Iran FM to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Do Not Intervene in Lebanon, Oppose Syria Split

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (Photo Credit: Ali Khamaj)
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (Photo Credit: Ali Khamaj)
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Iran FM to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Do Not Intervene in Lebanon, Oppose Syria Split

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (Photo Credit: Ali Khamaj)
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (Photo Credit: Ali Khamaj)

Iran is prepared to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States if Washington provides assurances against aggression, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said, warning that military strikes on Tehran’s nuclear facilities have failed to achieve their goals and will not succeed through talks either.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat in Jeddah, where he attended an extraordinary meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) foreign ministers on Gaza, Araghchi did not rule out the possibility of renewed confrontation with Israel.

“Anything is possible, and Tehran is prepared for all scenarios,” he said.

Araghchi said ties with Saudi Arabia have entered an “unprecedented phase of cooperation,” describing the Kingdom as a “major regional and Islamic power” alongside Iran.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on the sidelines of the Jeddah meeting, Araghchi stressed that Tehran does not interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs but voices its opinions like others. He said Hezbollah’s arsenal is an issue for the group and the Lebanese government, adding that “plans to disarm Hezbollah are entirely Israeli.”

Asked about recent comments by Iran’s defense minister on building military infrastructure abroad, Araghchi declined to elaborate, saying, “Any clarification must come from the defense minister himself.”

On threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian minister underlined that Tehran’s official policy is “absolutely clear” in seeking peace and stability in the vital Gulf waterway. “Iran is a producer and exporter of oil, and its economy depends heavily on it. That is why it wants free navigation for everyone,” he said.

Araghchi spoke extensively on a wide range of regional issues.

Gaza: Action Over Statements

Araghchi said people in Gaza need food, water and medicine rather than political declarations, urging Muslim countries to take practical steps in support of Palestinians.

Araghchi said the OIC meeting, which convened at the request of Iran, Palestine and Türkiye, produced “good statements and important decisions” but stressed that action on the ground was critical.

“I emphasized in my remarks that Islamic countries must take practical steps. Those that maintain ties with the Zionist entity should cut them and halt trade — that is a concrete move that can be made,” he said.

He added that Muslim states should unite in international forums and courts to condemn Israel. “It is only natural that more than 50 Islamic countries and over a billion Muslims, with their vast resources, can mobilize to support Gaza and Palestine,” Araghchi said.

Nuclear Talks with the US

Iran remains ready to enter “fair and balanced” negotiations over its nuclear program but will only engage in indirect talks with the United States if Washington guarantees it will not carry out military attacks during the process, Araghchi said.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Tehran is already holding discussions with the three European signatories to the 2015 nuclear deal, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to set out a new framework for negotiations.

“We are prepared for indirect talks with the United States, provided they reassure us there will be no military aggression during the talks,” Araghchi said.

“If they come to the table for fair negotiations built on mutual interests, that serves both sides. But if they believe they can achieve through negotiations what they failed to achieve through military strikes, then such talks will not happen.”

He added that Iran has never walked away from talks. “We were at the heart of negotiations when Israel attacked us and the United States joined in. That is why any future negotiations will not be like those in the past,” Araghchi said, stressing that Tehran’s stance on indirect talks with Washington “has not changed.”

Prepared for Any Scenario with Israel

Iran is prepared for any confrontation with Israel, Araghchi affirmed, warning that the outcome of the last conflict showed the futility of military action against Iran.

“Anything is possible, and we are ready for all circumstances,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat when asked about rising tensions and the prospect of a new clash with Israel.

“During the 12-day war, the Zionist entity and the United States failed to achieve any of their objectives, while Iran resisted heroically and responded to the aggression. We continued our missile strikes on Israel until the last moment, while they thought they could stop them in 48 hours.”

Araghchi said Israel eventually sought an unconditional ceasefire. “Since their request came without conditions, we accepted it. If they want to repeat the scenario, we are ready. The 12-day war proved that the military option is not a successful one - it is a failed one. That is why I doubt they will try again. But if they do, they will face a similar, even stronger, response,” he said.

Saudi and Regional Relations

Recent conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, as well as attacks on Iran, have convinced the region that Israel is the main threat, Araghchi said, adding that Tehran has stepped up efforts to build trust with Arab neighbors.

“I believe everyone now realizes that the entity threatening the whole region and seeking to keep it weak and divided is the Zionist entity,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat. He said regional states, without exception, stood by Iran and condemned both Israel and the US in the wake of the latest assault.

Araghchi noted that since Iran’s new government took office last year, he has worked to accelerate rapprochement with neighbors. “I personally met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman twice last year and also joined a meeting between him and Iran’s first vice president. Three meetings in one year are unprecedented in the history of relations between the two countries,” he said.

