How Al-Sharaa Led Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to the People’s Palace

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
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How Al-Sharaa Led Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to the People’s Palace

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 

Since the Syrian revolution transitioned into armed conflict—after the regime ruled out negotiations and used excessive force to suppress protests in 2011—the country witnessed a surge in armed factions. These ranged from jihadist Islamist groups to more moderate ones, differing in their levels of extremism and religiosity.

In late 2011, one of the largest factions, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, was established, blending jihadist and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies with a local agenda. Ahrar al-Sham was the first faction to merge global jihadist thought with local objectives, even preceding Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in this approach. HTS, originally affiliated with al-Qaeda, upheld global jihadism until its formal split from the organization in July 2016.

Throughout its various transformations and ascents—culminating in the “Deter the Aggression” battle that propelled HTS and its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) to power in Syria—the group maintained a precise internal structure, resembling a military academy, as described by a former HTS leader who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Ahrar al-Sham: The First Hybrid Jihadist Faction

At its peak, Ahrar al-Sham was among Syria’s most ideologically driven and organized factions. Its leaders, such as Hassan Abboud and Abu Yazan al-Shami, held strong charisma and influence within the revolutionary circles, alongside figures like Abdul Qadir al-Saleh, the leader of Liwa al-Tawhid.

This dominance continued until September 9, 2014, when a mysterious explosion targeted Ahrar al-Sham’s Shura Council meeting in Idlib’s Ram Hamdan, killing its leader Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi (Hassan Abboud) and nearly 40 other senior figures. This incident marked the beginning of the faction’s decline. Within a short period, Ahrar al-Sham shrank into a minor faction, fragmented between larger groups such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and HTS.

The Syrian National Army (SNA) itself was formed on December 30, 2017, comprising 36 armed factions, including the Sham Front, Jaysh al-Islam, Faylaq al-Majd, and Sultan Shah Division, which was predominantly Turkmen.

Liwa al-Tawhid: A Brief Yet Powerful Force

Another major faction that enjoyed significant strength and popularity—more than Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS’s predecessor) at one point—was Liwa al-Tawhid, established on July 21, 2012. This group brought together various local battalions primarily operating in northern Aleppo’s countryside.

At its height, Liwa al-Tawhid was the largest opposition formation, embodying a “moderate Islamist” trend that blended Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, and nationalist rhetoric. It was one of the few factions that initially attracted a diverse spectrum of fighters, from moderate jihadists to nationalists.

The group fought on multiple fronts, including a notable battle against Hezbollah in Qusayr (2013). However, after its leader Abdul Qadir al-Saleh was killed in an airstrike on November 18, 2013, Liwa al-Tawhid quickly disintegrated, with its members dispersing among various factions based on their ideological leanings.

Jaysh al-Islam: A dominant power in Damascus’ suburbs among the most prominent factions that played a key role in the war was Jaysh al-Islam, headquartered in Douma (Eastern Ghouta, Damascus countryside). The group established control over most opposition-held areas surrounding Damascus, including Eastern Ghouta, Qalamoun, and even neighborhoods inside the capital such as Qaboun, Barzeh, and Jobar—reaching as far as Abbasid Square, one of Damascus’ key landmarks.

Jaysh al-Islam was a declared Salafi-jihadist group, which, by 2013, had amassed over 25,000 fighters. It possessed medium and heavy weaponry, including tanks, armored vehicles, and short- to mid-range missiles—as showcased in its 2015 military parade, where 1,700 fighters graduated.

Despite its Salafi-jihadist ideology, Jaysh al-Islam engaged in fierce battles against Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS’s predecessor), Faylaq al-Rahman (an ally of Nusra), and even ISIS. These internal conflicts weakened the group, yet it maintained cohesion until its leader, Zahran Alloush, was assassinated in a suspected Russian airstrike on December 26, 2015.

Like many other factions that collapsed after losing their leaders, Jaysh al-Islam failed to maintain its influence, despite receiving external support. It ultimately lost its territories, especially compared to HTS, which proved more resilient.

How HTS Survived Where Others Failed

Many factions, including Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid, once outnumbered HTS (then Jabhat al-Nusra) and enjoyed greater material, media, and popular support. However, Nusra was designated a terrorist organization early on, leading to its international isolation. While this seemed like a disadvantage, it allowed HTS to consolidate power away from external interference.

Over time, as other factions splintered due to leadership losses, internal strife, and external pressure, HTS remained intact, strategically evolving. This resilience and adaptability—under Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s leadership—ultimately positioned HTS as the dominant force, culminating in its rise to power in Syria’s new political landscape.

