How Al-Sharaa Led Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to the People’s Palace

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
TT

How Al-Sharaa Led Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to the People’s Palace

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 

Since the Syrian revolution transitioned into armed conflict—after the regime ruled out negotiations and used excessive force to suppress protests in 2011—the country witnessed a surge in armed factions. These ranged from jihadist Islamist groups to more moderate ones, differing in their levels of extremism and religiosity.

In late 2011, one of the largest factions, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, was established, blending jihadist and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies with a local agenda. Ahrar al-Sham was the first faction to merge global jihadist thought with local objectives, even preceding Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in this approach. HTS, originally affiliated with al-Qaeda, upheld global jihadism until its formal split from the organization in July 2016.

Throughout its various transformations and ascents—culminating in the “Deter the Aggression” battle that propelled HTS and its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) to power in Syria—the group maintained a precise internal structure, resembling a military academy, as described by a former HTS leader who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Ahrar al-Sham: The First Hybrid Jihadist Faction

At its peak, Ahrar al-Sham was among Syria’s most ideologically driven and organized factions. Its leaders, such as Hassan Abboud and Abu Yazan al-Shami, held strong charisma and influence within the revolutionary circles, alongside figures like Abdul Qadir al-Saleh, the leader of Liwa al-Tawhid.

This dominance continued until September 9, 2014, when a mysterious explosion targeted Ahrar al-Sham’s Shura Council meeting in Idlib’s Ram Hamdan, killing its leader Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi (Hassan Abboud) and nearly 40 other senior figures. This incident marked the beginning of the faction’s decline. Within a short period, Ahrar al-Sham shrank into a minor faction, fragmented between larger groups such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and HTS.

The Syrian National Army (SNA) itself was formed on December 30, 2017, comprising 36 armed factions, including the Sham Front, Jaysh al-Islam, Faylaq al-Majd, and Sultan Shah Division, which was predominantly Turkmen.

Liwa al-Tawhid: A Brief Yet Powerful Force

Another major faction that enjoyed significant strength and popularity—more than Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS’s predecessor) at one point—was Liwa al-Tawhid, established on July 21, 2012. This group brought together various local battalions primarily operating in northern Aleppo’s countryside.

At its height, Liwa al-Tawhid was the largest opposition formation, embodying a “moderate Islamist” trend that blended Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, and nationalist rhetoric. It was one of the few factions that initially attracted a diverse spectrum of fighters, from moderate jihadists to nationalists.

The group fought on multiple fronts, including a notable battle against Hezbollah in Qusayr (2013). However, after its leader Abdul Qadir al-Saleh was killed in an airstrike on November 18, 2013, Liwa al-Tawhid quickly disintegrated, with its members dispersing among various factions based on their ideological leanings.

Jaysh al-Islam: A dominant power in Damascus’ suburbs among the most prominent factions that played a key role in the war was Jaysh al-Islam, headquartered in Douma (Eastern Ghouta, Damascus countryside). The group established control over most opposition-held areas surrounding Damascus, including Eastern Ghouta, Qalamoun, and even neighborhoods inside the capital such as Qaboun, Barzeh, and Jobar—reaching as far as Abbasid Square, one of Damascus’ key landmarks.

Jaysh al-Islam was a declared Salafi-jihadist group, which, by 2013, had amassed over 25,000 fighters. It possessed medium and heavy weaponry, including tanks, armored vehicles, and short- to mid-range missiles—as showcased in its 2015 military parade, where 1,700 fighters graduated.

Despite its Salafi-jihadist ideology, Jaysh al-Islam engaged in fierce battles against Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS’s predecessor), Faylaq al-Rahman (an ally of Nusra), and even ISIS. These internal conflicts weakened the group, yet it maintained cohesion until its leader, Zahran Alloush, was assassinated in a suspected Russian airstrike on December 26, 2015.

Like many other factions that collapsed after losing their leaders, Jaysh al-Islam failed to maintain its influence, despite receiving external support. It ultimately lost its territories, especially compared to HTS, which proved more resilient.

How HTS Survived Where Others Failed

Many factions, including Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid, once outnumbered HTS (then Jabhat al-Nusra) and enjoyed greater material, media, and popular support. However, Nusra was designated a terrorist organization early on, leading to its international isolation. While this seemed like a disadvantage, it allowed HTS to consolidate power away from external interference.

Over time, as other factions splintered due to leadership losses, internal strife, and external pressure, HTS remained intact, strategically evolving. This resilience and adaptability—under Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s leadership—ultimately positioned HTS as the dominant force, culminating in its rise to power in Syria’s new political landscape.