He added that Tehran had also revived contacts with other regional states, including Egypt and Jordan. “While diplomatic ties with Egypt are not yet at the highest level, I have had more phone calls and direct meetings with my Egyptian counterpart than with most other ministers in the region,” he said. Araghchi added that his talks showed regional governments now have greater confidence in Iran and share concerns about Israel’s threats.

Ties with Egypt

Araghchi said Tehran is in no hurry to formally raise its diplomatic relations with Cairo, though cooperation is ongoing and contacts are active.

“As with any two normal states, we have relations and cooperation, but formally upgrading diplomatic ties takes the right timing and we are not in a rush,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that both countries maintain “Interests Sections” in each other’s capitals, staffed by envoys with ambassadorial rank. “Just last night I had dinner with the Egyptian foreign minister, and we spoke for more than two hours,” he added.

Addressing sometimes conflicting messages from Iran, such as threats by some figures to close the Strait of Hormuz versus official calls for Gulf stability, Araghchi said such remarks do not reflect government policy.

“These are not statements by officials of Iran but by ordinary individuals or journalists with no responsibility. Iranian society is open, and you can hear all kinds of views. If you watch Iranian television, you will see nightly debates between someone calling to close Hormuz and another rejecting it,” he said.

Araghchi stressed that Iran’s official position is “absolutely clear.”

“We call for peace and calm in the Gulf. Like Saudi Arabia and other regional states, Iran is a producer and exporter of oil, and our economy depends heavily on it. It is natural that we want peace in the Gulf, free navigation for everyone, and normal shipping,” he said.

Iran: Israel Sought to Ignite ‘Oil War’ in Gulf During 12-Day Conflict

Israel tried to drag the region into an “oil war” by targeting Iran’s energy facilities during the recent 12-day conflict, but Tehran responded by striking Israeli sites while working to prevent the fighting from spilling into the Gulf, Araghchi revealed.

“During the 12-day war, when Israel attacked our oil installations in Asaluyeh, we realized they wanted to pull the war into the Gulf and ignite an ‘oil war,’” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat. “We responded by hitting Israeli facilities and did our utmost to prevent the conflict from spreading to the Gulf.”

He said Gulf Arab states should focus on the risks posed by Israeli policies rather than Iran. “Their concern should be directed at Israel’s actions, which could lead to closing the Strait of Hormuz and dragging the war into the region - not at Iran,” Araghchi said.

Iranian Defense Minister’s Remarks

Araghchi declined to comment on recent statements by Iran’s defense minister about building military infrastructure abroad, saying any clarification should come from the defense minister himself.

When asked to explain the remarks, Araghchi smiled and said: “Do you really expect me to answer such a question?” He added: “If further clarification was necessary, it should have been provided by the defense minister.”

Iran Says it Does Not Intervene in Lebanon

Araghchi said Tehran does not interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs but expresses its opinions like other states, stressing that any disarmament of Hezbollah is an entirely Israeli initiative.

“We do not intervene in Lebanon’s internal matters, but that does not prevent us from voicing our positions, just as all countries do,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Saudi Arabia, for example, expresses its views on Lebanon, which is not considered interference. True interference is occupying Lebanese territory or imposing strange plans to undermine Lebanon.”

Araghchi said Hezbollah itself and the Lebanese government are responsible for decisions regarding the group’s weapons. “Hezbollah has proposed a national dialogue to determine Lebanon’s security strategy with the participation of all components. We are confident of one truth: Israel wants all regional states weak, disarmed, scattered, and in conflict,” he said.

He cited Syria as an example, noting that Israel had seized more territory and destroyed military capabilities under the new government compared with Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

“This is the scenario Israel seeks to implement in Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s resistance thwarted it. While the resistance has suffered attacks and damage recently, they think it has weakened. That is why they want to disarm it. But disarming Hezbollah is 100% an Israeli plan. The decision belongs to Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, and the Lebanese themselves; we only express our opinion,” Araghchi said.

He added that other regional states should recognize this reality and not underestimate the risk of similar scenarios in their countries.

“Enemies tried to target Iran, but it resisted, and they regretted it. How did Iran resist? Not through diplomacy or talks with the US, but with its missiles. It is strength, not concession, that counters Israel. We advise regional states not to make concessions to Israel; the more they give, the more it expands and grows bold. Recent statements by Netanyahu confirm Israel’s ambitions across the region,” he said.

Iran Says Ready to Work with Saudi Arabia on Lebanon

Araghchi said Tehran is willing to cooperate with Riyadh on Lebanon, describing recent talks with his Saudi counterpart as constructive.

“I met with Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan in Jeddah, and we had a good discussion on Lebanon,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Yes, there are differences in viewpoints, but we spoke calmly and in a positive atmosphere. We are ready to continue this dialogue with the Saudi side until we reach a point that can help ease this file.”

