The Blast that Blew Away Lebanon's Faith in Itself

A general view shows the aftermath at the site of August's blast in Beirut's port area. (Reuters)
A general view shows the aftermath at the site of August's blast in Beirut's port area. (Reuters)
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The Blast that Blew Away Lebanon's Faith in Itself

A general view shows the aftermath at the site of August's blast in Beirut's port area. (Reuters)
A general view shows the aftermath at the site of August's blast in Beirut's port area. (Reuters)

They gather in groups, wearing black, in the shadow of buildings gutted by the explosion that shook this city on Aug. 4. Men, women and children from Christian and Muslim sects cradle portraits of their dead.

Beirut has been blown back to the vigils of its 1975-1990 civil war. Then, families demanded information about relatives who had disappeared. Many never found out what happened, even as the country was rebuilt. Today’s mourners know what happened; they just don’t know why.

Four months on, authorities have not held anyone responsible for the blast that killed 200 people, injured 6,000 and left 300,000 homeless. Many questions remain unanswered. Chief among them: Why was highly flammable material knowingly left at the port, in the heart of the city, for nearly seven years?

For me, the port explosion rekindled memories I’ve spent 30 years trying to forget. As a reporter for Reuters, I covered the civil war, the invasion and occupation of Lebanon by Israel and Syria – and the assassinations, air strikes, kidnappings, hijackings and suicide attacks that marked all these conflicts.

But the blast has left me, and many other Lebanese, questioning what has become of a country that seems to have abandoned its people. This time, the lack of answers over the catastrophe is making it difficult for an already crippled nation to rise from the ashes again.

“I feel ashamed to be Lebanese,” said Shoushan Bezdjian, whose daughter Jessica – a 21-year-old nurse – died while on duty when the explosion ripped through her hospital.

False hope
It took 15 years of sectarian bloodletting to destroy Beirut during the civil war. It then took 15 years to rebuild it – with lots of help from abroad. In 1990, billions of dollars poured in from Western and Gulf countries and from a far-flung Lebanese diaspora estimated to be at least three times the size of the country’s 6 million population.

The result was impressive: Beirut was reincarnated as a glamorous city featured in travel magazines as an exciting destination for culture and partying. Tourists came for the city’s nightlife, to international festivals in Graeco-Roman and Ottoman settings, to museums and archaeological sites from Phoenician times.

Many highly educated expatriates – academics, doctors, engineers and artists – returned to take part in the rebirth of their nation. Among them was Youssef Comair, a neurosurgeon who had left Lebanon in 1982 to pursue a specialization in the United States.

Comair had then worked as assistant professor of neurosurgery at UCLA and head of the epilepsy department at the Cleveland Clinic, where he pioneered the use of surgery as a therapy for epilepsy. When he landed back in Beirut to work as head of surgery at the American University of Beirut, Comair believed the country had turned a corner. Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, the industrialist-turned-politician who had rebuilt post-war Beirut, was in power and promised a renewed age of prosperity.

“I was yearning for a life and a place ... receptive to all kinds of civilizations. This is what we were in Lebanon before the war,” recalled Comair.

Behind the splendor of Beirut, however, post-civil war Lebanon was being built on shaky political ground.

At the end of the war, militia leaders on all sides took off their fatigues, donned suits, shook hands after the 1989 Saudi-brokered Taif peace accord and largely disarmed. But the nation’s political leaders, it seemed to many here, continued to pay more attention to a revolving door of foreign patrons than to the creation of a stable state.

The country’s Shiites turned to Iran and its Arab ally Syria, whose troops entered Lebanon in 1976 and stayed for three decades. The Sunnis looked to wealthy oil producers in the Gulf. Christians, whose political influence was heavily curtailed in the post-war deal, struggled to find a reliable partner and shifted alliances over the years. Domestic policy was dictated, at different times, by the foreign power with the deepest wallet.

Comair’s return to Beirut was propitious for me, too. While I was covering the US invasion of Baghdad in 2003, I was badly wounded in the head by shrapnel from a US tank shell fired at the Reuters office in the Palestine Hotel. After emergency surgery in Baghdad, I was evacuated by US Marines to neighboring Kuwait and then on to Lebanon for further treatment. Beirut had become a medical center of excellence for the region – and Comair was my doctor. For years, during my sojourns in Dubai and London, I regularly returned to Beirut and Comair to ensure I was healing.

