Historic Antakya Is a ‘City of Containers’ One Year After Devastating Earthquake in Türkiye

Asharq Al- Awsat tours the city a year after the disaster

Levelled areas are seen in Antakya city. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Levelled areas are seen in Antakya city. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Historic Antakya Is a ‘City of Containers’ One Year After Devastating Earthquake in Türkiye

Levelled areas are seen in Antakya city. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Levelled areas are seen in Antakya city. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

One year after the deadly earthquake that struck Türkiye, it is almost impossible to come across someone who has not lost a family member, a friend, or a neighbor in Antakya center. The southern city lost half of its population after many immigrated to the neighboring cities, as well as Istanbul and Ankara, after burying their loved ones and collecting some of their furniture from the ruined buildings.

The survivors are now trying to rebuild their lives amid the ruins, ghost buildings, pervasive dust from the demolition sites, and the noise of the heavy machinery operating in demolishing the damaged buildings.

The first few months after the earthquake, one common image shared on social media was that of a shopkeeper reopening his partially repaired store, placing a container among the rubble of the destroyed buildings in the deserted city center, but with no customer in sight. These images became the symbols for the survivors who were demanding to be heard amid the huge wave of immigration from the city. The immigration led to concerns that the reconstruction would be neglected due to the absence of a remaining stable workforce.

The shopkeepers were pictured with water and a broom in their hands, the main arms of their struggle to keep their stores neat and clean amid the dust and rubble. Graffiti depicting the resisting shopkeeper soon emerged in the city, accompanied with slogans such as, “We have not left,” “Don’t lose hope; we will come back,” “Our houses have collapsed, not our dreams.” Some of this graffiti was even adopted by kebab shops run by owners who wanted to keep alive the memory of the earthquake and the resilience of the Hatay people to rebuild their lives.

As we approach the anniversary of the earthquake, many more shops have opened, and the local vegetable and fruit market is buzzing with people. Yet, everyone has something to say about how hard their lives have become.

Nothing has changed

Visitors are surprised that a year since the disaster, the city remains the same. It looks as devastated as ever. Among the rubble, tents, containers, and makeshift tinware constructions could be seen nearly everywhere, functioning as homes, shops, restaurants, banks, and offices.

The cityscape was so drastically changed by the disaster that one common experience shared by several survivors was getting lost in places they had known all their lives. Without any trees, historical buildings, cafes, or meeting points as landmarks, the residents couldn’t figure out where their homes used to be. Yiğit, a university student, explained that it once took him almost an hour to meet his friend, as no one was able to describe their location. He said, “We ended up using FaceTime and our voice to make ourselves heard to one another.”

Container towns

One year after the earthquake, many survivors who remained in the city moved either to container towns or outside Antakya to other districts, as well as villages in Hatay. According to an official declaration in November 2023, more than 50,000 households were living in 175 container towns scattered across the city.

Those who lost their homes were able to benefit from an aid program that covered moving expenses and rental costs. However, the sums allocated as part of the program were not enough to rent a flat, as the prices had rocketed, due to the city’s loss of many buildings in the earthquake and the high inflation rate in Türkiye.

Many inhabitants, who did not have anywhere else to go, opted to move to container towns, which meant giving up their rental assistance.

In addition, a few still live in tents. One of the tent cities installed on a side street, a few kilometers away from central Antakya, accommodates around 50 Syrian families.

Mohammad lives with his wife and six children in one tent. When asked whether he was able to receive any aid, he replied: “Some people brought food for some time, but it has stopped now.” Mohammad is unable to work because a wall fell on his shoulder when he was trying to escape his house during the earthquake. So, his three sons have taken up jobs at a furniture shop.

They plan to modify their tent to accommodate for the winter and continue to live there. Mohammad does not have much hope about upgrading to a container. Frequent water and electricity cuts are the biggest hardship for him and his family as they receive electricity only every other day.

The power cuts are still a major problem in other parts of Antakya. Elif, a teacher living in one of the container towns, explained that the cuts have become less frequent compared to the initial months after the earthquake, yet when it does happen, it can sometimes take up to 48 hours for it to be restored.

“After the earthquake,” she said, “the immediate need was to restore electricity as soon as possible, and the workers rapidly and arbitrarily installed them wherever they were needed to meet the demand. Now, when a cut happens, it takes them a long time to figure out which cable to fix.”

For many survivors, rain is a major concern due to the fragile infrastructure of the city and the temporary housing sites. Not only do electricity cuts come often with rain, but also most containers are not waterproof. Water leaks from the top and beneath in places where the towns are built on plains.

Survivors blame it on the lack of planning and coordination which persisted since the rescue operations. “We are unable to plan anything and are just trying to pass each day at a time,” said Senem, a 45-year-old woman who lives in a 21-square-meter container with her three children and husband. Her children’s school collapsed during the earthquake, and now they are enrolled in remote education.

