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No Strategic Change as Iran Begins 'Tactical' Withdrawal of its Militias in Syria

A Russian soldier on his armoured vehicle watches Syrian opposition factions during evacuation from Daraa city, on July 15, 2018. (AFP)
A Russian soldier on his armoured vehicle watches Syrian opposition factions during evacuation from Daraa city, on July 15, 2018. (AFP)
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No Strategic Change as Iran Begins 'Tactical' Withdrawal of its Militias in Syria

A Russian soldier on his armoured vehicle watches Syrian opposition factions during evacuation from Daraa city, on July 15, 2018. (AFP)
A Russian soldier on his armoured vehicle watches Syrian opposition factions during evacuation from Daraa city, on July 15, 2018. (AFP)

Iran has intensified in recent days the redeployment of its militias in various regions in Syria, including Damascus and Deir Ezzour, and even moving west towards Iraq.

Officials dismissed these moves as nothing more than "tactical", saying that they don't signify any strategic change for Iran in Syria.

A western official told Asharq Al-Awsat that the tactical withdrawal could have been prompted by several factors, such as the Iranian economic crisis and the new coronavirus pandemic. He said the tensions with the United States playing out in Iraq are another factor. He also noted the reemergence of ISIS in the west, Israel's intensification of its strikes on Syria and the easing of the fighting in some Syrian regions, as well as Russian pressure.

At the same time, some foreign Iranian militias were handing over their positions to Syrian militias that are loyal to Tehran. He compared the situation to what happened in southern Syria after the American-Russian deal that called for the withdrawal of non-Syrian forces to 80 kilometers from the Jordan border and disengagement line in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Redeployment

The Deir Ezzour 24 network reported on Monday that members of the Fatemiyoun and 313 organizations had moved from Deir Ezzour and al-Mayadeen on Saturday. The former returned to their headquarters in Palmyra, while the other group returned the Sayeda Zainab area south of Damascus.

The network said they were transported in civilian buses without their weapons. The majority of the members were Afghans and they were replaced by local forces.

Sayeda Zainab had recently witnessed tensions between Syrian forces and Iranian factions over the regime's decision to lock down the area over the coronavirus outbreak.

Iranian and Iraqi forces loyal to Damascus are deployed widely in the Deir Ezzour countryside, especially in the Alboukamal and al-Mayadeen areas. They also control the Alboukamal border crossing with Iraq.

Syria's Jisr network reported of a handover operation at Iranian checkpoints and positions in Deir Ezzour under the supervision of Russian military police. The positions were handed over to the Qaterji militias that are affiliated with the Syrian Qaterji group. They are led by Fawwaz al-Bashir, a tribal leader, and affiliates of the Quds brigade that is run by the Russian Wagner group.

The withdrawal began from Deir Ezzour and the forces headed east towards the Iraqi border. The new forces now hold 70 kilometers of territory in Deir Ezzour leading east, while the Iranian militias control 70 kms in other areas, significantly in Alboukamal.

Slain Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani had overseen the reopening of the crossing, which gives Tehran a land route from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean. Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike near Baghdad in January.

Israeli position

On May 5, Israeli officials declared that Iran had started to pull out its forces from Syria after succumbing to frequent Israeli strikes.

Defense Minister Naftali Bennett said last week: "Iran has nothing to do in Syria... (and) we won't stop before they leave Syria." He said Iran was "trying to establish itself on the border with Israel to threaten Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa".

"They have enough problems at home with the coronavirus (and) the collapsing economy," he said about Iran.

Bennett said Iran "used to be an asset for the Syrians... but now it's a burden".

He made his remarks after 14 Iranian and Iraqi fighters were killed in suspected Israeli strikes on Deir Ezzour and on military caches in Aleppo.

In April, three civilians were killed in Israeli strikes near Damascus and a week earlier, nine pro-regime forces were killed in strikes on Palmyra.

Israel had in recent years drawn "red lines" in Syria, including: barring the transfer of rockets to Hezbollah in Lebanon, preventing Iran from setting up permanent military bases and factories for the manufacture of long-range rockets, and standing against the formation of cells in the Golan. It has launched hundreds of raids, none of which were intercepted by Russian air defenses deployed in Syria.

American position

US State Department’s special representative for the Syrian war and the fight against ISIS, James Jeffrey, told Asharq Al-Awsat earlier this month that his country supports "in every possible way", diplomatically and logistically, Israeli raids on Iranian sites in Syria.

He said all foreign forces, including Iranian ones, must withdraw from Syria. Russia was the exception because it has been there before 2011 when the conflict began.

Western officials confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Iran was redeploying its forces in Syria.

Jeffrey said that the Iranians were indeed tactically pulling out from Syria partially because they do not need so many ground forces there. He also cited concern over the economic toll amid the US sanctions against Tehran and the massive financial burden caused the coronavirus outbreak in Iran.

He also added that the moves could just be tactical with no far-reaching significance.

American and regional officials in countries neighboring Syria have speculated that internal and external pressure may have prompted the Iranian moves, but they downplayed their significance, saying they do not amount to strategic change.

