Reconstruction Studies Begin in Lebanon, Costs Exceed $6 Billionhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5086545-reconstruction-studies-begin-lebanon-costs-exceed-6-billion
Reconstruction Studies Begin in Lebanon, Costs Exceed $6 Billion
A man walks past near the rubble of a building in Beirut's southern suburbs, after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon November 29, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Reconstruction Studies Begin in Lebanon, Costs Exceed $6 Billion
A man walks past near the rubble of a building in Beirut's southern suburbs, after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon November 29, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
As Lebanese return to their ruined cities and villages after the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, the main question on their minds is: “When will reconstruction begin, and are the funds available, and if so, where will they come from?”
Unlike the aftermath of the 2006 war, which saw funds flow in automatically, the situation now is different.
The international conditions for reconstruction may be tougher, and Lebanon, already struggling with a financial and economic collapse since 2019, will not be able to contribute any funds due to the severity of the recent war.
Former MP Ali Darwish, a close ally of Prime Minister Najib Mikati, said a plan for reconstruction would likely be ready within a week.
The plan will identify the committees to assess damage, the funds for compensation, and whether the South Lebanon Council and Higher Relief Commission will be involved.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Darwish explained that the matter is being discussed with international partners, and more details will emerge soon.
He added that the process is unfolding in stages, beginning with the ceasefire, followed by army deployment, and eventually leading to reconstruction.
To reassure its supporters, many of whom have lost their homes and been displaced, Hezbollah promised before the ceasefire that funds were ready for reconstruction.
Sources close to the group say Iran has set aside $5 billion for the effort, with part of it already available to Hezbollah and the rest arriving soon.
Political analyst Dr. Qassem Qassir, familiar with Hezbollah’s operations, said a reconstruction fund would be created, involving Iran, Arab and Islamic countries, international partners, religious leaders, and Lebanese officials.
He added that preparatory work, including committee formations and studies, has already begun.
However, many affected people are hesitant to start rebuilding, wanting to ensure they will be reimbursed.
Some reports suggest that party-affiliated groups advised not making repairs until damage is properly documented by the relevant committees. Citizens were told to keep invoices so that those who can pay upfront will be reimbursed later.
Ahmad M, 40, from Tyre, told Asharq Al-Awsat he began repairing his damaged home, paying extra to speed up the process. The high costs of staying in a Beirut hotel have become unbearable, and he can no longer wait.
Economist Dr. Mahmoud Jebaii says that accurate estimates of reconstruction costs will depend on specialized committees assessing the damage. He estimates the cost of destruction at $6 billion and economic losses at $7 billion, bringing total losses from the 2024 war to around $13 billion, compared to $9 billion in 2006.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Jebaii explained that the 2024 destruction is much greater due to wider military operations across the south, Bekaa, and Beirut.
About 110,000 housing units were damaged, with 40,000 to 50,000 completely destroyed and 60,000 severely damaged. Additionally, 30 to 40 front-line villages were entirely destroyed.
Jebaii emphasized that Lebanon must create a clear plan for engaging the Arab and international communities, who prefer reconstruction to be managed through them.
This could involve an international conference followed by the creation of a committee to assess the damage and confirm the figures, after which financial support would be provided.
He added that Lebanon’s political system and ability to implement international decisions will be key to advancing reconstruction.
Jamal Mustafa to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Couldn’t Provide Bribe Demanded by Judge, So I Was Jailed for Another 10 Yearshttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5085869-jamal-mustafa-asharq-al-awsat-i-couldn%E2%80%99t-provide-bribe-demanded-judge-so-i-was
Jamal Mustafa to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Couldn’t Provide Bribe Demanded by Judge, So I Was Jailed for Another 10 Years
Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
In the final installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Jamal Mustafa Sultan, a former Iraqi official and Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, delves into his arrest, the collapse of hopes for resistance against US forces, and the turmoil that followed the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Mustafa faced a harsh journey during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. He traveled to rally tribal leaders to defend Baghdad, only to return and find the city occupied. Declared a fugitive, his face appeared on the US “most-wanted” playing cards.
Mustafa fled to Syria but was denied asylum and sent back to Iraq, where he was arrested. Accused of leading resistance and car bombings, the court found no evidence to convict him.
In 2011, a judge offered him release in exchange for a bribe, which Mustafa could not afford. His proposal to sell family land to pay was rejected, leaving him imprisoned for another decade. He was eventually freed over lack of evidence.
After his release, Mustafa went to Erbil, where Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani invited him for a meeting. Barzani welcomed him warmly and asked how he could help. Mustafa requested assistance in obtaining a passport, praising Barzani’s generosity.
Mustafa shared that Saddam respected Barzani, once calling him a “tough but honorable opponent.” He also revealed that, before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Barzani had assured Saddam that Kurdish forces would not fight the Iraqi army.
Recalling the lead-up to the war, Mustafa said Saddam tasked him with reconnecting with tribal leaders to encourage them to resist the invasion.
He delivered personal messages from Saddam, along with financial support, to help tribes host Iraqi soldiers stationed nearby. Mustafa later traveled to the Anbar province to rally tribes and bring them to defend Baghdad.