But my country was once again under strain. After the Iranian-backed Hezbollah drove out Israeli forces in south Lebanon in 2000, the group was steadily increasing its military and political influence. In 2005, Hariri was assassinated, once more dealing a blow to those who thought Lebanon had a bright future. Once again, Lebanese top professionals emigrated. Comair took up a position at St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital in Houston in 2006. I settled in London.

Both of us were determined to return, however. For me, a return home was a way to expose my children, who were in elementary school at the time, to my family and culture. The so-called Arab Spring in 2010 provided the moment. While protests erupted and dictators were toppled in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, Lebanon seemed like an oasis in a troubled region. Beirut was once again bustling. By 2012, both Comair and I were back in Beirut.

We were lulled into a sense of security: traditional Sunday lunches with family; sunset on the decks of Beirut beaches; music and film festivals; skiing on Mount Lebanon’s slopes. Friends and family began visiting in greater numbers, as Lebanon’s wartime reputation began to be forgotten. Tourism peaked in Lebanon in 2010, when the number of visitors reached almost 2.2 million, a 17% increase from 2009, according to official statistics.

Life stopped
Yet again, however, Lebanon’s foundations were weak. The country was living beyond its means, with successive governments piling up debt, which rose to the equivalent of 170% of national output in March 2020, according to Lebanon’s finance ministry. This time, national banks bore the brunt of the nation’s spending. By early last year, their losses on loans to the state totaled $83 billion, considerably more than Lebanon’s annual gross domestic product. The banks reacted by shutting their doors, freezing all accounts – effectively shutting down Lebanon’s economy.

For more than a year now, people in Lebanon have not been able to transfer money or withdraw more than $500 a week. The closure of the banks blocked another key stream of income for Lebanon’s economy – money from the diaspora.

Even before the coronavirus pandemic, Lebanon’s economic output had shrunk by 6.7% in 2019. In 2020, the economy is projected to shrink by another 20%. More than 50,000 children have left private schooling and enrolled in state education over the past year, government figures show, a trend that underscores the erosion of the country’s middle class. Nearly 700 doctors have left Lebanon over the past year, according to Sharaf Abou Sharaf, head of the doctors’ union.

What many Beirutis didn’t know before August is that an even bigger threat lay in their midst.

In 2013, a ship had docked at the Beirut port with a stash of the highly flammable chemical ammonium nitrate. It wasn’t – and isn’t to this day – clear why the ship had headed to Lebanon. But the arrival and storage of the material was known to a revolving door of port and national security officials – installed by various government factions – who were never able to agree on how to remove the chemical shipment. It lay untouched for more than six years in a warehouse at the Beirut port, a short walk from the busy city center.

When I covered the civil war, I chronicled the deaths of dozens of victims overlooked amidst the bigger events: two sisters who drowned at sea in a desperate attempt to flee shelling; three brothers immolated in a supermarket; young school children hit in shelling that targeted their bus. One morning in 1989 I found myself walking into a morgue with a mask that could not stifle the suffocating stench of 20 army soldiers shot in the head, their hands still tied behind their backs.

But I will never forget the terror in the eyes of my twin children on that afternoon in August when our car was suddenly thrown toward the side of the road as an orange and white mushroom cloud of dust and debris rose over our heads. “Duck and cover,” I yelled, instantly thrown back to the bombs of my conflict-zone reporting days. Glass and bricks from collapsing buildings fell near the car; uprooted trees blocked the roads. People ran everywhere; wailing ambulances struggled to reach the wounded.

“Life stopped on August 4,” said Rita Hitti, whose son Najib was a firefighter who was killed along with two other family members as they battled the flames that ignited the explosives at the port.

“I no longer have any feeling towards anything – my country or anything else.”

After the blast, the government resigned in the face of popular anger. But Lebanon’s different ruling factions remain too divided to create a new government that can help rebuild the city – and Lebanon’s economy. Their loyalties are split between foreign powers, including Europe, the United States, Iran and Syria. Attempts by France’s President Emmanuel Macron to help cobble together a new administration have thus far failed.

A society divided
Today, the split between Lebanon’s elite and the wider population is wide. Lebanese tycoons regularly feature on the Forbes list of the world’s richest people. Among the six listed in 2020 were members of the family of al-Hariri, the assassinated prime minister, and another former premier, Najib Mikati, and his brother Taha. Other leaders, many of them former militia heads, now live in grand villas, surrounded by security, in Beirut’s wealthy suburbs or secluded hilltops.