While most leaders of the armed opposition factions—such as Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid—were preoccupied with competing for power in areas outside the control of Bashar al-Assad’s forces, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) operated quietly and behind the scenes. He remained out of the public eye until 2016, when he announced his split from al-Qaeda, after which he once again withdrew from the spotlight.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, was formed through both voluntary and forced alliances among several militant factions, including Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Liwa al-Haqq. It also absorbed a wide range of smaller al-Qaeda-linked factions, such as the Caucasus Emirate, the Turkistan Islamic Party, Jaysh al-Izza, and Jaysh al-Nasr. Like other militant groups, HTS underwent major transformations, splits, and internal shifts. However, what set it apart was its ability to adapt ideologically in response to local, regional, and international realities.

Unlike other factions that were forced into mergers for survival—such as Ahrar al-Sham, which combined with Nour al-Din al-Zenki under the name “Syrian Liberation Front”—HTS managed to maintain its organizational independence. In fact, rather than dissolving into other groups, it continued to absorb smaller al-Qaeda-affiliated factions, including Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Nasr. As time passed, HTS grew stronger. By early 2019, after intense battles against Ahrar al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and other factions, it secured full control over Idlib Province, along with large parts of Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.

Sami Mohammad, a former religious and military leader within HTS, explained that the most important factor behind the group’s survival was its independent decision-making, the charisma of Ahmad al-Sharaa’ (Jolani), and the strong discipline within its ranks. He emphasized the personal trust that Jolani built with both his commanders and fighters, noting that Jolani knew all his field commanders, even the lower-ranking ones, and met with them regularly. This personal involvement strengthened his position within the organization and fostered loyalty, unlike other factions that suffered from chaos and disorganized leadership.

Mohammad described HTS as a “true military academy,” in contrast to most Syrian opposition factions, which were structured around local or tribal affiliations. HTS, he explained, had a clear organizational hierarchy and centralized decision-making, ensuring strategic consistency.

Mohammad Ibrahim, also known as Abu Yahya al-Shami, a former military commander in an Islamist faction, noted that the key to HTS’s rise was its relative independence and its ability to break established political boundaries. He explained that most armed factions were directly tied to foreign states, forcing them to adhere to external agendas, whereas HTS was not directly controlled by any state. This allowed it more freedom to act in its own interests, even if that meant eliminating rival factions. He also pointed out that HTS’s designation as a terrorist organization worked in its favor, as it prevented major countries from openly engaging with it like they did with other factions. This, in turn, gave HTS greater flexibility in its decision-making, allowing it to maneuver more effectively and eliminate competitors.

Yahya emphasized that Jolani always pursued his own faction’s interests ruthlessly, unlike other rebel groups that often compromised or sought partial solutions. He argued that while Jolani fought with extreme determination and always aimed to win, many other factions settled for half-measures.

A leaked audio recording of Hassan al-Daghim, a former moral guidance officer in the Syrian National Army, further supports this view. In the recording, Daghim states that Jolani is a pragmatic leader who will sacrifice anything or anyone to achieve power. Abu Yahya concluded that Jolani’s practical experience came from Syria itself, as he was not originally this skilled. However, his ambition, ability to capitalize on victories, and lessons learned Abu from the mistakes of both ISIS and Nusra contributed to his success.

HTS’s dominance was not only due to military strategy but was also aided by religious legitimacy. Several influential clerics and political figures played a key role in legitimizing Jolani’s rule through religious rhetoric. Among them were Zaid al-Atar (Abu Aisha), a former HTS political liaison who later became Foreign Minister under the name Asaad al-Shaibani, and Abu Ahmad Hudud (Anas Khattab), a former security chief who is now head of HTS intelligence. These figures helped consolidate Jolani’s leadership, ensuring that HTS eliminated all potential challengers, leaving only its own government—the “Salvation Government”—as the ruling authority.

Ultimately, HTS’s tactical flexibility, military discipline, and ruthless pragmatism allowed it to outlast and surpass all other opposition factions. Unlike groups that were either fragmented by infighting or constrained by foreign backers, HTS retained control over its own fate. With the fall of the previous regime, it successfully transitioned from an opposition faction to the dominant force in post-war Syria, with its leadership now firmly established in Damascus.

Victory... A Shared Triumph

Alaa al-Din Ayoub, known as “Farouq Abu Bakr,” a former commander in the Free Syrian Army who led negotiations for the withdrawal of opposition factions from Aleppo in 2016, reflected on the past conflicts with Jabhat al-Nusra—later known as Fatah al-Sham and eventually Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). “We had our differences regarding how they dealt with the Free Syrian Army factions,” he said, “but we cannot deny that they were the most organized and well-trained among us. HTS focused on structuring its ranks and training its fighters, yet the recent victory cannot be attributed solely to them.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayoub emphasized that the success in repelling aggression resulted from multiple factors, both external and internal. International power struggles and geopolitical conflicts played a role, but so did the resilience of tens of thousands of fighters across revolutionary factions. However, he acknowledged that HTS stood out for its ability to seize opportunities better than others.

