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Libya Political Process Deadlocked

Col. Muammar Gaddafi
Col. Muammar Gaddafi
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Libya Political Process Deadlocked

Col. Muammar Gaddafi
Col. Muammar Gaddafi

Libya has undergone significant changes since the fall of Col. Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The Libyans have struggled to establish a stable government, leading to the country being split into two main factions: One in the west backed by Türkiye and another in the east supported by Russia.

However, the reality is more complex than just two competing governments.

This report highlights the main players in the power struggle in Libya today, focusing on the Government of National Unity led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in Tripoli and the eastern government backed by parliament and Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces.

The report also explains why the UN-led political process has stalled and explores the influence of five key figures in Libya’s political landscape, the armed groups in Tripoli, and the rise of powerful families in both the east and west.

In 2011, Libyan rebels closed in on Tripoli, Gaddafi’s stronghold, and stormed his heavily fortified complex at Bab al-Aziziya. Armed groups, including some with ties to extremist movements, took over the complex, signaling the collapse of Gaddafi’s rule, though he continued to resist until he was killed near Sirte in October of that year.

Thirteen years after Gaddafi’s fall, Libya remains divided between two rival governments.

The Libyan army, which fell with Gaddafi’s regime, has largely been rebuilt in the east under Haftar’s command. In the west, the situation is more chaotic, with various armed groups operating under Dbeibeh’s government, each controlling different areas.

The conflict is further complicated by foreign involvement: Türkiye supports the western forces with troops and allied Syrian mercenaries, while Russia backs Haftar in the east and south, first through the Wagner Group and now with a direct military presence, raising concerns about a new Russian foothold on the Mediterranean.

The political process to reach a settlement in Libya has been stalled for years. International envoys come and go, but none have succeeded, and there is no solution in sight.

Since Gaddafi’s fall, Libya has changed a lot, but the new system remains unclear. To help explain the current situation, we spoke with Tim Eaton, a top Libya analyst at Chatham House in London.

Political Process... Dead in the Water

When asked about the status of the UN-led political process in Libya, Eaton started by clarifying that it is currently in the hands of Stephanie Khouri, the acting head of the UN mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

She was initially appointed as the deputy to UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily, but after his resignation, she ended up leading the mission. However, since Khouri wasn’t appointed by the UN Security Council, she’s not an official special envoy, and her role is less defined, coming directly from the UN Secretary-General.

There’s ongoing discussion about who will be the next special envoy to Libya, but given the challenges within the Security Council, appointing someone has been difficult and remains a tough task. In short, it’s increasingly hard to get a new envoy through a Security Council vote.

As for the political stalemate that Libya is suffering from nowadays, Eaton stressed that the reason behind this is that the political process is dead and hasn't moved at all.

In 2021, under the then deputy head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for political affairs Stephanie Williams, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed.

It was the first government since 2014 to be recognized by both eastern and western Libya, and it was supposed to hold elections by the end of that year. But that didn’t happen.

Critics accused the GNU of blocking the elections, and there were disputes over who could run, with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s return causing particular controversy.

After the elections failed to happen in 2022, the eastern House of Representatives formed a new government, but it wasn’t accepted by the broader political scene. So, Libyans were back to having two rival governments.

Jan Kubis, who succeeded Williams, couldn’t move the election process forward. When he left, it was clear elections wouldn’t happen. Williams briefly returned, but was then replaced by Abdoulaye Bathily, the UN special envoy.

Instead of pushing the process forward, Bathily decided to take time to assess the situation and engage in shuttle diplomacy. He focused on trying to get agreement among the five key players but hasn’t made much progress.

The Big Five

According to Eaton, Libya’s “Big Five” are Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity; Mohamed Takala, President of the High Council of State (recently replaced by Khaled al-Mishri); Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Mohamed al-Menfi, Head of the Presidential Council; and military leader Khalifa Haftar.

Bathily’s plan focused on getting these five leaders to sit down and agree on the future, but he couldn’t make it happen. Each of them set conditions that blocked progress.

