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SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
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SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pose the main challenge to Syria’s new administration, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, as it seeks to move past the conflict and rebuild the state.

While efforts focus on forming a unified army under state control, most factions have agreed to join the Defense Ministry. However, the SDF insists on keeping its independent military structure and refuses to disband or integrate its fighters individually. Instead, it wants to remain a single unit within the new army.
This stance contradicts the administration’s position, which rejects any military force outside the new national army.

Syrian Administration’s Stance on the SDF

The new Syrian administration has repeatedly emphasized that negotiations remain its primary approach to resolving its dispute with the SDF, with several rounds of talks held in recent months.

Syrian government sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that “negotiations are still the main option, and preparations are underway for new rounds in an effort to reach a comprehensive solution that eliminates any risk of future conflict.”

They added that the government’s policy is based on “unifying the country and preventing any military factions from operating outside the Defense Ministry’s authority.”

The sources also stressed that “the Kurdish issue is an internal Syrian matter and should not rely on external actors for a resolution.

Competing Agendas

Khaled al-Shuayti, one of the few Arab military commanders within the SDF in Deir Ezzor, said Arab tribes involved in the SDF through alliances and fighters “will not engage in a confrontation with the new Syrian state.”

Given the geography in which the SDF operates, it has forged alliances with local Arab communities and tribes in surrounding areas. Arab fighters number around 2,000 or slightly more, but they have little influence over the SDF’s internal and external policies.

“If the Kurdish leadership insists on pursuing non-Syrian agendas, Arab fighters will break away from the SDF,” al-Shuayti told Asharq Al-Awsat.

A faction within the SDF, led by Mazloum Abdi, supports talks with Damascus but faces opposition from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership, which refuses to disarm before securing key demands.

These include keeping the SDF as a single unit within Syria’s Defense Ministry and granting Kurds some form of autonomy.

Abdi, born Ferhad Abdi Sahin in Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in 1967, fought alongside the PKK and is a close associate of its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He helped establish the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which later became the military wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD).

Abdi’s push for negotiations with Damascus coincides with expectations that Ocalan may soon call for disarmament and an end to military action.

Al-Shuayti believes Abdi is stalling to ease pressure while securing political gains for Syria’s Kurds, including a role in governance and constitutional guarantees.

Researcher Firas Faham from the Abaad Center for Strategic Studies told Asharq Al-Awsat that the new Syrian administration prefers diplomacy with the SDF, using Türkiye’s military threats as leverage to push the group into talks with Damascus.

However, the SDF is unlikely to make major decisions until US President Donald Trump clarifies his stance on withdrawing American troops from Syria.

“The SDF wants to retain its military structure within the Syrian army and maintain special administrative control over its territories,” Faham said.

“Damascus, on the other hand, may be open to granting Kurdish local councils some autonomy and recognizing certain cultural rights. But when it comes to military control, the Syrian government remains firm on maintaining a unified command,” he added.

Possible Scenarios

According to Faham, the future of relations between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces hinges largely on whether Trump decides to keep or withdraw American troops from Syria.

The first scenario is a negotiated agreement in which the SDF drops what Damascus considers unrealistic demands, including maintaining its forces as a unified bloc within the Syrian army and abandoning its push for federal autonomy in areas under its control.

The second scenario is military confrontation if the SDF refuses to reach an agreement with Damascus. In this case, Türkiye could intervene alongside the new Syrian army, leading to a likely military defeat for the SDF without securing any gains.

The third scenario is maintaining the status quo, with the SDF retaining control over its forces and continuing to govern areas east of the Euphrates separately from the new Syrian administration. Currently, the SDF operates like a state within a state, with its own military and security forces and territory beyond Damascus’ control.

Internal divisions within the SDF further complicate the situation. One faction, led by Abdi, aligns with the West, while another, the Qandil faction—considered the most powerful—maintains close ties with Iran. This faction is dominated by PKK leaders from both Syria and Türkiye.

Faham noted that Iran is strengthening its alliance with the Qandil faction within the SDF, viewing it as a tool to maintain influence in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Kurds within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Kurdish activist Kurdi Ayubi, an Islamist who opposes the nationalist ideology represented by the SDF and who previously fought with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), estimates that only a few hundred Kurds share his views.

He argues that the real power in SDF-controlled areas remains in the hands of the PKK.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayubi explained that “cadres” — fighters who initially served with the PKK and later joined the SDF after the Syrian revolution began — became involved in fighting with the start of the battle of Kobani against ISIS.

These cadres come from various nationalities, including Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds.

