Turkey-Russia Relations: Friend or Foe or Just Pragmatism

Turkish-Russian relations have historical depth, marked mostly by conflict. Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia fought a dozen wars. During the First World War, they were on opposite sides. The two enjoyed fair to good relations during the Turkish War of Independence but even then, things were not as good as they looked. After the Second World War, the Soviets claimed some Turkish territories in eastern Anatolia and questioned Turkish sovereignty over the Turkish Straits. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 serving as the Alliance’s southern flank nation throughout the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia were in competition for what some like to call the new great game over the Caucasus and Central Asia.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Crimean Tatars, Circassians, Nogais ( Turkish ethnic group who live in the North Caucasus region), and many others of a shrinking Ottoman Empire had to flee their ancestral homes due to Russian advances. These people who found their new homes in Anatolia have also been a factor in Turkey-Russia relations.

Against this background, within the framework of the new strategic environment and developments in the international arena, Turkish-Russian relations gained a new momentum in the 2000s.

Presidents Erdoğan and Putin are regarded by many, as look-alike in their way of doing politics in general. They may not be the best of friends, (friendship defined by common ideals, lifestyles and pleasures) but they have established a kind of working relationship, based on mutual interest and benefit. This relationship plays a major and even central role in the present-day conduct of Turkey-Russia relations.

Bilateral relations between the two countries are quite active.

Trade volume is at an average of 25 billion dollars. At one point it was around 30 billion dollars. Despite a decline in its share, Russia is still Turkey’s main energy supplier, providing 34 per cent of its natural gas and 11 per cent of its oil. On the other side, Turkey’s exports to Russia are mainly agricultural products, machinery, land vehicles and textiles. All in all, around 80 per cent of bilateral trade volume is in favor of Russia.

But Turkey makes up for this deficit in the fields of services and construction. Turkey continues to be the major destination for Russians who adore its moderately priced all-inclusive five star resorts. The record was in 2019 with seven million Russian visitors. As to construction sector, up-to date, Turkey has completed around 1980 projects in Russia with a total value of around 75 billion dollars.

Turkey also serves as the transit carrier of Russian natural gas. The most recent joint project in this area is the TurkStream which has been officially inaugurated in 2020. This project connects Russia and Turkey with two 930 kilometers long offshore pipelines running under the Blacksea, one of which brings natural gas to Turkey. The other one is for gas destined for Europe.

Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, with a total project cost estimated at 20 billion dollars, is another strategic value cooperation. Its first reactor is planned to be operational in 2023.

On the world stage, Russia and Turkey keep running into each other in different theaters, such as Syria, Ukraine, Libya, south Caucasus, They are mostly on opposing sides and occasionally, they physically hurt each other. But on the whole, the two countries have managed to establish some sort of a dialogue and cooperation module in all these theaters.

Russia is a major actor in Syria and militarily active in the field. Astana Process has paved the way for cooperation between Turkey and Russia. But the potential for a rift is still very much present, especially in Idlib. Despite a 2018 agreement, half of the province has been captured by the regime and Russia. In the opposition-held and frequently targeted by the regime part of Idlib, thousands of armed militants of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other mostly radical groups are present.

At a press conference in Moscow on September 9 with Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid, in response to a question Minister Lavrov said: “Turkish colleagues need to fulfill the agreements reached by Presidents of Russia and Turkey in September 2018. These agreements provide for the separation of the normal, reasonable opposition from the terrorists, primarily from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This work is underway but, unfortunately, it is far from complete”. In the context of recent developments in Deraa, Lavrov stated that “in Deraa and on a broader plane, in Syria, no territories should be controlled by armed units other than the Syrian army.” What Lavrov said can be taken as a message as to what can be expected in the future.

What happens in Idlib and with its 3.4 million inhabitants in case of an all-out military campaign by the Assad regime and Russians, carries a potential for confrontation. In that regard, the attack on a Turkish patrol in Idlib on Saturday, killing two Turkish soldiers and wounding three, came at a critical time.

The 24 November 2015 incident, when Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 military aircraft in Syria, was a clear example of how things could turn very sour between the two countries. Russia halted almost everything from Turkish businesses on its territories, to Russians visiting Turkey. Turkish military activities in Syria were also seriously affected. Russia enforced its position in Syria with sophisticated military hardware including air defense systems. It took a lot of effort and almost a year to straighten out relations.