For example, Dbeibeh refused to participate if the talks were about forming a new government, as it would mean replacing him. Haftar demanded that if the western government was involved, the eastern one must be too. These obstacles led Bathily to resign, as there was nothing solid to build on.

This is where things stand now.

Despite seeming like rivals, the Big Five do cooperate in certain areas. For example, Haftar and Dbeibeh have an understanding on dividing oil revenues.

Family Rule

Eaton doesn’t think that the ongoing division between eastern and western Libya could lead to a real split of the country.

The connection between east and west Libya is stronger than many realize, the analyst affirmed.

What’s happening now is more about powerful families and their networks competing for control, rather than just an east-versus-west divide. In the east, those in power are closely linked to Haftar, while in the west, Dbeibeh’s family has strengthened its control and appointed people with ties to them.

Foreign Fighters

Foreign fighters and mercenaries have been involved in Libya since 2011. Initially, they came from places like Darfur and Chad. Recently, the situation has changed significantly.

During Haftar’s attempts to take Tripoli, he relied on Wagner Group mercenaries, which led Tripoli authorities to seek Turkish support. Türkiye established a permanent presence in the west and brought in Syrian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Wagner expanded its presence in Haftar’s areas.

Wagner’s involvement now seems more like a state relationship with Russia rather than just a mercenary group. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov has visited eastern Libya frequently, and there is significant Russian military equipment flowing into the region. This growing Russian presence is a major concern for the US.

In the west, the situation is more chaotic. No single family controls all security forces, and Türkiye supports specific groups, such as the 444 Brigade in Tripoli. Türkiye also took control of the Al-Watiya airbase.

Both Türkiye and Russia are firmly established in Libya now. Their presence makes a large-scale war less likely, as the costs would be high. Haftar cannot advance on Tripoli due to Turkish opposition, and when Misrata forces considered moving east, they were deterred by Russian aircraft and Egypt’s declared “red line.”

Foreign fighters have become a permanent part of the Libyan landscape and are likely to stay.

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What Syria’s Military Map Shows One Year After Liberation

Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)
Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)
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What Syria’s Military Map Shows One Year After Liberation

Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)
Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)

Syria’s map of control has been shaken to its core since late 2024, when the Deterrence of Aggression offensive erupted and the Assad government fell, unleashing a series of security and military shifts that continued to redraw the country’s landscape through 2025.

But this fluid map is unlikely to hold, according to a study by the Syrian research group Jusoor Center for Studies. With regional and international actors working to head off the chaos and potential partition that threaten wider stability, any near term changes in who controls what are expected to come through political and security pressure rather than a return to large scale battles.

Mahmoud Eibo, one of three researchers who worked on a report on territorial influence in Syria in 2025, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the balance of control shifted sharply after the launch of the Deterrence of Aggression battles on November 27, 2024.

In less than two weeks, the Assad government lost the areas it had held since 2020, which covered more than half of the country.

Iranian withdrawal from Syrian territory

With the government’s fall, Iran’s presence also unraveled after more than a decade of entrenchment. Iran backed militias withdrew from rural Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, the southern provinces and from Al-Bukamal and Al-Mayadin.

Eibo said the militias “withdrew completely” after supply lines linking them to Lebanon and Iraq were severed, which effectively ended Iran’s influence and that of its militias across Syria.

The military role of Hezbollah also came to an end. The group had been one of Tehran’s key proxies in Syria since 2013, when its intervention began with the capture of Al-Qusayr.

But the turning point ended in the same town, after factions in the Deterrence of Aggression campaign seized Al-Qusayr in late 2024 and Hezbollah forces pulled out entirely.

The moment marked a definitive end to Hezbollah’s long military presence in Syria, after the group lost one of its most critical geographic links to Iran through Syrian territory.

Many areas that had been under the indirect influence of Hezbollah and Iran backed factions also slipped out of their orbit and reverted to the authority of the new Syrian state and its security and military institutions in the north.

The largest shift in influence last year came at the expense of the Syrian Democratic Forces, known as the SDF, Eibo said. The Dawn of Freedom operation ended the group’s presence in strategically important areas west of the Euphrates, beginning with the fall of Tel Rifaat and surrounding villages and extending toward Manbij, which cost the SDF one of its key cities in the region.

