US ‘Conditional Proposal’ to Assad and Netanyahu 2011: Abandon Iran in Exchange for Restoring Golan

Asharq Al-Awsat reveals details of last chapter in negotiations between Syria and Israel

President Bashar Assad meets with John Kerry when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov, 8, 2010. AP file photo
President Bashar Assad meets with John Kerry when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov, 8, 2010. AP file photo
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US ‘Conditional Proposal’ to Assad and Netanyahu 2011: Abandon Iran in Exchange for Restoring Golan

President Bashar Assad meets with John Kerry when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov, 8, 2010. AP file photo
President Bashar Assad meets with John Kerry when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov, 8, 2010. AP file photo

Syria and Israel, through American mediation, were on the verge of signing a peace agreement in February 2011, just before the “Arab Spring” protests broke out. The American mediator drafted an agreement that “went further than any previous document.” It included Damascus’ pledge to sever “military ties” with Iran and the Hezbollah party in Lebanon and “neutralizing” any Israeli threat, in exchange for its reclaiming of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, based on the June 4, 1967 border.

This was confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat by officials who were involved in the negotiations, which were held by Syrian President Bashar Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and mediated by American envoy Frederic Hof. The negotiations also included at least two meetings with the participation of late Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem, legal advisor Riad Daoudi and former US Ambassador to Damascus Robert Ford. Then US President Barack Obama and his Vice President Joe Biden, the current president, were aware of these secret negotiations, which ex-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was also heavily involved in. No official statement over these negotiations was made by Damascus, which has long expressed its commitment to restoring all Golan territories and maintaining the “strategic relationship with Iran”.

Enticing offer

Former US Secretary of State John Kerry shed light on the secret talks. In his book “Every Day Is Extra”, he revealed that Assad had sent Obama a proposal to establish peace with Israel. When informed of the proposal, Netanyahu was very surprised with it. Kerry revealed that when he served as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he visited Damascus in 2009 where he met with Assad to tackle a number of issues including a peace deal with Israel given that previous attempts by the governments of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak and Netanyahu (1996-1999) ended in failure.

Kerry wrote: “Assad asked me what it would take to enter into serious peace negotiations [with Israel], in the hope of securing return of the Golan Heights, which Syria had lost to Israel in 1967. I told him that if he were serious, he should make a private proposal.”

“He asked what it would look like. I shared my thoughts. He instructed his top aide to draft a letter from Assad to President Obama,” he added. Assad, in his letter, had asked Obama to sponsor a fresh round of Syria-Israel peace talks, expressing his readiness “to take a number of steps in exchange for the return of the Golan from Israel”.

The next day, Kerry flew to Israel where he met with Netanyahu, who had returned to power. Netanyahu, recalled Kerry “was surprised that Assad was willing to go that far, significantly further than he’d been willing to go [previously].”

Kerry said that after meeting with Netanyahu, he returned to Washington with the “Assad offer”. The Obama administration tried to test the extent of the Syrian president’s seriousness by demanding “confidence-building measures” towards the US and Israel, including stopping some arms shipments to Hezbollah, which did not happen.

“I remember hearing that Assad was continuing with exactly the kind of behavior on Hezbollah that we told him needed to stop. It was disappointing but unsurprising,” wrote Kerry.

Iranian strikes

With the launch of peace negotiations in wake of the 1991 Madrid peace conference, overtures between Syria and Israel were made and peaked when Rabin held the so-called “four-legged table” negotiations. They focused on the withdrawal, peace relations, security arrangements and the timetable. Meetings included the Syrian and Israeli chiefs of staff, as well as secret and open negotiations that covered a commitment towards a “complete withdrawal” from the Golan and studying the possibility of “establishing normal peace relations”, security arrangements and opening embassies and border gates along the June 4, 1967 border.

After Rabin was assassinated in November 1995, Peres tried to “soar in the sky with a peace deal with Syria”, rushing to hold negotiations to reach a treaty. Indeed, in early 1996 bilateral negotiations were held but they collapsed after a series of suicide attacks in Tel Aviv, Ashkelon and Jerusalem.

