The Blast that Blew Away Lebanon's Faith in Itself

A general view shows the aftermath at the site of August's blast in Beirut's port area. (Reuters)
A general view shows the aftermath at the site of August's blast in Beirut's port area. (Reuters)
TT

The Blast that Blew Away Lebanon's Faith in Itself

A general view shows the aftermath at the site of August's blast in Beirut's port area. (Reuters)
A general view shows the aftermath at the site of August's blast in Beirut's port area. (Reuters)

They gather in groups, wearing black, in the shadow of buildings gutted by the explosion that shook this city on Aug. 4. Men, women and children from Christian and Muslim sects cradle portraits of their dead.

Beirut has been blown back to the vigils of its 1975-1990 civil war. Then, families demanded information about relatives who had disappeared. Many never found out what happened, even as the country was rebuilt. Today’s mourners know what happened; they just don’t know why.

Four months on, authorities have not held anyone responsible for the blast that killed 200 people, injured 6,000 and left 300,000 homeless. Many questions remain unanswered. Chief among them: Why was highly flammable material knowingly left at the port, in the heart of the city, for nearly seven years?

For me, the port explosion rekindled memories I’ve spent 30 years trying to forget. As a reporter for Reuters, I covered the civil war, the invasion and occupation of Lebanon by Israel and Syria – and the assassinations, air strikes, kidnappings, hijackings and suicide attacks that marked all these conflicts.

But the blast has left me, and many other Lebanese, questioning what has become of a country that seems to have abandoned its people. This time, the lack of answers over the catastrophe is making it difficult for an already crippled nation to rise from the ashes again.

“I feel ashamed to be Lebanese,” said Shoushan Bezdjian, whose daughter Jessica – a 21-year-old nurse – died while on duty when the explosion ripped through her hospital.

False hope
It took 15 years of sectarian bloodletting to destroy Beirut during the civil war. It then took 15 years to rebuild it – with lots of help from abroad. In 1990, billions of dollars poured in from Western and Gulf countries and from a far-flung Lebanese diaspora estimated to be at least three times the size of the country’s 6 million population.

The result was impressive: Beirut was reincarnated as a glamorous city featured in travel magazines as an exciting destination for culture and partying. Tourists came for the city’s nightlife, to international festivals in Graeco-Roman and Ottoman settings, to museums and archaeological sites from Phoenician times.

Many highly educated expatriates – academics, doctors, engineers and artists – returned to take part in the rebirth of their nation. Among them was Youssef Comair, a neurosurgeon who had left Lebanon in 1982 to pursue a specialization in the United States.

Comair had then worked as assistant professor of neurosurgery at UCLA and head of the epilepsy department at the Cleveland Clinic, where he pioneered the use of surgery as a therapy for epilepsy. When he landed back in Beirut to work as head of surgery at the American University of Beirut, Comair believed the country had turned a corner. Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, the industrialist-turned-politician who had rebuilt post-war Beirut, was in power and promised a renewed age of prosperity.

“I was yearning for a life and a place ... receptive to all kinds of civilizations. This is what we were in Lebanon before the war,” recalled Comair.

Behind the splendor of Beirut, however, post-civil war Lebanon was being built on shaky political ground.

At the end of the war, militia leaders on all sides took off their fatigues, donned suits, shook hands after the 1989 Saudi-brokered Taif peace accord and largely disarmed. But the nation’s political leaders, it seemed to many here, continued to pay more attention to a revolving door of foreign patrons than to the creation of a stable state.

The country’s Shiites turned to Iran and its Arab ally Syria, whose troops entered Lebanon in 1976 and stayed for three decades. The Sunnis looked to wealthy oil producers in the Gulf. Christians, whose political influence was heavily curtailed in the post-war deal, struggled to find a reliable partner and shifted alliances over the years. Domestic policy was dictated, at different times, by the foreign power with the deepest wallet.

