Historic Antakya Is a ‘City of Containers’ One Year After Devastating Earthquake in Türkiye

Asharq Al- Awsat tours the city a year after the disaster

Levelled areas are seen in Antakya city. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Levelled areas are seen in Antakya city. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Historic Antakya Is a ‘City of Containers’ One Year After Devastating Earthquake in Türkiye

Levelled areas are seen in Antakya city. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Levelled areas are seen in Antakya city. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

One year after the deadly earthquake that struck Türkiye, it is almost impossible to come across someone who has not lost a family member, a friend, or a neighbor in Antakya center. The southern city lost half of its population after many immigrated to the neighboring cities, as well as Istanbul and Ankara, after burying their loved ones and collecting some of their furniture from the ruined buildings.

The survivors are now trying to rebuild their lives amid the ruins, ghost buildings, pervasive dust from the demolition sites, and the noise of the heavy machinery operating in demolishing the damaged buildings.

The first few months after the earthquake, one common image shared on social media was that of a shopkeeper reopening his partially repaired store, placing a container among the rubble of the destroyed buildings in the deserted city center, but with no customer in sight. These images became the symbols for the survivors who were demanding to be heard amid the huge wave of immigration from the city. The immigration led to concerns that the reconstruction would be neglected due to the absence of a remaining stable workforce.

The shopkeepers were pictured with water and a broom in their hands, the main arms of their struggle to keep their stores neat and clean amid the dust and rubble. Graffiti depicting the resisting shopkeeper soon emerged in the city, accompanied with slogans such as, “We have not left,” “Don’t lose hope; we will come back,” “Our houses have collapsed, not our dreams.” Some of this graffiti was even adopted by kebab shops run by owners who wanted to keep alive the memory of the earthquake and the resilience of the Hatay people to rebuild their lives.

As we approach the anniversary of the earthquake, many more shops have opened, and the local vegetable and fruit market is buzzing with people. Yet, everyone has something to say about how hard their lives have become.

Nothing has changed

Visitors are surprised that a year since the disaster, the city remains the same. It looks as devastated as ever. Among the rubble, tents, containers, and makeshift tinware constructions could be seen nearly everywhere, functioning as homes, shops, restaurants, banks, and offices.

The cityscape was so drastically changed by the disaster that one common experience shared by several survivors was getting lost in places they had known all their lives. Without any trees, historical buildings, cafes, or meeting points as landmarks, the residents couldn’t figure out where their homes used to be. Yiğit, a university student, explained that it once took him almost an hour to meet his friend, as no one was able to describe their location. He said, “We ended up using FaceTime and our voice to make ourselves heard to one another.”

Container towns

One year after the earthquake, many survivors who remained in the city moved either to container towns or outside Antakya to other districts, as well as villages in Hatay. According to an official declaration in November 2023, more than 50,000 households were living in 175 container towns scattered across the city.

Those who lost their homes were able to benefit from an aid program that covered moving expenses and rental costs. However, the sums allocated as part of the program were not enough to rent a flat, as the prices had rocketed, due to the city’s loss of many buildings in the earthquake and the high inflation rate in Türkiye.

Many inhabitants, who did not have anywhere else to go, opted to move to container towns, which meant giving up their rental assistance.

In addition, a few still live in tents. One of the tent cities installed on a side street, a few kilometers away from central Antakya, accommodates around 50 Syrian families.

Mohammad lives with his wife and six children in one tent. When asked whether he was able to receive any aid, he replied: “Some people brought food for some time, but it has stopped now.” Mohammad is unable to work because a wall fell on his shoulder when he was trying to escape his house during the earthquake. So, his three sons have taken up jobs at a furniture shop.

They plan to modify their tent to accommodate for the winter and continue to live there. Mohammad does not have much hope about upgrading to a container. Frequent water and electricity cuts are the biggest hardship for him and his family as they receive electricity only every other day.

The power cuts are still a major problem in other parts of Antakya. Elif, a teacher living in one of the container towns, explained that the cuts have become less frequent compared to the initial months after the earthquake, yet when it does happen, it can sometimes take up to 48 hours for it to be restored.

“After the earthquake,” she said, “the immediate need was to restore electricity as soon as possible, and the workers rapidly and arbitrarily installed them wherever they were needed to meet the demand. Now, when a cut happens, it takes them a long time to figure out which cable to fix.”