While most leaders of the armed opposition factions—such as Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid—were preoccupied with competing for power in areas outside the control of Bashar al-Assad’s forces, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) operated quietly and behind the scenes. He remained out of the public eye until 2016, when he announced his split from al-Qaeda, after which he once again withdrew from the spotlight.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, was formed through both voluntary and forced alliances among several militant factions, including Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Liwa al-Haqq. It also absorbed a wide range of smaller al-Qaeda-linked factions, such as the Caucasus Emirate, the Turkistan Islamic Party, Jaysh al-Izza, and Jaysh al-Nasr. Like other militant groups, HTS underwent major transformations, splits, and internal shifts. However, what set it apart was its ability to adapt ideologically in response to local, regional, and international realities.

Unlike other factions that were forced into mergers for survival—such as Ahrar al-Sham, which combined with Nour al-Din al-Zenki under the name “Syrian Liberation Front”—HTS managed to maintain its organizational independence. In fact, rather than dissolving into other groups, it continued to absorb smaller al-Qaeda-affiliated factions, including Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Nasr. As time passed, HTS grew stronger. By early 2019, after intense battles against Ahrar al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and other factions, it secured full control over Idlib Province, along with large parts of Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.

Sami Mohammad, a former religious and military leader within HTS, explained that the most important factor behind the group’s survival was its independent decision-making, the charisma of Ahmad al-Sharaa’ (Jolani), and the strong discipline within its ranks. He emphasized the personal trust that Jolani built with both his commanders and fighters, noting that Jolani knew all his field commanders, even the lower-ranking ones, and met with them regularly. This personal involvement strengthened his position within the organization and fostered loyalty, unlike other factions that suffered from chaos and disorganized leadership.

Mohammad described HTS as a “true military academy,” in contrast to most Syrian opposition factions, which were structured around local or tribal affiliations. HTS, he explained, had a clear organizational hierarchy and centralized decision-making, ensuring strategic consistency.

Mohammad Ibrahim, also known as Abu Yahya al-Shami, a former military commander in an Islamist faction, noted that the key to HTS’s rise was its relative independence and its ability to break established political boundaries. He explained that most armed factions were directly tied to foreign states, forcing them to adhere to external agendas, whereas HTS was not directly controlled by any state. This allowed it more freedom to act in its own interests, even if that meant eliminating rival factions. He also pointed out that HTS’s designation as a terrorist organization worked in its favor, as it prevented major countries from openly engaging with it like they did with other factions. This, in turn, gave HTS greater flexibility in its decision-making, allowing it to maneuver more effectively and eliminate competitors.

Yahya emphasized that Jolani always pursued his own faction’s interests ruthlessly, unlike other rebel groups that often compromised or sought partial solutions. He argued that while Jolani fought with extreme determination and always aimed to win, many other factions settled for half-measures.

A leaked audio recording of Hassan al-Daghim, a former moral guidance officer in the Syrian National Army, further supports this view. In the recording, Daghim states that Jolani is a pragmatic leader who will sacrifice anything or anyone to achieve power. Abu Yahya concluded that Jolani’s practical experience came from Syria itself, as he was not originally this skilled. However, his ambition, ability to capitalize on victories, and lessons learned Abu from the mistakes of both ISIS and Nusra contributed to his success.

HTS’s dominance was not only due to military strategy but was also aided by religious legitimacy. Several influential clerics and political figures played a key role in legitimizing Jolani’s rule through religious rhetoric. Among them were Zaid al-Atar (Abu Aisha), a former HTS political liaison who later became Foreign Minister under the name Asaad al-Shaibani, and Abu Ahmad Hudud (Anas Khattab), a former security chief who is now head of HTS intelligence. These figures helped consolidate Jolani’s leadership, ensuring that HTS eliminated all potential challengers, leaving only its own government—the “Salvation Government”—as the ruling authority.

Ultimately, HTS’s tactical flexibility, military discipline, and ruthless pragmatism allowed it to outlast and surpass all other opposition factions. Unlike groups that were either fragmented by infighting or constrained by foreign backers, HTS retained control over its own fate. With the fall of the previous regime, it successfully transitioned from an opposition faction to the dominant force in post-war Syria, with its leadership now firmly established in Damascus.