At the time, the Israeli delegation informed its Syrian counterpart during talks in the US that “Iran is behind the attacks because it wants the negotiations to fail” and that “Syria must condemn the terrorist operations,” revealed an informed source. The negotiations ultimately collapsed and Peres launched Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon, which marked the end of his time in government.

Netanyahu then came to power in 1996. Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad “negotiated” with him through an American mediator, businessman Ronald Lauder, over a “very advanced” detailed agreement in 1998. Netanyahu was succeeded by Ehud Barak, who resumed the negotiations and held a meeting with former Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa. The talks were sponsored by former US President Bill Clinton. Barak offered an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan towards the June 4 border in exchange for peace and security arrangements. Intense work meetings were held in Shepherdstown near Washington, with attention focused on the thorny water file. The Israelis said that the issue was a “red line” and the Americans offered a “working paper” equivalent to a draft peace treaty.

In early 2000, Barak informed the Americans at the conclusion of another round of negotiations that he could not strike a peace deal because of the “complicated internal situation” that demanded he head back to Israel. He pledged to return to Shepherdstown, but never did.

The final shot at negotiations by a then ailing Hafez Assad was made in March 2000 when he met with Clinton in Geneva. Those talks also collapsed after 20 minutes due to a dispute over Syria’s access to the shores of Lake Tiberias and Clinton’s proposal of a map, which was previously rejected by Assad, of the June 4 border and Tiberias shore.

President Bashar Assad came to power in mid-2000. When Syria was confronted with international isolation following the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, Damascus started to show some flexibility in its desire to hold negotiations with Tel Aviv. It sought to “end the isolation imposed by Washington by holding negotiations with Tel Aviv.” Turkey sponsored the talks, which were held in 2008. The discussions were advanced enough to begin considering the possibility of arranging direct telephone negotiations between Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Assad and then Israeli PM Ehud Olmert in late 2008. The efforts collapsed when Israel launched an operation against the Gaza Strip in December of that year.

The European and American isolation eventually ended. Robert Ford was then appointed ambassador to Damascus in 2010. Washington built on previous efforts, including those exerted by Ankara, and on the Obama administration’s desire to activate the peace path. To that end, it had appointed envoy George Mitchell to test the waters in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, which remained secret and whom very few figures in each of the involved countries knew about.

On the American side, everyone from Obama, Biden, Clinton, national security advisor Tom Donilon, American Ambassador to Tel Aviv Dan Shapiro and Ford in Damascus knew of the talks. On the Syrian side, the officials who were informed of the talks, in varying degrees, included Assad, Muallem and Daoudi. The latter two had held rounds of talks with Hof and Ford. In Israel, Hof’s meetings were limited to Netanyahu at the official residence of the prime minister. The meetings were attended by then Defense Minister Ehud Barak.

Assad-Hof

The final meeting held as part of this mediation took place between Assad and Hof on February 28, 2011, at the height of the “Arab Spring” that had ousted regimes in Libya and Egypt and whose protests had started to break out in Damascus. Hof, who had worked on drafting the agreement, recalled that some proposals included Damascus’ abandoning of “military relations” with Tehran and Hezbollah in exchange for the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan towards the June 4 border.

Hof is a former US military commander and expert in the demarcation of borders of disputed areas. Back in the early 1990s, he was the first official to draw the June 4 border on the ground. Ford told Asharq Al-Awsat that upon his arrival in Damascus, Hof requested that the ambassador not attend his meeting with Assad. Ford agreed on condition that “that Hof sleep at the ambassador's residence”.

“I telephoned him on an open line so that Syrian intelligence could overhear our conversation. I said, ‘I agree on condition that you and your aide sleep at the ambassador’s residence, so that the Syrians know that we are a single team.’ And this is indeed what happened. Hof later informed me of the details of the meeting, I leave it to him to disclose” what took place during talks with Assad and with the negotiations as a whole.

According to Israeli reports in 2012, Hof’s documents revealed that the negotiations were based on Netanyahu’s readiness to return to the June 4 border, allowing Damascus complete control over the Golan, in exchange for a comprehensive peace deal that includes an Israeli “expectation” that Syria would sever ties with Iran.

