Turkey-Russia Relations: Friend or Foe or Just Pragmatism

A Russian military vehicle in the countryside of Qamishli, northeastern Syria (File Photo/AFP)
A Russian military vehicle in the countryside of Qamishli, northeastern Syria (File Photo/AFP)
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Turkey-Russia Relations: Friend or Foe or Just Pragmatism

A Russian military vehicle in the countryside of Qamishli, northeastern Syria (File Photo/AFP)
A Russian military vehicle in the countryside of Qamishli, northeastern Syria (File Photo/AFP)

Turkish-Russian relations have historical depth, marked mostly by conflict. Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia fought a dozen wars. During the First World War, they were on opposite sides. The two enjoyed fair to good relations during the Turkish War of Independence but even then, things were not as good as they looked. After the Second World War, the Soviets claimed some Turkish territories in eastern Anatolia and questioned Turkish sovereignty over the Turkish Straits. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 serving as the Alliance’s southern flank nation throughout the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia were in competition for what some like to call the new great game over the Caucasus and Central Asia.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Crimean Tatars, Circassians, Nogais ( Turkish ethnic group who live in the North Caucasus region), and many others of a shrinking Ottoman Empire had to flee their ancestral homes due to Russian advances. These people who found their new homes in Anatolia have also been a factor in Turkey-Russia relations.

Against this background, within the framework of the new strategic environment and developments in the international arena, Turkish-Russian relations gained a new momentum in the 2000s.

Presidents Erdoğan and Putin are regarded by many, as look-alike in their way of doing politics in general. They may not be the best of friends, (friendship defined by common ideals, lifestyles and pleasures) but they have established a kind of working relationship, based on mutual interest and benefit. This relationship plays a major and even central role in the present-day conduct of Turkey-Russia relations.

Bilateral relations between the two countries are quite active.

Trade volume is at an average of 25 billion dollars. At one point it was around 30 billion dollars. Despite a decline in its share, Russia is still Turkey’s main energy supplier, providing 34 per cent of its natural gas and 11 per cent of its oil. On the other side, Turkey’s exports to Russia are mainly agricultural products, machinery, land vehicles and textiles. All in all, around 80 per cent of bilateral trade volume is in favor of Russia.

But Turkey makes up for this deficit in the fields of services and construction. Turkey continues to be the major destination for Russians who adore its moderately priced all-inclusive five star resorts. The record was in 2019 with seven million Russian visitors. As to construction sector, up-to date, Turkey has completed around 1980 projects in Russia with a total value of around 75 billion dollars.

Turkey also serves as the transit carrier of Russian natural gas. The most recent joint project in this area is the TurkStream which has been officially inaugurated in 2020. This project connects Russia and Turkey with two 930 kilometers long offshore pipelines running under the Blacksea, one of which brings natural gas to Turkey. The other one is for gas destined for Europe.

Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, with a total project cost estimated at 20 billion dollars, is another strategic value cooperation. Its first reactor is planned to be operational in 2023.

On the world stage, Russia and Turkey keep running into each other in different theaters, such as Syria, Ukraine, Libya, south Caucasus, They are mostly on opposing sides and occasionally, they physically hurt each other. But on the whole, the two countries have managed to establish some sort of a dialogue and cooperation module in all these theaters.

Russia is a major actor in Syria and militarily active in the field. Astana Process has paved the way for cooperation between Turkey and Russia. But the potential for a rift is still very much present, especially in Idlib. Despite a 2018 agreement, half of the province has been captured by the regime and Russia. In the opposition-held and frequently targeted by the regime part of Idlib, thousands of armed militants of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other mostly radical groups are present.

At a press conference in Moscow on September 9 with Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid, in response to a question Minister Lavrov said: “Turkish colleagues need to fulfill the agreements reached by Presidents of Russia and Turkey in September 2018. These agreements provide for the separation of the normal, reasonable opposition from the terrorists, primarily from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This work is underway but, unfortunately, it is far from complete”. In the context of recent developments in Deraa, Lavrov stated that “in Deraa and on a broader plane, in Syria, no territories should be controlled by armed units other than the Syrian army.” What Lavrov said can be taken as a message as to what can be expected in the future.