Victory... A Shared Triumph

Alaa al-Din Ayoub, known as “Farouq Abu Bakr,” a former commander in the Free Syrian Army who led negotiations for the withdrawal of opposition factions from Aleppo in 2016, reflected on the past conflicts with Jabhat al-Nusra—later known as Fatah al-Sham and eventually Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). “We had our differences regarding how they dealt with the Free Syrian Army factions,” he said, “but we cannot deny that they were the most organized and well-trained among us. HTS focused on structuring its ranks and training its fighters, yet the recent victory cannot be attributed solely to them.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayoub emphasized that the success in repelling aggression resulted from multiple factors, both external and internal. International power struggles and geopolitical conflicts played a role, but so did the resilience of tens of thousands of fighters across revolutionary factions. However, he acknowledged that HTS stood out for its ability to seize opportunities better than others.

“We all remember the phase before HTS took control of Idlib and the battles it fought against other factions,” he continued. “In my opinion, the main reason it succeeded where others failed was the fragmentation of the opposition factions and their inability to present a unified, cohesive model.”

Fragmented Alliances

Regarding political formations, particularly the Syrian National Coalition—the political wing of the armed opposition that was tasked with negotiations before the fall of the regime—Ayoub pointed out that its creation was backed by Türkiye and other regional powers. As a result, most of its members and factions were beholden to the interests of the states that helped establish it.

Reflecting on the Syrian revolution’s fourteen-year history, Ayoub noted the emergence of various influential leaders with religious, grassroots, and revolutionary backgrounds. Figures like Zahran Alloush, Abdel Qader Saleh (leader of Liwa al-Tawhid), and Hassan Abboud (leader of Ahrar al-Sham) along with Abu Yazan al-Shami left a significant mark. Others, such as Jamal Maarouf, who led the Syria Revolutionaries Front before being eliminated by HTS in 2014, were eventually removed from the scene—either through assassination or political marginalization.

“In contrast,” Ayoub concluded, “Jolani was the luckiest of them all. After a period of hiding, he not only survived but ultimately prevailed. His past experience in Iraq, along with his security and military acumen, were key factors in his rise to power.”

 

 

 



Back to Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon?

Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
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Back to Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon?

Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)

A month into Israel's war against Hezbollah, invading Israeli troops are gradually advancing in south Lebanon, raising fears for the area's fate following the last Israeli occupation that lasted nearly two decades.

Since war erupted last month, Israeli officials have said Israel intends to establish a "security zone" inside Lebanon.

More recently, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the military "will establish itself in a security zone inside Lebanon ... and will maintain security control over the entire area up to the Litani" river, around 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the border.

What is happening on the ground and how far could Israel go?

- What's happening in south Lebanon? -

The Israeli military previously issued unprecedented evacuation orders for swathes of the country's south, where Iran-backed Hezbollah holds sway.

An Israeli military source told AFP that four army divisions are currently deployed across the country's northern border.

A Western military source in south Lebanon said "the Israelis are advancing one axis at a time" and destroying border villages as they go.

The source told AFP on condition of anonymity that Israeli forces had taken the strategic town of Khiam, located along the eastern stretch of the shared border.

Hezbollah, which drew Lebanon into the Middle East war last month with rocket fire towards Israel, has been claiming repeated attacks on Israeli troops in south Lebanon, where Israel's military says 10 soldiers have been killed in combat.

The Iran-backed group is not halting Israeli troops' advance "but is seeking symbolic victories such as the destruction of Merkava tanks", the Western military source said.

David Wood, senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group, told AFP that as Israel pushes further inside Lebanon, "it is entering a style of warfare that might actually suit Hezbollah better, in this sort of guerrilla hit-and-run style of fighting".

Lebanon's army has announced troop "repositioning and redeployment" in parts of the south where Israel is advancing.

A Lebanese military source said Israeli soldiers have advanced up to 10 kilometers (six miles) in some places, and Lebanon's army, which has limited means, fears it will be targeted or encircled.

Israeli fire has killed one on-duty Lebanese soldier.

United Nations peacekeepers deployed in south Lebanon have been powerless to stop the fighting, with three of their troops also killed.

- What does Israel want? -

Katz has said Israel would control south Lebanon up to the Litani, and vowed that hundreds of thousands of south Lebanon residents will not return until northern Israel's security is guaranteed.

Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa this week denounced "a clear intention to impose a new occupation of Lebanese territory".

UN aid chief Tom Fletcher has warned that south Lebanon could become another occupied territory in the Middle East.

But Eyal Zisser, a Lebanon expert at Tel Aviv University, cautioned against taking Katz's announcements at face value.