“I have no doubt that Saudi Arabia wants to help the Lebanese people, and so do we. The tools and methods may differ, but I have every hope that we can reach common ground,” he said.

Iran Backs Syrian Unity, Opposes Partition

Iran supports the territorial unity of Syria and opposes any attempts to partition the country, Araghchi said, condemning Israeli strikes on Syrian territory as the result of “excessive concessions” to Israel.

“Our position on Syria is very clear: we support Syria’s unity and the preservation of its sovereignty and borders, and we reject any attempts to divide it,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“We also want stability and calm in Syria. Experience shows that without stability, the country can become a haven for terrorist groups, which is against the interests of any regional state.”

Araghchi said Iran has had no contact so far with Syria’s new government. “We are not in a rush. Whenever the new government in Syria realizes that relations with Iran serve Syria’s interests - both the government’s and the people’s - we will consider it,” he added.

Iran Says Saudi Arabia a Major Regional Power, Stresses Cooperation for Stability

Araghchi described Saudi Arabia as a “major country in the region and the Islamic world,” saying stability and peace can only be achieved through cooperation between Tehran and Riyadh.

“Saudi Arabia and Iran are both key poles in the region. Yes, there are differences and competition, but they should not become hostility,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The Saudi people are our religious brothers, and the Iranian people are your brothers and sisters. More than 80,000 Iranian pilgrims perform Hajj annually, and recently Umrah campaigns have started, with around 400,000 expected this year.”

He added that both countries share concerns for Islam, Muslim interests, and regional security.

“Cooperation serves bilateral relations, the region, and the Islamic world. Fortunately, new opportunities have opened in relations over recent years, especially last year. But economic ties have not yet been sufficiently developed, requiring more joint planning,” Araghchi said.

Highlighting people-to-people ties, he said: “We hope to see, in the near future, the same number of Saudi tourists visiting Iran as Iranians visiting Saudi Arabia. Iran’s nature, culture, history, and landmarks will offer them a rewarding experience and provide a firsthand view of Iran, away from the portrayal by Western media. A visitor’s first trip changes that perception entirely.”

Iran Hails ‘Strong, Excellent’ Saudi Stance During Recent Israel Tensions

Araghchi praised Saudi Arabia’s position during the recent confrontation between Iran and Israel, calling it “strong and excellent.”

“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia took a very strong and excellent stance, whether in condemning Israeli and US attacks against Iran or in supporting Iran and the Iranian people,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat. “The same position was adopted by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which we consider extremely valuable.”

Iran Sees Economic Opportunities for Saudi Investors, Highlights Trade Potential

Araghchi said boosting trade and investment with Saudi Arabia is a priority, noting that both countries could supply many of each other’s needs more efficiently.

“Many goods currently sourced from distant countries could come from Iran, which is nearby, and similarly, many of our needs can be met by Saudi Arabia,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Trade between us and one regional country alone reaches around $30 billion, showing that even under sanctions, substantial exchange is possible.”

He highlighted opportunities for Saudi investors in Iran, particularly in oil, gas, and other industries. “Iran has about 100 million people, and its geographic location makes it a key corridor to Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe via the Indian Ocean and the Chabahar port,” Araghchi said.

Iranian FM Expresses Optimism About Regional Cooperation

Araghchi expressed cautious optimism about the future of the region, saying diplomacy remains hopeful even amid tensions.

“Diplomats are always optimistic,” Araghchi told Asharq Al-Awsat. “I believe that if cooperation is achieved among regional countries, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, we will see a region marked by stability and calm, flourishing with progress and development. I am doing everything I can to guide Iranian diplomacy toward this goal.”



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

“The army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian,” he says. “It wanted to restore control over security, nothing more.”

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. Security presentations would include Crown Prince Hassan, senior advisers, army commanders, the public security chief, the Royal Court chief, and the prime minister.

“Sometimes,” Obeidat says, “it was necessary to elaborate orally before the king on certain matters so they would not circulate more widely.”

Obeidat says the late King Hussein maintained a direct relationship with the General Intelligence Department, meeting regularly with senior officers and listening not only to intelligence briefings but also to their personal assessments.

When security briefings were presented before the king, Crown Prince Hassan would attend, along with royal advisers, senior army commanders, the public security chief, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister.

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. He met with the king regularly.

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.


Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
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Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)

Riyadh’s hosting of the Microsoft AI Tour this week delivered a headline with concrete weight: customers will be able to run cloud workloads from a local Azure data center region starting in the fourth quarter of 2026.

The announcement was more than a technical update. It marked a shift in posture. Saudi Arabia is no longer testing artificial intelligence at the margins. It is moving decisively into execution, where infrastructure, governance, skills development, and enterprise adoption align in a single direction.

For Turki Badhris, president of Microsoft Saudi Arabia, the timing reflects years of groundwork rather than a sudden push.