Officials who were informed of the talks said Hof was “confident that peace was possible, whereby Assad would end his relations with Iran and Hezbollah and shift his alliances towards America and moderate Arab countries.”

One official told Asharq Al-Awsat: “I did not see the peace agreement draft. It was the beginning of negotiations, not the end.” Another official said: “It was not clear whether the two sides had agreed on a specific timetable or a resolution to the water issue in the Golan. Syria was saying that Israel had no claim over waters beyond the June 4 border. Israel, however, said that even if it could not deploy its military beyond that border, it wanted to maintain logistic presence that would allow it access to the water.”

The water dispute and shore of Tiberias Lake were one of the reasons of the collapse of the Assad-Clinton summit in 2000. Assad at the time had insisted that he wanted to “dip his feet” in the lake, which Barak rejected at the time. In fact, the Israelis paved a road around the shore, making it virtually impossible for the Syrians to access it without a clear agreement.

Some said that the Hof mediation was “conditional-hypothetical”, similar to what had taken place in the mid-1990s when then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher led negotiations by posing “hypothetical” questions to Hafez Assad. “What if Rabin pledged to withdraw fully from the Golan? Are you ready to forge peace (normalize) ties?” At the time, Rabin had placed a “deposit” with Christopher that included the readiness to pullout completely from the Golan if Assad agreed to demands that included peace relations and security arrangements.

One of the officials informed of the Hof mediation said that Netanyahu was “prepared to withdraw completely from the Golan if the Syrians agreed to a peace agreement that includes changing regional approaches and severing ties with Iran.”

A former American official, who is informed of the file, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “There can be no doubt on the seriousness. The negotiations were conditional. The Israelis wanted strategic change in the Syrian approach. Syria wanted to reclaim all territories until the June 4 border. A lot of progress had taken place between both sides.”

“America had no doubt over the seriousness of the negotiations. Assad and Netanyahu were serious in finding out how far the other would go,” he added. “Moreover, great progress, more than ever before, was achieved with Netanyahu over the issue of territories. Hof’s meeting with Assad on February 28 gave a clear signal of what Assad could offer.”

The Americans are keen on stressing that the written draft of the agreement was American. “This is important because envoy George Mitchel did not draft any paper between Netanyahu and [Palestinian] President Mahmoud Abbas (Abou Mazen).” The Americans are also keen to stress that no direct Syrian-Israeli meeting had taken place, but the negotiations had been held through Hof.

Confidence-building

The last attempt at negotiations gains importance on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the eruption of the Syrian protests, especially for Moscow, the main player in Syria that is leading a “confidence-building” mediation between Damascus and Tel Aviv. This meditation includes a prisoner swap, repatriating the remains of Israeli soldiers, sponsoring a return to working with the “disengagement agreement” in the Golan of 2018 and keeping Iran and its militias away from southern Syria.

Another area of significance is word that some Arab countries are interested in opening channels between Damascus and Israel or holding secret meetings to test the possibility of striking a peace agreement and keeping Iran away in exchange for financial “incentives” related to reconstructing Syria and resolving its economic problems.

Tel Aviv did not openly express interest in the political negotiations, especially after President Donald Trump announced in 2019 his support for “Israeli sovereignty” over the Golan and as it has continued to carry out raids against “Iranian positions” in Syria. Damascus, for its part, has not openly expressed interest in peace that does not include a “complete withdrawal” from the Golan and that may “jeopardize its strategic relations with Iran.”

Ford, meanwhile, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “It will be difficult for Assad to presently sign a peace deal with Israel unless he receives a lot in return, because he currently needs the support provided by Iran, its militias and Hezbollah. If they pull out from Syria, who will help the regime control the Syrian Badia, Homs, Sweida and parts of Daraa?”

“Will Damascus obtain western financial aid even if Assad were to sign a peace agreement and open an Israeli embassy in Damascus? It is difficult for the money to flow and for the sanctions to be removed after all the crimes that have taken place in Syria,” he remarked. “Some American sanctions may be removed, such as those related to the blacklisting of terrorist organizations, meddling in Lebanon or the arrival of Arab or European aid. However, the Caesar Act (which came into effect in mid-2020) cannot be simply undone.”