As a result, the SDF’s influence contracted in northern and eastern Aleppo countryside and the group withdrew eastward toward Raqqa, Hasakeh and parts of Deir Ezzor.

Sweida and the south

In the south, a limited but consequential development emerged in Sweida province. Local groups linked to Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri seized parts of the province after government forces withdrew, taking advantage of the security vacuum.

Although the area under their control is geographically small, it created a pocket of influence outside the new government’s authority and added another layer of instability to the southern provinces.

In parallel, Israel capitalized on the collapse of the southern front. It pushed beyond the buffer zone and established a presence in select points and strategic hilltops near the disengagement line.

Although the area is small, the symbolic and intelligence value of the chosen positions gives Israel leverage through monitoring and pressure, keeping the south open to volatility.

What the new map shows

Syria’s territorial map at the end of 2025 reflects a new political landscape dominated by four actors: the Syrian government, the SDF, the National Guard forces in Sweida and Israel, each wielding varying degrees of influence.

The Syrian government remains the primary authority. Beyond its broad political and social control, it holds 69.3% of the country’s territory, covering major cities, most administrative structures and key transport routes. It does not, however, control four provincial capitals: Quneitra, Sweida, Hasakeh and Raqqa.

The SDF controls 27.8% of Syria’s territory, concentrated in the north and east. The expanse is significant but uneven in terms of internal stability. The group faces serious political pressure tied to the implementation of the March 10, 2025 agreement, which is expected to reshape its relationship with the Syrian government.

The National Guard forces in Sweida, loyal to Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri, control 2.8% of the country. Their influence is small in size but distinct in nature. The significance lies in their location and in the direct support they receive from Israel, which positions them within a broader framework aimed at prolonging instability in the south.

Their presence overlaps with Israel’s incursion into Syrian territory, which covers 0.1% of the country. Despite the small footprint, the choice of elevated positions and small villages with high surveillance value reflects strategic intent.

Israel is not seeking territorial control, but rather an early warning line and a tighter grip over the border zone, while supporting an environment that prevents full stability in the south. This aligns with its indirect role in reinforcing the position of the Sweida National Guard forces.

Change driven by political pressure

According to Eibo, Syria’s map of control has undergone a fundamental rupture since late 2024, ending a geopolitical phase that had been largely settled since 2020.

The country has entered a more fluid and complex period marked by the retreat of traditional actors and the emergence of new, still unsettled zones of influence.

Although limited security and military shifts continued through 2025, it is unlikely that the current map will hold. Regional and international efforts are focused on avoiding chaos and partition.

Any upcoming change in territorial control will most likely be driven by political and security pressure and by reengineering spheres of influence rather than a return to large scale military confrontations.

Features

Assad’s ‘Trap’: A Night That Shook Tehran’s Allies in Baghdad

A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)
A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)
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Assad’s ‘Trap’: A Night That Shook Tehran’s Allies in Baghdad

A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)
A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)

A senior Iraqi security official urged his driver to pick up speed as they raced toward Damascus airport. He needed to catch a flight back to Baghdad, while alerts kept lighting up his phone.

One message stood out: “The Syrian factions are on their way to the capital.”

It was Saturday evening, December 7, 2024, and the official had just wrapped up a routine mission in northeastern Syria to coordinate border security. But Syria itself was on the edge of a dramatic shift, its old order crumbling and a new one taking shape in the ruins.

At the outskirts of Damascus, the official’s convoy halted, waiting for “extraordinary arrangements” with the emerging authorities. A flurry of sudden, unexpected contacts unfolded between the two sides.

A former Syrian official from the Military Operations Directorate said it was “the first time that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group communicated with an official in the Iraqi government.”

An Iraqi security officer who was present during the arrangements said that “the process went ahead with unexpected ease at the time, and we entered Damascus” alongside members of the group on the morning of December 8, 2024. Then a message arrived like a lightning strike: “Bashar al-Assad has fled.”