“The Syrian cadres work almost openly, as seen with figures like Abdi, Farhad Shami, and Bulat Jan, alongside prominent women leaders such as Ilham Ahmed, who was a key fighter in the PKK,” added Ayubi.

Ayubi said any agreement with the Syrian government would need approval from Qandil, with the final solution depending on the relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan.

He suggested the best approach for Damascus is to follow two paths: one, direct talks with the Qandil faction, and two, engaging with Kurdish tribal leaders in Kobani, Qamishli, and nearby areas.

Ayubi said: “Qandil wants a normal relationship with Damascus, as long as it remains discreet.”

He added that reaching an agreement with Qandil would allow Damascus to enter the region peacefully.

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NATO Chief May Have to Match His Made-for-Trump Sales Pitch to Keep a Summit on the Rails

FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump participates in a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C., US, June 24, 2026. REUTERS/Evan Vucci/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump participates in a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C., US, June 24, 2026. REUTERS/Evan Vucci/File Photo
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NATO Chief May Have to Match His Made-for-Trump Sales Pitch to Keep a Summit on the Rails

FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump participates in a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C., US, June 24, 2026. REUTERS/Evan Vucci/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump participates in a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C., US, June 24, 2026. REUTERS/Evan Vucci/File Photo

Since he started work as NATO secretary-general almost two years ago, Mark Rutte has spent much of his time trying to keep the United States anchored to the world’s biggest military alliance, employing outright flattery to dissuade US President Donald Trump from acting on threats to abandon it.

But the goalposts keep shifting, raising the stakes ahead of this week’s summit in Türkiye, The Associated Press said.

Initially, it was about money. Trump has long railed against NATO allies for spending too small a fraction of their national budgets on defense. But those problems were addressed at their summit last year, when US allies committed to invest as much as America, in gross domestic product terms.

NATO's real problem now is turning that money into military capabilities, particularly as European countries worry about a possible attack from Russia.

Still, Rutte tried to put to bed any lingering concerns at a White House meeting last month, with a new pitch using a chart labeled the “The Trump Trillion” in gold letters — showing $1.2 trillion in spending by European allies and Canada since 2017.

But Trump appeared unmoved, saying he was still disappointed at some NATO allies’ refusal to join the Iran war, which he had launched alongside Israel without consulting them.

“We don’t need their money — we don’t need anything,” Trump said. “I just want loyalty.”

Trump suggested he might have skipped the upcoming summit entirely were it not being hosted by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It’s a sign that even Erdogan and Rutte — foreign leaders Trump seems to hold in rare esteem — will have their work cut out for them in keeping the summit on track.

Rutte set a new marker for flattery at the White House Historically, the prime tasks of NATO’s top civilian official — always a European, never an American — have been to encourage consensus in an organization that makes its decisions unanimously, and to speak on behalf of all 32 member countries.

But during both of Trump’s terms, Rutte and his predecessor at the helm of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, have dedicated a huge amount of energy just to keep the United States inside their alliance.

Trump has threatened to leave NATO, dallied with pulling US troops out of Europe and vowed to take over the island of Greenland — a semiautonomous part of ally Denmark. He has cast doubt over whether he would defend another member not spending enough on their military, eroding trust.

Rutte’s approach has been heavy on flattery. Last month’s carefully choreographed pitch in the Oval Office — with props redolent of an American flag — laid down a new marker, even for a man heavily criticized for likening Trump to a “daddy.”

The charts showed tens of thousands of US jobs were being created and a backlog of $300 billion in European orders for military equipment — all thanks to the “leader of the free world,” Rutte said.

He pushed back, gently, on Trump’s complaints that NATO did not support the US against Iran, noting that up to 5,000 US planes took off from bases in Europe before an April ceasefire.

Trump has threatened to pull forces from Europe at a moment of peril NATO cannot function without its biggest and most powerful ally. Europe is being pushed to fend for itself even as Russia, the historical reason for the alliance, poses a greater threat.

Last month, the Pentagon surprised its NATO allies by announcing that it was scaling back the number of troops, warships, aircraft and drones it would provide if one of them came under attack. Trump has also sent conflicting messages about whether US troop numbers would be lowered or increased.

The cutbacks and mixed messaging has undermined unity at the alliance, just as Russia has been probing Europe's defenses with drone flights near military bases across multiple countries, according to a study released on Thursday.

Flattery worked last year, but now there are new challenges

Each summit is meant to showcase the commitment to collective security — the all-for-one, one-for-all pledge enshrined in Article 5 of NATO’s treaty. It’s only been invoked once, when allies came to America’s aid after the Sept. 11 attacks.