In 2019, the richest 10% owned about 70% of the country’s personal wealth, according to a report by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. More than half the population is in poverty, the report added.

Samia Doughan, 48, recently joined a protest at the Beirut port against the nation’s leaders. She sobbed as she held a picture of her dead husband. “Every day, we wake up crying and we sleep crying,” said Doughan, the mother of twin girls. “These leaders should have been toppled a long time ago. They ruled us for 30 years, it’s enough.”

In contrast to the post-civil-war period, when overseas support flowed in, foreign donors say they will not finance Lebanon until a new administration can show that their money will not be squandered.

During the civil war, many Lebanese emigrated. This time, too, people are starting to look for an exit. Information International, a Beirut-based research firm which has done extensive research about migration, said an estimated 33,000 people left in 2018 and 66,000 left in 2019.

Immediately after the August blast, searches in Lebanon for the word “immigration” on Google Trends hit a 10-year peak, and a recent search by the Arab Opinion Index revealed that four out of five Lebanese aged 18 to 24 are considering emigration. Sharaf, head of the doctor’s union, says he receives between five and 10 requests a day for recommendations from doctors seeking jobs in foreign hospitals.

The heart of the capital, ordinarily packed over Christmas, is deserted. Stores and restaurants are closed. Martyrs Square, which during the Civil War was the frontline between Muslim west and Christian east Beirut before being rebuilt, is no longer lit up at night.

Comair and I are both now thinking of leaving Lebanon again. My doctor spends his days trying to rebuild his hospital, which was destroyed during the explosion. But he has little faith in the country’s long-term revival.

“We are witnessing the annihilation of Lebanon,” he told me. “I have no hope that this country can rise up.”

Samia Nakhoul for Reuters



Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
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Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)

Egypt’s El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant has yet to begin operations on the country’s Mediterranean coast, but Israeli media outlets supportive of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have intensified warnings that the project could pave the way for a major Russian nuclear presence in the Middle East.

Those concerns over Egypt’s capabilities, as well as its regional partnerships, which have grown since the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023, are unlikely to subside, according to experts interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat.

They said that the rhetoric is tied to Israeli domestic politics, electoral competition and efforts to create new security threats for Israeli voters, while also exerting pressure on Cairo and its partners at a time when Israel is seeking to capitalize on tensions between Washington and Moscow.

Although Egypt’s nuclear program dates back to a 1956 agreement with the Soviet Union, the country’s first nuclear power project effectively began on Nov. 19, 2015, when Egypt and Russia signed an agreement to build the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in the Matrouh governorate on the Mediterranean coast. The project is valued at $30 billion, including a $25 billion Russian loan that Egypt is due to begin repaying in October 2029 over a 35-year period at an annual interest rate of 3%.

The plant, which is designed to generate 4,800 megawatts of electricity, will comprise four nuclear reactors. It is expected to operate for more than 60 years and is projected to supply about 10% of Egypt’s electricity needs once its first reactor comes online, currently expected between late 2027 and mid-2028.

Israeli website Natziv.net recently claimed that El Dabaa is more than an electricity-generation project, describing it as “a potential nuclear foothold for Moscow” in the Middle East. The outlet said Russia’s financing of 85% of the project’s cost - about $25 billion - along with its responsibility for fuel supplies and nuclear waste management for 60 years, could create a “long-term strategic dependence” on Moscow.

The website also warned about plans for a Russian industrial zone near the Suez Canal, describing it as a permanent presence at a key global trade hub and a sign of Cairo’s drift away from the West toward a Russia-China axis within the BRICS group, which Egypt joined in January 2024.

Despite the project’s civilian nature, the outlet claimed that the infrastructure and expertise acquired through El Dabaa could one day provide Egypt with a shorter path toward military nuclear options or fuel enrichment capabilities.

It suggested that any radioactive leak could affect Israel’s coastline and desalination facilities, while closer Egyptian-Russian ties could narrow Israel’s strategic room for maneuver and weaken traditional US influence in the region.

Similar arguments appeared in an analysis published last week by Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that the plant’s first reactor could begin operating in 2027.

It described the notion that El Dabaa is solely an energy project as a “grave misreading,” portraying it instead as a slow-moving strategic encirclement effort in which “Israel is not incidental to the picture, but the target.”