“We all remember the phase before HTS took control of Idlib and the battles it fought against other factions,” he continued. “In my opinion, the main reason it succeeded where others failed was the fragmentation of the opposition factions and their inability to present a unified, cohesive model.”

Fragmented Alliances

Regarding political formations, particularly the Syrian National Coalition—the political wing of the armed opposition that was tasked with negotiations before the fall of the regime—Ayoub pointed out that its creation was backed by Türkiye and other regional powers. As a result, most of its members and factions were beholden to the interests of the states that helped establish it.

Reflecting on the Syrian revolution’s fourteen-year history, Ayoub noted the emergence of various influential leaders with religious, grassroots, and revolutionary backgrounds. Figures like Zahran Alloush, Abdel Qader Saleh (leader of Liwa al-Tawhid), and Hassan Abboud (leader of Ahrar al-Sham) along with Abu Yazan al-Shami left a significant mark. Others, such as Jamal Maarouf, who led the Syria Revolutionaries Front before being eliminated by HTS in 2014, were eventually removed from the scene—either through assassination or political marginalization.

“In contrast,” Ayoub concluded, “Jolani was the luckiest of them all. After a period of hiding, he not only survived but ultimately prevailed. His past experience in Iraq, along with his security and military acumen, were key factors in his rise to power.”

 

 

 



Report: Assad’s Exiled Spy Chief and Billionaire Cousin Plot Syrian Uprisings from Russia

A poster of Bashar al-Assad is seen on the ground at the presidential palace in Damascus after he fled Syria on December 8, 2024. (AP)
A poster of Bashar al-Assad is seen on the ground at the presidential palace in Damascus after he fled Syria on December 8, 2024. (AP)
TT

Report: Assad’s Exiled Spy Chief and Billionaire Cousin Plot Syrian Uprisings from Russia

A poster of Bashar al-Assad is seen on the ground at the presidential palace in Damascus after he fled Syria on December 8, 2024. (AP)
A poster of Bashar al-Assad is seen on the ground at the presidential palace in Damascus after he fled Syria on December 8, 2024. (AP)

Former loyalists to Bashar al-Assad who fled Syria after the dictator’s fall are funneling millions of dollars to tens of thousands of potential fighters, hoping to stir uprisings against the new government and reclaim some of their lost influence, a Reuters investigation has found.

Assad, who escaped to Russia last December, is largely resigned to exile in Moscow, say four people close to the family. But other senior figures from his inner circle, including his brother, have not come to terms with losing power.

Two of the men once closest to Assad, Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan and billionaire Rami Makhlouf, are competing to form militias in coastal Syria and Lebanon made up of members of their minority Alawite sect, long associated with the Assad family, Reuters found.

All told, the two men and other factions jostling for power are financing more than 50,000 fighters in hope of winning their loyalty.

Assad’s brother, Maher, who is also in Moscow and still controls thousands of former soldiers, has yet to give money or orders, said the four people close to the Assads.

One prize for Hassan and Makhlouf is control of a network of 14 underground command rooms built around coastal Syria toward the end of Assad’s rule, as well as weapons caches. Two officers and a Syrian regional governor confirmed the existence of these concealed rooms, details of which appear in Photos seen by Reuters.

Hassan, who was Bashar’s military intelligence chief, has been tirelessly making calls and sending voice messages to commanders and advisors.

In them, he seethes about his lost influence and outlines grandiose visions of how he would rule coastal Syria, home to the majority of Syria’s Alawite population and Assad’s former powerbase.

Makhlouf, a cousin of the Assads, once used his business empire to fund the dictator during the civil war, only to run afoul of his more powerful relatives and wind up under years of house arrest. He now portrays himself in conversations and messages as a messianic figure who will return to power after ushering in an apocalyptic final battle.

Hassan and Makhlouf did not respond to requests for comment for this report. Bashar and Maher Assad couldn’t be reached. Reuters also sought comment from the Assad brothers through intermediaries, who didn’t reply.

From their exiles in Moscow, Hassan and Makhlouf envision a fractured Syria, and each wants control of the Alawite-majority areas. Both have spent millions of dollars in competing efforts to build forces, Reuters found. Their deputies are in other countries including Russia and Lebanon.

To counter the plotters, Syria’s new government is deploying another former Assad loyalist – a childhood friend of new President Ahmed al-Sharaa who became a paramilitary leader for Assad and then switched sides mid-war after the dictator turned against him. The task of that man, Khaled al-Ahmad, is to persuade Alawite ex-soldiers and civilians that their future lies with the new Syria.

“This is an extension of the Assad regime’s power struggle,” said Annsar Shahhoud, a researcher who studied the dictatorship for more than a decade. “This competition continues now, but instead of the goal being to please Assad, the focus is on finding his replacement and controlling the Alawite community.”

