The Year After ISIS

Three members of a Sunni tribal militia stand near a road on the outskirts of Muneira, Iraq. After ISIS fighters were driven out last fall, militiamen set fire to houses belonging to residents accused of sympathizing with the militants. (Photo by Emilien Urbano/MYOP for The Washington Post)
Three members of a Sunni tribal militia stand near a road on the outskirts of Muneira, Iraq. After ISIS fighters were driven out last fall, militiamen set fire to houses belonging to residents accused of sympathizing with the militants. (Photo by Emilien Urbano/MYOP for The Washington Post)
TT
20

The Year After ISIS

Three members of a Sunni tribal militia stand near a road on the outskirts of Muneira, Iraq. After ISIS fighters were driven out last fall, militiamen set fire to houses belonging to residents accused of sympathizing with the militants. (Photo by Emilien Urbano/MYOP for The Washington Post)
Three members of a Sunni tribal militia stand near a road on the outskirts of Muneira, Iraq. After ISIS fighters were driven out last fall, militiamen set fire to houses belonging to residents accused of sympathizing with the militants. (Photo by Emilien Urbano/MYOP for The Washington Post)

Soldiers descended on a gathering of villagers at a roadside kiosk and quickly drew their guns. An accusation led to words, words led to scuffles and finally, an act of humiliation that was expected and intolerable at once. The soldiers viciously dragged two young men from the village to a waiting car, slapping their heads as their fathers watched.

“They represent the government,” said Khalid Saleh, an aid worker, who stood among a seething crowd watching the soldiers a few weeks ago. “The problem is, they consider us all ISIS.”

The scene in Muneira, on the Tigris River in northern Iraq, offered a glimpse into the struggles of one Sunni Arab village in the year since the government drove the militants away: a place beset by suspicions, troubled by violence while coping, like much of the country, with death and loss.

A critical test for Iraq’s Shiite-led government is whether it can win the trust of the country’s Sunni minority in villages like this one, perched unsteadily on political and social fault lines. The nation, in turn, was demanding answers from Muneira about why some of its sons had supported a jihadist group dedicated to the bloody overthrow of the state.

In the 11 months since the village was liberated, its residents had become more isolated, impoverished and disparaged — by soldiers barely out of their teens, no less — than before the militants had arrived. Muneira was impatiently awaiting Iraq’s embrace.

The defeat of ISIS in its Iraqi strongholds, including the nearby city of Mosul, has presented this splintered country what many hope could be a moment of unity. At the very least, there has been a sense of shared sacrifice after thousands of soldiers and police officers were killed in the government offensive that freed millions of Iraqis, regardless of sect, who were trapped by the militants’ rule.

In April, a poll by the Almustakilla for Research group found that a majority of Sunnis were hopeful about the country’s direction — a startling finding given their longtime complaints about marginalization by the government.

But during multiple visits over the past year to Muneira, where 440 families live on a series of dull desert hills, expressions of optimism were tentative or fleeting, the hope seeming to evaporate by the day.

The legacy of a long conflict was etched into the village’s geography. Houses were destroyed — by ISIS or the Iraqi forces sent to vanquish them. Others were torched by a vengeful mob.

Bodies still wash up on the riverbanks some days, the human runoff of a hidden, dirty war between the security forces and its enemies still raging in Mosul and its surroundings.

Shepherds have found bullet-ridden corpses in their fields.

After the fight in the village, as he watched the soldiers drive off with his 21-year-old son Namir, Saadi Khalaf recalled a sense of possibility, long ago, before ISIS arrived. Men found jobs as police officers and soldiers or in other coveted government posts. “Young men got married. They bought cars. They built houses,” he said, ticking off the hallmarks of accomplishment here.

Now, the state was absent but for the soldiers standing sentry on the edges of the village.

Only a handful of police officers have returned to their posts, residents said. Jobless men have taken up cigarette smuggling or send their children off to sell bottles of water to the passing drivers.

Trucks roared through the village on a skinny dirt road that the military had recently transformed into one of the region’s main traffic arteries — yet another slight leveled against this place that left it choking under a cloud of soot and dust.

His son was released by the military a few hours after he was detained, but his father’s anger lingered.