For many survivors, rain is a major concern due to the fragile infrastructure of the city and the temporary housing sites. Not only do electricity cuts come often with rain, but also most containers are not waterproof. Water leaks from the top and beneath in places where the towns are built on plains.

Survivors blame it on the lack of planning and coordination which persisted since the rescue operations. “We are unable to plan anything and are just trying to pass each day at a time,” said Senem, a 45-year-old woman who lives in a 21-square-meter container with her three children and husband. Her children’s school collapsed during the earthquake, and now they are enrolled in remote education.

No place for families

In many financially better-off families, women immigrated to other cities for the education of their children, while men stayed in Hatay to continue their work. Yusuf is one of them. He currently lives in a container in his village and rents a flat in Istanbul for his wife and children.

After a short stay in Istanbul, Yusuf realized the difficulty of restarting a business there and returned to Antakya to reopen his shoe shop. After the earthquake, his new customers were mainly soldiers, police officers, and workers who came to the city as part of rescue operations or for construction work.

Many families indeed followed a similar pattern, which dramatically changed the men-to-women ratio in the city from 61,8 to 38,1%, according to the Hatay Planning Center.

Meanwhile, those whose buildings survived with “minor” or “moderate” damage have gradually moved back to their houses despite their constant fear of aftershocks and another earthquake. Those who live in moderately damaged buildings were left in limbo for months because authorities were in disagreement over whether such buildings would be safe to live in after reinforcement or should be demolished and rebuilt. Finally, in November, nine months after the earthquake, the state-run disaster and emergency organization (Afad) issued a memorandum clarifying the situation about such buildings.

Solidarity destroyed by politics

In the weeks that followed the earthquake, many individuals, groups, and NGOs stood in solidarity with the survivors, in particular with the residents of Hatay, as the city was seen as a living example of multiculturalism that boasts Arab-Alawite, Sunni, Christian, Armenian, and Jewish populations.

As soon as the heartbreaking images were broadcast on social media and on TV channels, citizens from different parts of the country tried to reach the region with their own means to send donations or help in rescue operations. New networks of solidarity were established inside and outside to work on how to rebuild life in the city. These stories are still vivid in the memories of the victims.

One year after the earthquake, however, memories of solidarity are overshadowed by the stories of disputes and disagreements, some of which had existed in the city before the disaster. No doubt, the highly polarized political atmosphere of the country also acts as a catalyst for deepening disputes and divisions.

The Arab-Alawite community of the city - the second largest after the Sunni population - which generally votes for the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party, has been particularly wary of the actions taken by the government of the Justice and Development Party. Müjgan, a 45-year-old restaurant owner, said the part of Antakya where she is from did not receive any government aid during the first three days after the earthquake becuase the region is mainly populated by Arab-Alawites.

Like many other Arab-Alawites in the city, she believes that the government used the earthquake to divide the community by making their lives harder and indirectly forcing them to immigrate by leaving them with no other option.

According to Müjgan, the division between the Sunni and Arab-Alawite populations deepened, in particular after the arrival of Syrian refugees in the city, which she also viewed as part of the government’s policy against the Arab-Alawite community. Two expropriation decisions of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan taken in the months following the earthquake also deepened the concerns of the Arab-Alawite community.

These decisions allowed the government-led housing agency (Toki) to construct new buildings in Dikmece and Gülderen, the two neighborhoods of Antakya populated mainly by Arab-Alawites. Both decisions are currently before the administrative court. Soon after the presidential decision, Dikmece villagers started a resistance against the expropriation of their olive groves and organized several protests, which led to violent clashes between them and the local police.

Reconstruction

Local lawyer Ecevit Alkan said: “There is chaos in the city, and the politicians benefit from this situation; it is easier for them to govern that way.” Besides the repercussions of the national problems in the disaster-stricken city, disputes on various matters have become part of everyday life.

Alkan said: “Disputes can be found in nearly every WhatsApp group that were formed between the residents of different apartments who must decide together what to do about their collapsed buildings.” The options are either to reconstruct in the same place, which requires the consent of 50% of the flat owners, or replace their right of ownership with a flat from Toki.

Whatever they choose, the government will provide a grant of 750,000TL (around 24,700 dollars) and an interest-free loan for the same amount, the repayment of which starts two years later. These sums, however, are very low compared to the inflation in the country. Moreover, most of the survivors lost both their homes and jobs in the earthquake and fear that the new buildings might turn out to cost them much more than what the grant and the credit would cover, and so, they might end up in huge debt.

