'Blood Emirate' Expands Across Sahel in Hunt for Gold, Power  

Al-Shabaab fighters display weapons as they conduct military exercises in northern Mogadishu, Somalia, October 21, 2010. (AP file photo)
Al-Shabaab fighters display weapons as they conduct military exercises in northern Mogadishu, Somalia, October 21, 2010. (AP file photo)
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'Blood Emirate' Expands Across Sahel in Hunt for Gold, Power  

Al-Shabaab fighters display weapons as they conduct military exercises in northern Mogadishu, Somalia, October 21, 2010. (AP file photo)
Al-Shabaab fighters display weapons as they conduct military exercises in northern Mogadishu, Somalia, October 21, 2010. (AP file photo)

In the Libyan city of Sabha, known as the “Bride of the South,” authorities dismantled three terrorist networks in August, revealing links stretching across and back to the African coast.

Five months earlier, in March 2025, security forces in western Libya had reported the arrest of another “terrorist organization” and aired “confessions” from several members who said they belonged to a jihadist group called “Nasr”. They spoke of “plans to recruit young men and manufacture drones.”

Across the vast belt of the Sahel, spanning countries separated by as much as 2,300 kilometers, militant attacks have intensified in recent months. Omar al-Mahdi Bashara, a veteran Chadian rebel, says these operations aim to “subject the region to the calculations of global powers and exploit its impoverished, underdeveloped populations.”

Bashara, who leads the Chadian National Salvation Movement, told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the former colonizer is overseeing from afar the drawing of a new map for the Sahel and the Sahara in blood, with his eyes fixed on the region’s resources.”

The Sahel stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. Geographically and climatically, it encompasses northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, Mali, southern Algeria, Niger, Chad, South Sudan and Eritrea.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) use a broader definition that includes Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad.

The term “Sahel” here does not refer to a sea coast, but to the “edge” — the long geographic strip lying south of the Sahara Desert, from the Atlantic coast in the west (Mauritania and Senegal) to the Red Sea in the east (Sudan and Eritrea).

As terrorist organizations have expanded across this belt, they have also deepened the bloodshed through armed attacks targeting soldiers and civilians over the past decade, leaving more than 150,000 people dead, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Before tracing the map of these groups — which Bashara sums up as “a nightmare weighing on a region forgotten by development” — it is worth noting a significant shift: these organizations are increasingly turning to modern technologies, even artificial intelligence, while expanding beyond their traditional rural strongholds into urban centers.

Groups that once thrived on the ignorance of poor communities are now adopting artificial intelligence, outpacing some of their state adversaries still clinging to rifles, cannons and conventional warplanes.

Domestic proxies

Amid a bloody contest for influence, recruits and resources, ISIS has come to rely on its affiliates in West Africa, Central Africa and the Greater Sahara, while al-Qaeda moves more fluidly through local alliances with Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Ansar al-Din.

Hamdy Abdulrahman Hassan, an African affairs expert who teaches at Zayed University and Cairo University, noted that “many of these globalized groups have taken on a local character, and the lines between them have blurred.” Local residents interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat echoed the same view.

Both al-Qaeda and ISIS now have domestic proxies. As grievances against “new ruling regimes” have grown, these groups have managed to infiltrate social structures and exploit poverty — a key factor behind their resurgence, according to Fareh Wali from Somalia.

Wali explained that al-Shabaab members “win people over with money and by appealing to national sentiment, portraying themselves as defenders of the country against an infidel government.” In a written statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, he added: “They exploit people’s ignorance, poverty and hatred of those in power to recruit them. Those who refuse are kidnapped or killed.”

In Somalia, al-Shabaab killed around 30 people in two attacks, one on the Cairo Hotel in Beledweyne and another on a military recruitment center in Damanio, in March and May 2025.

Egyptian scholar Hassan identified several factors behind the surge in terrorist activity, including the region’s “porous” borders, which are “too loose to control,” and the “fragile state structures inherited from colonial rule.”

He also pointed to the wave of coups that have swept the region, saying: “These groups found an opportunity to expand, especially in the absence of regional coordination.”

In several parts of the Sahel, al-Qaeda has adopted local grievances and “localized its narratives to appeal to communities,” according to a July 2025 report by the UN Monitoring Team. This ideological pragmatism, the report said, helped expand the group’s territorial influence.