The last NATO summit was held in The Hague, the hometown of Rutte, a former Dutch prime minister. The Dutch royal family hosted dinner, and Trump stayed overnight at the king’s palace.

Rutte got the allies behind a major defense spending pledge, and Trump left a happy man, calling his NATO partners a “nice group of people.”

This year, the summit will be hosted by Erdogan, another key NATO member with an independent streak. His close ties to Trump may keep the American president at the table, but it’s unlikely to mend the rifts.

Rutte has tried to convince Trump that his European partners are spending so much more that America can safely turn its attention to security challenges posed by China while they handle the war in Ukraine.

But Trump wants more now, and his demand for “loyalty” is hard to capture on any chart.

Rutte’s predecessor, Stoltenberg, has written in his memoir about chairing a 2018 summit that Trump nearly upended.

“If an American president says he no longer wishes to defend the other allies and leaves a NATO summit in protest, then the NATO treaty and its security guarantee aren’t worth very much,” Stoltenberg wrote.

Features

Lebanon Enters Conflict Management Phase as End Remains Elusive

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
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Lebanon Enters Conflict Management Phase as End Remains Elusive

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)

Negotiations to cement the ceasefire in southern Lebanon, alongside talks on the future of the south, the role of the Lebanese army and international guarantees, are raising a central question: Is Lebanon heading toward a repeat of the model that followed the July 2006 war, or has the latest conflict pushed it into a wholly different phase?

Nearly two decades after the 2006 war led to UN Resolution 1701, the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River and a long effort to regulate the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, today’s conditions look starkly different. The scale of destruction in the south is deeper, and the international approach to what comes next appears more forceful.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, university professor and lawyer Ali Mourad said the reality on the ground, away from “point-scoring speeches and declarations of victory,” demands a new reading of the war and the future of the south.

The south, he said, remains occupied, devastated on an unprecedented scale, and trapped in a displacement crisis likely to drag on.

Israel targets Tyre (Reuters)

 

“Talk of ending the conflict in Lebanon can only be achieved through a set of basic goals: ending the war definitively, withdrawing Israeli forces from occupied Lebanese territory, returning prisoners, launching reconstruction and securing the safe and sustainable return of displaced people to their areas,” Mourad said.

Mourad, who comes from the southern border town of Aitaroun, said the main fear was “Iran’s attempt to take hold of the Lebanese file.” Such a move, he said, could prolong the management of the conflict rather than end it, keeping the roots of tension alive and blocking a final, stable settlement.

Hezbollah’s weapons at the heart of the deadlock

Mourad said there would be “no real end to this conflict without a clear and decisive handling of Hezbollah’s weapons.”

Leaving the issue unresolved, he said, would place Lebanon before a model entirely unlike the one that followed the 2006 war. Comparing the two phases is no longer realistic, he added, given the changes now in place.

“The south today is destroyed on an unprecedented scale, while the battlefield and military realities clearly show that the existing equations are difficult to overturn in the foreseeable future,” he said.

That reality, Mourad said, requires sustainable political solutions that address the roots of the crisis, rather than simply managing it. Ending the conflict, he added, depends on resolving the core unresolved issues, not merely halting military operations or containing current tensions.

“Any approach that does not address the causes of the crisis will lead to its reproduction in one form or another,” he said.

 

Israel targets Tyre (AFP)

 

The post-2006 phase is over

Retired Maj. Gen. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies, said the situation in southern Lebanon “differs radically from the phase that followed the July 2006 war.”

Talk of returning to the formulas of Resolution 1701 as applied then is no longer realistic, he said, given the military and political changes produced by the latest war.

“What happened after 2006 is completely different from what is happening today,” Jaber told Asharq Al-Awsat. “At that time, Israel quickly withdrew from the Lebanese territory it had occupied, and political and diplomatic tracks were launched with broad Arab and international support. Today, Israel is holding on to the areas it occupies and does not seem ready to give them up easily.”

 

A photograph taken from the southern Lebanese region of Marjayoun shows smoke rising following an Israeli airstrike on the village of Choukine on June 19, 2026. (Photo by AFP)

 

Jaber said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces domestic pressure that pushes him to keep the war going and avoid concessions.

“Netanyahu cannot appear as someone who fought a long war that ended without clear gains,” he said. “Continuing military pressure is therefore a way for him to improve negotiating terms and force the Lebanese position into submission.”