Currently, the buildings in the city are categorized into four groups: “destroyed”, “heavy damage”, “moderate damage”, and “minor or no damage”. However, these categorizations have also become a major source of dispute as many owners have taken the status of their properties to the courts in the hope of changing them to either “moderate” or “minor” damage to prevent their demolition.

Hatay, as well as its central district Antakya, are replete with buildings with a sign that says “Don’t demolish, taken to the court,” as the owners fear that if they lose even the ruins of what they used to have, their land can be seized for some government projects or new unaffordable apartment building. Government officials have expressed concern about the excessive number of cases that have inundated the local courts and which they believe are delaying reconstruction in the city.

Bazaar dispute

The historical bazaar in the city, Uzunçarşı, is much more vibrant than it was a couple of months ago. However, the shopkeepers are also in disagreement with one another about its fate. The official plan is to demolish and rebuild it with better infrastructure.

Not everyone is on board with the plan, including Yusuf, who believes that the reconstruction would take much longer than what the officials have promised. He said the government has yet to keep any of its pledges. Also, if the bazaar were to be demolished, the shopkeepers will be temporarily transferred to a container bazaar, which according to Yusuf, lacks the soul that the historical market has and hardly attracts any customers.

The pro-government residents of the city are certainly more hopeful about the process, and they believe that if everyone puts their trust in the government, things will flow more smoothly. However, even Serdar, who works as a civil servant in the AKP-led Antakya municipality, admits that, compared to other cities hit by the earthquake, in Hatay, things are moving very slowly.

He said: “Hatay is seen almost like a tassel hanging beneath the mainland... Its problems hardly enter the political agenda as a priority.” Such sentiments are common among the locals, regardless of their affiliations.

Salim, for instance, painted his tractor in rainbow colors and described at the back how the city was left alone after the earthquake. He put on a makeshift license plate “31 Earthquake 4.17”, with 31 indicating the traffic code in Hatay and 4.17 the time when the first earthquake hit the city the hardest.

Salim used to own a restaurant before the earthquake, and had bought the old tractor to use it as an attraction in the front. He didn’t know that it would become his livelihood. For the moment, he uses it to collect items taken out of the demolition sites, but does not know what work he will find afterwards.

Ambiguity that has paralyzed almost every aspect of life in Hatay and the absence of effective political action to meet the urgent needs of the locals characterize the general atmosphere in the city one year after the earthquake. However, with municipal elections set for March 31, the politics in the city now revolve around electoral pledges made by candidates, whose credibility is doubted by many locals. If none of their pledges were fulfilled in a year, what are they hoping to achieve in a few months?



US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
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US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)

The fifth round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations ended in Washington on Friday with the signing of a framework agreement that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said could help lay the foundation for “lasting peace and security” between the two countries.

At a ceremony where the flags of the United States, Lebanon and Israel stood side by side, Rubio announced a framework agreement between the sovereign government of Lebanon and the government of Israel, mediated and supported by Washington.

The US-sponsored talks shifted the discussion from a ceasefire to a field-based model under which Israel would gradually withdraw from areas it occupies in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army would then take control of those areas and prevent the return of Hezbollah’s military presence.

Behind closed doors, and despite talk from Tehran and its allies about “victories” and “resistance,” leaks from negotiating rooms in Washington and Switzerland point to a different picture: firm US pressure, Israeli efforts to secure substantial security gains, and Iranian concessions that could reshape Tehran’s regional influence from Beirut to Baghdad.

Before the agreement was announced, Rubio said Israel and Lebanon had made progress and were close to a “declaration of intentions.” Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the talks focused on security measures needed to restore stability and extend state authority to Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders. Israeli and Lebanese officials, however, denied US claims that Israel had withdrawn from part of the “buffer zone” as a goodwill gesture.

What emerged on Friday was an initial understanding on direction, not an agreement on implementation. The talks therefore appear to mark the start of a new political and security track rather than the end of the current military phase.

The Lebanese track has also become connected, though not fully merged, with US negotiations with Iran. Washington insists Lebanon’s future is being discussed with its government, while also holding Tehran responsible for restraining Hezbollah and ending its funding and armament. The round has thus become part of a broader test of a regional order that did not exist before the war.

Israeli military APCs parked in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon, Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

Army deployment

The main outcome was preliminary acceptance of “pilot zones.” The plan calls for selecting a defined area from which Israeli forces would withdraw after Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is removed. Lebanese Army units would then deploy and secure the area before the model is repeated elsewhere.