Damascus airport was a ghostly stage. Even the officers of the Air Transport Brigade whom the Iraqi official knew had disappeared. No one asked for a ticket or a passport. The diplomatic lane was wide open to the wind. The man boarded a special flight to Baghdad.

As the plane climbed through daylight, the Iraqi security official carried a bag full of questions about the new Syria.

On the same route, but on the ground, Iraqi militias that had been stationed in Syria since 2011 were withdrawing. Convoys moved from the Damascus countryside toward Al-Bukamal near the Iraqi border, making a final one-way journey for hundreds of fighters, leaving behind 15 years of a “Resistance Axis” now collapsing like a mountain of sand.

Exclusive testimonies gathered by Asharq Al-Awsat from Iraqi figures involved in the Syrian file before Assad’s escape reveal how militias withdrew from Syria without coordination or prior arrangements.

The accounts describe what unfolded behind the scenes, including how they viewed the events, and later showed that Tehran, Moscow and Assad had each made separate decisions not to fight in Syria, failing to share essential information with their Iraqi allies until late.

The testimonies also shed light on the reactions of Shiite groups following the collapse of the Assad regime, including calls to strengthen the influence of armed factions in Iraq’s political process and reinforce what became known as “Shiite governance” in Baghdad, in order to “absorb the shock felt by those who had been left behind in Syria.”

Damascus airport after the collapse of the Assad regime. (AFP file)

‘It was not a maneuver... we were deceived’

On November 30, 2024, three days after the launch of Operation Deterrence of Aggression to topple the Syrian regime, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani held a phone call with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

At that time, Syrian opposition factions had seized control of the Aleppo countryside. Sudani told Assad that “Syria’s security is tied to Iraq’s national security.” The following day, the opposition encircled Hama. Sudani did not call Assad again.

In Nineveh, the northern Iraqi province that borders Syria, Shiite militia leaders attempted to send reinforcements to Syria, since “as the Syrian factions advanced, the number of Iran-aligned fighters was far smaller than in previous years.” A militia official in Nineveh said they told their fighters, “You must protect the Shiites and the shrines in Syria,” and many volunteers were eager to join.

Kadhim al-Fartousi, spokesman for Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, which had been active in Syria since 2013, said the group withdrew in late 2023. “Our mission was over,” he said.

Until 2018, Syria was crowded with more than 150,000 fighters from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, according to Iraqi and Syrian security estimates. The Syrian army under the former regime appeared smaller than the foreign forces operating on its territory. By December 2023, something had changed.

The Revolutionary Guard allowed several Shiite groups to leave after consultations with Assad. It was widely said that a “regional deal” had driven this shift.

As part of the partial withdrawal of Iranian-backed forces from Syria in 2023, Assad was attempting to regain Syria’s seat in the Arab League. It required significant time and diplomatic maneuvering to prepare for an almost impossible reintegration with the Arab world, which ultimately did not materialize.

When Operation Deterrence of Aggression began in November 2024, the number of Iranian groups in Syria had fallen to several thousand, but Assad’s return to the Arab fold was not complete.

As opposition factions advanced toward Damascus, the prevailing belief was that Shiite groups were moving to plug a gap that no one had noticed.

On December 2, 2024, dozens of fighters infiltrated Syria at night via an unofficial military road, but United States aircraft struck their convoys near Al-Bukamal. After that, it became clear that those who had been eager to enter Syria were backing off.

The next morning, Syrian opposition forces seized 14 towns in Hama and turned to the battle for Homs. That day, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah said “it is too early to decide on sending military support to Syria.”

A senior member of a Shiite armed group said he asked his superiors in Baghdad about the first days of Operation Deterrence of Aggression. “Do not worry... Syria may fall to the opposition, but Damascus will hold,” they told him, referring to Assad’s grip on the capital.

“A week later,” he added, “we could no longer comprehend what had happened.”

Before the opposition reached Homs, Shiite groups assumed the advance would stop there. A commander said intelligence reports reviewed by officials in Iraq’s National Security Service, the Popular Mobilization Forces leadership and militia commanders indicated that Russia and Iran would halt the opposition’s momentum and that Homs would be the decisive point.