In Libya, Turkey and Russia have faced each other with various fighting elements. Turkish involvement on behalf of the Government of National Accord changed the course of the war. Russia and its side did not end up on top. But neither seems discontent with the turn of events, at least for now.

In 2020, Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, was able to liberate its territories under Armenian occupation. Turkey carved its mark in the Caucasus demonstrating that it is a force that counts. Turkey also further solidified its alliance with Azerbaijan and won points with its kin in the Caucasus and Central Asia. On part of Russia, not-so-Russia-friendly Prime Minister Pashinyan learned a lesson. Russia managed to engineer a ceasefire and under the terms of the ceasefire agreement, was back on the Azeri soil for the first time since 1990. In any case, both Turkey and Russia played it well in preventing things from taking a different shape and turn into a conflict between themselves.

Turkey and Russia are also on opposite sides on Ukraine. Turkey’s openly declared position is that it does not recognize the annexation of Crimea. Russia does not seem to mind this, as long as political positions are not turned into some sort of action. But the Russians follow with dissatisfaction and some concern, recent defense cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine, in particular, transfer of Turkish killer drones.

Afghanistan may become another file either for cooperation or confrontation between the two countries, depending on how things develop over there. The reasons are not entirely clear for everyone, but Turkey seems keen to assume a role in new Afghanistan. Russia regards Afghanistan basically from a security point of view, with particular reference to Central Asian countries. This region is crucial for Russia in terms of its strategic value, near abroad concept and the Russian-led Collective Security Organization.

One other issue of particular importance and with a strong NATO angle is the Black Sea and the Montreux Convention. Russia does not want NATO vessels in the Black Sea and is adamant about preserving the Convention as it is, which regulates the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and limits their presence. The Turkish President’s most favored and politically advertised Canal Istanbul Project has raised some questions as to whether the Convention will have to be altered or not. Turkey’s position does not seem to be in contradiction to Russia’s.

The most important development in bilateral relations with far-reaching implications has been Turkey’s acquisition of S-400 air defense systems from Russia. The US and some other NATO Allies reacted strongly. The US went so far as imposing CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions on Turkey. Many in the West continue to present the S-400 issue as yet another proof of Turkey drifting away from NATO and the West.

Turkey’s side of the story is quite different. For some time now, Turkey has felt very unfairly treated by the EU or the West in general. It felt left out in the cold by its Allies on a number of occasions. Turkey’s EU accession negotiations are in deep freeze. Arms sales from many Allied countries including the USA, Canada, France and Germany are either restricted or in some cases, banned altogether. Turkey has argued that it had attempted to purchase air defense systems from the US and other western nations but was turned down. Russia, on the other hand, was more than ready to sell and Turkey opted for where it was possible to purchase the much-needed system.

Turks of different political convictions which rarely agree on anything, are of the same opinion that Turkey’s moves are not out of love for Russia but a consequence of the negative treatment of its Western Allies and partners.

In any case, Russia is happy. It managed to sell one of its multi-billion dollars weapons system, created a rift within NATO and further troubled the already strained relations between Turkey and the West.

Turkey is a member of an Alliance which identifies Russia as the main threat in a deteriorating security environment. But there is nothing to prevent Turkey, or any other member country for that matter, to engage with Russia in various fields, based on mutual benefit and respect, without contradicting NATO commitments and obligations. In any case, it is equally true that Turkey which enjoys good relations with its western allies and partners will be much better positioned in its dealings with Russia, compared to Turkey which is left alone by its allies and partners.

In conclusion, Turkey and Russia may have diverging positions on a number of issues, some with a potential for direct or indirect confrontation. But, for now, their relations seem to be governed by pragmatism. Even though a lot of patience and some occasional looking the other way may be needed in these relations, both countries seem to realize that dialogue and cooperation are better than confrontation; so long as it is possible.

Lebanon’s new president and former army commander Joseph Aoun has maintained a low profile. Those who know him say he is no-nonsense, kind and averse to affiliating himself with any party or even expressing a political opinion — a rarity for someone in Lebanon’s fractured, transactional political system.

Bilal Saab, a former Pentagon official who is now senior managing director of the TRENDS US consulting firm, often met Aoun while overseeing Washington's security cooperation in the Middle East. He called Aoun a "very sweet man, very compassionate, very warm" who avoided political discussions "like the plague."

"He really was viciously nonpartisan, did not have any interest in even delivering speeches or doing media," Saab said. "He wanted to take care of business, and his only order of business was commanding the Lebanese army."