Raouf Saad, Egypt’s former ambassador to Russia and a former assistant foreign minister, said the reports should be read within their political context. He added that Netanyahu has sought to disrupt efforts toward regional peace and has repeatedly attempted to provoke Egypt since the Gaza war, without success.

Saad dismissed the Israeli allegations as “naive and transparent” aimed at warning the United States about Russia’s return to the region, saying they reflected the weakness of Netanyahu’s position rather than any genuine security threat.

Retired Major General Samir Farag, a military and strategic analyst, said such reports are part of recurring attempts to manufacture crises and are likely to intensify as Israel approaches elections.

“Netanyahu-aligned media outlets have long tried to convince the Israeli public that Egypt seeks to acquire nuclear capabilities and pursue militarization,” Farag said, describing the claims as an effort to exploit the issue politically and divert attention from Israel’s actions in the region.

While Egypt has not officially responded to the allegations, officials and analysts continued to stress that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a legitimate right under international law.

They noted that Egypt is fully committed to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that the El Dabaa project, like the country’s Inshas Nuclear Center, is subject to comprehensive oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency.


Trump Faces G7 After Year of Trade Wrath, Diplomatic Bluster

People stand outside the Palais Lumiere ahead of the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 12, 2026. (Reuters)
People stand outside the Palais Lumiere ahead of the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 12, 2026. (Reuters)
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Trump Faces G7 After Year of Trade Wrath, Diplomatic Bluster

People stand outside the Palais Lumiere ahead of the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 12, 2026. (Reuters)
People stand outside the Palais Lumiere ahead of the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 12, 2026. (Reuters)

Little is known about what President Donald Trump's intentions are for the G7 summit in Evian, France next week, except maybe the obvious: the American president will impose his schedule and his mood.

The latter may depend largely on the peace agreement discussions with Iran, which were gathering steam Friday.

"It is not possible to 'manage Trump' the way it has been possible during his first term," Liana Fix, associate fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, told AFP ahead of the summit that will bring the US face-to-face with France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom.

All these countries' leaders have been on the receiving end of Trump's trade wrath or diplomatic intimidation -- with the exception of Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who he is very fond of.

Every other leader expected on the shores of Lake Geneva has been the target of attacks, criticism or mockery from the Republican billionaire.

- 'Expect the worst' -

Neither growing unpopularity that could cost Trump control of Congress in November, nor the Supreme Court's annulment of his across-the-board tariffs is likely to soften his bruising stance toward global partners.

European leaders in particular have learned, through the Greenland episode, trade conflicts, and the Iran war, "to hope for the best but to expect the worst," Fix said.

Moreover, the US has informed Europeans of their intentions to significantly reduce the number of planes and warships made available to NATO in Europe, the New York Times reported.

"I don't think you're going to see a weakened president," Jackson James, senior fellow at German Marshall Fund of the US, told AFP.

"I think he's going to go over there and do what he always does, which is just try to bully his way through these very, very complicated issues and try to get the American agenda, as he sees it, fulfilled."

Trump "says he doesn't like these multilateral meetings," but "cannot bear for an assembly of world leaders to meet and he not being there," Victor Cha, an expert for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said during a press conference.

"So he shows it up at these things and he leaves early," Cha said, as he did during the last G7.

- Versailles -

Still, French president Emmanuel Macron hopes to persuade the impatient American president to stay for a dinner at Versailles on Wednesday evening, playing to the 79-year-old's fascination with monarchy and ornate trappings of luxury.

France has already tried to cater to the American president by changing the dates of the summit so it would not coincide with his 80th birthday and the celebratory mixed martial arts tournament Trump will host at the White House on Sunday.

Some experts also consider it a concession to Washington that South Africa, which was being considered for participation in the G7 summit, will not be participating.

Paris insists, however, that there was no pressure to withdraw the invitation to South Africa -- a nation Trump accuses, without evidence, of broad persecution of its white population.

Several analysts say at least one issue that France has put on the table for discussion may attract Trump's interest: trade relations with China.

- Ukraine -

The balance of power has also shifted somewhat when it comes to Ukraine, where the situation has not fundamentally changed since Trump began his second term.

