Israel ‘Stuck’ in War After 200 Days

Israeli soldiers near the Lebanese border (AFP)
Israeli soldiers near the Lebanese border (AFP)
TT

Israel ‘Stuck’ in War After 200 Days

Israeli soldiers near the Lebanese border (AFP)
Israeli soldiers near the Lebanese border (AFP)

Despite 200 days passing since Israel’s war on Gaza, few in Israel, except Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, claim a clear victory. Even the usually boastful army now speaks more modestly.

Expectations have shifted from “destroying Hamas” to “weakening its rule” and from “forcefully freeing captives” to “negotiating their release.”

While Netanyahu insists on the narrative of overwhelming victory, top experts are warning of significant failure, with some even suggesting defeat.

Ron Ben-Yishai, a security expert at the “Yedioth Ahronoth” newspaper, cautioned that Israel was at a strategic deadlock. He noted that regarding prisoners, Israel has lost its leverage over Hamas.

Regarding the invasion of Rafah, Netanyahu is still in talks with Washington about the scope of Israel’s actions, with no American approval yet.

Concerning the “day after,” Israel is still uncertain, with its proposals seen as impractical. Although Hamas has lost much of its military power, it still controls many areas.

Tensions are also rising on the Lebanese front, but there’s no clear path to war or a political deal, with everyone waiting for Gaza’s fighting to end.

As for Iran, Israel struggles to form a regional alliance due to its lack of progress on the Palestinian issue, which is seen as crucial for resolving other problems.

Ben-Yishai affirmed that Israel must soften its stance on Palestine and heed calls from Washington.

Without strategic cooperation with the Biden administration, not only will Israel remain stuck but also face defeat in the war, he warned.

In a recent piece for Israeli daily “Haaretz,” Israeli thinker Yuval Noah Harari emphasizes that war is a tool to achieve political goals.

Harari argues that the success of war should be measured by whether these goals are met. He pointed out that after the Oct. 7 tragedy, Israel aimed to free captives and disarm Hamas, but it also needed to strengthen alliances and establish regional stability.

However, he criticizes Netanyahu’s government for focusing on revenge rather than these broader objectives, failing to release all captives or eliminate Hamas.



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
TT

Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.