of the Litani River, keeping the area exclusively under the Lebanese military and UN peacekeepers.

Up to 15,000 UN peacekeepers would help to maintain calm, return displaced Lebanese and secure the area alongside the Lebanese military.

The goal was long-term security, with land borders eventually demarcated to resolve territorial disputes.

The resolution also reaffirmed previous ones that call for the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon — Hezbollah among them.

“It was made for a certain situation and context,” Elias Hanna, a retired Lebanese army general, told The Associated Press. “But as time goes on, the essence of the resolution begins to hollow.”

Has Resolution 1701 been implemented? For years, Lebanon and Israel blamed each other for countless violations along the tense frontier. Israel said Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force and growing arsenal remained, and accused the group of using a local environmental organization to spy on troops.

Lebanon complained about Israeli military jets and naval ships entering Lebanese territory even when there was no active conflict.

“You had a role of the UNIFIL that slowly eroded like any other peacekeeping with time that has no clear mandate,” said Joseph Bahout, the director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy at the American University of Beirut. “They don’t have permission to inspect the area without coordinating with the Lebanese army.”

UNIFIL for years has urged Israel to withdraw from some territory north of the frontier, but to no avail. In the ongoing war, the peacekeeping mission has accused Israel, as well as Hezbollah, of obstructing and harming its forces and infrastructure.

Hezbollah’s power, meanwhile, has grown, both in its arsenal and as a political influence in the Lebanese state.

The Iran-backed group was essential in keeping Syrian President Bashar Assad in power when armed opposition groups tried to topple him, and it supports Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Yemen. It has an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles, including precision-guided missiles pointed at Israel, and has introduced drones into its arsenal.

Hanna says Hezbollah “is something never seen before as a non-state actor” with political and military influence.

How do mediators hope to implement 1701 almost two decades later? Israel's security Cabinet approved the ceasefire agreement late Tuesday, according to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office. The ceasefire began at 4 am local time Wednesday.

Efforts led by the US and France for the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah underscored that they still view the resolution as key. For almost a year, Washington has promoted various versions of a deal that would gradually lead to its full implementation.

International mediators hope that by boosting financial support for the Lebanese army — which was not a party in the Israel-Hezbollah war — Lebanon can deploy some 6,000 additional troops south of the Litani River to help enforce the resolution. Under the deal, an international monitoring committee headed by the United States would oversee implementation to ensure that Hezbollah and Israel’s withdrawals take place.

It is not entirely clear how the committee would work or how potential violations would be reported and dealt with.

The circumstances now are far more complicated than in 2006. Some are still skeptical of the resolution's viability given that the political realities and balance of power both regionally and within Lebanon have dramatically changed since then.

“You’re tying 1701 with a hundred things,” Bahout said. “A resolution is the reflection of a balance of power and political context.”

Now with the ceasefire in place, the hope is that Israel and Lebanon can begin negotiations to demarcate their land border and settle disputes over several points along the Blue Line for long-term security after decades of conflict and tension.



Jamal Mustafa: Saddam and Other Iraqi Officials Headed to the Gallows with Heads Held High

Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Jamal Mustafa: Saddam and Other Iraqi Officials Headed to the Gallows with Heads Held High

Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saddam Hussein’s entourage never expected that they would one day find themselves in jail. It never occurred to them that the American military machine would use all of its might to oust Saddam’s regime and overthrow the ruling party and army. They never believed that forces allied to Iran would assume positions of power in the new regime.

Times changed and Saddam, who controlled the fate of the nation and its people, found himself in prison where he counted the days until his execution. The man was unyielding until his last breath and his will remained unbroken.

The men who made up the Revolutionary Command Council or government soon found themselves in prison. They were interrogated by the Americans and Iraqis and a death sentence was always going to be their fate.

In the second installment of his interview to Asharq Al-Awsat, Dr. Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan, late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and second secretary, recalled the execution of his colleagues and relatives. He also recalled how he married Hala, the youngest of Saddam’s daughters, and how the late president acted around his family, away from state affairs.

Other officials who were held along with Saddam included “Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan, my uncle and member of the Revolutionary Command Council Ali Hussein al-Majid, my other uncle Abed Hassan al-Majid, head of the Revolutionary Command Council Awad al-Bandar, Saddam’s half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Hassan, Secretary Abed Hammoud and aide to the intelligence chief Farouk Hijazi,” said Mustafa.

He showed Asharq Al-Awsat a video that recently came to light of Khodair al-Khozaei, the former vice president during the American occupation. “In it, he said that he saw no justification for the death sentence against Abed Hammoud. Most dangerous of all, he confessed that he visited Iran and consulted with a judicial official, who encouraged him to sign the death sentence, which he did,” added Mustafa.

“The truth is that we sensed from the beginning that our trial was a means of revenge acting at Iran’s orders. One day, Abed Hammoud was informed that he was going to be moved to hospital and later that day the guards informed us that he was executed,” he continued.

“Mr. President (Saddam) expected to be executed. The truth is that his very existence, whether in jail or otherwise, was a source of concern for them. I can firmly attest that the members of the leadership bravely faced their death sentence. None of them showed any weakness or faltered,” he revealed.