“We see no bright future in Iraq,” Saadi Khalaf said.

Almost as soon as militants fled Muneira last fall, the place was shaken by revenge. Five houses belonging to members of an extended family accused of supporting ISIS were looted and torched.

In November, a group of men from the family walked through the rooms of one of the homes, which was emptied of most everything except a child’s bicycle, a melted washing machine and a singed coat rack. The men said they were falsely accused and blamed the arson on a Sunni tribal militia that was tasked at the time with the village’s security.

As the residents told their story late last year, three of the militia’s members watched from up the road. Rather than deny responsibility for the fire, they insisted that the destruction of homes had not been punishment enough.

“They are still breathing air,” said Shaker Atallah Helal, a former police officer and militiaman who wore dark sunglasses over a jagged scar on his face.

Their crime had been to join demonstrations against government abuses three years ago that were held in Sunni areas across Iraq. ISIS militants infiltrated the protests, exploiting the anger as they began their terrible march across the country.

Many in Muneira had sympathized with the aims of the protests, even if they did not participate. That nuance was lost in the frenzied climate of revenge that followed the ISIS defeat. “They are the ones who brought Daesh,” Helal said, using the Arabic acronym for ISIS.

Areas around Mosul were full of similar stories of house burnings and more violent retaliation in the early days of the government offensive. The source of the anger was no mystery. The countryside was dotted with mass graves containing the bodies of policemen and other security personnel who were executed by the militants, often with their hands bound behind their backs.

The graves lent the area an unshakable misery and powered the quest for revenge.

“We will not let them forget,” said Helal, who belonged to one of the unruly, ad hoc local militias that were given responsibility for securing areas recently liberated from the Islamic State. Helal’s militia — the Knights of Jabbour — was named for one of the region’s biggest tribes.

Within months, the men accused of attending the protests had disappeared from Muneira. “No one knows anything about them,” Yasser Ibrahim, a school principal, said at his house a few weeks ago.

The men’s families had stayed behind the village, he said. So had the militiamen who burned down their homes.

Conversations about Iraq these days often focus on the worry that disaffected Sunni Arabs will someday be tempted, out of frustration, to welcome the militants back. But that did not seem to be a danger in Muneira, where residents spoke about the Islamic State era with a mixture of horror and regret.

Some had been police officers in Mosul, stationed there on the fateful morning in June 2014 when ISIS easily captured the city, after the men trusted to guard it retreated en masse. “We all fled. I had to swim across the river,” said Ibrahim Jassim Mohammed, a police officer. “It was a black day for us.”

The militants kidnapped at least 24 people from the village, including the father of Ibrahim, the principal, who has not been heard from in three years, he said.

Rather than maintain a constant presence, the militants would drive through Muneira a few times a week. Ibrahim said that parents kept their children from attending classes to insulate them from the jihadists’ teachings. He would sit in the schoolhouse, every day, waiting for the gunmen to arrive, then lie about why the place was empty, he said.

But the efforts of its residents to resist the militants had won Muneira no favors.

The village was lucky if it received a few hours of electricity a day. Officials had not distributed food vouchers, residents said. Water was scarce, too. The trucks that rumble along the dirt road had exposed and ruptured the water pipes underneath.

Reflexively, the villagers believed that Iraq’s endemic government corruption had prevented the paving of the road.

And now no one knew whose responsibility it was to fix things.

With nothing to do, the men of the village could be found most days near a kiosk along the busy road, watching the traffic pass. Barefoot children, selling snacks to the truckers, had replaced their fathers as family breadwinners.

“We are hoping for good things for the government,” said Ammar Mohammed, a former soldier who these days carved out a living by smuggling cigarettes into Kurdish areas to the north.

“We have nothing but patience,” he said.

The fate of Muneira seemed to hang, in some way, on whether Hazem Khalil, a lifelong resident, would be able to stay.

Khalil’s older brother had been a senior Islamic State leader and was missing and probably dead. Two other brothers, accused of being associated with the militants, were in prison. Khalil’s elderly parents had fled after their house was burned to the ground in payment for the sins of their extremist son.