This account offers a rare glimpse into the behind-the-scenes efforts to resist the US invasion and the complex relationships that shaped Iraq’s history.
As the US invasion loomed, Mustafa met with thousands of tribal leaders to rally support for Baghdad’s defense.
“During the war, I met with over 4,500 tribal sheikhs from across Iraq,” he said. But when he returned to Baghdad after a trip to Anbar, everything had changed. “The city had fallen, and everything was in chaos.”
Mustafa tried to locate his associates but found no one. On April 11, 2003, he sent his driver to search for allies.
By chance, his brother, Lt. Gen. Kamal Mustafa, located him. “He told me we needed to leave Baghdad. I hadn’t planned to leave, but he convinced me it was the logical choice—we had no weapons, no men, and no resources. Staying would only mean capture.”
The brothers fled to Ramadi, where tribal leaders offered them refuge, and from there, they attempted to seek asylum in Syria. After just two days, Syrian authorities sent them back to Iraq.
Back in Baghdad, Mustafa and Khalid Najm, Iraq’s last intelligence chief, stayed with a university friend, Dr. Hafidh Al-Dulaimi. While there, Al-Dulaimi’s nephew suggested surrendering to Ahmed Chalabi’s forces, but Mustafa refused.
Shortly after, armed men stormed the house. “They came with tanks and masks,” Mustafa recalled. He and Najm were arrested on April 21, 2003—a day he will never forget.
Mustafa shared his experiences in US detention after his capture. “The interrogations were relentless, often involving psychological and physical pressure,” he added.
“They focused on weapons of mass destruction—’did Iraq have them, and where were they?’ Everyone faced the same questions. They also asked about US pilot Michael Scott Speicher, whose plane was shot down during the Gulf War. Though his remains were later found, the Americans kept questioning us, believing more was being hidden.”
Life in the detention center was highly controlled. Detainees were grouped in blocks of seven and given 30 minutes of outdoor time. Sultan recalled a chilling moment when Ahmed Hussein, Saddam’s office chief, told him during exercise: “The president has been captured.”
“We had clung to hope that Saddam’s freedom could lead to Iraq’s liberation,” Mustafa said. “His arrest shattered that hope and signaled the occupation’s permanence.”
He also described mysterious construction in the prison. “We saw carpenters working constantly. Eventually, they built a wooden barrier, blocking the corridor from view. We could only guess what it was for.”
When asked if Saddam had led the resistance before his capture, Mustafa confirmed: “Yes, the resistance began after the war. It wasn’t planned in advance because, at that time, the focus was purely military—army against army.”
“After the occupation, a new phase started. Battles unfolded in stages, and Saddam was leading the resistance during this one. He was the hope of the resistance, of the Iraqi people, and of Arabs and Muslims,” Mustafa revealed.
His remarks offer a glimpse into the post-invasion dynamics and the symbolic role Saddam played during Iraq’s turbulent transition.
Mustafa also recounted the difficulty of reaching his family after his arrest.
“After my capture, I lost all contact with my family. I didn’t have any phone numbers for my brothers, friends, or colleagues. Even if I had, phone lines had been disrupted—many exchanges had been bombed, and communication in Iraq was severely impacted,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
Mustafa recalled an encounter with the International Red Cross during his detention.
“The Red Cross offered me the chance to write a message to my family, as is their usual practice. But I was at a loss—who could I write to? I had no idea where my brothers or family were. I didn’t know anything about their whereabouts.”
Then, Mustafa had an idea. “I thought of Ammo Baba, a well-known football coach in Iraq. I didn’t know his address, but I remembered the address of the Police Club, where I had been president. I decided to write the letter there, addressed to Ammo Baba, asking him to pass it on to my family.”
Mustafa’s story highlights the communication challenges and isolation faced by detainees during the Iraq War.
He then described the prolonged separation from his family following his arrest. “I had no hopes of hearing from my family when I sent my letter through Ammo Baba,” Mustafa said.
“The situation was too difficult. After two and a half to three months, I received a response from Ammo Baba. He sent his regards, inquired about my health, and included a message from Yassin, a coach who worked with me. Along with the letter, they sent me sportswear—a shirt and shorts.”
Mustafa’s communication with his family may have been limited, but the letter served as a lifeline.
“A couple of years later, I received the first message from my wife, Hala, after two years in detention.”
When asked if he had been separated from his family for 18 years, Mustafa confirmed: “Yes, I hadn’t seen them or my children for 18 and a half years.”
“There were no visits or conversations, except for a brief period when we were held by the Americans. During that time, they allowed us five minutes a week to speak with our families. I would split the time—two and a half minutes with my mother and siblings, and the rest with my wife and daughters,” he said.
However, he revealed that after 2010, communication was cut off entirely.
“When we were transferred to Iraqi custody, they stopped allowing any contact. I was careful not to make calls with the Iraqis, as I feared enemies or foreign agents could record them,” explained Mustafa.
Mustafa’s story underscores the isolation he endured and the limited means of contact with his loved ones during years of detention.