Dr. Ramadan Qarni, another African affairs expert, linked this deep societal penetration to the entry of international powers into the Sahel, which militant groups “used to stir local sentiment against them.”

Alongside the financial incentives mentioned by Wali, “perceived injustices” have served as another justification used by extremists to gain ground among Sahel and Sahara populations disillusioned with the “new authorities” that took power after eight successive military coups.

Hassan noted that the Macina Brigade, a JNIM affiliate active in central Mali and along the Burkina Faso border, draws its strength from the “historic grievances” of the Fulani, nomadic herders who accuse local authorities and Dogon militias of committing abuses against them, including “mass killings.”

Following this same pattern, al-Qaeda has expanded its operations through its local arm, JNIM, while ISIS and its affiliates have intensified their campaigns across the Sahara.

Blood and interests

The growing threat in the Sahel is not only measured by the frequency of attacks and rising death tolls, but also by the “pragmatism” of militant groups operating on volatile ground fraught with conflict, as they interact with civilians and seek to recruit new fighters for their brutal wars.

Contrary to expectation, the behavior of ISIS and al-Qaeda reveals contrasting ideologies. Mauritanian scholar and researcher on the Sahel, the Sahara and armed groups, Mohameden Ayeb, describes them as “a mix of global jihadist Salafism, local exploitation of ethnic and tribal disputes, and economic interests rooted in smuggling and extortion.”

While al-Qaeda and its branches tend to adapt to local environments in the Sahel and court the goodwill of tribes, ISIS rejects popular compromise and clings to the notion of a centralized caliphate, adhering to a stricter and more violent framework.

From his own experience in several Sahel countries, Sudanese national Abdelghani Ismail recounts witnessing the movements of extremist groups. “They try to impose themselves wherever they exist to achieve their goals of seizing power,” he said.

Ismail, who later traveled to Europe through Libya, told Asharq Al-Awsat that these groups “are locked in a battle for survival, driven by a misguided ideology, and they do not hesitate to blow up anyone who stands in their way.”

Map of groups and resources

In this fragmented security landscape, Ayeb maps militant groups across the Sahel and the Sahara, linking their movements in some areas to a push to control the region’s subterranean wealth.

Ayeb warns that the threat posed by these groups has changed from what it was before, as fighting has intensified in the border triangle of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, historically known as Liptako- ourma, a zone the 2024 Global Terrorism Index ranked among the ten most terror-affected areas in the world.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the al-Qaeda affiliate, and ISIS, Sahel Province, “have tightened their grip on this area rich in gold and uranium deposits,” and that “local arms of the groups have become the strike force in their sophisticated operations,” pointing to ISIS activity in Nigeria, Mozambique, Cameroon, Togo and Benin.

Al-Qaeda, he added, has not only deepened its reach in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, it is also present in the northwestern borderlands bordering Lake Chad, overlapping with other groups such as Boko Haram.

Ayeb said Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, announced by al-Qaeda in March 2017, is a coalition of four main components, namely Ansar al-Din, led by Tuareg commander Iyad ag Ghaly, the Katibat al-Murabitun faction that split from al-Murabitun and was formerly led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the Macina Liberation Front, a socially rooted movement in central Mali led by Amadou Koufa, and the Greater Sahara Emirate, formerly affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

The group has reached a new level of operational capability, able to carry out complex attacks on well-fortified garrisons using drones, improvised explosive devices and large numbers of fighters, according to the UN report to the Security Council in June 2025.

Fighting has escalated in recent months between ISIS and al-Qaeda over the Liptako-Gourma triangle, Ayeb said, because the area is rich in raw gold and dense forest terrain that “is inaccessible to ground forces or airborne operations.”

Arms linked to ISIS, including units in West Africa Province and Greater Sahara Province, have expanded their footprint and their propaganda output to recruit fighters and raise funds, with signs of foreign fighters, mostly from West Africa, arriving during 2024.

The United Nations estimates that ISIS in West Africa comprises between 8,000 and 12,000 fighters. UN experts say Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin has also broadened its operational reach, operating with relative freedom in northern Mali and across much of Burkina Faso. ISIS activity in the Greater Sahara has also seen a resurgence, particularly along the Niger, Nigeria border where the group seeks to consolidate its presence.

Banditry and cattle theft

Militant groups in the Sahel employ multiple methods, often justified in religious terms, to secure weapons and funding, including theft and armed robbery. Ayeb described this as “a form of pragmatism that permits and forbids according to their interests.”