Details of the scheming are based on interviews with 48 people with direct knowledge of the competing plans. All spoke on condition of anonymity. Reuters also reviewed financial records, operational documents, and exchanges of voice and text messages.

The governor of the coastal region of Tartous, Ahmed al-Shami, said Syrian authorities are aware of the outlines of the plans and ready to combat them.

He confirmed the existence of the command-room network as well, but said it has been weakened.

“We are certain they cannot do anything effective, given their lack of strong tools on the ground and their weak capabilities,” al-Shami told Reuters in response to questions about the plotting.

The Lebanese Interior Ministry and the Russian Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment. A UAE official said its government is committed to preventing the use of its territory for “all forms of illicit financial flows.”

An uprising could destabilize Syria’s new government as the United States and regional powers throw their support behind Sharaa, the former opposition commander who toppled Assad last December and is now navigating a fractured political landscape. It would risk igniting another round of deadly sectarian violence, which has roiled the new Syria over the past year.

For now, the prospects of a successful uprising seem low.

Chief plotters Hassan and Makhlouf are virulently at odds with one another. Their hopes are fading to win backing from Russia, once Assad’s most powerful political and military supporter. Many Alawites in Syria, who also suffered under Assad, mistrust the pair.

And the new government is working to stymie their plans.

In a brief statement in response to the Reuters findings, the government’s Alawite point man al-Ahmad said the “work of healing – of uprooting sectarian hatred and honoring the dead – remains the only path toward a Syria that can live with itself again.”

'PERHAPS THOUSANDS MORE WILL DIE'

Hassan claims control of 12,000 fighters, while Makhlouf claims control of at least 54,000, according to their factions’ internal documents. Commanders on the ground said fighters are paid a pittance and taking money from both sides.

The exiles don't appear to have mobilized any forces yet. Reuters could not confirm the fighter figures or determine specific action plans. Tartous governor Al-Shami said potential fighters numbered in the tens of thousands.

The new government took power after emerging victorious a year ago in the nearly 14-year civil war that plunged the country into sectarian bloodshed.

In March, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed across the Mediterranean coast by government-affiliated forces after a failed uprising in an Alawite town. Both Hassan and Makhlouf promise to protect Syria’s Alawites from the insecurity that has continued since March.

Alawite anger toward the new government erupted on November 25, when thousands took to the streets in Homs and coastal cities. They demanded more autonomy and the release of detainees.

The protests marked the first large-scale demonstrations Syria had witnessed since Assad’s fall.

Neither Makhlouf nor Hassan were behind the protests, but rather a cleric who opposes both men and publicly called on people to demonstrate peacefully. Makhlouf attacked the cleric the next day in a social media post, saying, “all these movements will only bring calamity, for the time is not yet right.”

One of Hassan’s top military coordinators told Reuters that fighting is the only way to restore Alawite dignity.

“We are lucky that only this number of our people have died so far,” said the coordinator, a former Assad-era military intelligence officer who is now in Lebanon. “Perhaps thousands more will die, but the sect must offer up sacrificial lambs” to defend the community.

According to January 2025 documents seen by Reuters, Assadist forces drew up initial plans to build a paramilitary force of 5,780 fighters and supply them from the subterranean command rooms. These are essentially large storerooms equipped with arms, solar power, internet, GPS units and walkie-talkies.

Nothing came of that early plan, and the command rooms – along a spine in coastal Syria about 180 kilometers from north to south – remain operational but essentially idle, according to two people with knowledge of them and photos seen by Reuters.

One photo showed a room with five stacked crates, three of which were open to reveal a collection of AK-47s, ammunition and hand grenades. The room also held three desktop computers, two tablets, a set of walkie-talkies, and a power bank. In the center was a wooden table topped with a large map.

For the plotters, “this network is Treasure Island, and they are all boats trying to reach it,” said one of the people, a commander who monitors the readiness of the rooms.

Al-Shami, the Tartous governor, said the network is real but poses little danger. “These centers have been significantly weakened since the liberation,” he said. “There is no concern about their continued existence.”

As senior military officials and ranking government figures escaped abroad in December 2024, many mid-level commanders remained in Syria. Most fled to the coastal regions dominated by Alawites, a Muslim minority that makes up a little over 10% of Syria’s population. Those officers started recruiting fighters, according to a retired commander involved in the effort.

“The most fertile ground was the military,” the retired commander said. “Thousands of young men from the sect had been conscripted into the army, which was dissolved in December, and they suddenly found themselves exposed.”

Then came the failed uprising on March 6. An Alawite unit operating independently ambushed security forces from the new Syrian government in rural Latakia, killing 12 men and capturing more than 150, according to a brigadier general who was involved with the ambush and has since left for Lebanon.