“I swear to God, I am the only one left,” Khalil said as he sat in his house with his children as they watched morning cartoons on television, reflecting on the calamity that had befallen his family and his town.

At the center of it was his older brother, Shaker, who had studied French literature, served as a school headmaster and was an imam at a local mosque.

He was recruited by the militants largely because of what they considered to be sterling credentials: He had been imprisoned for two-and-a-half years and tortured while in custody, his brother said. When ISIS captured Mosul, he served there as its minister for real estate.

In Muneira, people joked darkly that the militants did not destroy a single house without Shaker’s approval.

But it was not prison that had radicalized his brother, Khalil said.

“He was the product of extremism. He went too deep into religion,” he said.

It was also true, though, that resentment swirled around Muneira and other Sunni areas in the period before the militants took over. “Political agendas caused sectarian tensions,” Khalil said, referring to the government’s policies at the time. “There was no relationship between the security forces and citizens. There was a vacuum. That made it easy for ISIS,” he said.

With that legacy in mind, he added, “I was afraid of liberation.”

In the year that followed ISIS, his worries had yielded to guarded optimism. In his experience, the security forces had treated people well. The fearsome local militias had been disbanded. His neighbors refused to blame Khalil for his brother’s sins. For whatever reason, his corner of the village received regular electricity.

He had kept his job, at a nearby cement factory. Khalil had even decided to renovate his house.

He had received threatening text messages about his brother, but they had stopped about six months ago. Khalil was determined to stay in Muneira, and savor the humble graces.

“No one has questioned me about anything,” he said. “My house was not burned down.”

(The Washington Post)



Venice Ovation Fuels Hopes for Gaza Girl Film to Reach Global Audience

Venice Ovation Fuels Hopes for Gaza Girl Film to Reach Global Audience
TT
20

Venice Ovation Fuels Hopes for Gaza Girl Film to Reach Global Audience

Venice Ovation Fuels Hopes for Gaza Girl Film to Reach Global Audience

Tunisian director Kaouther Ben Hania said on Thursday she hopes the rapturous reception given to her new film "The Voice of Hind Rajab" at the Venice Film Festival would help carry its harrowing story to audiences worldwide.

Recounting the final hours of a 5-year-old girl from Gaza who died in 2024 after she was trapped in a car under Israeli fire, the movie drew a 24-minute standing ovation at its premiere on Wednesday - by far the longest so far this year.

"It was overwhelming because I didn't expect that," Ben Hania told Reuters. "I'm so, so grateful to Venice for the selection (of the film) and to give us such an incredible beginning of the career of the movie."

The applause only ended when officials had to ask the audience to leave because another film was due to be screened.

Amer Hlehel, an actor who plays a Red Crescent dispatcher trying to organise the girl's rescue, said he had mixed emotions over the thunderous reception.

"There is a guilty feeling that we are celebrating while people are still suffering from starvation and mass killing," he said, adding that the cast and crew felt they were "on a mission" to tell Rajab's story to the rest of the world.

The girl was trying to flee Gaza City on January 29, 2024, when the vehicle in which she was riding came under attack by Israeli forces. She survived the initial gunfire and pleaded with Red Crescent staff - in heart-rending audio used in the film - to save her.

Israel finally gave the green light for the rescue after a three-hour wait, but contact with the ambulance crew was cut shortly after they arrived at the scene. The bodies of Rajab, some of her relatives and the two medics were found days later.

The Israel Defence Forces initially denied that its troops had been within firing range of the car. However, a subsequent UN report blamed Israel. The Israeli army said this week that the incident was still under review and declined further comment.

SEEKING US DISTRIBUTION

"The Voice of Hind Rajab" has yet to secure a US distributor, but Ben Hania said she remained hopeful.

Films critical of Israel can struggle to get a broad release in the United States. A hard-hitting film about the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, "No Other Land," won this year's best documentary feature Oscar, but despite its critical success, no major US distributor bought the project.

However, Ben Hania's film has attracted some top Hollywood names as executive producers, giving it added industry heft, including actors Brad Pitt, Joaquin Phoenix and Rooney Mara.