A report submitted by the UN Monitoring Team to the Security Council said ISIS has increasingly turned to kidnappings, either directly or through criminal networks, to obtain ransom payments. It added that such operations serve as a source of financing and recruitment, which “could further intensify as the group seeks to break its isolation in the border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.”

Bashara told Asharq Al-Awsat that “armed groups have widely resorted to kidnapping local residents.”

Member states informed the UN committee preparing the report that “cattle theft in the Lake Chad Basin has become a common source of revenue, with livestock sold in local markets.” The report also noted that Boko Haram collects zakat, or alms, at a rate of four to five cows for every 120.

Regarding weapons supplies, both al-Qaeda and ISIS depend on “small and light arms, either smuggled or stolen.” Member states observed that the transfer of these weapons “is coordinated among organized criminal networks.”

The report warned that both groups “are actively seeking to enhance their expertise in drone operations by recruiting specialists.”

‘Sea jihad’

As militant groups in the Sahel continue to build up their forces and arsenals, academic expert Hassan warned of what he calls a “dangerous development,” noting that these groups “are preparing to move westward from the Sahel toward the ocean, in an attempt to control maritime routes and revive what they call ‘sea jihad,’ targeting gas lines.”

He also pointed out that after ISIS declared its Mozambique Province in Central Africa, it is now seeking to expand its rule by establishing a Borno Province in West Africa.

This geographical belt, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east, forms a semi-desert strip that separates the Sahara Desert to the north from the tropical regions to the south, extending roughly 5,400 kilometers.

The Mozambique Province, though smaller in size, is more brutal, posing a direct threat to major international economic interests linked to natural gas, making it a focal point of global attention.

Lake Chad

What is happening in the Sahel is closely linked to events in Chad, which on August 18 dealt a sharp blow to ISIS in West Africa by arresting six leaders of a local cell, including Muslim Yusuf, the youngest son of Boko Haram’s founder in Nigeria.

A report by the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) said Boko Haram and its West Africa Province were responsible for about 66% of violent deaths in Nigeria in 2024.

Although Chad lies in Central Africa, its northern region, Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, is a direct extension of the Sahara, while its south is closer to tropical Africa, and the country is a member of the Group of Five Sahel States, G5.

Academic Hamdi Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat the Lake Chad area has become a “testing ground for ISIS’s new caliphate,” a development he describes as entrenching a grim picture of a bloody conflict that has quietly escalated into one of the most violent jihadist theaters in the world.

He said ISIS controls large swathes of rural land in the poorest and most densely populated parts of Nigeria, and it levies taxes said to generate about $190 million a year as it seeks to expand its influence.

He added that the group has built a parallel state infrastructure in West Africa, creating departments to oversee military operations, collect taxes and enforce sharia.

Conflict between Islamist insurgencies in the region’s northeast killed nearly 350,000 people and displaced more than two million by the end of 2020, the United Nations Development Program said.

Who controls the lake?

Four countries share responsibility for managing Lake Chad and its resources: Chad, which contains most of the lake, Nigeria to the west and southwest, Niger to the northwest, and Cameroon to the southwest.

Bashara, the former rebel, said that about 70% of the lake’s area, spanning northeastern Nigeria, southeastern Niger, northern Cameroon and western Chad, “is now beyond the control of these states.”

Bashara told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Unfortunately, these terrorist groups enjoy broad popular support among local populations, which explains their continued presence across most of the Lake Chad Basin.”

Local residents, including Somali analyst Wali, attributed this support to “financial inducements” used to advance the groups’ agendas, but he notes this does not prevent them from “oppressing the most vulnerable members of society, especially women.”

Women and girls bear the greatest burden, according to Sima Bahous, Executive Director of UN Women, who told the Security Council in August 2025, that this is a region where women are effectively erased from public life.

Bahous said that over one million girls are out of school, 60% of whom have never attended, amid widespread child marriage and sexual violence.

Strikes with cheap drones

The security vacuum in parts of the Sahel, combined with the overlap of local terrorist agendas and international interventions, is turning the region into a long-term conflict hotspot that threatens North Africa and Europe. Notable developments in terrorist tactics are a key factor.

Hassan warned that “current waves of violence are unlike previous ones, with significant advances in tactics and capabilities.”