The new Syrian government says hundreds of its security forces died in the fighting that followed – a claim largely echoed by the pro-Assad fighters.

The brigadier general said 128 pro-Assad forces died in the uprising, which was quelled by the new government.

The Assadist exiles neither started nor commanded the uprising, according to the officers who were there, but those days marked a turning point. They began to organize.

AN ASSAD FAMILY FEUD

It was on March 9 that Makhlouf started calling himself “The Coast Boy,” declaring in a statement that he had been entrusted with a divine mission to help Alawites. “I’m back, and blessed be the return,” the statement read. It did not mention that he was in Moscow.

Makhlouf dominated Syria’s economy for more than two decades, with holdings estimated by the British government at well over a billion dollars in industries as varied as telecoms, construction and tourism. He used his money to fund Syrian army units and allied militias during the civil war, which broke out in 2011.

When Assad’s victory seemed assured in 2019, Makhlouf publicly claimed credit. Soon after, Assad seized Makhlouf's businesses, ostensibly because they were indebted to the state, and put him under years of house arrest.

Makhlouf escaped to Lebanon in an ambulance the night of December 8, 2024, as Damascus fell to Sharaa’s forces. Makhlouf’s brother Ehab also tried to flee that night in his Maserati, but was shot to death near the border and robbed of millions of dollars he was carrying in cash, according to four close associates of the family and a customs officer with direct knowledge of the events.

Reuters could not independently verify the events of that night.

Makhlouf now lives on a private floor in a luxurious Radisson hotel in Moscow under tight security, according to nine aides and relatives. He quotes frequently from the Quran. They said he became deeply religious during house arrest.

The Radisson in Moscow and group headquarters in Brussels did not respond to a request for comment.

Using trusted business administrators in Lebanon and Russia, Makhlouf is transferring money to Alawite officers for salaries and equipment, according to a financial manager and receipts and payroll tables seen by Reuters.

The documents show the money is funneled through two prominent Syrian officers who reunited with Makhlouf in Moscow: Suhail Hassan and Qahtan Khalil, who both held the rank of major general.

Hassan and Khalil claimed to have created a force for Makhlouf totaling what they said were 54,053 willing fighters, including 18,000 officers, organized into 80 battalions and groups in and around the cities of Homs, Hama, Tartous and Latakia. Many rank-and-file soldiers conscripted under Assad, however, gave up fighting when his government fell.

Hassan and Khalil didn’t reply to requests for comment about their role in transferring money.

One of his financial managers told Reuters that Makhlouf has spent at least $6 million on salaries. Payroll tables and salary receipts created by financial aides to Makhlouf in Lebanon claimed he spent $976,705 in May, and that one group of 5,000 fighters received $150,000 in August.

The total force numbers are real, according to five leaders of military groups in Syria who are on Makhlouf’s payroll and lead about a fifth of his following. But Makhlouf’s funding falls short of their needs, amounting to just $20 to $30 a month per fighter.

In addition, Makhlouf’s staff has sought to provide weapons. They have mapped the possible location of dozens of caches hidden during the Assad era totaling a few thousand firearms, according to schematics Reuters viewed. These stockpiles are separate from the hidden command rooms.

They have also been in discussions with smugglers in Syria for new weapons.

People familiar with the discussions said they didn’t know if new weapons were actually purchased or delivered.

Altogether, the five local military leaders said they command about 12,000 men in various stages of readiness. One of them told Reuters the time wasn’t yet right for action.

Another of the five commanders derided Makhlouf as trying to buy loyalty with “crumbs of money.”

All five said they had accepted money from both Makhlouf and Hassan, the spy chief. They saw no issue with overlapping paymasters.

“Thousands of Alawites, whether former Syrian soldiers or civilians dismissed from state jobs, live in extreme poverty,” one of the men said. “There is nothing wrong with taking some cash from these whales who sucked our blood for years.”

‘BE PATIENT’

Hassan ran the Assad dictatorship’s military detention system, which was notorious for extorting money at scale from prisoners’ families, according to a 2024 United Nations report about the system.

A Reuters investigation this year found it was Hassan who proposed moving a mass grave containing thousands of bodies in 2018 to the Dhumair desert outside Damascus to hide the scope of the Assad government atrocities.

Abandoned by Assad’s disintegrating army, Hassan fled first to the UAE’s embassy in Damascus and then took refuge in the Russian embassy in December 2024 for nearly two weeks. He was infuriated at what he perceived as ill-treatment by his hosts, who provided a single room with just one hard chair to sit on, according to two people close to him.

“Kamal Hassan is not one to sit on a wooden chair for days!” he said in one WhatsApp voice message to his inner circle from this spring, reviewed by Reuters.

Hassan ultimately took up residence in a three-story villa in suburban Moscow, according to an officer who met him over the summer. Since then, he has seen Maher al-Assad once and maintains close ties with Bashar’s Russian protectors, according to the two people aware of Hassan’s movements.