In 2025 "Europeans just sort of agreed that they had to bend the knee to Trump because of Ukraine" and its need for US military support, but now "we're just in a different dynamic where Ukraine is not as dependent on the United States," said Max Bergmann, a CSIS Europe expert, said at a briefing.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who probably knows better than anyone how quickly a meeting with Trump can spiral out of control, has been invited to a discussion session in Evian.


Why Is a ‘Very Close’ Iran-US Deal Taking So Long?

A man walks past Iran's national flag at the Vanak Square in Tehran on June 10, 2026. (AFP)
A man walks past Iran's national flag at the Vanak Square in Tehran on June 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Why Is a ‘Very Close’ Iran-US Deal Taking So Long?

A man walks past Iran's national flag at the Vanak Square in Tehran on June 10, 2026. (AFP)
A man walks past Iran's national flag at the Vanak Square in Tehran on June 10, 2026. (AFP)

President Donald Trump has repeatedly declared Iran and the US are on the verge of agreeing a deal to end the Middle East war, but a litany of sticking points have delayed finalizing an accord and will complicate its implementation, analysts say.

Trump has been widely mocked in US and Iran for frequently insisting an end to the conflict was imminent even as negotiations dragged on for weeks, with US network CNN saying he had used phrases like "very close to a deal" or in the "final throes" of talks on 39 occasions.

In what has become a familiar pattern, Trump on Thursday withdrew a threat of renewed strikes on Iran and said a deal could be signed in the coming days, only for Iran's foreign ministry to respond by saying it "has not reached a final conclusion on the agreement".

Arash Azizi, lecturer at Yale University, told AFP that one reason the deal has taken so long is that the Iranian side believed "they could hold out to get better terms" after not capitulating during the conflict.

Trump, meanwhile, "could hardly stomach" releasing Iran's frozen assets -- a key demand of Tehran -- and also risked facing accusations the accord would be more favorable to Iran than the 2015 nuclear deal he pulled out of during his first term, he added.

Trump "had to accept that his initial gambit of causing an Iranian capitulation by sheer military force didn't work and he had to settle for something much less", said Azizi.

Both Iran and the United States would appear to have vested interests in ending a conflict that saw five weeks of all-out war, paused by an uneasy ceasefire on April 8.

The US-Israeli war has become increasingly unpopular in the US, even among the president's core supporters, with Trump mindful of the looming US midterm elections.

A deal could also see Tehran win the security guarantees and recognition it has long craved from the US and ensure the personal safety of its own leadership, after former supreme leader Ali Khamenei and several top officials were killed in the first phase of the war.

But any negotiation -- in this case mediated by Pakistan as well as Qatar -- between two foes who have been sworn enemies since shortly after the 1979 revolution was never going to be easy.

- 'Frozen war' with 'flare-ups' -

Iran's new leadership structure after the killing of Ali Khamenei has likely proved problematic, with the extent of the power wielded by his successor and son Mojtaba Khamenei still unclear. He is said by Iranian officials to have been wounded and has yet to appear in public.

Trump's own pronouncements have also changed with startling rapidity, most notably on Thursday when he threatened to hit Iran "very hard" before predicting that a "great settlement" was near.

Trump, in a Truth Social post Friday, appeared to again be losing patience, describing the Iranian side as "very dishonorable people to deal with".

"Trump has neither a clear strategic objective nor a credible exit strategy for extricating the United States from the war with Iran," said Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI).

He said a key obstacle was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has opposed any Iran-US deal and on Friday again vowed "Iran will not have nuclear weapons".

The Iranian authorities, meanwhile, have "sensed Trump's reluctance to enter the midterm election season burdened by an unpopular war", and seek above all an enduring peace without US aggression, said Alfoneh.

"The conflict has already taken on the characteristics of a frozen war, punctuated by periodic flare-ups," he added.

- 'Tremendous leverage' -

Iran has always insisted that any deal include Lebanon, where Israel has been attacking the Tehran-backed group Hezbollah, which has been further weakened but not eradicated.

A White House official said on Friday that Iran had agreed to dismantle its nuclear program, which the West fears is aimed at making a nuclear weapon -- a commitment that has yet to be confirmed by Tehran.

Critical will be the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz shipping bottleneck, which Iran blockaded at the start of the war in a move that caused global energy prices to surge.

Iran "will not forget the tremendous leverage it gained by closing it," Thomas Juneau, professor at the University of Ottawa, wrote in a study for London-based think tank Chatham House.

"It will not hesitate to consider closing the Strait again if it perceives it to be necessary."