"He's good at making statements, but you always have to check first of all if it is in full agreement" with what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says, he told AFP's Jerusalem bureau.

Netanyahu has ordered troops to "further expand" a so-called security zone in south Lebanon "to definitively neutralize the threat of invasion (by Hezbollah) and to keep anti-tank missile fire away from the border".

Military analyst and retired Lebanese army general Khalil Helou told AFP that Hezbollah has "recruited people from southern towns" for decades, giving the group "local power" that Israel fears could be further exploited if southerners return.

- New occupation? -

Israel has previously tried to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

Following a first invasion in 1978, Israeli troops returned four years later, entering Lebanon all the way to Beirut to drive out Palestinian fighters.

Hezbollah was born in response to the 1982 invasion.

Israel withdrew gradually but kept an area up to 20 kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory until 2000, when it pulled out under persistent pressure from Hezbollah.

Lebanese are increasingly concerned about a return to a similar scenario.

In its last war with Hezbollah and even after a November 2024 ceasefire, Israeli troops damaged or destroyed swathes of border villages and towns through strikes, controlled demolitions and the wrecking of agricultural areas.

Zisser said Israel maintaining control of the area south of the Litani was technically feasible.

"But you need to make a decision and you need to decide how to do it, (whether) to occupy the entire territory and establish yourself there" or not, he said.

Wood meanwhile cautioned that an occupation would create "new security threats" for Israel.

"If Israel denies people the right to return to their ancestral homes, then armed resistance groups will emerge or will continue to take up this struggle," he said.


Al-Tanf Crossing Opens Iraqi Energy Lifeline to Counter Hormuz Disruption

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
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Al-Tanf Crossing Opens Iraqi Energy Lifeline to Counter Hormuz Disruption

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)

In a step reflecting a strategic shift in regional energy routes, Baghdad has officially begun exporting crude oil via Syria, in an effort to bypass the paralysis that has affected traditional maritime trade corridors. The move, which Damascus described as a return to its role as a “transit compass” and a vital platform for global energy, comes amid sweeping geopolitical shifts in the region that are imposing a new economic reality based on overland integration between the two countries.

The first convoys of Iraqi fuel tankers set off through the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed border crossing, heading toward the Baniyas refinery on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, marking the effective launch of a new phase of economic cooperation. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that the cargo of 299 fuel tankers will later be loaded for export.

The Al-Tanf crossing had been closed since 2015, when ISIS took control of it. In 2016, US-backed forces established a military base in Al-Tanf. Syrian forces took control of the base last month, paving the way for the crossing to reopen.

"Transit Compass"

With the first convoys entering Syrian territory through the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed crossing en route to Baniyas, Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed Al-Bashir wrote on X: “From the Syrian-Iraqi border to the maritime carriers in Baniyas... Syria is returning as a transit compass and a strategic export platform for global energy.” He said the step “enhances national interests and advances Arab economic integration toward broader horizons.”

The General Authority for Land and Sea Ports said the move represents “an important milestone in developing economic cooperation between the two countries by activating trade and energy routes, enhancing opportunities for economic integration, and supporting trade flows in the coming phase,” stressing its readiness to provide all necessary facilitation and ensure efficient procedures.

Mazen Alloush, director of public relations at the authority, announced Tuesday via Facebook the reopening of the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed crossing, confirming the entry of the first Iraqi oil tanker convoys toward the Baniyas terminal.

In parallel, a delegation from the authority conducted a field tour to assess readiness at the Al-Yarubiyah–Rabia crossing ahead of plans to resume operations in early May, while also reviewing the status of the Semalka–Fishkhabour crossing as part of procedures to integrate it into the authority’s operational system. Passenger traffic has resumed at the Al-Bukamal–Al-Qaim crossing.

Alongside the reopening of Al-Waleed, Syrian government efforts are focused on activating Al-Yarubiyah–Rabia in early May and completing procedures at Semalka–Fishkhabour to strengthen the broader cross-border connectivity network.

For his part, the Iraqi subdistrict head of Al-Waleed, Mujahid Mardhi Al-Dulaimi, told the Iraqi News Agency (INA) that the crossing has entered a trial reopening phase with crude oil tankers beginning to move between Iraq and Syria. He said more than 150 tankers are currently waiting to enter Syrian territory, expecting daily traffic to reach at least 500 tankers.

Oil cooperation between Syria and Iraq has the backing of President Donald Trump’s administration. US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said last week at the Atlantic Council that Syria could be “the solution” to the energy crisis stemming from the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting the potential development of pipeline networks, including from Iraq.

