Inside Israel’s Settler State and its Hidden Strategy

Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
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Inside Israel’s Settler State and its Hidden Strategy

Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)

For decades, settler attacks in the West Bank were largely concentrated in “Area C,” under full Israeli control. But since the Hamas-led Oct. 7 assault on Israel, violence has spread deeper, reaching “Area B” and reshaping life across the territory.

The assaults, carried out day and night, have coincided with a surge in settlement activity. There are now 243 new settlement outposts that did not exist before the 1993 Oslo accords, and 129 additional “shepherding outposts” established since October 7, 2023, alone.

Officially, Israeli settlements cover 3.6% of the West Bank. But their de facto footprint — including roads, security zones and areas of influence — extends to nearly 10%, according to Palestinian monitoring groups.

Nature reserves are also part of the land Israel has moved to place under its control as part of a sovereignty plan driven by far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

In what analysts say could be the most decisive step yet toward blocking the creation of a Palestinian state, Smotrich in late August 2025 secured final approval for the long-stalled “E1” project.

The plan, frozen for decades due to international pressure, received a green light from the Civil Administration’s Supreme Planning Council, an arm of Israel’s Defense Ministry.

A Village Turned Into a Cage

In Sinjil, a town of 9,000 people about 21 km north of Ramallah, residents say daily life has come to resemble imprisonment. Fences, gates, settlements and military outposts ring the community, leaving villagers hemmed in and fearful.

The scars of a July 11 attack are still visible. On that day, settlers killed two young Palestinian men in one of the deadliest assaults since the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.

The victims were not from Sinjil but from the nearby town of al-Mazra’a al-Sharqiya. They had come to help defend their neighbors when hundreds of settlers stormed the village.

“It was a wide-scale assault,” said Mohammad Alwan, coordinator of the Popular Committee Against Settlements. “More than 300 settlers gathered in the mountains and attacked the village. It was a tough battle. Neighbors rushed to defend each other.”

Two young men went missing during the clashes. Hours later, villagers found 22-year-old Saif Musallat dead in a valley. “He had just come from America to visit Palestine ...

They hit him until he died,” Alwan said, his voice breaking. “The bruises were all over his body.”

The second victim, Mohammad Shalabi, was shot dead. “Criminals and savages were unleashed on us,” Alwan added.

Alwan, who has lived through decades of settler attacks, said the brutality has escalated sharply since Oct. 7. “After October they built fences, put up gates and seized the rest of the land - 8,000 out of 14,000 dunams. Look how they turned the village into a cage.”

Gates, Closures and Economic Strain

Beyond the human toll, villagers describe economic suffocation. Mechanic Gharib Khalil’s shop lies just behind a yellow gate sealing the village entrance. “Since they put the gate up a year ago, business collapsed. People can’t reach me anymore,” he said.

Nearby, Abed al-Nasser Alwan stood by his broken-down truck trapped on the other side of the gate. “It looks open, but cameras are everywhere. If you move it, they shoot you or arrest you. We’re stuck.”

Palestinian officials say these restrictions are part of a deliberate policy. The Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission counts 898 military checkpoints and gates across the West Bank, including 146 added since Oct. 7, 2023.

“These barriers reflect Israel’s closure policy since 1967,” said Amir Dawood, the commission’s publishing director. “They are designed to create a new geographic reality - one of exclusion and surveillance.”

Boundaries Drawn with Fire

The violence has spread to neighboring Kafr Malik, where settlers killed four men in July. Posters of the victims cover village walls, alongside slogans of defiance. Settlements loom from the hilltops above, expanding since Oct. 7.

“From there, they attack the village,” said activist Montaser al-Maliki. “Before October, attacks happened, but not like this. Now they are larger, more organized, and more violent.”

Almost daily, footage circulates of settlers blocking roads or pelting Palestinian cars with stones.

The Vanishing Oslo Map

Maps of the West Bank illustrate how Oslo’s partition into Areas A, B and C has eroded.

Area A, once under full Palestinian control, has become a patchwork of isolated enclaves.

“They’ve built a state within a state,” said Issa Zboun, head of GIS at the Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem. “Instead of giving Palestinians their promised state, they took the land and turned it into a settlers’ state.”

Figures compiled by Palestinian groups show the transformation:

1967: 69 settlements, 98,000 settlers, covering 0.2% of the West Bank.

1993 (Oslo Accords): 172 settlements, 248,000 settlers, covering 1.2%.

2025: 200 official settlements, 243 outposts — including 129 built after Oct. 7 — housing more than 940,000 settlers.

While settlements officially cover 3.6% of the West Bank, their effective footprint — including security zones, bypass roads and areas of influence — reaches nearly 10%.

Zboun said Israel once needed laws to seize land for settlements. “Today they do it without orders, without announcements, without laws,” he said.

In his office, Zboun displayed maps showing how every major Palestinian city is surrounded by settlements and bypass roads. “They turned Area A into isolated islands,” he said. “They’ve built something larger than the Palestinian state Oslo promised.”

