The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.



Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destruction

People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
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Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destruction

People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)

Hazem Saghieh

The advent of the 21st Century brought with it historic developments. The most significant for Syria and Lebanon took place on June 10, 2000 with the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Many openly mourned his passing. Many having experienced firsthand the cruelty of the ruler. In secret however, they said: “This is the first time Assad does something useful.”

Hafez was in effect the president of two countries. Weeks before his death, he met with US President Bill Clinton in Geneva to discuss resuming negotiations between Syria and Israel. On May 25, 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in line with an electoral pledge made by Ehud Barak.

The day was a calamity to Assad’s Lebanese and Syrian supporters, who saw in the withdrawal the end of their excuses to carry arms outside state control. So, they described the move as a “conspiracy” and suddenly, like a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, they cited Israel’s continued occupation of the long-forgotten Shebaa Farms. Israel had occupied the area from Syria in 1967. Calls for war mounted, demanding that Israel withdraw or suffer the consequences. Soon after, however, tensions eased, and Hezbollah declared the withdrawal a “liberation” achieved with the support of “Syria’s Assad”.

Training Bashar and Lebanese politicians

Syrians recalled the story of a peasant from Daraa who headed to Damascus to attend Hafez’s funeral. On his way, he saw a billboard that read: “The Assad (Arabic for lion) is immortal and does not die.” So the peasant turned back and returned home believing that the news of Hafez’s death were rumors spread by enemies.

The peasant wasn’t completely wrong or so it would seem when Hafez’s son, Bashar, came to power to follow in his father’s footsteps. Despite the changes the new young ruler introduced to the country and his marriage to a “modern” British-born woman, the apple did not fall far from the tree, and he maintained his father’s iron-fisted grip on power.

Bashar forged ahead along his father’s destructive path and where better to gain experience than in Syria’s favorite training ground: Lebanon.

Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and US President Bill Clinton meet in Geneva in 2000. (Getty Images)

In 1998, two years before he came to power and four years after his older brother Bassel’s death, Bashar was put in charge of the Syrian military presence in “brotherly” Lebanon, where 40,000 Syrian soldiers were deployed. As part of Bashar’s training, he documented his relations with Lebanese politicians, the majority of whom bowed their heads to the lowliest of Syrian officers.

Three Lebanese figures stood out for Bashar. Two had his unabashed admiration and one was an abhorred thorn in his side:

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was the leader of the resistance party and enjoyed Bashar’s full support. He was viewed as the man of the 2000 liberation. He represented to Bashar everything that he could not achieve because he inherited power, while Nasrallah earned his way to the top. However, Hafez had the upper hand over Nasrallah when negotiating with Iran; the young inexperienced Bashar did not.

Bashar’s admiration of Nasrallah stemmed from what he could never achieve, while his admiration for Emile Lahoud stemmed from what was possible. The Lebanese army and naval commander was chosen by Damascus to be president in 1998. Lahoud, the commander of the very modest Lebanese navy, was as much a military man as Bashar, the ophthalmologist, was a doctor.

With the very little time needed to run the navy, Lahoud spent his leisure hours oiling himself up to tan under the sun at the Bain Militaire resort in Beirut. In all likelihood, Bashar was drawn to Lahoud because of their shared weakness in articulating words and putting sentences together, following that up with weak laughter, leaving their statements utterly meaningless.

The thorn in Bashar’s side was wealthy businessman and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who lavished gifts on Syrian officers hoping for political leniency in return. This was not the type of wealthy man who Bashar was drawn to. Bashar looked up to the wealthy man whose sole ambition was to keep his riches from being seized.

Articles spoke about how Hariri was the one who was building Syria’s relations with the world, and he was the one who proposed to Damascus that it follow the “Chinese model” whereby power remains in the hands of the rulers, while freedom is introduced to the markets. Bashar resented Hariri for this and his sentiment deepened because Hariri was a Sunni leader and Bashar was Alawite. The Sunnis make up the majority in Lebanon and Syria where Alawites are a minority.

Rumors abounded that Hariri not only wanted to be the leader of the Sunnis in Lebanon, but in Syria as well. No wonder Bashar was suspicious. Rumors also spread that Hariri sought regional peace whereby the Palestinians and Israeli would continue where they left off in Oslo in 1993. Perhaps what irked Bashar the most about Hariri was that he was a self-made man.

From left to right: Former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, slain former PM Rafik al-Hariri and slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (AFP file)

Regional tumult and crimes in Lebanon

The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon removed the Syrian regime’s excuse for keeping its forces deployed in Lebanon. Hafez’s death encouraged people to speak out. The man of the moment was late Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, who in September 2000 sponsored a Maronite call on Syria to pull out its troops. Sfeir forged ahead. In April 2001, he blessed the establishment of the Qornet Shewan gathering that marked the beginning of the emergence of an anti-Syria opposition.