Comair’s return to Beirut was propitious for me, too. While I was covering the US invasion of Baghdad in 2003, I was badly wounded in the head by shrapnel from a US tank shell fired at the Reuters office in the Palestine Hotel. After emergency surgery in Baghdad, I was evacuated by US Marines to neighboring Kuwait and then on to Lebanon for further treatment. Beirut had become a medical center of excellence for the region – and Comair was my doctor. For years, during my sojourns in Dubai and London, I regularly returned to Beirut and Comair to ensure I was healing.

But my country was once again under strain. After the Iranian-backed Hezbollah drove out Israeli forces in south Lebanon in 2000, the group was steadily increasing its military and political influence. In 2005, Hariri was assassinated, once more dealing a blow to those who thought Lebanon had a bright future. Once again, Lebanese top professionals emigrated. Comair took up a position at St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital in Houston in 2006. I settled in London.

Both of us were determined to return, however. For me, a return home was a way to expose my children, who were in elementary school at the time, to my family and culture. The so-called Arab Spring in 2010 provided the moment. While protests erupted and dictators were toppled in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, Lebanon seemed like an oasis in a troubled region. Beirut was once again bustling. By 2012, both Comair and I were back in Beirut.

We were lulled into a sense of security: traditional Sunday lunches with family; sunset on the decks of Beirut beaches; music and film festivals; skiing on Mount Lebanon’s slopes. Friends and family began visiting in greater numbers, as Lebanon’s wartime reputation began to be forgotten. Tourism peaked in Lebanon in 2010, when the number of visitors reached almost 2.2 million, a 17% increase from 2009, according to official statistics.

Life stopped
Yet again, however, Lebanon’s foundations were weak. The country was living beyond its means, with successive governments piling up debt, which rose to the equivalent of 170% of national output in March 2020, according to Lebanon’s finance ministry. This time, national banks bore the brunt of the nation’s spending. By early last year, their losses on loans to the state totaled $83 billion, considerably more than Lebanon’s annual gross domestic product. The banks reacted by shutting their doors, freezing all accounts – effectively shutting down Lebanon’s economy.

For more than a year now, people in Lebanon have not been able to transfer money or withdraw more than $500 a week. The closure of the banks blocked another key stream of income for Lebanon’s economy – money from the diaspora.

Even before the coronavirus pandemic, Lebanon’s economic output had shrunk by 6.7% in 2019. In 2020, the economy is projected to shrink by another 20%. More than 50,000 children have left private schooling and enrolled in state education over the past year, government figures show, a trend that underscores the erosion of the country’s middle class. Nearly 700 doctors have left Lebanon over the past year, according to Sharaf Abou Sharaf, head of the doctors’ union.

What many Beirutis didn’t know before August is that an even bigger threat lay in their midst.

In 2013, a ship had docked at the Beirut port with a stash of the highly flammable chemical ammonium nitrate. It wasn’t – and isn’t to this day – clear why the ship had headed to Lebanon. But the arrival and storage of the material was known to a revolving door of port and national security officials – installed by various government factions – who were never able to agree on how to remove the chemical shipment. It lay untouched for more than six years in a warehouse at the Beirut port, a short walk from the busy city center.

When I covered the civil war, I chronicled the deaths of dozens of victims overlooked amidst the bigger events: two sisters who drowned at sea in a desperate attempt to flee shelling; three brothers immolated in a supermarket; young school children hit in shelling that targeted their bus. One morning in 1989 I found myself walking into a morgue with a mask that could not stifle the suffocating stench of 20 army soldiers shot in the head, their hands still tied behind their backs.

But I will never forget the terror in the eyes of my twin children on that afternoon in August when our car was suddenly thrown toward the side of the road as an orange and white mushroom cloud of dust and debris rose over our heads. “Duck and cover,” I yelled, instantly thrown back to the bombs of my conflict-zone reporting days. Glass and bricks from collapsing buildings fell near the car; uprooted trees blocked the roads. People ran everywhere; wailing ambulances struggled to reach the wounded.