What happens in Idlib and with its 3.4 million inhabitants in case of an all-out military campaign by the Assad regime and Russians, carries a potential for confrontation. In that regard, the attack on a Turkish patrol in Idlib on Saturday, killing two Turkish soldiers and wounding three, came at a critical time.

The 24 November 2015 incident, when Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 military aircraft in Syria, was a clear example of how things could turn very sour between the two countries. Russia halted almost everything from Turkish businesses on its territories, to Russians visiting Turkey. Turkish military activities in Syria were also seriously affected. Russia enforced its position in Syria with sophisticated military hardware including air defense systems. It took a lot of effort and almost a year to straighten out relations.

In Libya, Turkey and Russia have faced each other with various fighting elements. Turkish involvement on behalf of the Government of National Accord changed the course of the war. Russia and its side did not end up on top. But neither seems discontent with the turn of events, at least for now.

In 2020, Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, was able to liberate its territories under Armenian occupation. Turkey carved its mark in the Caucasus demonstrating that it is a force that counts. Turkey also further solidified its alliance with Azerbaijan and won points with its kin in the Caucasus and Central Asia. On part of Russia, not-so-Russia-friendly Prime Minister Pashinyan learned a lesson. Russia managed to engineer a ceasefire and under the terms of the ceasefire agreement, was back on the Azeri soil for the first time since 1990. In any case, both Turkey and Russia played it well in preventing things from taking a different shape and turn into a conflict between themselves.

Turkey and Russia are also on opposite sides on Ukraine. Turkey’s openly declared position is that it does not recognize the annexation of Crimea. Russia does not seem to mind this, as long as political positions are not turned into some sort of action. But the Russians follow with dissatisfaction and some concern, recent defense cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine, in particular, transfer of Turkish killer drones.

Afghanistan may become another file either for cooperation or confrontation between the two countries, depending on how things develop over there. The reasons are not entirely clear for everyone, but Turkey seems keen to assume a role in new Afghanistan. Russia regards Afghanistan basically from a security point of view, with particular reference to Central Asian countries. This region is crucial for Russia in terms of its strategic value, near abroad concept and the Russian-led Collective Security Organization.

One other issue of particular importance and with a strong NATO angle is the Black Sea and the Montreux Convention. Russia does not want NATO vessels in the Black Sea and is adamant about preserving the Convention as it is, which regulates the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and limits their presence. The Turkish President’s most favored and politically advertised Canal Istanbul Project has raised some questions as to whether the Convention will have to be altered or not. Turkey’s position does not seem to be in contradiction to Russia’s.

The most important development in bilateral relations with far-reaching implications has been Turkey’s acquisition of S-400 air defense systems from Russia. The US and some other NATO Allies reacted strongly. The US went so far as imposing CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions on Turkey. Many in the West continue to present the S-400 issue as yet another proof of Turkey drifting away from NATO and the West.

Turkey’s side of the story is quite different. For some time now, Turkey has felt very unfairly treated by the EU or the West in general. It felt left out in the cold by its Allies on a number of occasions. Turkey’s EU accession negotiations are in deep freeze. Arms sales from many Allied countries including the USA, Canada, France and Germany are either restricted or in some cases, banned altogether. Turkey has argued that it had attempted to purchase air defense systems from the US and other western nations but was turned down. Russia, on the other hand, was more than ready to sell and Turkey opted for where it was possible to purchase the much-needed system.

Turks of different political convictions which rarely agree on anything, are of the same opinion that Turkey’s moves are not out of love for Russia but a consequence of the negative treatment of its Western Allies and partners.

In any case, Russia is happy. It managed to sell one of its multi-billion dollars weapons system, created a rift within NATO and further troubled the already strained relations between Turkey and the West.

Turkey is a member of an Alliance which identifies Russia as the main threat in a deteriorating security environment. But there is nothing to prevent Turkey, or any other member country for that matter, to engage with Russia in various fields, based on mutual benefit and respect, without contradicting NATO commitments and obligations. In any case, it is equally true that Turkey which enjoys good relations with its western allies and partners will be much better positioned in its dealings with Russia, compared to Turkey which is left alone by its allies and partners.