“Confirming that customers will be able to run cloud workloads from the Azure data center region in the fourth quarter of 2026 gives organizations clarity and confidence as they plan their digital and AI journeys,” Badhris told Asharq Al-Awsat on the sidelines of the event.

“Clarity and confidence” may sound procedural, but they are strategic variables. Government entities and large corporations do not scale AI based solely on pilot projects.

They move when they are assured that local infrastructure is available, regulatory requirements are aligned, and long-term operational continuity is secured. The announcement of the new Azure region signals that the infrastructure layer is no longer a plan, but a scheduled commitment nearing implementation.

From pilots to production

Saudi Arabia’s AI story has unfolded in phases. The first focused on expanding digital infrastructure, developing regulatory frameworks, and strengthening cloud readiness. That phase built capacity. The current phase centers on activation and use.

Badhris said the conversation has already shifted. “We are working closely across the Kingdom with government entities, enterprises, and partners to support readiness, from data modernization and governance to skills development so that customers can move from experimentation to production with confidence.”

The distinction is fundamental. Pilots test potential. Production environments reshape workflows.

Companies such as Qiddiya Investment Company and ACWA Power illustrate that transition. Rather than treating AI as isolated pilot initiatives, these organizations are embedding it into daily operations.

ACWA Power is using Azure AI services and the Intelligent Data Platform to optimize energy and water operations globally, with a strong focus on sustainability and resource efficiency through predictive maintenance and AI-driven optimization.

Qiddiya has expanded its use of Microsoft 365 Copilot to enable employees to summarize communications, analyze data, and interact with dashboards across hundreds of assets and contractors.

AI is no longer operating at the margins of the enterprise. It is becoming part of the operating core, a sign of institutional maturity. The technology is shifting from showcase tool to productivity engine.

Infrastructure as strategic signal

The Azure data center region in eastern Saudi Arabia offers advantages that go beyond lower latency. It strengthens data residency, supports compliance requirements, and reinforces digital sovereignty frameworks.

In highly regulated sectors such as finance, health care, energy, and government services, alignment with regulatory requirements is not optional; it is essential.

Badhris described the milestone as part of a long-term commitment. “This achievement represents an important milestone in our long-term commitment to enable real and scalable impact for the public and private sectors in the Kingdom,” he said.

The emphasis on scalable impact reflects a more profound understanding: infrastructure does not create value on its own, but enables the conditions for value creation. Saudi Arabia is treating AI as core economic infrastructure, comparable to energy or transport networks, and is using it to form the foundation for productivity gains.

Governance as accelerator

Globally, AI regulation is often seen as a constraint. In the Saudi case, governance appears embedded in the acceleration strategy. Adoption in sensitive sectors requires clear trust frameworks. Compliance cannot be an afterthought; it must be built into design.

Aligning cloud services with national digital sovereignty requirements reduces friction at scale. When organizations trust that compliance is integrated into the platform itself, expansion decisions move faster. In that sense, governance becomes an enabler.

The invisible constraint

While generative AI dominates headlines, the larger institutional challenge often lies in data architecture. Fragmented systems, organizational silos, and the absence of unified governance can hinder scaling.

Saudi Arabia's strategy focuses on data modernization as a foundation. A structured and integrated data environment is a prerequisite for effective AI use. Without it, AI remains superficial.

Another global challenge is the skills gap. Saudi Arabia has committed to training three million people by 2030. The focus extends beyond awareness to practical application. Transformation cannot succeed without human capital capable of integrating AI into workflows.

Badhris underscored that skills development is part of a broader readiness ecosystem. Competitiveness in the AI era, he said, is measured not only by model capability but by the workforce’s ability to deploy it.

Sector transformation as economic strategy

The Riyadh AI Tour highlighted sector use cases in energy, giga projects, and government services. These are not peripheral applications but pillars of Vision 2030. AI’s role in optimizing energy management supports sustainability. In major projects, it enhances execution efficiency. In government services, it improves the citizen experience.

AI here is not a standalone industry but a horizontal productivity driver.

Positioning in the global landscape

Global AI leadership is typically measured across four pillars: compute capacity, governance, ecosystem integration, and skills readiness. Saudi Arabia is moving to align these elements simultaneously.

The new Azure region provides computing. Regulatory frameworks strengthen trust. Partnerships support ecosystem integration. Training programs raise skills readiness.

Saudi Arabia is entering a decisive stage in its AI trajectory. Infrastructure is confirmed. Enterprise use cases are expanding. Governance is embedded. Skills are advancing.

Badhris said the announcement gives institutions “clarity and confidence” to plan their journey. That clarity may mark the difference between ambition and execution. In that sense, the Microsoft tour in Riyadh signaled that infrastructure is no longer the objective, but the platform on which transformation is built.