Since April 2025, ISIS in West Africa launched a campaign called “Burning the Camps,” targeting fortified military bases long considered secure. Hassan said: “Observers might think these are ordinary raids, but the reality is far more complex.”

He added: “Terrorists in the Lake Chad region have learned to carry out night attacks using drones and night-vision devices,” cautioning that the area “has become a major battlefield for ISIS West Africa and its rival faction Boko Haram. ISIS today is different from before; it has acquired night-vision equipment that allows coordinated strikes during Nigeria’s low-visibility hours.”

The group now arms itself with commercially available, low-cost drones launched from safe distances to drop small explosives on army and security camps, which Hassan described as “a persistent aerial threat that complicates traditional defenses.”

The United Nations recorded more than 400 terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger alone between April and July 2025, killing 2,870 people, according to Leonardo Simao, head of the UN regional office for West Africa and the Sahel, speaking before the Security Council on August 8.

International maritime security

Concerns over the expanding use of modern technologies by extremist groups dominated the session. Simao warned of “increasing use of drones, encrypted communication technologies, and cooperation between terrorist groups and transnational organized crime networks.”

He also expressed concern for maritime security, noting that shipping routes “are now at risk” and that “youth have become a prime target for recruitment.”

In response to this threat, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies highlighted “growing cooperation between al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Houthis in Yemen,” warning of “rising risks to navigation in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and western Indian Ocean.”

The center cited a UN report from February 2025 indicating “evidence of contacts between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, including actual meetings in 2024 regarding the transfer of military equipment and training from the Houthis in exchange for increased piracy and arms smuggling activities.”

The report noted that the relationship between the two groups “is based on mutual benefit, not sectarian affiliation,” and detailed a flow of weapons from Yemen to areas controlled by al-Shabaab between June and September 2024, including ammunition and explosives delivered via the ports of Marka and Barawe in Lower Shabelle. Al-Shabaab was tasked with escalating piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast.

‘Companies of evil’

UN concerns have grown over terrorist groups’ use of advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence and social media, which were described as “a new challenge” during a Security Council session last August.

These worries were reinforced by Rami Shaheen, an international expert on AI technology, who said, “Imagine a geographical theater spanning 10 African countries, where burning sands meet the coolest technologies in the AI world.” Shaheen noted that these groups are no longer simply armed militias, “they have become startup companies of evil investing in cutting-edge technologies.”

Shaheen told Asharq Al-Awsat about what he called “liquid recruitment,” highlighting the use of “customized content,” where “each target receives promotional messages tailored specifically to their vulnerabilities and hopes.” He gave the example of “a young man in Niger receiving an AI-modified video showing a prosperous future with the group.”

He also discussed what he termed “digital camouflage,” involving “self-destructing communication networks,” which are applications that send encrypted messages disappearing after being read.

He described this as a shift “from the rifle to the algorithm,” particularly when combined with funding through complex cryptocurrencies that are difficult to trace.

Shaheen’s points were echoed by Vladimir Voronkov, head of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office, before the Security Council in August, as reported by the UN mission in Libya.

Voronkov warned of the use of emerging technologies by extremist groups, saying they continue to use encrypted messaging platforms to secure their communications, exploit crowdfunding systems to raise funds, and increasingly experiment with AI to enhance their propaganda.

From Africa to Al-Hol in Syria

Libyan authorities dismantled three terrorist cells, announcing the discovery of large and varied caches of weapons buried in storage beneath a house in Sabha, including shells, bombs, improvised explosive devices, medium and heavy ammunition, and anti-aircraft guns.

Investigations indicated the first cell was responsible for recruiting fighters, facilitating their movement from North Africa to Somalia and the Sahel, and supplying them with forged passports and safe housing.

The second cell laundered money through front companies to help fighters and their families escape the Al-Hol camp in Syria and relocate to Libya, where they were housed in accommodation funded by ISIS, the cell also sought to make investments in regional states.

The third cell handled transfers to ISIS using cryptocurrencies.

A source at the Libyan public prosecutor’s office told Asharq Al-Awsat that ongoing investigations showed the cells received logistical support from groups in the Sahel, and from some neighboring Arab states.

The source also described the July 2024 dismantling of a cell led by a Libyan who had ties to Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, saying that cell was involved in supplying satellite communications equipment.