In conclusion, Turkey and Russia may have diverging positions on a number of issues, some with a potential for direct or indirect confrontation. But, for now, their relations seem to be governed by pragmatism. Even though a lot of patience and some occasional looking the other way may be needed in these relations, both countries seem to realize that dialogue and cooperation are better than confrontation; so long as it is possible.



'Currently Impossible': North Korea Defections in Freefall

Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
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'Currently Impossible': North Korea Defections in Freefall

Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP

A building-sized North Korean flag waves from a tower on the de facto border with South Korea, marking territory that experts say has become nearly impossible to escape.

The combined total of North Koreans to reach South Korea in the past six years is less than the number that typically defected each year for decades -- and appears to be declining further in 2026, said AFP.

The main cause is leader Kim Jong Un's aim to preserve his family dynasty by sealing the country off from the outside, keeping people in and information out, experts say.

"As I understand it, bringing family members directly from North Korea is currently impossible," 29-year-old Chae Yoon-seo, who fled in 2019, told AFP.

She swam across a river into China at night with a smuggler's help, and travelled through Laos, Vietnam and Thailand before finally flying to South Korea.

Defections to the South hit a peak of more than 2,900 in 2009 and stayed well above 1,000 per year for the next decade.

But there were just 63 in the first half of this year -- down by over a third from the same period in 2025, said Seoul's Unification Ministry.

- 'Soviet-style border' -

Arrivals have fluctuated over the decades, but plunged sharply during the Covid pandemic when many nations shut their borders.

A key change in North Korea, however, started years before.

After taking power in 2011, Kim began restricting the informal trade and migration links along the roughly 1,415-kilometer (880-mile) northern border with China.

In addition to being an economic lifeline, the Chinese border region has also been the first step in most defectors' escapes.

The long frontier was relatively porous, unlike the heavily mined, fenced and surveilled Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that serves as the Koreas' de facto border.

Along the boundary with China, Kim's government has erected fences and installed cameras as well as strips of sand that preserve the footprints of anyone who crosses.

"North Koreans built a real Soviet-style border security system," said Andrei Lankov, an expert on the North at Kookmin University in Seoul.

Beijing has helped too, said Lankov, noting China's preference to keep the status quo of the Kim dynasty by opposing potential instability from defectors or their supporters.

As part of its efforts, China reportedly has put in place hundreds of facial recognition cameras, noted Rachel Minyoung Lee, senior fellow with the Stimson Center's 38 North.

She added that Beijing also added more patrol boats and new or planned deportation facilities along its northeastern border.

- Ousted, killed or exiled -

The roughly 34,500 defectors to reach the South since 1998 are a fraction of North Korea's 26.6 million people, UN figures show, but the plunging number of escapes has consequences.

"Defectors are the main source of information about the North," said Fyodor Tertitsky, lecturer at Seoul's Korea University, noting both South Korean intelligence and researchers interrogate them.

Though some people still do get out.

Defector Gyuri Kang's 2023 escape by boat with her mother and aunt -- across the maritime border with the South, an extremely rare feat -- was a "miracle", she told a UN hearing.

She is also a case in point for why North Korea has made great efforts to seal itself off.

Kang noted the influence of South Korean dramas smuggled in on USB drives, finding them "so refreshing and more credible than North Korea state propaganda".

"North Korean authorities are keenly aware of the impact of outside media," she said.

In 2020, North Korea made possessing foreign media a crime punishable by years-long forced labor terms -- and potential death sentences for large-scale distribution, according to Amnesty International.

Lankov, from Kookmin University, said external information is the greatest threat to the long-term survival of North Korea's leadership.

"If they let their people interact with the outside world, they are highly likely to be overthrown, and maybe killed or driven into exile," he added.

Chae, the defector, said her hope was that the North's isolated people are not one day simply forgotten by the outside world.