A pause, not an end to war

Jaber, who is from Nabatieh, said the current situation does not amount to a comprehensive end to the war. Rather, he called it “a temporary halt to some military operations.”

Israel, he said, still claims the right to strike whenever and wherever it chooses against targets it considers linked to Hezbollah.

“The Israelis say clearly that they retain freedom of military action in Lebanon,” he said. “So we cannot speak of an end to the war as much as we can speak of managing the conflict and controlling the level of confrontation.”

Jaber said the comparison with 2006 no longer stands.

“The post-2006 phase is over,” he said. “We are facing a completely different new reality, and Israel will not accept a return to the previous equations or to the situation that existed before the latest war.”

Washington manages the conflict

Jaber said the United States is managing the conflict more than trying to end it.

“If it wanted to end it completely, it would have applied sufficient pressure to stop the war definitively,” he said. “What we are seeing today is conflict management and an attempt to prevent it from exploding, nothing more.”

Israel, he said, is treating the border strip and destroyed villages as “a buffer security zone.”

“There are dozens of villages that are almost completely destroyed, and their residents cannot return because of the scale of destruction and the absence of reconstruction capacity, making the crisis likely to continue for a long time,” he said.

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of South Lebanon Fronts (AFP)

 

A difficult test for Lebanon’s army

On the Lebanese army’s role, Jaber said the military faces challenges that exceed its current capabilities.

Some proposals under discussion, especially those related to moving Hezbollah fighters away from areas south of the Litani, cannot be carried out without a full Israeli withdrawal and clear security guarantees, he said.

“The army cannot be asked to carry out unilateral measures while Israeli occupation continues and attacks persist,” he said. “This is unrealistic, and the army cannot resolve the problem alone in this way.”

Jaber said the next phase would remain governed by mutual attrition.

“We are facing a phase of managing the conflict, not ending it,” he said. “I do not expect a major breakthrough in the foreseeable future. The war has effectively turned into a low-intensity war of attrition between Israel and Hezbollah, but the real price is being paid by the Lebanese people, especially the people of the south, who have been drained by war, displacement and destruction.”

Talks unlike any earlier phase

While Jaber’s view starts from the military and field realities created by the latest war, Brig. Gen. Khaled Hamadeh, a researcher in security and political affairs, links the future of this phase to the negotiations themselves.

He said the talks differ radically from all previous rounds, and that their success remains tied to US-Iranian understandings.

Hamadeh told Asharq Al-Awsat that the current negotiations between Lebanon and Israel are unlike the 2000, 2006 or 2024 arrangements linked to Resolution 1701.

“The military, political and regional circumstances have completely changed, while the outcome remains tied to the path of US-Iranian dialogue,” he said.

“In 2000, indirect negotiations took place between Hezbollah and Israel with German mediation to implement Resolution 425. Israel withdrew without conditions, and the border was demarcated. Today, the scene is completely different because the Lebanese state is conducting the negotiations, not the party.”

After the 2006 war, he said, Resolution 1701 called for UNIFIL to deploy alongside the Lebanese army south of the Litani, with a mechanism to monitor implementation and prevent any armed presence outside the state in that area.

“But this mechanism later proved ineffective, and war returned and fighting resumed,” he said.

Hamadeh said the current process is not a new international resolution, but understandings based on Resolution 1701. The difference, he said, is that they are being built through negotiations led by the Lebanese state, with security responsibility gradually shifting to the state after earlier monitoring mechanisms failed.

“The main difference today is that the negotiations are moving toward ending the conflict,” he said.

The latest US memorandum, he added, speaks for the first time of ending the state of war between Lebanon and Israel and addressing border issues between the two states — points not included in Resolution 1701.

From Resolution 1701 to the armistice agreement

“If we compare the current texts with the 1949 armistice agreement, we find a great similarity,” Hamadeh said.

The armistice agreement, he said, was based on a commitment by Lebanon and Israel not to use regular or irregular forces in military action against the other side. Today, he added, the principle being established is that the Lebanese state alone should assume responsibility for security, and that no weapons should remain outside its framework.

Hamadeh also pointed to a major difference on the ground.

“In the 2006 war, Israeli military achievements were limited, and Israeli forces did not penetrate deep into Lebanese territory in the way that has happened today,” he said. “In the latest confrontation, Israeli forces went beyond southern Litani and reached deeper areas, while Hezbollah suffered major field losses, making the balance of power completely different from what it was in 2006.”

US-Iranian understanding remains decisive

Hamadeh said the current agreement is also unfolding “under a US-Iranian understanding,” a factor that was absent in earlier phases. Iran’s role in the Lebanese file, he said, has become deeper and more influential than before.