For villagers like those in Sinjil and Kafr Malik, the map is redrawn not with ink but with blood. Boundaries, they say, are now “drawn with fire.”

Restricted Zones for the Palestinian Authority

Palestinian security forces are formally allowed to access parts of Areas B and C of the West Bank only with Israeli coordination. Yet even when entry is possible, analysts and residents say it is unthinkable for Palestinian officers to confront armed settlers or the Israeli army directly.

Israel’s military is often present during settler raids, ostensibly to keep order, but Palestinians say soldiers routinely shield settlers rather than restrain them. Many Palestinians have been killed during these attacks, with no record of Israeli law enforcement prosecuting settlers beyond brief detentions.

US Pressure Eased Under Trump

Since the start of the occupation in 1967, no Israeli settler has been jailed for killing Palestinians in West Bank attacks, despite periodic US pressure. The Biden administration sought to curb settler violence by imposing sanctions on settler leaders and their political backers. But President Donald Trump revoked those sanctions on his first day in office, a move that emboldened settler leaders and the Israeli defense minister to scrap a policy allowing administrative detention of violent settlers.

Trump’s arrival in power marked a turning point for both Israel’s right-wing leaders and the settler movement, who viewed his presidency as a rare chance to entrench Israeli sovereignty across the West Bank.

The period after Trump’s election saw what Palestinians describe as “unprecedented terror.” Settler raids became more frequent, larger, and more violent.

According to The Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, Israel carried out 11,280 attacks in the first half of 2025, of which 2,154 were by settler militias, killing six Palestinians.

The Trump administration remained silent even after high-profile killings, including that of Musallat.

Only after Musallat’s family launched legal action and US media spotlighted the case did US ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, call for accountability.

This was a criminal and terrorist act, Huckabee said, before visiting the nearby Christian town of Taybeh, where settlers had recently torched an old cemetery.

Despite his words - calling the attacks “absolute terrorism” and the desecration of holy sites a “crime against humanity” - no arrests were made, and settlers continued their assaults, including fresh raids on Taybeh.

The Desert Raids

Settler attacks have also spread to remote desert communities near Bethlehem, in what locals say is a campaign of intimidation.

In the village of al-Minya, council head Zayed Kawazba pointed to burned-out cars as evidence of recent raids. “They can come at any time,” he said. “Wherever they go, destruction follows.”

Nearby Kisan and the desert hamlet of Deir al-Ahmar have also faced near-daily violence. Residents describe settlers beating villagers, burning homes, killing livestock and then accusing Palestinians of theft.

“Before Oct. 7, the attacks were limited, but afterwards the orders came,” said Adnan Abayat of Deir al-Ahmar, showing a scar from a settler beating. “Now they are relentless. People can’t defend themselves, many have already left.”

A Secret Plan in Plain Sight

Palestinians and rights groups say these raids are not random but part of a broader Israeli strategy led by Smotrich, who also holds sweeping powers over the West Bank’s Civil Administration.

Since being appointed in 2022, Smotrich has overseen what critics call the most dramatic transformation of West Bank governance since 1967. By transferring powers once reserved for the Israeli military to civilian officials loyal to him, Smotrich has blurred the line between military occupation and outright annexation.

Though Israel denies officially annexing the West Bank, Smotrich has openly declared his aim of blocking any Palestinian state and entrenching Jewish settlement. A leaked recording captured him calling the process “a dramatic shift that changes the DNA of the system.”

In August 2025, Smotrich secured final approval for the long-stalled E1 settlement plan, linking Jerusalem to the vast Maale Adumim bloc. The project, frozen for decades under international pressure, will effectively bisect the West Bank, severing north from south and crippling the territorial viability of a Palestinian state.

“This is historic,” Smotrich said. “The Palestinian state has been erased from the table — not with slogans but with deeds. Every settlement, every house, every neighborhood is another nail in the coffin of that dangerous idea.”

Israeli rights group B’Tselem warned that the move cements a system of apartheid by entrenching “a bi-national state of separation.”

The E1 approval followed a July 23 Knesset vote endorsing annexation of the West Bank - condemned by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas alike. Netanyahu framed the decision as “a response to Western recognition plans for Palestine” and vowed to accelerate settlement expansion.

Infrastructure work on E1 could begin within months, with housing construction starting as early as next year, Israeli officials said.

B’Tselem argues that Israel has already created a dual system of governance in the occupied West Bank, with separate legal regimes for settlers and Palestinians, amounting to apartheid.

Smotrich has made little effort to disguise his intentions. His 2017 manifesto openly called for dismantling the Palestinian Authority, preventing statehood, and forcing Palestinians to choose between emigration, second-class citizenship, or resistance.

In two years of the current government, observers say Smotrich has delivered a historic shift, consolidating Israeli civilian rule over occupied land and accelerating settlement expansion at a pace unseen in decades.

As settlers push deeper into Palestinian villages and deserts, residents say they are left with only three choices: flee, submit, or resist.

“Their plan is to erase us,” said Abayat. “They beat us, burn our homes, kill our sheep and the world says nothing. We have nothing left but survival.”



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.