"These days, there are a lot of cynical reactions on helping other countries, so I am a bit worried that one day, interest in North Korean human rights might fade away as well," she added.


How Israel’s Regional Neighbors See Its Upcoming Elections

 Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
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How Israel’s Regional Neighbors See Its Upcoming Elections

 Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)

Israel's upcoming elections are being followed closely by its regional neighbors, who are aware that any outcome will have ramifications far beyond the country's borders.

In his Likud party's campaign launch this month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeated his refrain that he "has changed the face of the Middle East" and vowed to continue doing so.

He has been unapologetic about keeping Israeli troops in neighboring Lebanon and Syria, while his ministers tout plans to displace Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, creating a refugee crisis for Jordan and Egypt and making a future Palestinian state impossible.

Opinion polls show the October 27 elections are likely to be close. The bloc led by Netanyahu and his far-right and ultra-Orthodox allies are squaring off against that of his main opponent, centrist Gadi Eisenkot.

AFP correspondents around the region take a look at how different countries are following the contest:

- Jordan -

While Netanyahu has stopped short of formally annexing the West Bank, observers say unofficial annexation is creeping in, as his government -- the most right-wing in Israel's history -- approves an unprecedented number of settlements.

Government officials repeatedly call for the expulsion of over three million Palestinians across the Jordan River, posing "an existential threat" to the Hashemite kingdom, according to Oraib Rantawi, founder of Amman's Al-Quds Center for Political Studies.

At the UN on Tuesday, King Abdullah II said "the Israeli government's expansionist appetite is now a regional threat".

"In the medium and long term, Jordan and Israel are on a collision course," Rantawi said, as right-wing politicians try to push responsibility for "dealing with the Palestinian population" onto Amman.

Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, and "is maintaining a minimum level of political engagement" Rantawi said is unlikely to change, no matter the outcome.

- Egypt -

Israel's other neighbor, most often threatened by what Israeli ministers describe as "voluntary emigration", has kept a "cold peace" since it first recognized Israel in 1978.

Cairo maintains extensive security collaboration, but ties have been increasingly strained as Egypt says it has had to resist repeated efforts to force more than two million Palestinians into its territory.

The best-case scenario is "a government that is less ideologically driven and more focused on security, which could help lower the temperature around Gaza, even without changing the fundamental Israeli position," said former ambassador El-Sayed Shalaby.

Asked by AFP, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said Egypt "will deal with any government that is coming," before blaming Netanyahu for obstructing the Trump ceasefire plan, which Egypt brokered.

- Lebanon -

Israel's attacks on and invasion of southern Lebanon have killed more than 4,300 people and left 329,000 displaced since March, while Beirut pursues gradual talks with Israel centered on the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said this month that Israel "is turning southern Lebanon, its people and their properties into a ballot box soaked in blood" ahead of the vote.

"We are not optimistic," a former Lebanese minister and diplomat told AFP on condition of anonymity.

"The style may change... perhaps Eisenkot has a less radical discourse, but on the ground, the policy will remain unchanged. It is the far right that remains in power."

In an interview with AFP, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the elections were an internal matter.

"But the question we want to ask the Israeli people, the State of Israel and all future governments is the following: do they want stability, security and no wars on their border, or not?" he said.

- Syria -

Since the December 2024 ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad, Israel has launched hundreds of strikes into Syria, sent troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone on the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights and carried out regular incursions.

"For Damascus, the stakes are not whether the Israeli elections will completely change the rules of the game, but whether they will produce a government that is less inclined toward escalation and more willing to listen to Washington," a Syrian diplomatic source told AFP.

"A more centrist government, or a right-wing government that does not revolve around Netanyahu... could be less inclined to make political capital out of escalation," and work towards gradual security understandings.


From Jeddah to New York: Why Do Sudan's Truces Fail?

Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
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From Jeddah to New York: Why Do Sudan's Truces Fail?

Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)

Sudanese doctor "S" needed a truce to get out of a health center where she and her colleagues were trapped in the first days of the war. She took a long route from Nile Street, crossing the Fiteihab and Halfaya bridges, until she reached her family in Kober.