According to Hassan’s operations coordinator in Lebanon, Hassan has spent $1.5 million since March on 12,000 fighters in Syria and Lebanon.

“Be patient, my people, and don’t surrender your arms. I am the one who will restore your dignity,” he said in another WhatsApp voice message from April that appeared aimed at commanders. Two recipients confirmed the message was from him.

In mid-year, a charity called the “Development of Western Syria” announced its creation and said it was funded by “the Syrian citizen Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan,” according to one of its initial Facebook posts. Three officers linked to Hassan and a manager in the organization described it as a humanitarian cover so Hassan could build influence among Alawites.

In August, the charity paid $80,000 to shelter 40 Syrian Alawite families, according to an announcement of its first action. That same month, Hassan sent $200,000 in cash to 80 officers in Lebanon, according to a payroll document seen by Reuters.

Over the summer, Hassan also recruited about 30 hackers once affiliated with his military intelligence branch, according to an aide in Moscow and one of the hackers, a computer engineer. Their orders were to carry out cyberattacks against the new government and plant spyware in its computer systems.

By September, Syrian government datasets that the engineer said his team stole were for sale on the dark web for $150 to $500. Reuters found several of the sets he identified online, including databases with staff details for the communications and health ministries.

The engineer said former spy chief Hassan plans a multifaceted attack to reclaim his place in Syria. “Major General Kamal knows that war is not only on the ground but on every front,” he said.

THE OTHER ASSAD

A potential key player in attempts to instigate an uprising is Maher al-Assad, the ex-dictator’s younger brother.

Maher controlled both a business empire and the most powerful unit of the Syrian military, the 4th Armored Division. Under him, according to research by the US think tank New Lines Institute, the division gained power and financial independence that made it akin to a state within a state – to the point where it received its own sanctions from the United States, Britain and the European Union.

A senior division commander, now in Lebanon, said Maher’s financial empire remains largely operational except for his alleged sales of Captagon, an illicitly produced amphetamine. His assets are believed to be stashed in shell companies both inside and outside Syria, according to a businessman close to him.

The commander said while Bashar al-Assad is focused on his private life and businesses, Maher still wants influence in Syria. The younger brother cannot fathom how the children of Hafez al-Assad, the dictatorship’s founder, could be forced out of Syria, he said.

Two division officers say many of its 25,000 fighters, both inside and outside Syria, still consider Maher al-Assad their commander and he can mobilize them if he gives the order.

Makhlouf isn’t seeking the Assads’ backing: Publicly, he has derided his cousins as “the fugitives.” Hassan, relying on years of personal ties and collaboration with the Assads, is appealing for Maher’s support, according to three senior sources in both camps.

Russia has so far withheld support for Hassan and Makhlouf, according to six people with direct knowledge of the exiles’ attempts to win over the Kremlin.

While Moscow is harboring the exiles, the Russian government has been clear that its priority is continued access to the military bases it still operates in coastal Syria, according to two diplomats familiar with Russia’s position.

In bidding for Russian help, one key figure is a senior Syrian officer, Ahmed al-Malla, who has had Russian citizenship since early in the civil war. Al-Malla brokered separate informal meetings in Moscow beginning in March between Russian officials and Hassan and Makhlouf’s two Russia-based deputies, according to handwritten minutes from one meeting seen by Reuters. According to the notes, the Russians told the exiles: organize yourselves, and let us see your plans.

Al-Malla did not respond to requests for comment about his role as a mediator.

But the meetings between Russian officials and the exiled Syrian factions have grown infrequent, said two people with direct knowledge of their scheduling. They said there have been none since President Sharaa visited Moscow in October to secure Kremlin support.

During the visit, Sharaa raised the issue of Hassan and Makhlouf with the Russian government, said al-Shami, the Tartous governor. Al-Shami said Russia – and, separately, Lebanon – “expressed their willingness to increase coordination and prevent any activity by these individuals within their territories.” He was unaware of any meetings the plotters may have had with Russian officials.

One of the diplomats said Sharaa’s meeting at the Kremlin “sent a signal to Alawite insurgents: There was no one abroad coming to save them.”

There are indications that Makhlouf, whose business accounts have been frozen due to international sanctions, is having cash flow problems. October salaries have yet to arrive, according to three people with knowledge of the transfers.

THE MAN ON THE GROUND

Since the March killings, the Damascus government has relied on a point man to counter the plotting: Khaled al-Ahmad, a childhood friend of President Sharaa.

An Alawite, al-Ahmad was once in Assad’s inner circle. He served as a shadow diplomat and a founder of the National Defense Forces, Assad’s largest allied paramilitary.