The formula combines Lebanon’s demand for withdrawal and restored sovereignty with Israel’s demand that evacuated territory not become a platform for Hezbollah to rebuild its capabilities.

But Rubio’s phrase “commitment of intentions” also reveals the limits of the achievement. It signals agreement on the broad goal, not on maps, timetables or monitoring rules.

Disagreement also remains over the location of the first zone: whether it begins north of the Litani River, as Lebanese information suggests, or inside the buffer zone established by Israel.

Another unresolved question is whether withdrawal would be part of a comprehensive roadmap or decided case by case according to Israeli security assessments.

The confusion over withdrawal underscored that these questions remain unsettled.

A US official said Israel had pulled forces from part of the area without specifying where. An Israeli security official noted that the army had not withdrawn, while a senior Lebanese official stressed that Beirut knew nothing about such a step.

This may mean Washington announced Israeli political approval before implementation, or that a limited redeployment took place that Israel does not consider a withdrawal and that Lebanon has no information about.

Either way, Washington appears to be trying to prevent the talks from collapsing under the pressure of skirmishes and strikes.

Southern Lebanon remains, in practice, a war zone for tens of thousands of displaced residents unable to return because of Israeli forces or widespread destruction. The success of the agreement will be measured by whether it produces the first clear, documented handover of land to the Lebanese army.

A security wall in northern Israel on the border with Lebanon , Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)

‘Pilot zones’

The plan means different things to each side. For Lebanon, a pilot zone should be the first step toward full Israeli withdrawal, an end to strikes and assassinations, the return of residents, and the deployment of the state up to the international border.

For Israel, it is a test of the Lebanese army’s ability to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure, control supply routes and prevent the group’s fighters from returning under civilian cover.

Israel is therefore insisting on a “zone-by-zone” approach. It does not want to commit in advance to a comprehensive withdrawal before seeing the results of the first phase.

It is also linking any pullback to Hezbollah’s disarmament, or at least to clearing the relevant area of military infrastructure and weapons capable of threatening northern Israeli communities.

Beirut fears the plan could yield another form of the occupation: withdrawal from secondary positions while Israel keeps a narrower security strip.

This leaves a central question unanswered: what does Hezbollah’s disarmament actually mean? Does the first phase only require removing weapons and fighters from areas where the state deploys, or does it include Hezbollah’s arsenal across Lebanon? Which weapons come first: precision and long-range missiles, drones, air defenses, anti-tank missiles, tunnels or command centers?

Nothing announced so far proves there is a final agreement on the type of weapons to be collected or the timetable.

Washington appears to be trying to break the problem into stages: first establishing areas free of military presence, then moving to heavy and strategic weapons, while leaving small arms and organizational structures to a longer Lebanese process.

Israel fears this approach will give Hezbollah time to regroup. Lebanon fears a domestic confrontation the army cannot contain.

The US guarantee

This is where the US guarantee becomes essential. The model requires a verification mechanism that determines who decides an area is weapons-free, how violations are monitored, what happens if Hezbollah tries to return, and what limits are placed on Israel’s right to act.

Without agreement on these rules, every violation could become a pretext for renewed Israeli strikes, and every strike could trigger a return to fighting.

Separating Lebanon from Iran’s influence

At first glance, US policy toward Lebanon appears dual-track. Rubio says Lebanon-Israel negotiations are separate from talks with Iran because Lebanon is a sovereign state with a government Washington deals with directly.

In parallel, Vice President JD Vance is leading talks with Tehran that include ending the fighting in Lebanon, while President Donald Trump has threatened to strike Iran again if it fails to stop Hezbollah from “causing trouble.”

Rubio’s track identifies the legitimate decision-maker: the Lebanese government, not Iran or Hezbollah. Vance’s track deals with the actor capable of obstructing the US efforts.

In that sense, Washington is negotiating Lebanon’s future with Beirut, while negotiating with Tehran over support for the force that could derail any arrangement. It is using Iran’s need to stabilize the ceasefire and ease sanctions to pressure it on Hezbollah without granting it guardianship over Lebanon.

Trump’s warnings are therefore more than just threats. They shift responsibility for Hezbollah’s actions to its sponsor, Iran, suggesting that continued violence in Lebanon could carry a direct cost for Tehran.

The strategy is risky. Including Lebanon in a US-Iran understanding could allow Tehran to claim that any Israeli withdrawal resulted from its pressure, not from the Lebanese track.