She said she found bullet holes in the walls of her bedroom. Her siblings were waiting for her so they could leave together. The family fled and remains displaced today.

A brief halt in fighting in May 2023 allowed S to escape, but it did not last long enough for her family to remain in their home. Since that brief truce, initiatives and agreements have followed, while the hardest question has remained: How can mediators bring the two sides to agree to a cessation of fighting that is implemented and sustained?

The question returned to the fore on Sept. 23, when the Quad and Quintet met together for the first time in New York, under the co-chairmanship of the African Union and the United States. Participants called for a humanitarian truce and an end to hostilities.

They agreed to coordinate efforts to protect civilians and prepare to monitor and verify the implementation of any agreement. But the meeting's statement announced no agreement with the army or the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and set no date for talks between them.

A worker repairs a damaged building in Khartoum on September 20, 2026 (Photo by Ebrahim HAMID / AFP)

The sticking point lies in the terms of the truce itself. According to Reuters, the army-led government accepted most of a US proposal for a 90-day truce but rejected a provision that would limit the RSF's withdrawal to specified areas.

It demanded that the RSF withdraw from all cities it had seized. Sudan's Foreign Ministry said this week that it rejected any negotiating process it believed would legitimize a reality imposed by the RSF through force. The RSF, meanwhile, welcomed the truce proposal, but the fighting continued.

Even when the two sides signed an agreement, it did not guarantee its implementation. In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the army and the RSF signed a declaration committing them to protecting civilians on May 11, 2023. On May 20, they signed an agreement on a short ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements.

But the ceasefire did not hold. In June, the army suspended its participation in the talks, accusing the RSF of violating the agreement.

Other efforts faced different obstacles. In December 2023, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization involved in peace efforts in the Horn of Africa, announced that army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, had agreed to meet face to face under its auspices. IGAD renewed the invitation in January, but the meeting never took place.

In Manama, Bahrain, a document titled "Principles and Foundations for a Comprehensive Solution to the Sudanese Crisis" was initialed on Jan. 20, 2024, in the names of Shams al-Din Kabbashi for the army and Abdel Rahim Dagalo for the RSF, according to the published text. But the initialing was not followed by a final agreement or a sustained negotiating process. Dagalo accused Kabbashi of backing away from the document, while Kabbashi did not comment on the reasons for the process coming to a halt.

In August 2024, the absence of one of the warring sides prevented direct ceasefire talks in Switzerland, shifting the focus to facilitating the delivery of aid and protecting civilians.

Rosalind Marsden, a researcher at Chatham House, wrote in an analysis published by the institute on Sept. 18, 2024, that the main reason the August 2024 ceasefire talks in Switzerland failed was that both the army and the RSF continued to seek a military victory. Their continued hopes of making military gains were a major reason for the negotiations' failure to make progress, despite limited progress in delivering aid to Darfur.

In September 2025, the Quad proposed a roadmap beginning with a three-month humanitarian truce, during which aid would reach areas across Sudan, followed by a permanent ceasefire and a political transition.

But the Quad's roadmap remained a proposal by the mediators and did not become an agreement between the warring parties. The dispute over withdrawal in the latest US proposal shows that the two sides have yet to agree on the terms under which a new truce could be tested.

Researcher Ahmed Soliman says the multiplicity of mediation groups and weak coordination among them make it necessary to link ceasefire efforts to a Sudanese political process led by civilian forces.

Hubert Kinkoh, a researcher at Chatham House, argued in an analysis published by the institute on Feb. 13, 2026, that the multiplicity of mediation tracks on Sudan, along with the absence of clear leadership and effective coordination among them, had allowed the army and the RSF to resist making serious concessions.

The New York meeting may help address the fragmentation of mediation efforts. Its real value, however, will become clear if it can bring the warring parties to a clear agreement and establish a mechanism to monitor compliance and address violations.

A brief truce allowed S to reach her family, but the family was then forced to leave their home. The truce that displaced people and refugees are waiting for today would allow aid to reach them and mark the beginning of a lasting end to the fighting, making a safe return to their homes and communities possible.