"I hope it will be seen in the US," Ben Hania said, noting that Tunisia has already chosen it as its submission for best international feature at the 2026 Academy Awards.

"The most important thing is that 'The Voice of Hind Rajab' reaches everybody all over the world and the Oscars and Venice here are a great doorway," she said, dismissing any suggestion that the film might prove controversial.

"The killing of a child should not be divisive. ... It's a crime," she said.


The Worst Drought in Decades Is Threatening Syria’s Fragile Recovery from Years of Civil War

A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
TT
20

The Worst Drought in Decades Is Threatening Syria’s Fragile Recovery from Years of Civil War

A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)
A drone view shows the dried up Orontes River in Jisr al-Shughour, west of Idlib, Syria, on Aug. 14, 2025. (AP)

The worst drought in decades is gripping much of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, drying out rivers and lakes, shriveling crops and leading to dayslong tap water cutoffs in major cities.

The situation is particularly dire in Syria, where experts say rainfall has been declining for decades and where the fledgling government is trying to stitch the country back together following a 14-year civil war that left millions impoverished and reliant on foreign aid.

Small-farmer Mansour Mahmoud al-Khatib said that during the war, he couldn't reach his fields in the Damascus suburb of Sayyida Zeinab some days because fighters from the Lebanese Hezbollah party allied with then-President Bashar Assad would block the roads. That problem vanished when Hezbollah withdrew after Assad fell in a December opposition offensive, but the drought has devastated his farm, drying up the wells that irrigate it.

"The land is missing the water," al-Khatib told The Associated Press recently as he watched workers feed the wheat he did manage to harvest into a threshing machine. "This season is weak — you could call it half a season. Some years are better and some years are worse, but this year is harsh."

In a good year, his land could produce as much as 800 to 900 kilograms (1,764 to 1,984 pounds) of wheat per dunam, an area equal to 0.1 hectares and 0.25 acres. This year, it yielded about a quarter that much, he said. He hired only six or seven workers this harvest season instead of last year’s 15.

Syria's withering crops

Because the drought followed a prolonged war, farmers who were already financially stretched have had little ability to cope with its effects, said Jalal Al Hamoud, national food security officer for the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization in Syria.

Before the uprising-turned-civil war that began in 2011, Syrian farmers produced an average of 3.5 million to 4.5 million tons of wheat per year, which was enough to meet the country’s domestic needs, according to Saeed Ibrahim, director of agricultural planning and economics in Syria’s Agriculture Ministry.

That annual yield dropped to 2.2 million to 2.6 million tons during the war, and in recent years, the government has had to import 60% to 70% of its wheat to feed its roughly 23 million people. This year's harvest is expected to yield only 1 million tons, forcing the country to spend even more of its strained resources on imports.

Mudar Dayoub, a spokesperson for Syria's Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection, said this year’s wheat crop will only last for two or three months and that the government is "currently relying on signing contracts to import wheat from abroad" and on donations, including from neighboring Iraq.

But in a country where the World Food Program estimates that half the population is food-insecure, Ibrahim warned that "total reliance on imports and aid threatens food security" and is "unsustainable."

The drought isn't the only major issue facing Syria, where postwar reconstruction is projected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Since Assad fled, the country has been rattled by outbreaks of sectarian violence, and there's growing doubt about whether the new authorities will be able to hold it together. Without jobs or stability, millions of refugees who fled during the war are unlikely to come home.

A drone view shows dramatically low water levels at Lake Qaraoun, one of the Lebanon's largest reservoirs, as the result of a drought following heatwaves and a winter with very scarce precipitation, in Qaraoun village, eastern Lebanon, Aug. 6, 2025. (AP)

Interconnected crises

A dam on the Litani River in neighboring Lebanon's fertile Bekaa Valley forms Lake Qaraoun, a reservoir that spans about 12 square kilometers (4.6 square miles).

Over the years, climate change has led to a gradual decline in the water flowing into the reservoir, said Sami Alawieh, head of the Litani River National Authority.

This summer, after an unusually dry winter left Lebanon without the water reserves its usually banks through snow and rainfall, it has shrunk to the size of a pond, surrounded by a vast expanse of parched land.