On the chances of success, Hamadeh said it was “far too early” to speak of definitively ending the conflict, because the Lebanese negotiations cannot be separated from the US-Iranian track.

“We must wait to see where those talks lead, and only then can we judge their repercussions for Lebanon,” he said. “If the US-Iranian negotiations fail, Iran may return to using the Lebanese arena again. Therefore, the most influential element in the scene has not yet stabilized, and no final results can be built before the picture becomes clear.”

Hamadeh said any disruption in implementing the proposed understandings — whether on cementing the ceasefire, full withdrawal, or Hezbollah’s weapons — would lead to another round of fighting.

“Any agreement that is not completed through the implementation of all its stages will not be viable,” he said.

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Afghans Come Home But Risk Exclusion Without any ID

Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
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Afghans Come Home But Risk Exclusion Without any ID

Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP

Lugging suitcases across the border after packing up in Pakistan, Afghans are returning home with their worldly possessions but often lack one key item to restart their lives: an identity card.

On the Afghan side of the Torkham border crossing, children and adults wheeled their luggage or carried belongings atop their heads, as they moved from desk to desk to log their arrival, reported AFP.

"I don't know how and where to get the ID card; now I'll go and check," said 17-year-old Abdulrehman Sudais, standing beside a crate of chickens he had carried across the border for his mother.

The Pakistan-born teenager had been to Afghanistan just once before, but his cousin had already told him he would need ID to access work or education.

Out of 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023, more than 86 percent are listed as undocumented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

At the crossing point, which still bears the shrapnel marks of this year's war between the neighboring countries, officials and aid workers were taking down everyone's details.

While border officials contact authorities nationwide to verify the identity of those who don't have any form of ID, the process for newly arrived Afghans can be bewildering.

Sardar Khan, 41, was sitting in a large tent at Omari camp near the crossing, where people get a return certificate and are fingerprinted.

"We are blind; we don't know what to do," he told AFP, as his son fell asleep at his side.

"We've never been to Afghanistan before; we'll get to know the importance of ID cards," he said.

As well as a requirement for getting a job or school place, an ID card is essential for Afghans trying to prove they own land or a home, claiming inheritance, accessing state benefits, and travelling through the myriad of checkpoints across the country.

Outside the tent, as the temperature hit 40C, people waiting to be processed huddled in the limited shade available.

Ziad Salih, regional coordinator at IOM, described the ID card as "one of the essential pieces of the puzzle" for Afghans.

"Many returnees are arriving without a valid ID document and this is placing them at risk of administrative and social exclusion," he told AFP at the agency's Torkham transit center.

Afghanistan's Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation Affairs did not respond to AFP's request to comment on the documentation issue.

'Difficult decisions'

Near the Torkham crossing, colorful trucks were piled high with families' furniture and other possessions from Pakistan.

Once Afghans reach their destination -- often the places their relatives fled years ago -- organizations have helplines and projects to support them with their paperwork.

Murat Khan Safi, an octogenarian who returned a few months ago, found rooms to rent on the outskirts of Jalalabad, the closest city to the border crossing.

"We were given a number at Torkham, then we contacted WADAN, and we made the ID cards," he told AFP, referring to the Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan that works with the UN refugee agency (UNHCR).

Surrounded by sons and grandsons under a clattering ceiling fan, Safi showed the tattered identity document he has kept since fleeing the Soviet occupation more than four decades ago.

Processing the new ID cards only took a couple of days, he said, but paying a fee of 500 Afghanis ($7.80) for each relative was hard.

"I made some difficult decisions... I had to sell household belongings," said Safi, his white beard matching the color of his clothes.

The family has been reimbursed for the ID card fees by the Welfare Association, and is due to receive additional support.

In June, the United Nations launched an initiative that aims to help Afghans get 1.5 million identity documents over the next three years.

Arafat Jamal, UNHCR's representative for Afghanistan, described the lack of documentation as an "almost invisible" phenomenon.

"The absence of documentation is a serious impediment to continuing your lives," he told AFP in the capital Kabul.

The UN appeal comes as global aid cuts hit hard in Afghanistan, with those crossing the border entering a country where jobs are scarce and support has been shrinking.

At Omari camp, Nazamin Baloch didn't know how to get an ID card but knew from other Afghans that it was "important for everything".

"This is the first time I am coming to Afghanistan," said Baloch, in her sixties.

"No one in the family has an ID card... We have not even seen our country before."