But Russia used its air superiority sparingly. As opposition factions moved from Hama toward Homs on December 6, 2024, aircraft believed to be Russian struck the Al-Rastan bridge linking the two cities with destructive force, but not enough to prevent convoys from crossing.

Later aerial footage showed Sukhoi jets armed with missiles sitting unused at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase as opposition fighters crossed the bridge into Homs, which was fully taken by dawn on December 7.

At this point, many within the so-called Resistance Axis became convinced that the swift advance of the opposition was not a mere maneuver. The militia commander said they realized “the Iranians had given us conflicting signals... maybe they were deceived too.”

Questions about the roles of Tehran and Moscow remained unresolved. Shiite factions had no clear answers in the months following Assad’s escape.

Today, Fartousi, the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada spokesman, believes that “the Russian and Iranian position only shifted after the Assad regime retreated, the forces holding the ground collapsed and the battle turned into a confrontation with the people.”

But sources from factions active in Syria since 2013 spoke of “a decision taken early by Iran not to wage a battle in Syria due to far more complex regional calculations.”

According to these sources, “Iran was not confident of favorable outcomes had it confronted the opposition’s advance, because it realized too late that Moscow was acting independently in Syria.”

In the end, the pillars of the alliance between Moscow, Tehran and Assad appeared to be drifting apart, taking separate battlefield decisions that enabled the opposition’s rapid advance and Assad’s even faster escape. What is certain, the Shiite commander said, is that “the Iraqi groups were not central to the discussions that led to what happened.”

By then, more than ten Iraqi factions had spent over a decade on the Syrian front, during which thousands of fighters were drawn into a sea of blood.

Assad shakes hands with Iraqi PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in Damascus. (File photo)

‘And the wheel turns’

At six in the morning on December 8, 2024, former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdulmahdi posted on X about how tables turn and the “aggressor” is overtaken by events. Shock swept through Shiite political forces in Baghdad. Assad had fled and the regime had fallen.

Two days after the liberation, all factions had left Syrian territory and Assad was in Moscow. On December 12, 2024, Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition and a long-time ally of Assad, declared that “the goal of what happened in Damascus is to stir the street in Baghdad.” Public opinion erupted with questions.

Shiite political circles in Baghdad struggled to absorb the shock. Private discussions intensified around “the future of the Shiites in Iraq,” dominated by deep confusion, according to participants in closed-door meetings held in the weeks following Assad’s escape.

They said Shiite decision-makers found no answers regarding what had happened in Syria or Iran’s role, and many struggled to answer how Iraq and the region would change after Assad.

One participant in a private session held in January 2025 said the crisis in Syria was not about Assad’s escape or the collapse of the Resistance Axis, but for Iraqi Shiites it was about “redefining their role after old alliances and balances had crumbled.”

Secondary effects of this difficult debate emerged within Shiite groups. Many within the resistance environment began promoting the concept of a “Shiite federation” stretching from Iraq’s Samarra to Basra on top of vast oil reserves. The idea faded quickly, like cold ash.

Talk of “Shiite governance” intensified. A militia commander said: “Shiite forces in recent months focused on strengthening the domestic scene and consolidating their presence in political life, which explains their active participation in the elections held on November 11, 2025, and the victory of armed factions in seats in the new parliament.”

It appeared that all those who had fought in Syria won seats in the new legislature. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, secured 28 seats. The Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, won 18. The Rights bloc, linked to Kataib Hezbollah, won six. A list affiliated with Kataib Imam Ali won three. The Services Alliance, led by Shibl al-Zaidi, won nine seats.

These groups are now proposing a transitional project built on new Shiite roles, driven by the growing ambition of leaders such as Khazali to craft an umbrella that shields Shiite groups from fragmentation by expanding their influence in both the legislative and executive branches of the state.

In March 2025, Khazali was asked about the new Syria. He said: “It is the duty and interest of the Iraqi state to engage with it, as long as those governments represent their countries.”