“Life stopped on August 4,” said Rita Hitti, whose son Najib was a firefighter who was killed along with two other family members as they battled the flames that ignited the explosives at the port.

“I no longer have any feeling towards anything – my country or anything else.”

After the blast, the government resigned in the face of popular anger. But Lebanon’s different ruling factions remain too divided to create a new government that can help rebuild the city – and Lebanon’s economy. Their loyalties are split between foreign powers, including Europe, the United States, Iran and Syria. Attempts by France’s President Emmanuel Macron to help cobble together a new administration have thus far failed.

A society divided
Today, the split between Lebanon’s elite and the wider population is wide. Lebanese tycoons regularly feature on the Forbes list of the world’s richest people. Among the six listed in 2020 were members of the family of al-Hariri, the assassinated prime minister, and another former premier, Najib Mikati, and his brother Taha. Other leaders, many of them former militia heads, now live in grand villas, surrounded by security, in Beirut’s wealthy suburbs or secluded hilltops.

In 2019, the richest 10% owned about 70% of the country’s personal wealth, according to a report by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. More than half the population is in poverty, the report added.

Samia Doughan, 48, recently joined a protest at the Beirut port against the nation’s leaders. She sobbed as she held a picture of her dead husband. “Every day, we wake up crying and we sleep crying,” said Doughan, the mother of twin girls. “These leaders should have been toppled a long time ago. They ruled us for 30 years, it’s enough.”

In contrast to the post-civil-war period, when overseas support flowed in, foreign donors say they will not finance Lebanon until a new administration can show that their money will not be squandered.

During the civil war, many Lebanese emigrated. This time, too, people are starting to look for an exit. Information International, a Beirut-based research firm which has done extensive research about migration, said an estimated 33,000 people left in 2018 and 66,000 left in 2019.

Immediately after the August blast, searches in Lebanon for the word “immigration” on Google Trends hit a 10-year peak, and a recent search by the Arab Opinion Index revealed that four out of five Lebanese aged 18 to 24 are considering emigration. Sharaf, head of the doctor’s union, says he receives between five and 10 requests a day for recommendations from doctors seeking jobs in foreign hospitals.

The heart of the capital, ordinarily packed over Christmas, is deserted. Stores and restaurants are closed. Martyrs Square, which during the Civil War was the frontline between Muslim west and Christian east Beirut before being rebuilt, is no longer lit up at night.

Comair and I are both now thinking of leaving Lebanon again. My doctor spends his days trying to rebuild his hospital, which was destroyed during the explosion. But he has little faith in the country’s long-term revival.

“We are witnessing the annihilation of Lebanon,” he told me. “I have no hope that this country can rise up.”

Samia Nakhoul for Reuters



US Buildup Balances Iran Deterrence, Day-After Risks

US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
TT

US Buildup Balances Iran Deterrence, Day-After Risks

US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)

As the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, several destroyers, and fighter aircraft, are expected to arrive in the Middle East in the coming days, a familiar but increasingly pressing question is back in play: Is Washington preparing the ground for another strike on Iran, or orchestrating a calibrated show of force designed to raise the psychological and political cost for Tehran without tipping into war?

The answer is not binary. The same military buildup can serve dual purposes: a defensive deterrent to shield US bases and allies, and a pressure tool that keeps the option of attack alive without formal warning.

According to US officials cited by media outlets, the movement of the force, alongside discussions about deploying additional air defense systems, comes at a sensitive moment following a broad crackdown on protests inside Iran.

President Donald Trump, for his part, has publicly insisted that he would prefer nothing happens militarily. Still, he has tied that preference to two conditions: that Tehran does not resume any nuclear path approaching the weapons threshold, and that it does not proceed with executions of protesters.

Three messages in one buildup

The first message is directed at Iran itself. Washington wants to signal that it can rapidly reposition forces and that it considers the “deterrence window” open. Months ago, the United States struck Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, and Trump is now reminding Iranians that it will happen again if the same activity resumes.