It also raises fears in Beirut and Tel Aviv that Lebanese security details could become bargaining chips in talks over the nuclear file, sanctions and the Strait of Hormuz.

That is why Rubio insists publicly on separation, even as he acknowledges that Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah cannot be ignored.

Washington may be unable to separate the two tracks completely, but it is trying to prevent their political merger.

Its success depends on using Iranian influence to restrain Hezbollah without turning Iran into a partner in shaping the Lebanese state or its arrangements with Israel.

Israeli tank maneuvers as United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy drive between destroyed houses in the south Lebanon village of Mais al-Jabal, as seen from the Israeli side of the border in the upper Galilee, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Israeli concerns

Israel’s concern is that a US-Iran understanding could save Hezbollah from the consequences of the war. Israeli officials fear Washington’s priority may shift from dismantling the group and reducing Iranian influence to simply preserving a ceasefire and preventing conflict, while pressuring Israel to withdraw before durable security guarantees are in place.

Israel therefore is insisting on freedom to act against what it sees as rearmament or imminent threats and has not offered an unconditional commitment to return to the border. The buffer zone has become both a negotiating card and a security guarantee. Giving it up without disarmament would expose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to domestic criticism.

The Lebanese army, meanwhile, faces a test that goes beyond entering territory vacated by Israel. It must prove it can remain there, control it, prevent Hezbollah’s return, deal with weapons depots and tunnels, and avoid being dragged into civil strife.

It also needs manpower, equipment, funding and political cover, all of which remain uncertain, especially amid widespread destruction and the need to protect returning residents and secure the border.

The United States is studying training for Lebanese units and ways to verify their readiness and reliability. Reports have suggested a possible role for US Central Command, or CENTCOM, in supervision or monitoring, but no final announcement has clarified whether CENTCOM would directly vet personnel or limit itself to support and coordination.

Analysts say the deeper problem is that army deployment is not the same as disarmament.

The army may be able to control a specific area after an Israeli withdrawal if it receives enough support. But dismantling Hezbollah’s network across Lebanon requires a national political decision, a gradual mechanism, guarantees for the Shiite community and steps to prevent Iran from rebuilding funding and weapons channels.

If Washington burdens the army with more than it can carry, the model may turn from a test of state sovereignty into a test that exposes the limits of the state.


Through Lebanon… Is a New Regional Order Taking Shape?

Esmail Qaani 
Esmail Qaani 
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Through Lebanon… Is a New Regional Order Taking Shape?

Esmail Qaani 
Esmail Qaani 

Iran is portraying the outcome of the current war as a “victory” that forced Israel to consider withdrawal. That narrative was reinforced by a warning from Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, who said Israel would either withdraw voluntarily or “flee in defeat”, a clear attempt to present the negotiating process as the result of the resilience of Tehran’s regional axis.

While Qaani’s remarks are unmistakably mobilizing rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences and Iran’s regional allies, one fact cannot be overlooked: Tehran succeeded in making a ceasefire in Lebanon part of its understandings with Washington. Despite the military blows it has sustained, Iran has preserved both its political system and a key regional bargaining chip.

Measured against the concessions, Tehran has been forced to accept, however, the picture looks different. Lebanon is engaged in direct negotiations with Israel over the deployment of the Lebanese Army and the disarmament of Hezbollah, Iran’s most prominent regional ally. Washington has also publicly held Iran responsible for Hezbollah’s actions, while Iran-aligned factions in Iraq are facing pressure to integrate into state institutions or reduce their independent armed presence. At the same time, negotiations over sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program have become linked, to some extent, to Tehran’s ability to rein in its regional network.

Writing in Foreign Affairs, former US ambassador James Jeffrey argues that failing to achieve maximum objectives does not amount to an Iranian victory. In his view, the conflicts since 2023 have weakened Iran’s capabilities, eroded its network of proxies, and strengthened Washington’s position. That assessment remains open to debate, however, given that Hezbollah has not disappeared, Iraqi armed factions have not been disarmed, and Iran has demonstrated an ability to use the Strait of Hormuz and other regional flashpoints to compel direct negotiations.

It may therefore be more accurate to say the region is entering a transitional phase rather than witnessing the definitive end of Iran’s regional axis. Tehran appears to be shifting from reliance on large, openly organized groups with extensive arsenals to smaller, more clandestine networks, or accepting the formal integration of some factions into state institutions while preserving its influence within them.