A Shiite leader said the moment Assad fled was not a Syrian event as much as “an earthquake in Shiite consciousness inside Iraq,” pushing everyone to reconsider the alliances that had shaped the region for years.

But beneath this transformation lie lingering questions and doubts about “the future of the Iranian doctrine itself,” now facing major disruption after four decades of uninterrupted influence across the region.

“The answer,” the commander said, “has not yet matured.”

Features

New Political, Military Reality in Lebanon a Year after Assad’s Ouster 

People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
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New Political, Military Reality in Lebanon a Year after Assad’s Ouster 

People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.
People raise the Syrian flag during the one-year anniversary marking the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, Lebanon.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in December 2024 created major political, security and economic changes in Lebanon. Beirut also rid itself of what remained of Damascus’ influence - after Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 2005 following 30 years of military and political hegemony - through Assad’s allies, namely Hezbollah.

With the ouster Assad, Lebanon became free to make its political decisions away from the influence of Damascus and its allies. Lebanon and Syria can establish mutual official relations, secure their shared border and improve the trade exchange between them.

Tehran-Beirut route severed

Head of Lebanon’s Saydet al-Jabal Gathering, former MP Fares Souaid told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Lebanon has changed. The most important thing that happened was that the new Syria severed the Tehran-Beirut route that used to supply Hezbollah with all of its security, military and financial means.”

Now, the party has to resort to smuggling to get what it needs, he added. “That option is not secured by military units working for Iran, forcing Hezbollah to approach the new situation in Lebanon with a lot more pragmatism than before.”

He said the party has been forced to take a “humble” approach to “critical issues.”

“We saw how Hezbollah did not quit the government even though it objected to cabinet decisions, especially the one related to imposing state monopoly over arms,” he explained. The decision effectively calls on Hezbollah to disarm.

The party was unable to take any steps to counter the decision because the “real route that has been feeding it has been cut,” Souaid stressed.

Developments, past and present, have shown that anything negative or positive taking place in Syria will impact Lebanon, he went on to say. “If Syria is well, then Lebanon is well.”

He said Lebanon still believes that Syria under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has a promising future and relations between Beirut and Damascus will also be promising.

The relations are already on the right track with the establishment of joint security and military committees sponsored by Saudi Arabia, he remarked. Efforts have already been exerted to secure the shared border between them ahead of demarcation starting from the Shebaa Farms.

Such coordination between Lebanese and Syrian security and military agencies “never happened under Assad rule. So, this is a new development for both countries,” he revealed.

Treaties with Syria

The neighbors currently appeared focused on reshaping their relations in a way that preserves their mutual interests. Souaid acknowledged, however, that pending complex issues remain.

He underlined the need to annul all political, security and economic treaties that were signed during Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon.

Lebanon has appointed an ambassador to Damascus, while the latter has yet to name an envoy to Beirut, he noted.

He also said that the Syrians are prioritizing resolving the issue of Syrian detainees held in Lebanese jails.

The issue is a “black mark” in the relations between the two countries. Lebanon’s justice minister must resolve this file so that it does not complicate efforts to forge good ties, Souaid urged.

Pending files

Lebanon has been perceived as dealing “coolly” with Syria’s insistence on resolving the detainee file.

Some Lebanese officials have for years also complained about Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the burden they have on the state. An informed security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that with Assad’s collapse, this issue was no longer a “major crisis”.

It revealed that half of the Syrian refugees who were in Arsal and the northern Akkar region in Lebanon have returned to their home country. This has been felt by the drop in the numbers of Syrian laborers in Lebanon.

The shared border is another issue of pressing concern for the neighbors.

After Assad’s ouster, Lebanon’s northern and eastern borders are no longer open to the regime’s allies and outlaws, especially drug and other smugglers.

The source said: “The most important achievement on the security level has been curbing the smuggling of weapons from Syria to Lebanon and money from Lebanon to Syria.”

“Captagon factories along both sides of the border have also been destroyed, leading to the dismantling of drug smuggling networks and culminating in the arrest of Lebanon’s most wanted drug smuggler, Noah Zeiter, who was seeking refuge in Syria before Assad’s ouster,” added the source.