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)

"Syria a Vital Option"

The move gains added significance amid escalating regional tensions and intensifying confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which has resulted in direct threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of global energy supplies pass.

In this context, economic expert Dr. Fadi Ayash said Iraq, as a major oil producer, has found in Syria a vital and available option to sustain export flows, especially given the difficulty of secure maritime exports. He said the current direction aims to raise tanker traffic to between 500 and 700 per day at a minimum.

Amid drone attacks and shelling targeting the Syrian side of the border since the outbreak of the unprecedented regional war- including a drone strike last Saturday launched from Iraq on the Al-Tanf base in southeastern Syria, questions arise about the sustainability of keeping crossings open and continuing Iraqi oil exports through Syrian territory under these security conditions.

Ayash said: “There is no doubt that Iraq is among the Gulf countries most affected by the current war, given that it is a major oil producer and exporter heavily dependent on export revenues. It therefore had to look for alternatives to sustain exports, and Syria was a viable option. However, sustainability depends on balancing financial and oil needs- especially with continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz- against on-the-ground security challenges in active conflict zones.”

Iraq is seeking to increase exports through Syria to between 600 and 700 trucks per day, making it a vital and mutually agreed option. According to Ayash, this represents “a practical application of spatial economics as a temporary solution to sustain exports, allowing time and resources to revive the pipeline linking Iraq and Syria to the Baniyas oil terminal on the Mediterranean. Pipeline exports are more efficient, less costly, and more secure, particularly as border areas are subject to intermittent security tensions and shelling, posing direct risks to trucks and crews.”

Iraq had reduced oil production by about 80 percent, to 800,000 barrels, due to shipping difficulties.

Operations Despite Risks

Despite the risks, initial convoys have begun moving, indicating an effort to proceed despite regional conditions. Ayash said continuation depends primarily on the ability of security forces in both countries to secure tanker routes, as well as the availability of financial, technical, and logistical resources needed to rehabilitate pipelines and pumping stations in both Iraq and Syria.

Economic Returns for Syria

According to current estimates and agreements under implementation, exporting Iraqi oil through Syrian territory is expected to generate direct and indirect financial and technical benefits for Syria. Transit fees alone could reach between $150 million and $200 million annually if operations run at high capacity.

The Syrian treasury would also benefit from port fees, storage and unloading charges, and road service revenues for trucks. Operating between 600 and 700 trucks daily would drive significant spending on fuel, maintenance, and road fees, stimulating economic activity along transit routes.

Ayash added that the arrangement could allow Syria to obtain shares of oil or derivatives at preferential prices or as part of transit compensation, easing its energy import bill. These revenues, he said, are vital under current conditions, contributing to economic recovery and foreign currency inflows, although final returns depend on export volumes and border security stability, which remains essential for sustaining exports through the Syrian route.


Securing Iran’s Enriched Uranium by Force Would Be Risky and Complex, Experts Say

 This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
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Securing Iran’s Enriched Uranium by Force Would Be Risky and Complex, Experts Say

 This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)

Should the US decide to send in military forces to secure Iran’s uranium stockpile, it would be a complex, risky and lengthy operation, fraught with radiation and chemical dangers, according to experts and former government officials.

US President Donald Trump has offered shifting reasons for the war in Iran but has consistently said a primary objective is ensuring the country will "never have a nuclear weapon." Less clear is how far he is willing to go to seize Iran’s nuclear material.

Given the risks of inserting as many as 1,000 specially trained forces into a war zone to remove the stockpile, another option would be a negotiated settlement with Iran that would allow the material to be surrendered and secured without using force.

Iran has 440.9 kilograms (972 pounds) of uranium that is enriched up to 60% purity, a short, technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog agency.

That stockpile could allow Iran to build as many as 10 nuclear bombs, should it decide to weaponize its program, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told The Associated Press last year. He added it doesn’t mean Iran has such a weapon.

Iran long has insisted its program is peaceful, but the IAEA and Western nations say Tehran had an organized nuclear weapons program up until 2003.

Nuclear material is probably stored in tunnels

IAEA inspectors have not been able to verify the near weapons-grade uranium since June 2025, when Israeli and American strikes greatly weakened Iran’s air defenses, military leadership and nuclear program. The lack of inspections has made it difficult to know exactly where it is located.