Like Makhlouf, al-Ahmad believed he was responsible for Assad’s victory in the civil war. Assad gave al-Ahmad much the same treatment as his cousin, stripping him of privileges and ordering him drafted, according to two aides.

Al-Ahmad fled to Cyprus, and then, in 2021, visited northwestern Syria’s Idlib to meet up with his old friend, Sharaa, according to accounts from three people who have worked with both men. They discussed Sharaa’s plan to topple Assad, according to the three people.

It materialized in December 2024.

Reuters reviewed WhatsApp voice messages from al-Ahmad in late 2024 in which he told key military officials that it was futile to stick with the losing dictator and promised clemency if they abandoned him and prevented a bloodbath.

In his statement to Reuters, al-Ahmad said his objective as the government fell in December was to prevent more bloodshed, but acknowledged being unable to fully “spare Syrians from further loss, or from the sectarian shadows that continue to darken our society.”

Today al-Ahmad is Syria’s most powerful Alawite, moving between a Beirut penthouse overlooking the sea and a fortified villa in Damascus.

“His role is considered crucial in fostering trust between the Alawite community and the new government,” said al-Shami, the Tartous governor.

Four aides said al-Ahmad is funding and coordinating job creation and economic development because he believes they are the solution to the destabilizing high unemployment that followed the fall of Assad, when the army was dissolved and Alawites lost government posts.

In late October, the Interior Ministry announced the arrest of a coastal cell it said was funded by Makhlouf that was plotting to assassinate journalists and activists.

In all, Tartous governor al-Shami said, the number of arrests of people linked to Makhlouf and Hassan was in the dozens.

Along that same coast, stockpiles of gear are quietly gathering dust in underground rooms, according to the field commander, who personally keeps watch over several of them.

They’ll be ready when needed, he said, but so far he sees no side worth choosing.


Mass Wedding in Gaza Celebrates New Life After Years of War and Tragedy 

Palestinian couples participate in a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)
Palestinian couples participate in a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)
TT

Mass Wedding in Gaza Celebrates New Life After Years of War and Tragedy 

Palestinian couples participate in a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)
Palestinian couples participate in a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)

Eman Hassan Lawwa was dressed in traditional Palestinian prints and Hikmat Lawwa wore a suit as they walked hand-in-hand past the crumbled buildings of southern Gaza in a line of other couples dressed in exactly the same way.

The 27-year-old Palestinians were among 54 couples to get married Tuesday in a mass wedding in war-ravaged Gaza that represented a rare moment of hope after two years of devastation, death and conflict.

"Despite everything that has happened, we will begin a new life," Hikmat Lawwa said. "God willing, this will be the end of the war," he said.

Weddings are a key part of Palestinian culture that have become rare in Gaza during the war. The tradition has begun to resume in the wake of a fragile ceasefire, even if the weddings are different from the elaborate ceremonies once held in the territory.

As roaring crowds waved Palestinian flags in the southern city of Khan Younis, the celebrations were dampened by the ongoing crisis across Gaza.

Most of Gaza's 2 million residents, including Eman and Hikmat Lawwa, have been displaced by the war, entire areas of cities have been flattened and aid shortages and outbursts in conflict continue to plague the daily lives of people.

The young couple, who are distant relatives, fled to the nearby town of Deir al-Balah during the war and have struggled to find basics like food and shelter. They said they don’t know how they’re going to build their lives together given the situation around them.

"We want to be happy like the rest of the world. I used to dream of having a home, a job, and being like everyone else," Hikmat said. "Today, my dream is to find a tent to live in."

"Life has started to return, but it's not like we hoped it would," he added.

Palestinians watch and celebrate a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)

The celebration was funded by Al Fares Al Shahim, a humanitarian aid operation backed by the United Arab Emirates. In addition to holding the event, the organization offered couples a small sum of money and other supplies to start their lives together.

For Palestinians, weddings are often elaborate dayslong celebrations, seen as both an important social and economic choice that spells out the future for many families. They include joyful dances and processions through the streets by massive families in fabric patterns donned by the couple and their loved ones and heaping plates of food.

Weddings can also be a symbol of resilience and a celebration of new generations of families carrying on Palestinian traditions, said Randa Serhan, a professor of sociology at Barnard College who has studied Palestinian weddings.

"With every new wedding is going to come children and it means that the memories and the lineages are not going to die," Serhan said. "The couples are going to continue life in an impossible situation."

On Tuesday, a procession of cars carrying the couples drove through stretches of collapsed buildings. Hikmat and Eman Lawwa waved Palestinian flags with other couples as families surrounding them danced to music blaring over crowds.

Eman, who was cloaked in a white, red and green traditional dress, said the wedding offered a small moment of relief after years of suffering. But she said it was also marked by the loss of her father, mother, and other family members who were killed during the war.

