Force Cannot Protect Lebanon

In the torrent of talk about "protecting Lebanon," many of us have reiterated that rebuilding our state and its army is what protects us. This claim hits the nail on the head, drawing the lessons that many bitter experiences have taught us. Indeed, it has become abundantly clear that the danger of the entanglements imposed by the militia far outweighs whatever protection it provides. Moreover, entrusting the state and the army with this matter adheres to a sound principle, defining the responsibilities of states and armies and granting the latter a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence without partners.
Nonetheless, some are getting carried away; taken with a culture popularized by successive militant and radical movements, they suggest we build a fearsome army in Lebanon to protect it. Rather, Hezbollah supporters themselves defend their role by presenting it as one they were forced into out of necessity, sometimes claiming that only the establishment of this ferocious army could justify disbanding their armed group. It is clear that, in many instances, this argument is intended to raise the bar to impossible heights- that is, it seeks to close the door to the kind of army we could feasibly build in the name of an army that we cannot.
Moreover, proposing that we build a ferocious army, even if the proponents of the idea are sincere, is dangerous. The risks of taking this path are no less dangerous than those posed by Hezbollah, even if the two threats are different in nature. An army that dominates society, militarizes life, and consumes the lion's share of the national economy to "protect us" from Israel, would achieve nothing but turning us into a militarized society. It is antithetical to all democratic aspirations and the pursuit of a life free of despotism. After undergoing a phase in which it was claimed that the militia is an alternative to the army, the proponents of this idea want us to enter a phase in which the army presents an alternative to the militia, with the world seen through the lens of war and perceived as being defined by conflict. Our lived experience shows that the slogans associated with this vision- "building a resistant state,we are all a resistance," and similar nonsense- inevitably give rise to the triad of a strong army, iron-fisted single-party rule, and state ideology. Since the battles of ferocious armies are necessarily ferocious, we can expect a dark future in the event that such a proposal materializes.
A ferocious army, under the rule of a "state that resists," would not protect a belligerent Lebanon. What it could do is drive us to focus on building an arsenal that would never surpass Israel’s but would create avoidable risks. In other words, rather than militias, we need an army that can protect the peace, safeguard domestic stability, and ensure calm on our borders, an army that can be one of the few sources of consensus among Lebanese. Real protection, however, can only come from the adoption of a militarily neutral stance on foreign conflicts, with the armed forces tasked with safeguarding this policy. This kind of inclination would find its future reinforcement in a regional move to a state of peace that culminates in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
In turn, the initiative of the Lebanese and the capacities they find within themselves could, in this event, be channeled towards making the political and social changes the country needs, instead of being used to build an unstoppable army so that it can fight on "fierce battlefields." We know, from the October 17 movement for change, that those championing a "Lebanon of resistance" and a "strong Lebanon" were the first to oppose this push for change, under the pretext of a single cause that leaves no room for any other.
As for the policy of military neutrality that can offer protection, it requires a culture that corresponds to it, one that understands that the world is not necessarily a jungle where if you are not a predator, you are the prey, and that we can aspire to a post-war and a post-Netanyahu world, if not tomorrow, then the day after.
This entails promoting a culture of peace, which has traditionally been weak in Arab political thought, as well as a rupture with the culture of force that glorifies "manhood,heroism,martyrdom," and other notions that have seeped through from epic tales to a time that is no longer epic.
In the final analysis, force is incompatible with the makeup of Lebanon, an entity that was not founded on force but on avoiding it. Lebanon has only collapsed at moments when war was championed with pathological bravado. The chapter of force and its champions might end with the end of this war. Nevertheless, building immunity against violence- regardless of who stands behind it, whether it be the state or a militia, and irrespective of their sect or ideology- remains necessary in the future.
There is also a need for the people of Lebanon to reflect on the bitter experiences of their neighbors in Syria, where the principle of an "ideological army" prevailed, for decades, in a strong state run by a single party. We now see the tragic outcome of this experience for Syria and its people, and how they have ended up weaker than they had ever been in their modern history after the state went on a relentless rampage against Syrian society, drained it of its energy, and killed the aspirations of its people. What ended in tragedy for a country of Syria’s size will inevitably be a farce in a country the size of Lebanon. It might be time to leave tragedies and farces behind once and for all, in order to transition towards normal states that address their problems and improve the conditions of their people, avoiding grandiose claims of all sorts. If, that is, the country can shake off the debris and go back to normal life.