No place for families

In many financially better-off families, women immigrated to other cities for the education of their children, while men stayed in Hatay to continue their work. Yusuf is one of them. He currently lives in a container in his village and rents a flat in Istanbul for his wife and children.

After a short stay in Istanbul, Yusuf realized the difficulty of restarting a business there and returned to Antakya to reopen his shoe shop. After the earthquake, his new customers were mainly soldiers, police officers, and workers who came to the city as part of rescue operations or for construction work.

Many families indeed followed a similar pattern, which dramatically changed the men-to-women ratio in the city from 61,8 to 38,1%, according to the Hatay Planning Center.

Meanwhile, those whose buildings survived with “minor” or “moderate” damage have gradually moved back to their houses despite their constant fear of aftershocks and another earthquake. Those who live in moderately damaged buildings were left in limbo for months because authorities were in disagreement over whether such buildings would be safe to live in after reinforcement or should be demolished and rebuilt. Finally, in November, nine months after the earthquake, the state-run disaster and emergency organization (Afad) issued a memorandum clarifying the situation about such buildings.

Solidarity destroyed by politics

In the weeks that followed the earthquake, many individuals, groups, and NGOs stood in solidarity with the survivors, in particular with the residents of Hatay, as the city was seen as a living example of multiculturalism that boasts Arab-Alawite, Sunni, Christian, Armenian, and Jewish populations.

As soon as the heartbreaking images were broadcast on social media and on TV channels, citizens from different parts of the country tried to reach the region with their own means to send donations or help in rescue operations. New networks of solidarity were established inside and outside to work on how to rebuild life in the city. These stories are still vivid in the memories of the victims.

One year after the earthquake, however, memories of solidarity are overshadowed by the stories of disputes and disagreements, some of which had existed in the city before the disaster. No doubt, the highly polarized political atmosphere of the country also acts as a catalyst for deepening disputes and divisions.

The Arab-Alawite community of the city - the second largest after the Sunni population - which generally votes for the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party, has been particularly wary of the actions taken by the government of the Justice and Development Party. Müjgan, a 45-year-old restaurant owner, said the part of Antakya where she is from did not receive any government aid during the first three days after the earthquake becuase the region is mainly populated by Arab-Alawites.

Like many other Arab-Alawites in the city, she believes that the government used the earthquake to divide the community by making their lives harder and indirectly forcing them to immigrate by leaving them with no other option.

According to Müjgan, the division between the Sunni and Arab-Alawite populations deepened, in particular after the arrival of Syrian refugees in the city, which she also viewed as part of the government’s policy against the Arab-Alawite community. Two expropriation decisions of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan taken in the months following the earthquake also deepened the concerns of the Arab-Alawite community.

These decisions allowed the government-led housing agency (Toki) to construct new buildings in Dikmece and Gülderen, the two neighborhoods of Antakya populated mainly by Arab-Alawites. Both decisions are currently before the administrative court. Soon after the presidential decision, Dikmece villagers started a resistance against the expropriation of their olive groves and organized several protests, which led to violent clashes between them and the local police.

Reconstruction

Local lawyer Ecevit Alkan said: “There is chaos in the city, and the politicians benefit from this situation; it is easier for them to govern that way.” Besides the repercussions of the national problems in the disaster-stricken city, disputes on various matters have become part of everyday life.

Alkan said: “Disputes can be found in nearly every WhatsApp group that were formed between the residents of different apartments who must decide together what to do about their collapsed buildings.” The options are either to reconstruct in the same place, which requires the consent of 50% of the flat owners, or replace their right of ownership with a flat from Toki.

Whatever they choose, the government will provide a grant of 750,000TL (around 24,700 dollars) and an interest-free loan for the same amount, the repayment of which starts two years later. These sums, however, are very low compared to the inflation in the country. Moreover, most of the survivors lost both their homes and jobs in the earthquake and fear that the new buildings might turn out to cost them much more than what the grant and the credit would cover, and so, they might end up in huge debt.

Currently, the buildings in the city are categorized into four groups: “destroyed”, “heavy damage”, “moderate damage”, and “minor or no damage”. However, these categorizations have also become a major source of dispute as many owners have taken the status of their properties to the courts in the hope of changing them to either “moderate” or “minor” damage to prevent their demolition.

Hatay, as well as its central district Antakya, are replete with buildings with a sign that says “Don’t demolish, taken to the court,” as the owners fear that if they lose even the ruins of what they used to have, their land can be seized for some government projects or new unaffordable apartment building. Government officials have expressed concern about the excessive number of cases that have inundated the local courts and which they believe are delaying reconstruction in the city.

Bazaar dispute

The historical bazaar in the city, Uzunçarşı, is much more vibrant than it was a couple of months ago. However, the shopkeepers are also in disagreement with one another about its fate. The official plan is to demolish and rebuild it with better infrastructure.