In confessions aired by a security agency in western Libya, one suspect spoke of plans to target sensitive military and security sites, and of contacting Algerians to train members of the network in drone manufacture.

Expulsion of French forces

Explanations for developments in the African Sahel vary.

At the UN level, Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, the UN Special Coordinator for the Sahel, believes that “the destruction of Libya has fueled counterterrorism challenges in the Sahel,” dismissing the idea that the crisis stems from events in northern Mali some 13 years ago.

In remarks reported by Senegalese media in early August, Dieye said: “The world owes a huge debt to the Sahel countries, and that debt has not yet been paid.”

At the same time, local residents in several Sahel states, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, said the situation in their countries is a predictable outcome of weak governance. Bashara noted that ethnic tensions have “fueled conflicts and opened the way for cross-border jihadist growth.”

Some observers argued that the expulsion of French forces from several Sahel states has paved the way for the rise of extremist groups.

Qarni said that “targeting numerous local leaders and chiefs has weakened governance,” adding that “the absence of genuine development frameworks and the channeling of national resources toward military efforts have also exacerbated the terrorist phenomenon.”

Bashara considered Qarni’s assessment one of the main factors enabling terrorist expansion, attributing the failure of governments in the Lake Chad Basin to confront these groups to “the exclusion of local communities from development and security,” adding, “N’Djamena has made security the responsibility of the people themselves.”

Mali has faced a deepening security crisis since 2012, fueled by armed rebellion. Yet the UN peacekeeping mission requested to leave the country at the end of 2023, after a decade of support to the government.

France remained the main security and military actor in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, and to a lesser extent in Mauritania, providing military and intelligence support until its withdrawal. Russia has since emerged as a “new alternative” in an attempt to fill the resulting vacuum.

Gold before ideology

Dieye said the aim of warring groups is less about religion and more about economic gain. Speaking in early August, he said, all the terrorism we see is not ideological; it is purely economic.

Ayeb agreed, noting that “the material dimension of these groups is always the priority,” explaining that “Nigeria is a gas country, Niger is a uranium region, and Mali is a gold zone; therefore, the problems these countries face are linked to their resources.”

Bashara added that “gold mines in northern Mali are overseen by terrorist groups.”

The Malian transitional government’s Minister of Mines, Amadou Keita, previously revealed that proceeds from illegal gold mining “contribute significantly to financing terrorist and criminal networks.”

The South African Institute for Security Studies points out that jihadist groups such as ISIS’s Sahel Province impose taxes on miners and control smuggling routes.

Gaddafi’s weapons

Experts on African affairs say developments in the African Sahel cannot be separated from the interests and historical legacies of international powers in a region plagued by poverty and conflict, despite its abundant resources.

Bashara said that “the French colonizer will not leave its former colonies so easily, seeing the resource-rich Sahel countries as part of its strategic reserve for itself and future generations.”

He accused France, whose forces were previously expelled from Sahel states, of “mobilizing its proxies in extremist groups and affiliated organizations to destabilize countries from which its military bases were recently removed.”

Following military coups in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023), French troops were gradually withdrawn from these countries, eroding Paris’s historical influence in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

Russia quickly entered through southern Libya into the Sahel, especially Mali, deploying forces it calls the “African Legion” to fill the security vacuum, alongside growing influence from China and Türkiye.

The magazine African Defense Forum, affiliated with AFRICOM, previously reported on Russian moves in the Sahel, citing military analyst Andrew McGregor from the Jamestown Foundation in July 2025.

McGregor said Russia has been using the Khadim airbase as an advanced platform for operations in the region.

Located about 100 kilometers east of Benghazi, the Khadim base is believed by McGregor to have become a hub for storing weapons and smuggling resources to and from the African Sahel.

He added that Russia is repeating the mistakes of Moammar al-Gaddafi in the 1980s when he attempted to use Soviet weapons to expand influence in the Sahel. The Kremlin is now reinvesting in the same base Gaddafi used to attack Chad.

Russia, seeking to build new alliances in Africa, signed a defense memorandum of understanding with Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, announced on August 14.

However, the Conflict Armament Research Center, which tracks conventional weapons and military materials, said in April 2025 that weapons flowing from Libya to the Sahel accounted for only 7% of the total arms circulating there.

The situation in the African Sahel thus reveals a complex equation in which rising terrorist activity intertwines with international influence and interventions, while the struggle for resources remains a central objective pursued by armed groups.



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.