Although an average of 350 million cubic meters (12.4 billion cubic feet) of water flows into the lake during the rainy season each year, meeting about one-third of Lebanon's annual demand, this year the incoming water didn't exceed 45 million cubic meters (1.6 billion cubic feet), he said.

Lebanon’s water woes have further exacerbated the drought in Syria, which partially relies on rivers flowing in from its western neighbor.

The largest of those is the Orontes, also known as the Assi. In Syria’s Idlib province, the river is an important source of irrigation water, and fishermen make their living from its banks. This year, dead fish littered the dried-out river bed.

"This is the first time it’s happened that there was no water at all," said Dureid Haj Salah, a farmer in Idlib’s Jisr al-Shugour. Many farmers can't afford to dig wells for irrigation, and the drought destroyed not only summer vegetable crops but decades-old trees in orchards, he said.

"There is no compensation for the loss of crops," Haj Salah said. "And you know the farmers make just enough to get by."

Mostafa Summaq, director of water resources in Idlib province, said the groundwater dropped by more than 10 meters (33 feet) in three months in some monitoring wells, which he attributed to farmers over-pumping due to a lack of rain. Local officials are considering installing metered irrigation systems, but it would be too expensive to do without assistance, he said.

Syrian farmers harvest wheat in the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, July 2, 2025. (AP)

A drier climate

Most experts agree that Syria and the broader region appear headed toward worse climate shocks, which they aren't prepared to absorb.

Climate change makes some regions wetter and others drier, and the Middle East and Mediterranean are among those that are drying out, said Matti Kummu, a professor at Aalto University in Finland who specializes in global food and water issues. Syria, specifically, has shown a trend of reduced rainfall over the past 40 years, while it has been using water at an unsustainable rate.

"There’s not enough water from rainfall or from snowmelt in the mountains to recharge the groundwater," Kummu said. Due to increasing irrigation needs, he said, "the groundwater table is going lower and lower, which means that it’s less accessible and requires more energy (to pump)." At some point, the groundwater might run out.

Even with limited means, the country could take measures to mitigate the impacts, such as increased rainwater harvesting, switching to more drought-tolerant crops and trying to put more effective irrigation systems in place, even simple ones.

But "in the long term, if the situation in terms of the climate change impacts continues" as currently projected, how much of the croplands will be arable in the coming decades is an open question, Kummu said.


Inside Israel’s Settler State and its Hidden Strategy

Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
TT
20

Inside Israel’s Settler State and its Hidden Strategy

Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)

For decades, settler attacks in the West Bank were largely concentrated in “Area C,” under full Israeli control. But since the Hamas-led Oct. 7 assault on Israel, violence has spread deeper, reaching “Area B” and reshaping life across the territory.

The assaults, carried out day and night, have coincided with a surge in settlement activity. There are now 243 new settlement outposts that did not exist before the 1993 Oslo accords, and 129 additional “shepherding outposts” established since October 7, 2023, alone.

Officially, Israeli settlements cover 3.6% of the West Bank. But their de facto footprint — including roads, security zones and areas of influence — extends to nearly 10%, according to Palestinian monitoring groups.

Nature reserves are also part of the land Israel has moved to place under its control as part of a sovereignty plan driven by far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

In what analysts say could be the most decisive step yet toward blocking the creation of a Palestinian state, Smotrich in late August 2025 secured final approval for the long-stalled “E1” project.

The plan, frozen for decades due to international pressure, received a green light from the Civil Administration’s Supreme Planning Council, an arm of Israel’s Defense Ministry.

A Village Turned Into a Cage

In Sinjil, a town of 9,000 people about 21 km north of Ramallah, residents say daily life has come to resemble imprisonment. Fences, gates, settlements and military outposts ring the community, leaving villagers hemmed in and fearful.

The scars of a July 11 attack are still visible. On that day, settlers killed two young Palestinian men in one of the deadliest assaults since the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.

The victims were not from Sinjil but from the nearby town of al-Mazra’a al-Sharqiya. They had come to help defend their neighbors when hundreds of settlers stormed the village.

“It was a wide-scale assault,” said Mohammad Alwan, coordinator of the Popular Committee Against Settlements. “More than 300 settlers gathered in the mountains and attacked the village. It was a tough battle. Neighbors rushed to defend each other.”