Not everyone is on board with the plan, including Yusuf, who believes that the reconstruction would take much longer than what the officials have promised. He said the government has yet to keep any of its pledges. Also, if the bazaar were to be demolished, the shopkeepers will be temporarily transferred to a container bazaar, which according to Yusuf, lacks the soul that the historical market has and hardly attracts any customers.

The pro-government residents of the city are certainly more hopeful about the process, and they believe that if everyone puts their trust in the government, things will flow more smoothly. However, even Serdar, who works as a civil servant in the AKP-led Antakya municipality, admits that, compared to other cities hit by the earthquake, in Hatay, things are moving very slowly.

He said: “Hatay is seen almost like a tassel hanging beneath the mainland... Its problems hardly enter the political agenda as a priority.” Such sentiments are common among the locals, regardless of their affiliations.

Salim, for instance, painted his tractor in rainbow colors and described at the back how the city was left alone after the earthquake. He put on a makeshift license plate “31 Earthquake 4.17”, with 31 indicating the traffic code in Hatay and 4.17 the time when the first earthquake hit the city the hardest.

Salim used to own a restaurant before the earthquake, and had bought the old tractor to use it as an attraction in the front. He didn’t know that it would become his livelihood. For the moment, he uses it to collect items taken out of the demolition sites, but does not know what work he will find afterwards.

Ambiguity that has paralyzed almost every aspect of life in Hatay and the absence of effective political action to meet the urgent needs of the locals characterize the general atmosphere in the city one year after the earthquake. However, with municipal elections set for March 31, the politics in the city now revolve around electoral pledges made by candidates, whose credibility is doubted by many locals. If none of their pledges were fulfilled in a year, what are they hoping to achieve in a few months?



Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)

The fragile global legal framework for nuclear weapons control faces further setbacks in 2026, eroding guardrails to avoid a nuclear crisis.

The first half of the year will see two key events: the US-Russia bilateral treaty, New START, expires on February 5, and in April, New York hosts the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- the cornerstone of global nuclear security frameworks.

The RevCon, held every four to five years, is meant to keep the NPT alive. But during the last two sessions, the 191 signatory states failed to agree on a final document, and experts expect the same outcome in April.

"I think this is going to be a difficult RevCon," said Alexandra Bell, head of US-based global security nonprofit the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at a UN-hosted online conference in early December.

"In terms of the current state and near future prospects of nuclear arms control architecture, things are bleak," she added.

Anton Khlopkov, director of Russian think-tank the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), took an even starker point of view, saying at the same event that "we are at the point of almost complete dismantlement of arms control architecture".

"We should be realistic in the current circumstances. At best, I think we should try to preserve what we have," he said.

- 'Crumbling' safeguards -

From US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to Russia's test of the new Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and US President Donald Trump's remarks about possibly resuming nuclear tests -- the international nuclear landscape darkened in 2025.

At the same time, "the arms control architecture is crumbling", Emmanuelle Maitre of France's Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) told AFP.

A key challenge hinges on a shift in global relations.

Nuclear control had been built over decades around a Moscow-Washington axis, but China's growing power and rapid technological advances have shifted the international playing field, which is simultaneously increasingly strained.

"The growing interlinkage between nuclear and conventional forces and the emergence of disruptive technologies (such as the US Golden Dome defense system and new hypersonic weapons) have transformed traditional nuclear deterrence into a multi-domain concept, especially in a multipolar world," said Peking University's Hua Han.

"This trilateral configuration introduces complexities far beyond the Cold War-era bilateral model. Increasing China-Russia cooperation further complicates deterrence calculations, particularly in the two main theaters of concern: Europe and the Asia-Pacific," she added, according to the minutes of an April event held by Pakistan's Center for International Strategic Studies.

A likely result of the changing landscape is the lapse of New START, which sets weapon limits and includes inspection systems.

"The entire inspection component is no longer functioning, the notifications when a missile is moved, etc, all of that has vanished. What remains is only the voluntary commitment to stay within the limits," said Maitre.

- 'Collective solutions' -

But allowing New START to lapse is "in American interest", according to Robert Peters of the influential Heritage Foundation, reflecting the stance of much of the US strategic community to avoid tying Washington's hands to Moscow alone.

Beijing, which currently has fewer weapons, has so far refused to engage in trilateral disarmament talks.

"China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet. It's building 100 new warheads a year and now has more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos than the US has active Minuteman III silos," Peters said at a recent online International Institute for Strategic Studies event.

"New START does nothing to address" that issue, he added.

However, Maitre said, a New START lapse doesn't mean the world should expect serious consequences as early as February 6.

In both Washington and Moscow, "there is a small margin to bring some weapons back into service, but the numbers cannot be very significant. There are bottlenecks" that will slow any buildup, she said.

Nor will the lack of a final document from the RevCon cause "immediate or damaging consequences" to the NPT, she said.

But, she warned, fewer safeguards risks leaving the world without diplomatic tools to resolve tensions.

"The less functional the NPT becomes, the harder it is to forge collective solutions in the event of a crisis."


Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.