The second message is aimed at allies and regional adversaries alike. The buildup is not only a threat to Tehran but also an umbrella to protect US interests and bases from potential Iranian retaliation, especially as Iran’s military leadership has openly warned that any attack would make US bases and interests legitimate targets.

Such threats are not new, but they raise the sensitivity of any US decision.

Today’s reinforcements could amount to a preemptive defense aimed at limiting losses if events spiral out of control.

The third message is domestic and political. Trump is also brandishing non-military tools such as “secondary tariffs” on countries that trade with Iran, seeking to combine pressure instruments between sanctions and military deterrence.

In January, he announced a punitive tariff mechanism targeting states that trade with Tehran.

Nuclear ambiguity

The nuclear file adds another layer of uncertainty. The International Atomic Energy Agency has not verified Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium for months. At the same time, estimates circulate of a large quantity enriched to 60 percent, a level technically close to the 90 percent required for a weapon.

This monitoring gap creates two contradictory dilemmas. Hardliners argue that ambiguity implies the possibility of covert rebuilding and therefore justifies tougher pressure.

Advocates of de-escalation counter that the same ambiguity makes any strike a blind gamble that could miss targets or widen the war, without guaranteeing that the program will be halted.

From this perspective, the military buildup could become a language of negotiation: raising the cost for Tehran to accept stricter verification arrangements, or to absorb an internal retreat without appearing defeated.

The Iranian street

If a strike were carried out, what would the Iranian street gain today, after the system has already suppressed protests? Here, limited expectations appear more realistic than grand promises.

Even in Washington, there is a clear debate: any military intervention, particularly a “limited strike” against instruments of repression such as the Revolutionary Guard, may not change the outcome of an internal confrontation if the opposition is fragmented, unarmed, and unorganized.

Analyses in the US press have warned that bombing alone does not “make a revolution.”

It may temporarily halt repression, but it does not dismantle the security apparatus without a lengthy and costly campaign.

Worse, a strike could produce the opposite effect: national mobilization in favor of the system through a narrative of “external aggression,” a hardening of repression under the banner of fighting agents and terrorism, expanded arrests or harsher sentences, and an uncontrolled slide toward internal conflict if some pillars of the state break while others remain intact.

With protest momentum receding after the crackdown, and with continued restrictions on the internet and communications, the “street effect” does not appear to be at its peak in a way that would allow Trump, if he wished, to tie any strike to a quick internal political outcome.

In recent days, there have been signs of debate inside Iran about easing the shutdown. Still, the information environment remains unstable to the point that state television was hacked, and inciting messages were broadcast.

The day after

The question prompting warnings in some Washington circles is this: what if a strike were decisive and weakened the head of the system or paralyzed its center, but the state did not collapse in an orderly way? This is where the specter of “the day after” looms large.

Michael Doran, a researcher at the Hudson Institute, warns that Iran, as a multi-ethnic state with sensitive border regions, could face fragmentation or internal conflict if the center of power collapses suddenly, as in historical cases where “state identity” eroded rapidly after a regime fell.

Doran notes that minorities, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, and Turkmen, are concentrated along the periphery and have cross-border extensions, making neighboring states directly invested in Iran’s internal fate.

The most dangerous scenario, in this logic, is not only fragmentation but also the persistence of the system in another form: the Revolutionary Guard and security services retaining control, shedding the religious ideological cover, and adopting a nationalist or military guise.

That would amount to a change of head rather than a change of regime.

He urges avoiding the idea of “appointing a successor” for Iran from outside or presuming the shape of the state in advance, as this could inflame ethnic sensitivities and plant the seeds of early conflicts.

What has changed from previous buildups is that Washington is no longer facing only the question of “do we strike?” but also “what comes after the strike?” inside Iran and across the region. This equation makes the decision harder. A strike may satisfy the logic of deterrence. Still, it could also open doors that cannot be closed if policy is not designed around uncertainty, rather than the illusion of quick stability.


ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
TT

ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)

The issue of ISIS detainees transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq has moved to the forefront of Baghdad’s security and political agenda, coinciding with intensified efforts to form a new government and determine the next prime minister.

Long confined to narrow security and technical discussions, the issue has entered broader political debate following Iraqi steps to receive a number of the detainees inside its territory, in coordination with concerned international parties. While the move carries direct security implications, it has also unfolded against a highly sensitive domestic political backdrop.

On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron, urged “countries around the world, particularly European Union states,” to repatriate their nationals held as ISIS detainees, following their transfer from Syria to Iraq.

 

An Iraqi border guard at a checkpoint along the Syrian border in Sinjar, January 22, 2026 (AP)

From a Border Liability to a Domestic Challenge

For years, the presence of thousands of ISIS members in detention facilities beyond Iraq’s direct control has been a persistent security concern for Baghdad, given the proximity of those prisons to the Iraqi-Syrian border and the region’s fragile security conditions. The transfer of some detainees into Iraq has shifted the challenge from a cross-border threat to a domestic issue requiring complex security, judicial, and logistical arrangements.

Iraqi authorities say handling the detainees falls within the state’s responsibility toward its citizens and individuals accused of crimes committed on Iraqi soil, while also reducing the risk of a potential security breakdown at detention sites outside the country.

At the same time, political circles have raised questions about the security burden, societal repercussions, and Iraq’s capacity to manage the issue over the long term.

Where Security and Politics Converge

The renewed focus on the detainee issue has coincided with a sensitive phase of negotiations among political forces within the Coordination Framework coalition over government formation and the selection of a prime minister.

Although fundamentally a security matter, the timing has propelled the issue into political debate, particularly as international actors welcomed steps taken by the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, while regional players monitored developments in Baghdad with caution.

On Friday, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack praised what he described as Baghdad’s “exceptional leadership” and its firm commitment to helping protect the international community from the continuing threat posed by ISIS detainees, speaking on behalf of the US president and secretary of state.

Some political factions view the handling of ISIS detainees as a test of the Iraqi government’s ability to manage complex issues in coordination with the international community. Others see it as a highly sensitive issue that must be handled independently of political pressure or diplomatic signals between capitals with influence over Iraqi affairs.

 

Iraqi border guards are deployed along the Syrian border amid tight security measures (AP)

Complex Domestic Calculations

Within Iraq, debate over the detainees is inseparable from concerns about the possible resurgence of extremist cells, prison attacks, or escape attempts — scenarios Iraq has experienced in the past. As a result, security discussions have focused on intelligence readiness, securing detention facilities, and expediting judicial procedures for suspects.

Politically, most parties are careful to avoid appearing lenient on terrorism, yet they differ on the timing and approach to managing the issue, particularly amid a political transition whose outcome remains unsettled.

The detainee issue also highlights Baghdad’s effort to strike a balance between responding to international security concerns and asserting its sovereignty and national interest. Countries concerned with foreign fighters and ISIS dossier are pushing for lasting solutions, while Iraqi authorities are keen to prevent the country from once again becoming a theater for the fallout of regional and international conflicts.

In this context, the issue of ISIS detainees is no longer merely an isolated security concern; it has become a complex issue intertwining considerations of border control, sovereignty, security readiness, internal political tensions, and sustained international attention to the ISIS group.


Greenland Galvanizes Europe to Confront New US Reality

Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
TT

Greenland Galvanizes Europe to Confront New US Reality

Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)

Europe may have rallied to see off President Donald Trump over Greenland, but its leaders recognize the confrontation is unlikely to be the last in dealings with his increasingly strident version of the United States.

The stakes could hardly be higher, given the $2 trillion trading relationship between the European Union and the US and the dominant role Washington continues to play in the NATO alliance and in support of Ukraine against Russia.