The success of the Lebanese model will therefore carry significance far beyond Lebanon itself. If Israel withdraws, the Lebanese Army deploys, and Hezbollah is prevented from re-establishing its presence, it would set a precedent for placing arms exclusively in the hands of the state. Only then could it be said that the fifth round of negotiations marked the beginning of a new phase for Lebanon and the wider region. If, however, withdrawal remains stalled or Hezbollah returns to evacuated areas, the fifth round will amount to little more than another negotiated truce.


Older Buildings and Substandard Construction Left Venezuela Vulnerable to Earthquakes

People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
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Older Buildings and Substandard Construction Left Venezuela Vulnerable to Earthquakes

People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
People conduct search operations in an area affected by an earthquake in La Guaira, Venezuela, 26 June 2026. (EPA)

Older buildings, substandard construction and geography left many neighborhoods in Venezuela vulnerable to strong earthquakes like the ones that struck the country this week.

Engineers and other experts said the back-to-back earthquakes on Wednesday were among the most intense to hit the country in more than a century, leveling buildings and leaving more than 900 dead with the number expected to rise. Videos and satellite imagery from the disaster zone reviewed by The Associated Press reveal scores of multistory buildings had collapsed.

Microsoft’s AI for Good Lab analyzed satellite imagery of Catia La Mar in La Guaira state, one of the hardest hit cities along the Caribbean coast. Using AI-based damage assessment models, Microsoft determined that about a third of the city's nearly 30,000 structures were damaged.

Among the factors that left so many structures at risk: Some housing complexes in northern Venezuela were constructed quickly during recent oil booms, and builders may not have adhered to best practices that mitigate the risks of serious seismic activity, according to experts.

Engineers said that older housing erected in the 1950s and 1960s — before modern earthquake standards were adopted — may not have been retrofitted to survive such violent shaking. And many buildings were constructed on geography and soft soils that compound the danger of the earthquakes, the experts said.

Tall buildings and older concrete contributed to damage David Cocke, a structural engineer in California and former president of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, said that a combination of soft soils, tall towers and older concrete structures contributed to the widespread damage, particularly when buildings pancaked, or collapsed floor-by-floor.

“They just don’t have the more modern reinforcing steel connections that we put in those kinds of buildings today,” said Cocke.

Since the 1970s, engineers have known that concrete buildings are particularly susceptible to earthquakes and seek to reinforce new construction with steel. While many rich nations have forced property owners to retrofit or tear down dangerous buildings, many poorer or middle income countries have lagged in enforcing upgrades as they battled more immediate woes.

“Some of the more advanced countries like Japan and New Zealand and the US have made those changes, but some of the other countries have not,” Cocke said. “It’s a very typical kind of construction all over the world.”

‘Soft stories’ and soft soil played a role

Other experts noted that a number of buildings that collapsed also had non-structural walls comprised of heavy bricks, or they had “soft stories" in which their ground floors consisted of garages or similar open spaces. Such construction increases the risk of pancaking, they said.

“Soft stories are a huge problem everywhere in the world,” said Eduardo Miranda, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University. “And in Venezuela, they are particularly prevalent, and if you combine softer soils with a soft story, buildings can collapse.”

Marcos Ferreira, a geophysicist and researcher at the Geological Survey of Brazil, said the destruction in Venezuela was compounded by the back-to-back quakes, known as a doublet. A similar incident took place in Türkiye and Syria in 2023, killing almost 60,000 people.

“It is as if I am screaming and then someone starts screaming, too," Ferreira said. “That amplifies the vibration and adds to the potential hazard.”

Newer buildings also collapsed

Venezuelan government officials took steps following a deadly 1967 quake to update building codes. But it is unclear how many buildings were retrofitted to comply with those rules.

In late 1999, former President Hugo Chávez’s first year in office, floods and landslides destroyed housing, including in coastal northern Venezuela. The government went on a building spree to replace the demolished structures and to house so many displaced people, said Juan Carlos Vielma, a Venezuelan civil engineer who is head of academic affairs of the civil engineering school at Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, Chile.

Some of the newer buildings appear to also have collapsed.

“Something that leaves me perplexed is the fact that, among the collapsed buildings, more than one was recently designed and built in accordance with current standards,” Vielma said. “We need to embark on a process not only of reconstruction, but also of reviewing the applicable standards, since something might have gone wrong within our engineering processes, too.”