Grossi has said that the IAEA believes a stockpile of roughly 200 kilograms (about 440 pounds) of highly enriched uranium is stored in tunnels at Iran’s nuclear complex outside of Isfahan. The site was mainly known for producing the uranium gas that is fed into centrifuges to be spun and purified.

Additional quantities are believed to be at the Natanz nuclear site and lesser amounts may be stored at a facility in Fordo, he has said.

It's unclear whether additional quantities could be elsewhere.

US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard told a House hearing March 19 that the US intelligence community has "high confidence" that it knows the location of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpiles.

Radiation and chemical risks

Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium fits into canisters each weighing about 50 kilograms (110 pounds) when full. The material is in the form of uranium hexafluoride gas. Estimates on the number of canisters range from 26 to about twice that number, depending on how full each cylinder is.

The canisters carrying the highly enriched uranium are "pretty robust" and are designed for storage and transport, said David Albright, a former nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq and founder of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.

But he warned that "safety issues become paramount" should the canisters be damaged — for example, due to airstrikes — allowing moisture to get inside.

In such a scenario, there would be a hazard from fluorine, a highly toxic chemical that is corrosive to skin, eyes and lungs. Anyone entering the tunnels seeking to retrieve the canisters "would have to wear hazmat suits," Albright said.

It also would be necessary to maintain distance between the various canisters in order to avoid a self-sustaining critical nuclear reaction that would lead to "a large amount of radiation," he said.

To avoid such a radiological accident, the canisters would have to be placed in containers that create space between them during transport, he said.

Albright said that the preferred option for dealing with the uranium would be to remove it from Iran in special military planes and then "downblend" it — mix it with lower-enriched materials to bring it to levels suitable for civilian use.

Downblending the material inside Iran probably is not feasible, given that the infrastructure needed for the process may not be intact due to the war, he added.

Darya Dolzikova, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, agreed.

Downblending the material inside Iran is "probably not the most likely option just because it’s a very complicated and long process that requires specialized equipment," she said.

Risks for ground forces

Securing Iran's nuclear material with ground troops would be a "very complex and high-risk military operation," said Christine E. Wormuth, who was secretary of the Army under former US President Joe Biden.

That's because the material is probably at multiple sites and the undertaking would "probably take casualties," added Wormuth, now president and CEO of the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative.

The scale and scope of an operation at Isfahan alone would easily require 1,000 military personnel, she said.

Given that tunnel entrances are probably buried under rubble, it would be necessary for helicopters to fly in heavy equipment, such as excavators, and US forces might even have to build an airstrip nearby to land all the equipment and troops, Wormuth said.

She said special forces, including perhaps the 75th Ranger Regiment, would have to work "in tandem" with nuclear experts who would look underground for the canisters, adding that the special forces would likely set up a security perimeter in case of potential attacks.

Wormuth said the Nuclear Disablement Teams under the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Command would be one possible unit that could be employed in such an operation.

"The Iranians have thought this through, I’m sure, and are going to try to make it as difficult as possible to do this in an expeditious way," she said. "So I would imagine it will be a pretty painstaking effort to go underground, get oriented, try to discern ... which ones are the real canisters, which ones may be decoys, to try to avoid booby traps."

A negotiated solution

The best option would be "to have an agreement with the (Iranian) government to remove all of that material," said Scott Roecker, former director of the Office of Nuclear Material Removal at the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency within the US Department of Energy.

A similar mission occurred in 1994 when the US, in partnership with the government of Kazakhstan, secretly transported 600 kilograms (about 1,322 pounds) of weapons-grade uranium from the former Soviet republic in an operation dubbed "Project Sapphire." The material was left over from the USSR's nuclear program.

Roecker, now vice president for the Nuclear Materials Security Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, said the Department of Energy's Mobile Packaging Unit was built from the experience in Kazakhstan. It has safely removed nuclear material from several countries, including from Georgia in 1998 and from Iraq in 2004, 2007 and 2008.

The unit consists of technical experts and specialized equipment that can be deployed anywhere to safely remove nuclear material, and Roecker said it would be ideally positioned to remove the uranium under a negotiated deal with Iran. Tehran remains suspicious of Washington, which under Trump withdrew from a nuclear agreement and has twice attacked during high-level negotiations.

Under a negotiated solution, IAEA inspectors also could be part of a mission. "We are considering these options, of course," the IAEA's Grossi said March 22 on CBS' "Face the Nation" when asked about such a scenario.

Iran has "a contractual obligation to allow inspectors in," he added. "Of course, there’s common sense. Nothing can happen while bombs are falling."