He recalled the day they informed Barzan and Awad that they were going to be executed. “I was working out with al-Bandar when we received the news. I am not exaggerating when I say that he maintained his optimism even in that moment. They were executed the next day. Days later, I learned that Abed Hassan al-Majid, Farouk Hijazi and Hadi Hassan, an intelligence officer, were executed,” Mustafa said.

“Let me tell you what used to happen. One day, they came up with false charges that before the US occupation, I gave Mr. Khamis al-Khanjar (a Sunni politician) a sum of 250,000 dollars. Of course, the charge is baseless. They told me that I would remain in jail for life if I did not confess to the charge. I refused and told them that I enjoyed normal relations with Khanjar,” he went on to say.

“They later came up with a different scenario. They told me that they would take me to the Iraqi embassy in Jordan if I confessed to the charge and that I would late be released in Amman with a hefty sum of money. I told them that I would reject whatever they have to offer because I would not abandon my values to betray Khanjar, who was a friend,” he stated.

“They later accused me of complicity in the draining of the Mesopotamian Marshes, which I had nothing to do with,” he added.

Saddam Hussein with his daughter Hala in this undated photo. (Getty Images)

First call after Saddam’s execution

Mustafa recalled the first telephone call he had with his wife Hala and her mother, Sajida Khairallah Talfah, right after Saddam’s execution. “Five days after Mr. President’s martyrdom, I contacted my family. I spoke with my wife, and she was in very good spirits. She had very high faith and patience. I asked her about her mother, and she reassured me that she was also doing very well despite the pain,” he said.

“I pray that Gold Almighty will give her health and a long life. We have always derived our strength from her. My mother-in-law lost her two sons, Uday and Qusay, and then her husband. She had played a major role in supporting her husband from the beginning of his struggle. She always used to support him and stood by him throughout his career,” he remarked.

First meetings with Saddam

Mustafa recalled the early days of his meeting with Saddam. “They started when I began working for his special guard. That was when I first met him. Like most Iraqis and Arabs, I believed that he would be a difficult person, but the truth is that I saw him as a paternal figure,” he added. “When you work with him, you begin to develop a different opinion than the public impression. He was a very paternal figure.”

During their first meeting, they learned that they came from the same tribe and were distant cousins.

“I stayed by Mr. President’s side for around 20 years. I started off as part of his personal guard and he then tasked me with people’s affairs, meaning seeing to their needs and addressing their problems. He was very concerned with the people’s affairs and refused any one of them to be wronged. The truth is that many laws were amended or changed at the time following complaints from the people,” he revealed.

“There were two telephones at Mr. President’s office, and both were connected to my office. Whoever had a problem could call the president through the citizens’ line. I used to answer their calls and listen to their problems and set an appointment with the president. Sometimes I used to ask the caller to come in person with their request so that their problem could be tackled. Sometimes Mr. President would interject on the call to ask about the issue and would request to talk to the citizen on the line,” Mustafa said.

“He would listen to the person’s grievance and tell him to head to the dedicated office to tackle the issue. (...) So we used to receive hundreds of citizens every week to solve their problems. Mr. President was very concerned about these issues,” he stressed. “I have never met another person like him. He would listen, care and then come up with a solution.”

President’s son-in-law

Asharq Al-Awsat asked Mustafa about when he asked Hala to marry him. “It was in 1994. As is the tradition in Iraq, I headed with my uncles to Saddam’s family to ask her hand in marriage,” he said. “One of my uncles made the request to Mr. President on my behalf and he agreed and welcomed it.”

“A judge was summoned immediately for the ceremony, and we were married. We had lunch at the president’s house that same day. I first met Hala on September 12, and we were married on September 26. It was a short engagement in line with tradition.”

“Mr. President used to separate state affairs from his relationship with his family. His work was completely separate from family, which had nothing to do with political or state affairs. It never intervened in those issues. Mr. President was a man of state when he was doing his job, and a father when he came home. He treated his family as if he were its father – the perfect father. Every family wishes to have a father that can measure up to him because he looked after all of his children and all of his relatives,” Mustafa said.

“When he sat down to the dinner table, he himself used to serve his own food and ask his children about their day. He would serve them food and generally cared very much for them. The state is one thing and family is another. At the same time, he acted as a father to all Iraqis. He treated them fairly. This is Saddam Hussein,” stressed Mustafa. “He was always keen that Iraqis be treated justly and that none of them be wronged. He was also very firm with his children if they made any mistake.”

Saddam’s hobbies

Saddam was a “very traditional Arab man. He loved traditional Arab and Iraqi dishes. He himself used to cook his own version of the traditional Iraqi dish al-Habeet. (...) He also loved seafood and would cook the Masgouf fish dish himself,” Mustafa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

His hobbies included horseback riding, hunting, swimming and sharpshooting. “Occasionally, before heading to the front to fight against Iran, he would visit the al-Amarah region, where gazelle and geese are abundant, to hunt. As circumstances became more challenging, he limited himself to fishing, which he did regularly,” he added.

He was a skilled shooter from his youth. “Generally, growing up in a tribe, children are taught at a young age how to become a good shooter. This is part of our upbringing. He was also an avid reader. He was always reading something,” Mustafa said of Saddam.