Two young men went missing during the clashes. Hours later, villagers found 22-year-old Saif Musallat dead in a valley. “He had just come from America to visit Palestine ...

They hit him until he died,” Alwan said, his voice breaking. “The bruises were all over his body.”

The second victim, Mohammad Shalabi, was shot dead. “Criminals and savages were unleashed on us,” Alwan added.

Alwan, who has lived through decades of settler attacks, said the brutality has escalated sharply since Oct. 7. “After October they built fences, put up gates and seized the rest of the land - 8,000 out of 14,000 dunams. Look how they turned the village into a cage.”

Gates, Closures and Economic Strain

Beyond the human toll, villagers describe economic suffocation. Mechanic Gharib Khalil’s shop lies just behind a yellow gate sealing the village entrance. “Since they put the gate up a year ago, business collapsed. People can’t reach me anymore,” he said.

Nearby, Abed al-Nasser Alwan stood by his broken-down truck trapped on the other side of the gate. “It looks open, but cameras are everywhere. If you move it, they shoot you or arrest you. We’re stuck.”

Palestinian officials say these restrictions are part of a deliberate policy. The Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission counts 898 military checkpoints and gates across the West Bank, including 146 added since Oct. 7, 2023.

“These barriers reflect Israel’s closure policy since 1967,” said Amir Dawood, the commission’s publishing director. “They are designed to create a new geographic reality - one of exclusion and surveillance.”

Boundaries Drawn with Fire

The violence has spread to neighboring Kafr Malik, where settlers killed four men in July. Posters of the victims cover village walls, alongside slogans of defiance. Settlements loom from the hilltops above, expanding since Oct. 7.

“From there, they attack the village,” said activist Montaser al-Maliki. “Before October, attacks happened, but not like this. Now they are larger, more organized, and more violent.”

Almost daily, footage circulates of settlers blocking roads or pelting Palestinian cars with stones.

The Vanishing Oslo Map

Maps of the West Bank illustrate how Oslo’s partition into Areas A, B and C has eroded.

Area A, once under full Palestinian control, has become a patchwork of isolated enclaves.

“They’ve built a state within a state,” said Issa Zboun, head of GIS at the Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem. “Instead of giving Palestinians their promised state, they took the land and turned it into a settlers’ state.”

Figures compiled by Palestinian groups show the transformation:

1967: 69 settlements, 98,000 settlers, covering 0.2% of the West Bank.

1993 (Oslo Accords): 172 settlements, 248,000 settlers, covering 1.2%.

2025: 200 official settlements, 243 outposts — including 129 built after Oct. 7 — housing more than 940,000 settlers.

While settlements officially cover 3.6% of the West Bank, their effective footprint — including security zones, bypass roads and areas of influence — reaches nearly 10%.

Zboun said Israel once needed laws to seize land for settlements. “Today they do it without orders, without announcements, without laws,” he said.

In his office, Zboun displayed maps showing how every major Palestinian city is surrounded by settlements and bypass roads. “They turned Area A into isolated islands,” he said. “They’ve built something larger than the Palestinian state Oslo promised.”

For villagers like those in Sinjil and Kafr Malik, the map is redrawn not with ink but with blood. Boundaries, they say, are now “drawn with fire.”

Restricted Zones for the Palestinian Authority

Palestinian security forces are formally allowed to access parts of Areas B and C of the West Bank only with Israeli coordination. Yet even when entry is possible, analysts and residents say it is unthinkable for Palestinian officers to confront armed settlers or the Israeli army directly.

Israel’s military is often present during settler raids, ostensibly to keep order, but Palestinians say soldiers routinely shield settlers rather than restrain them. Many Palestinians have been killed during these attacks, with no record of Israeli law enforcement prosecuting settlers beyond brief detentions.

US Pressure Eased Under Trump

Since the start of the occupation in 1967, no Israeli settler has been jailed for killing Palestinians in West Bank attacks, despite periodic US pressure. The Biden administration sought to curb settler violence by imposing sanctions on settler leaders and their political backers. But President Donald Trump revoked those sanctions on his first day in office, a move that emboldened settler leaders and the Israeli defense minister to scrap a policy allowing administrative detention of violent settlers.