The gathering brought together Christian politicians and helped extend bridges to Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, both of whom were upset with Bashar and his employee in Lebanon, Lahoud. In the summer of 2001, Sfeir sponsored a major reconciliation between the Christians and the Druze. Both sects were seen as the backbone of Lebanon’s national identity.

On August 7, Christian society was rattled by student protests held by supporters of the Lebanese Forces and former army commander Michel Aoun, who was in exile at the time. The protesters were summarily rounded up and imprisoned in shocking scenes. Hundreds were detained without any legal justification and for simply demanding freedom and the withdrawal of Syrian troops.

The region was in store for more tumult. In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and a year later Syria’s Kurds in Qamishli were encouraged to revolt against the regime. Bashar responded to the unrest by shipping terrorists to Iraq where they caused so much death and destruction. Washington soon began to mount its pressure on Bashar to ease meddling in Lebanon.

Bashar responded with a bombshell in Beirut. He remained steadfast in extending Lahoud’s term in office in 2004 despite deep opposition in Lebanon. In September later that year, the UN Security Council issued resolution 1559 that calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the dismantling of all militias. It was as clear as day that Bashar and Hezbollah were the main targets of the resolution.

Bashar and Nasrallah were determined to retaliate against the resolution and Jumblatt and Hariri were seen as the main targets. Jumblatt had joined the opposition, while Hariri, who openly opposed the extension of Lahoud’s term – in what was seen as a direct insult to Bashar – was suspected of having played a major role in the issuance of resolution 1559.

And so, Beirut would be struck with disaster on February 14, 2005. Hariri was assassinated in major car bombing that would also claim the life of minister Bassil Fleihan and 21 people. A slew of crimes and assassinations would ensue against politicians and journalists who were vocal in their opposition to Bashar and Nasrallah.

Lebanon would soon become divided into two camps: one known as “March 8”, named so after holding a large rally on that day in 2005 to “thank Syria’s Assad” for its role in Lebanon, and “March 14”, also named so after a rally on that day that dwarfed the first and that protested against Hariri’s killing and demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian forces.

The forces would eventually withdraw from Lebanon on April 30, 2005. Nasrallah eagerly gifted the head of the Syrian security apparatus in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, the “rifle of resistance” because he wanted the Syrian troops to quit Lebanon with their heads held high, not weak and humiliated. Hariri’s “curse” would haunt Ghazaleh and his predecessor Ghazi Kanaan. Their mysterious fate would be added to countless others who died under the Assad rule.

Syrian forces deployed in Lebanon. (AFP file)

Ghazaleh was named to his post in Lebanon in 2002. He followed in Kanaan’s bloody footsteps of killing and torture. They had set up base in the town of Anjar in the Bekaa and the Beau Rivage Hotel in Beirut, both of which became synonymous with the Syrian regime’s oppression. They also sponsored drug and weapons smuggling networks whose revenues they reaped, along with the regime and their allies in the “Axis of Resistance”.

Ghazaleh was known for his utmost loyalty to the regime. Perhaps it was because he was a Sunni and needed to prove himself to his Alawite masters. Kanaan, a Alawite, didn’t need to go that far and years later would go on record and speak proudly of his friendship with Hariri.

At any rate, with Syrian troops out of Lebanon, the regime feared that all of its plotting to kill Hariri would be revealed. So, Ghazaleh, the regime’s secret keeper and owner of the “rifle of the resistance” was killed in 2015. Kanaan was shot and killed in his office in 2005. He was shot with two or three bullets, but the regime famously preferred to call his death a suicide. A few years later, two of his brothers also committed “suicide” - also using two or three bullets.

Tying the brother to the sister

Throughout the hegemony of “sister” Syria over “brother” Lebanon, the latter was under the Baathist theory of “Lebanon’s Arabism”. Describing what the regime did to Arabism is an insult to the word. In reality, it required that Lebanon stand by Syria and non-Arab Iran, through thick and thin, against Egypt, Iraq and Arab Gulf and Maghreb. For the first time in Lebanon’s modern history, it had an official ideology that identified “friend” and “foe”, replacing freedom of expression that was a hallmark of Lebanon’s official stances.

Hafez had also tightened the bond between Damascus and Beirut with the 1991 treaty of “Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination” that tied Lebanon’s foreign policy to Syria’s. Damascus was also granted the final say in administrative and public appointments, especially security and military ones. It was allowed to name judges and ministers and outline media policies of various outlets.

This form of “Arabism” continued under Bashar, who at first attempted to display some openness towards Syria and Lebanon. He gave some breathing room for civil society activists in Syria and Lebanese banks opened branches in Syria. Bashar also approached Christian Lebanese parties that are traditionally opposed to the Assads.

War with Israel

Bashar’s relative “openness” led to the establishment of the “Beirut-Damascus Declaration” in May 2006. It was signed by hundreds of Syrian and Lebanon intellectuals and activists and called on the Syrian government to “correct” relations with Lebanon and respect its sovereignty and independence and end its series of political assassinations. The declaration marked the end of the openness. The Syrian signatories soon found themselves in jail or fired from their jobs.

Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon left Hezbollah and its allies isolated. They were also confronted with a national agenda championed by the March 14 movement. Syrian voices chimed in solidarity with the Lebanese people. Hezbollah and its allies therefore sensed the need to shift attention elsewhere. And as usual, what best way to do that than sparking a war with Israel? Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, leading Israel to declare war on the party.

Hezbollah would declare “divine victory” some 33 days later. Soon after, Iran-backed Hezbollah would assume in Lebanon the role once played by Ghazaleh. Iran’s role in Lebanon would become more pronounced, while Syria still held sway, albeit in back alleys, instead of the rooftops.

Lebanese mourners hold up a sign during the funeral of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut, Lebanon, February 16, 2005 (Reuters)

A deadly duality emerged: a popular and parliamentary majority represented by Fuad Siniora’s government on the one hand, and the “divine victory” camp whose weapons and alliances would prevent the establishment of any stable form of rule on the other. The camp obstructed the government functioning and crippled the entire capital with a sit-in in Downtown Beirut that extended for over a year.

In May 2007, members of the so-called Fatah al-Islam group killed 27 Lebanese soldiers in their sleep. Clashes soon ensued in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp between the group and the army. Later, it would be revealed that the leader of the group, Shaker al-Absi, was working for Syrian intelligence. He had been imprisoned in Damascus and later released. He was tasked with sending terrorists to Iraq. After the Nahr al-Bared battle, he fled to Damascus and was later unsurprisingly killed in mysterious circumstances.

With Hezbollah and its allies holding sway in Lebanon, meeting constitutional deadlines became impossible. It took six months to elect Michel Suleiman president and that was only after Hezbollah and its allies turned their weapons against the Lebanese people in May 2008. The Doha conference was held to restore calm and end the political impasse and Suleiman was elected president.

Even after the crisis was resolved, Hezbollah continued to obstruct political life when things did not go in its favor even though the 2009 parliamentary elections, just like the 2005 polls, handed the March 14 camp a majority.

Syrian revolution and Assad’s downfall

The Syrian revolution erupted in 2011 and people in Lebanon hoped that it would positively impact their country and sweep away the rot and corruption that had been eating away at it. Voices of solidarity rose with the Syrian people, this time calling for freedom and dignity, not Arabism and resistance. Thugs affiliated with Damascus loyalists and Hezbollah soon cracked down on people expressing solidarity.

The northern city of Tripoli suffered the brunt of the crackdown. Its close proximity to Syria had always made it a prime target for the regime’s oppressive practices. In 2013, two mosques in the city were bombed, leaving 49 people dead and over 800 wounded. Unsurprisingly, the terrorist group that had claimed responsibility for the attack was actually affiliated with Damascus.

In 2012, scandal shook Lebanon when former minister Michel Samaha was busted for smuggling explosives from Syria to Lebanon where he planned on carrying out bombings. Ali al-Mamlouk, Bashar’s security advisor, was the mastermind behind the plot.

Ousted Syrian President Bashar all-Assad. (SANA file)

In 2019, as the sanctions tightened around the regime, it turned to Lebanon to ease the strain. The regime’s financial ties to Hezbollah were deepened during that phase, especially when it came to smuggling captagon.

While Syria kept a low profile in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s role in Syria grew more prominent. It reached a glaring peak in 2013 when it intervened militarily in Syria to help the regime fight the opposition seeking its ouster.

On the official level, Lebanon had sought to distance itself from the conflict in Syria. The Baabda Declaration was issued in 2012, stressing that Lebanon would keep a distance from the unrest. All parties, including Hezbollah, had agreed to it. Iran, Hezbollah’s backer, had other plans and soon the party scrambled to the aid of its ally, sowing death and destruction in Syria.

On August 4, 2020, Beirut was in store for yet another tragedy. Ammonium nitrate unsafely stored at the Beirut port mysteriously detonated, destroying swathes of the capital and killing over 200 people. The explosion was the third largest non-nuclear explosion in history. A lot was written about how associates of the Assad regime, who were complicit in shady deals and smuggling operations, had been storing the nitrate at the port.

The claims gained ground when Hezbollah thwarted investigations into the explosion. The party had no problem dispatching its enforcer and security official Wafik Safa to threaten the judge in charge of the probe to shut it down. And so it was, and the investigations have been stalled for years.

Much can be said about the Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon during their country’s conflict. Strong bonds were forged between them and the locals, but they also strained Lebanon’s already fragile economy, fueling resentment and racism against them.

The Syrian regime collapsed on December 8 and Bashar fled to Moscow. The Lebanese people shared the Syrian people’s delirium in seeing the downfall of their oppressor.

However, Lebanon is not out of the woods yet. Members of the regime fled Syria to Lebanon and local authorities are demanded to arrest them, otherwise risk jeopardizing relations with the new rulers in Damascus. But everyone can safely say, that at the moment, the past 25 years of oppression, death and ruin at the hands of the regime are truly over.