“Assad will not receive any sympathy in America even if a peace agreement is signed. There are limits to what can be offered in exchange to any peace deal,” he added.

Meanwhile, an Arab official, who is informed of Damascus’ position, said: “It is difficult for the regime to agree to sign a peace agreement without receiving a clear guarantee that it will reclaim the whole of the Golan. It is also difficult for the regime to completely disassociate itself from Iran.”

Between these two stances, a senior official, who is informed of the position in Syria, Israel, the region and the US, said: “Perhaps this was the final chapter in efforts to reach a peace agreement between Syria and Israel in the form we have been familiar with in past decades. At best, a new agreement or understanding may be reached, but it will be different than what we have read about and negotiated over for decades.”



Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)

The fragile global legal framework for nuclear weapons control faces further setbacks in 2026, eroding guardrails to avoid a nuclear crisis.

The first half of the year will see two key events: the US-Russia bilateral treaty, New START, expires on February 5, and in April, New York hosts the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- the cornerstone of global nuclear security frameworks.

The RevCon, held every four to five years, is meant to keep the NPT alive. But during the last two sessions, the 191 signatory states failed to agree on a final document, and experts expect the same outcome in April.

"I think this is going to be a difficult RevCon," said Alexandra Bell, head of US-based global security nonprofit the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at a UN-hosted online conference in early December.

"In terms of the current state and near future prospects of nuclear arms control architecture, things are bleak," she added.

Anton Khlopkov, director of Russian think-tank the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), took an even starker point of view, saying at the same event that "we are at the point of almost complete dismantlement of arms control architecture".

"We should be realistic in the current circumstances. At best, I think we should try to preserve what we have," he said.

- 'Crumbling' safeguards -

From US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to Russia's test of the new Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and US President Donald Trump's remarks about possibly resuming nuclear tests -- the international nuclear landscape darkened in 2025.

At the same time, "the arms control architecture is crumbling", Emmanuelle Maitre of France's Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) told AFP.

A key challenge hinges on a shift in global relations.

Nuclear control had been built over decades around a Moscow-Washington axis, but China's growing power and rapid technological advances have shifted the international playing field, which is simultaneously increasingly strained.

"The growing interlinkage between nuclear and conventional forces and the emergence of disruptive technologies (such as the US Golden Dome defense system and new hypersonic weapons) have transformed traditional nuclear deterrence into a multi-domain concept, especially in a multipolar world," said Peking University's Hua Han.

"This trilateral configuration introduces complexities far beyond the Cold War-era bilateral model. Increasing China-Russia cooperation further complicates deterrence calculations, particularly in the two main theaters of concern: Europe and the Asia-Pacific," she added, according to the minutes of an April event held by Pakistan's Center for International Strategic Studies.

A likely result of the changing landscape is the lapse of New START, which sets weapon limits and includes inspection systems.

"The entire inspection component is no longer functioning, the notifications when a missile is moved, etc, all of that has vanished. What remains is only the voluntary commitment to stay within the limits," said Maitre.

- 'Collective solutions' -

But allowing New START to lapse is "in American interest", according to Robert Peters of the influential Heritage Foundation, reflecting the stance of much of the US strategic community to avoid tying Washington's hands to Moscow alone.

Beijing, which currently has fewer weapons, has so far refused to engage in trilateral disarmament talks.

"China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet. It's building 100 new warheads a year and now has more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos than the US has active Minuteman III silos," Peters said at a recent online International Institute for Strategic Studies event.

"New START does nothing to address" that issue, he added.

However, Maitre said, a New START lapse doesn't mean the world should expect serious consequences as early as February 6.

In both Washington and Moscow, "there is a small margin to bring some weapons back into service, but the numbers cannot be very significant. There are bottlenecks" that will slow any buildup, she said.

Nor will the lack of a final document from the RevCon cause "immediate or damaging consequences" to the NPT, she said.

But, she warned, fewer safeguards risks leaving the world without diplomatic tools to resolve tensions.

"The less functional the NPT becomes, the harder it is to forge collective solutions in the event of a crisis."


Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.