That might make Aoun an odd fit as Lebanon’s president after being elected Thursday — ending a more than two-year vacuum in the post — but Saab said it could be a boon for the country where incoming leaders typically demand that certain plum positions go to supporters.

"He’s not going to ask for equities in politics that typically any other president would do," Saab said.

Aoun, 61, is from Aichiye, a Christian village in Jezzine province, southern Lebanon. He joined the army as a cadet in 1983, during Lebanon's 15-year civil war.

George Nader, a retired brigadier general who served alongside Aoun, recalled him as keeping cool under fire.

They fought together in the battle of Adma in 1990, a fierce confrontation between the Lebanese army and the Lebanese Forces militia during the war's final stages. Nader described it as one of the toughest battles of his career.

"The level of bloodshed was significant and I remember Joseph was steady and focused," he said.

Aoun commanded the Lebanese army's 9th infantry brigade before being appointed army chief in March 2017.

During his tenure as commander, he oversaw the army’s response to a series of crises, beginning with a battle to push out militants from the ISIS group and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, who were then operating in eastern Lebanon near the Syrian border. The army fought in coordination with the Hezbollah group.

HTS in its current iteration led a lightning offensive that toppled Syrian president Bashar al-Assad last month and has become the de facto ruling party in Syria.

The Lebanese army navigated other challenges, including responding to mass anti-government protests in 2019, the 2020 Beirut port explosion and the 14-month conflict between Israel and Hezbollah that came to a halt with a ceasefire agreement in November.

The Lebanese military largely stayed on the sidelines in the Israel-Hezbollah war, only returning fire a handful of times when Israeli strikes hit its positions. Dozens of soldiers were killed in airstrikes and shelling

The military also took a major hit when Lebanon's currency collapsed beginning in 2019, reducing the monthly salary of a soldier to the equivalent of less than $100.

In a rare political statement, Aoun openly criticized the country's leadership for its lack of action on the issue in a speech in June 2021.

"What are you waiting for? What do you plan to do? We have warned more than once of the dangers of the situation," he said. The United States and Qatar both at one point subsidized soldiers' salaries.

Ed Gabriel, president of the American Task Force on Lebanon, a nonprofit that aims to build stronger US-Lebanon ties, said he met Aoun about seven years ago when he was taking over command of the armed forces and "immediately found him to be the best of those that we had worked with."

He described Aoun as a "very direct guy, very honest" and a leader "who inspires loyalty by his hard work." Those attributes helped Aoun to prevent a flood of defections during the economic crisis, when many soldiers had to resort to working second jobs, Gabriel said.

On a personal level, Gabriel described Aoun as a humble and deeply religious man. Like all Lebanese presidents and army commanders under Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system, Aoun is a Maronite Christian.

"His religion really sets the groundwork for ... his value system and his morals," Gabriel said.

In Aoun's hometown, residents burst into celebrations after his election, setting off fireworks, dancing in the streets and handing out sweets.

"We are currently living in very difficult times, and he is the right person for this challenging period," said Claire Aoun, among those celebrating. "May God guide and support him, and may he rebuild this entire nation for us."

But Aoun's election was not without controversy or universally supported, even among fellow Christians.

One of the most influential Christian parties in the country, the Free Patriotic Movement of former President Michel Aoun — no relation to the current president — opposed his candidacy. And the Lebanese Forces party gave him their endorsement only the night before the election.

Some have argued that Joseph Aoun’s election violated the law. The Lebanese constitution bars a sitting army commander from being elected president, though the ban has been waived multiple times. Some legislators were not happy doing it again.

Some in Lebanon also perceived Aoun's election as the result of outside pressure — notably from the United States — and less the result of internal consensus. Hezbollah's war with Israel weakened the group, politically and militarily, and left Lebanon in need of international assistance for reconstruction, which analysts said paved the way for Aoun's election.

Saab, the analyst, said painting Aoun as a puppet of Washington is unfair, although he acknowledged there’s no such thing as a Lebanese president or prime minister completely independent of foreign influence.

"The entire country is heavily penetrated and vulnerable and at the mercy of international powers," Saab said. "But ... if you were going to compare him to the leadership of Hezbollah being fully subservient to Iranian interests, then no, he’s not that guy when it comes to the Americans."

Turkey-Russia Relations: Friend or Foe or Just Pragmatism