Trump’s arrival in power marked a turning point for both Israel’s right-wing leaders and the settler movement, who viewed his presidency as a rare chance to entrench Israeli sovereignty across the West Bank.

The period after Trump’s election saw what Palestinians describe as “unprecedented terror.” Settler raids became more frequent, larger, and more violent.

According to The Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, Israel carried out 11,280 attacks in the first half of 2025, of which 2,154 were by settler militias, killing six Palestinians.

The Trump administration remained silent even after high-profile killings, including that of Musallat.

Only after Musallat’s family launched legal action and US media spotlighted the case did US ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, call for accountability.

This was a criminal and terrorist act, Huckabee said, before visiting the nearby Christian town of Taybeh, where settlers had recently torched an old cemetery.

Despite his words - calling the attacks “absolute terrorism” and the desecration of holy sites a “crime against humanity” - no arrests were made, and settlers continued their assaults, including fresh raids on Taybeh.

The Desert Raids

Settler attacks have also spread to remote desert communities near Bethlehem, in what locals say is a campaign of intimidation.

In the village of al-Minya, council head Zayed Kawazba pointed to burned-out cars as evidence of recent raids. “They can come at any time,” he said. “Wherever they go, destruction follows.”

Nearby Kisan and the desert hamlet of Deir al-Ahmar have also faced near-daily violence. Residents describe settlers beating villagers, burning homes, killing livestock and then accusing Palestinians of theft.

“Before Oct. 7, the attacks were limited, but afterwards the orders came,” said Adnan Abayat of Deir al-Ahmar, showing a scar from a settler beating. “Now they are relentless. People can’t defend themselves, many have already left.”

A Secret Plan in Plain Sight

Palestinians and rights groups say these raids are not random but part of a broader Israeli strategy led by Smotrich, who also holds sweeping powers over the West Bank’s Civil Administration.

Since being appointed in 2022, Smotrich has overseen what critics call the most dramatic transformation of West Bank governance since 1967. By transferring powers once reserved for the Israeli military to civilian officials loyal to him, Smotrich has blurred the line between military occupation and outright annexation.

Though Israel denies officially annexing the West Bank, Smotrich has openly declared his aim of blocking any Palestinian state and entrenching Jewish settlement. A leaked recording captured him calling the process “a dramatic shift that changes the DNA of the system.”

In August 2025, Smotrich secured final approval for the long-stalled E1 settlement plan, linking Jerusalem to the vast Maale Adumim bloc. The project, frozen for decades under international pressure, will effectively bisect the West Bank, severing north from south and crippling the territorial viability of a Palestinian state.

“This is historic,” Smotrich said. “The Palestinian state has been erased from the table — not with slogans but with deeds. Every settlement, every house, every neighborhood is another nail in the coffin of that dangerous idea.”

Israeli rights group B’Tselem warned that the move cements a system of apartheid by entrenching “a bi-national state of separation.”

The E1 approval followed a July 23 Knesset vote endorsing annexation of the West Bank - condemned by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas alike. Netanyahu framed the decision as “a response to Western recognition plans for Palestine” and vowed to accelerate settlement expansion.

Infrastructure work on E1 could begin within months, with housing construction starting as early as next year, Israeli officials said.

B’Tselem argues that Israel has already created a dual system of governance in the occupied West Bank, with separate legal regimes for settlers and Palestinians, amounting to apartheid.

Smotrich has made little effort to disguise his intentions. His 2017 manifesto openly called for dismantling the Palestinian Authority, preventing statehood, and forcing Palestinians to choose between emigration, second-class citizenship, or resistance.

In two years of the current government, observers say Smotrich has delivered a historic shift, consolidating Israeli civilian rule over occupied land and accelerating settlement expansion at a pace unseen in decades.

As settlers push deeper into Palestinian villages and deserts, residents say they are left with only three choices: flee, submit, or resist.

“Their plan is to erase us,” said Abayat. “They beat us, burn our homes, kill our sheep and the world says nothing. We have nothing left but survival.”