In his book “Science and Politics as a Vocation,” German sociologist Max Weber argued that a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” is among the primary requisites for the establishment of the state. This monopoly - state institutions “monopolizing the use of violence” - is the defining feature of statehood.
Weber explained that the army and the police are the only two bodies that should be granted the authority to use force within the defined borders of the state. And the state’s success in ensuring that they have this monopoly is crucial for its success.
Up until last Friday, the Russian state had maintained total domestic sovereignty and respect for its authority across the country. That changed when the commander of the Wagner militia announced that the city of Rostov had been seized and began his march toward the capital.
His actions over the few days that followed are a testament to the threats posed - to any authorities, regardless of how firm their hegemony over society and the state are - by allowing parallel bodies to take its place and threaten its stability. Such a status quo is a major symptom of state frailty. This is evident in other places where such parallel bodies operate, like in Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.
Some of these groups have full legal cover, and others have become a fait accompli, but in all of these countries, they have taken the place of the state. Indeed they have hijacked it, making its decisions, or challenging its authority as Wagner did.
While the rebellion of the Kremlin’s chef may have ended swiftly, it will likely have long-term political, security and social repercussions on the domestic scene in Russia, which had been stable since the end of the post-Soviet transitional period, that is, since President Boris Yeltsin stepped down and Putin came to power in 2000. Putin has managed to remove all his opponents and powerful rivals since then, and there had been only one person in Russia until the date of the 24th of June.
Indeed, the Kremlin ensured that there was not even a second in command, and it was difficult to predict who could succeed Putin until Yevgeny Prigozhin came out and challenged his authority, turning Russia into a country with two leaders and two military forces for a few hours. One represents the state, which deployed its army in and around the capital and blocked off the roads to it, and the other a rebel movement that took control of a strategic city and began marching towards the capital as though it were carrying out a coup.
This crisis has cleared up previously obscure dynamics playing out within the walls of the Kremlin, exposing the struggle between rivals within the Russian top brass. The Wagner chief probably did not act alone, and there are definitely high ranking officials who support him. As for his rivals, had it not been for Putin’s personal intervention from the first moment of the crisis, they would not have managed to confront him. This will have consequences for the image of the regime, both at home and abroad.
Domestically, it has become legitimate to question the cohesion of the regime and the Ukraine war. This is especially true given that this crisis is part of a struggle between two camps (the war camp and the negotiation camp). It also exposed a struggle within the Russian forces (security and military) known as “the silovik.” This internal struggle is a massive blow to cohesion on the home front, and it was dealt to a country fighting a foreign war in defense of its national security.
Outside Russia, the Western camp will exploit this crisis to undermine the Russian military, economically and politically, and increase the burdens of the war in Ukraine on the Kremlin. The crisis also undercut one of the Kremlin’s most important principles in foreign policy. From the colored revolutions to the Arab Spring, Moscow has defended regime stability and repudiated Western interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The West, especially Washington, believes that after having justified foreign interventions under the pretext of reimposing stability, that Russia now needs help maintaining stability itself.
And so, Wagner proves that the potential for coexistence between the state and a militia is limited and that those who cook this poison internally or externally expose themselves to a taste of its violence.