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Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
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Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)

The sound of gunfire, barrel bombs, and stray bullets is nothing new in Sudan. What’s new is that the violence has moved from the outskirts to the capital, Khartoum. This shift forced the government and military to relocate to a temporary capital in Port Sudan, nearly 1,000 kilometers away on the Red Sea coast.
Past conflicts were seen as rebellions against the state, but they stemmed from a deeper struggle: the “center” holds all the power and resources, while the “margins” are left with nothing.
These wars have always been about demands for rights and equality.
Under Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s wars shifted from demands for rights to a “religious war” between the Muslim north and the Christian or secular south. This led to South Sudan’s secession and the creation of a new state that joined the United Nations. But what drives the conflicts that continue to devastate Sudan?
Analysts say the root cause is the lack of a national vision and the failure to recognize Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Without a unified political and economic framework, this diversity has been ignored.
The current war, though fought between two formal armies, stems from the same issues of marginalization and exclusion. These problems sparked Sudan’s first rebellion in 1955, led by the Anya-Nya 1 forces, named after the cobra snake.
The Naivasha Agreement
Sudan’s first civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but reignited in 1983 after former President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia law. This sparked a rebellion led by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The conflict escalated into a “jihadist” war as Islamist forces framed it as a battle against “enemies of the faith.” The fighting lasted for years, killing more than two million people.
Unable to secure a military victory, the government signed the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. The deal granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, with a five-year transitional period to decide between unity or independence.
John Garang briefly became Sudan’s First Vice President during this period but died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His deputy, Salva Kiir, succeeded him and led South Sudan to a 2011 referendum, where the region voted for independence. South Sudan became a new nation, taking a third of Sudan’s land, a quarter of its people, and most of its resources.
Meanwhile, conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, with rebels accusing the government of marginalization. The war turned ethnic when the government armed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to fight African-origin rebel groups. One Janjaweed leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, later became the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Darfur war claimed 300,000 lives. Al-Bashir’s government was accused of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, leading to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Bashir and three senior officials that remain in effect.
Chasing Peace Across Capitals
In May 2006, Sudan’s government signed a peace deal in Abuja with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Arko Minnawi. However, the movement split, and another faction, led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, rejected the deal and continued fighting from Jebel Marra in central Darfur.
Minnawi briefly joined the government as an assistant to President Omar al-Bashir but later rebelled again, claiming he was treated as a "kitchen helper" rather than a serious political partner.
Efforts to negotiate peace moved between capitals. In 2011, some groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which promised power and wealth-sharing, but fighting continued.
In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government signed a new peace agreement in Juba with key armed groups, including Minnawi’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim.
The deal gave Minnawi the role of Darfur governor and Ibrahim the post of finance minister. Despite these accords, true peace remains out of reach.
A New Southern Conflict
War broke out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two regions given a right to “popular consultation” under the Naivasha Agreement to decide their future. The SPLM-North, an offshoot of the southern SPLM, took up arms again.
The SPLM-N split into two factions: one led by Malik Agar, now a deputy in Sudan’s Sovereign Council, who signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, controls Kauda in South Kordofan and continues sporadic fighting.
Eastern Sudan also saw conflict in the 1990s, with groups like the Beja Congress and Free Lions opposing Bashir’s regime. These groups later signed the Asmara Peace Agreement, gaining shares of power and wealth.
In April 2019, months of protests forced the military to oust President Omar al-Bashir. But sit-ins continued, and a violent crackdown killed hundreds, drawing condemnation as a horrific crime against civilians.
Under public pressure, the military signed a constitutional declaration in August 2019, agreeing to share power with civilians. This led to a transitional government with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti.
War of the Generals
On October 25, 2021, Sudan's army leader overthrew Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s civilian government in a coup. Under pressure from peaceful protests, the general later agreed to a framework agreement with civilian leaders, promising a return to civilian rule and preventing the return of the Islamist regime.
However, supporters of the former regime undermined the deal, causing tensions between the army and the RSF, leading to war.
On April 15, 2023, gunfire broke out in southern Khartoum, marking the start of the ongoing conflict. The RSF accused the army of attacking its camps, while some claim Islamist cells within the army targeted the RSF, forcing it to choose between surrender or war.
Miscalculations
The war was expected to end quickly due to the army’s stronger military. However, the RSF surprised the army by using urban warfare tactics to take control of key military bases and government buildings, including the presidential palace.
The government moved to Port Sudan, while Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was trapped for over three months before escaping.
The RSF expanded its control over Darfur, western Sudan, and the central Gezira region, holding about 70% of the country. After nearly two years of fighting, the army regained some areas, but the RSF still controls large parts of Sudan and continues fierce fighting, with the war still ongoing.
The Worst Humanitarian Crisis
The war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands and triggered what the UN calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in history." More than 11 million people are displaced within Sudan, while around 3 million have fled to neighboring countries. Over half of Sudan’s population, about 25 million people, face severe food insecurity.
Negotiations have failed, with both sides refusing to return to talks after the Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration collapsed, largely due to the army’s and its supporters' refusal to engage.
Root Causes
Former Sovereign Council member and deputy head of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Tagadum,” Al-Hadi Idris blames the war on Sudan’s failure to agree on a “national development plan” since independence.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he says the main reasons for the conflict are the failure to implement fair development, achieve justice, and the lack of resolution on key issues like the role of religion in politics, national identity, and military involvement in government.
Idris argues that addressing these issues is crucial to ending the war for good.
Mohamed Abdel-Hakim, a leader in the Unionist Gathering, believes the wars stem from unequal development and citizenship.
He says resolving issues like marginalization, protecting people’s rights, and replacing oppressive regimes with democratic governance is key to stopping Sudan’s long-running conflicts.
Abdel-Hakim also calls for reforming the military to create a professional, national army focused on protecting the constitution and civilian leadership, with strict oversight to prevent the army from becoming politicized.