This week, ​in the space of a few hours at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Trump first ruled out taking Greenland by force and then removed the threat of new tariffs on eight European states standing in his way - hailing instead a vague deal for the Arctic island with NATO chief Mark Rutte.

European leaders believe Trump backed down in part because - in contrast to their more accommodating stance in last year's tariff negotiations - this time they made it clear he was crossing a red line by asserting that Greenland's status as an autonomous territory of Denmark was non-negotiable.

"All this shows that you cannot let the Americans trample all over the Europeans," said a European Union official, who requested anonymity to speak candidly about US ties.

"We did the right thing to push back, to be firm in what we said, but it is not over. My sense is that we will be tested constantly on issues like this," ‌the official told ‌Reuters.

While Europe may have learned the value of standing up to Trump, the challenge is ensuring it ‌is ⁠less ​exposed next time.

"It's ‌a hard route, and it's going to take time," said Rosa Balfour, director at Carnegie Europe, adding that Europe had "far more leverage than it has dared to use".

EUROPE NOT SEEKING A SPLIT

An emergency summit of Europe's leaders on Thursday called for last year's EU-US trade deal to be put back on track after lawmakers suspended its ratification in protest over Greenland.

"Despite all the frustration and anger of recent months, let us not be too quick to write off the transatlantic partnership," German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said in Davos beforehand.

While seeking to stabilize the partnership, Europe is also taking steps aimed at "de-risking" it given the open antipathy from Trump, whose new national security strategy accuses the continent of freeloading on defense and demands it open its markets to US companies.

Europe is only too aware of how long it can ⁠take to get agreement among 27 nations with different histories, politics and economies, which was highlighted in taunts this week by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

Two EU officials said the Greenland row has accelerated discussions on ‌how the approach taken on Ukraine - in which countries offer security guarantees on a voluntary basis ‍and no one has a right of veto - can be extended.

"We should ‍do more with coalitions of the willing and leave it open for others to follow if they want," said one, adding that joint efforts to ‍boost Europe's development of artificial intelligence technology could be one example.

Coalitions such as the "E3" group comprising France, Germany and Britain focusing on security matters also allow non-EU states to take part, which speaks to others on the rough end of Trump policies.

"The middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu," Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said in a Davos speech to warm applause.

Another route is using the leeway afforded by EU law.

In December, EU states used an emergency provision ​to indefinitely immobilize hundreds of billions of dollars of Russian assets. That removed the risk of a pro-Moscow country like Hungary blocking the roll-over of the measure at some point and forcing the EU to return the money.

NEW EUROPEAN DOCTRINE

Europe also plans to toughen ⁠up on economic policy.

Next month it will kickstart legislation that will include "Made in Europe" requirements on strategic sectors and strengthening conditionality clauses for any foreign direct investment in the EU.

"Some provisions were originally conceived to reduce reliance on China but in reality they will help us to de-risk from other markets," European Commissioner for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy Stephane Sejourne told Reuters.

"This will totally change the European doctrine on those sectors," Sejourne added.

Unlike Canada, there is no plan in Europe to pivot more towards China to compensate for transatlantic strains. But the bloc is actively pursuing others in a diversification drive.

While the impact of higher US tariffs on European goods is not clear - in fact Europe's trade surplus with the US initially rose over the course of 2025 as companies front-loaded exports ahead of the new levies - recent data shows that German companies nearly halved investments there last year.

After the signing of the EU-Mercosur pact this month - the largest in EU history - European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said it is now "on the cusp" of a deal with India.

However, nobody is saying Europe can redress the imbalance with the US overnight, particularly on security.

Despite European commitments to a defense spending surge and even calls for an EU army, analysts say it will be years before its military might is up to ‌tasks which now include bolstering Arctic security.

The question is whether the past few weeks provide a catalyst for Europe to start reducing its US dependencies.

"All this is not surprising," Swedish deputy Prime Minister Ebba Busch said of Trump's showing in Davos.

"The EU needs to toughen up," she told Reuters.