"It’s hard to experience joy after such sorrow," she said, tears streaming down her face. "God willing, we will rebuild brick-by-brick."


‘Some Took Part in Israeli Captive Handover’…How Hamas Fighters Hid in Rafah Tunnels ?

Israeli captive Avera Mengistu stands on the handover platform as part of a prisoner exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel in Rafah in February (Reuters)
Israeli captive Avera Mengistu stands on the handover platform as part of a prisoner exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel in Rafah in February (Reuters)
TT

‘Some Took Part in Israeli Captive Handover’…How Hamas Fighters Hid in Rafah Tunnels ?

Israeli captive Avera Mengistu stands on the handover platform as part of a prisoner exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel in Rafah in February (Reuters)
Israeli captive Avera Mengistu stands on the handover platform as part of a prisoner exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel in Rafah in February (Reuters)

A series of Israeli military statements reporting the killing or capture of members of Hamas’s Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades inside Rafah’s tunnel network has sharpened scrutiny of who these fighters were and how long they had remained hidden underground.

The operations targeted men who had spent months beneath a city Israel moved to occupy in May 2024 and later brought under full control.

For more than a month, indirect contacts had sought to arrange the fighters’ safe withdrawal from the tunnels unarmed, an effort that helped expedite the handover of the body of Israeli officer Hadar Goldin on November 9.

But Israel later backed away from informal understandings with the United States, which had been engaging on the issue with Türkiye, over allowing the fighters to exit safely.

As weeks passed, Israel began hunting them down, killing and capturing them in groups through airstrikes or direct pursuit once they emerged from tunnels or ambush positions.

The pressure mounted as the fighters became confined to the last pockets of tunnels in Rafah’s eastern al-Jneina neighborhood.

Eight months in tunnels and ambush positions

Field sources from Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that the fighters had spent most of the two year war inside the city’s tunnels despite the presence of Israeli forces above ground and despite Israel’s entry into many of the passageways.

The sources said the tunnels had been built in ways that made them difficult for Israel to uncover fully even now.

They said that during the first truce which lasted seven days in November 2023, the fighters surfaced, then returned underground when the fighting resumed.

They alternated between staying in the tunnels and emerging into ambush positions above ground. Communication with their commanders continued until a second truce was reached in January of this year which lasted until March 18.

One source said that before the fighting resumed, and despite Israel’s deployment in Rafah, the fighters managed to emerge above ground, reach Khan Yunis, meet their commanders and take part in the handover of Israeli captives.

Some participated in the February release of Avera Mengistu, who had been held in Gaza since the 2014 war.

After the war resumed and diplomatic efforts to halt it failed, Qassam fighters returned to Rafah through the tunnels and resumed their ambush positions above ground.

From late March until August, the fighters remained in touch with their command and carried out a string of attacks that inflicted casualties on Israeli forces even after Israel declared it had brought Rafah under full control.

The Qassam Brigades at the time launched a series of attacks named Gates of Hell that killed about six Israeli soldiers.

The attacks involved detonating military vehicles, booby trapped houses and tunnel openings. In one incident in May, Qassam fighters attempted to seize an Israeli soldier.

Hamas, which was then engaged in negotiations to halt the war, sought through these operations to show that the Rafah Brigade remained active at a time when Israeli military sources were claiming the brigade had been dismantled after its battalions were destroyed.

According to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, Rafah fighters and their immediate commanders spent more than eight months inside tunnels and in above ground ambush positions.

How did they obtain food and water

Field sources in the factions told Asharq Al-Awsat that the tunnels had been stocked with limited supplies of food and water.

One source who had experienced a similar shortage in a previous Gaza war said the fighters had likely relied on whatever food they could find.

This included leftover supplies from Israeli soldiers in some of the houses they had occupied or food in homes of residents that had not been destroyed.

The source cited social media posts from months earlier showing handwritten notes left by Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters apologizing to homeowners for taking food.

The sources said duties differed inside the Qassam Brigades. Some fighters handled logistics, others manned ambush positions and others moved between units while maintaining direct coordination with field commanders.

Senior commanders

Among those whose photos Israeli media circulated after they were killed were the commander of Rafah’s eastern battalion, Mohammad al-Bawab, and his deputy, Ismail Abu Labda. Al-Bawab was married to Abu Labda’s sister.

Another senior figure killed was Tawfiq Salem, commander of the battalion’s elite company, according to the sources.

Abu Labda appeared in the February handover of Mengistu and was in direct contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross during the transfer. The sources said al-Bawab monitored the process from a distance but did not take part directly.

The sources added that al-Bawab and Abu Labda were among those who oversaw the capture of Israeli officer Hadar Goldin during the 2014 war.

Israel also killed Abdullah Hamad, the son of senior Hamas political bureau member Ghazi Hamad and a member of the movement’s negotiating delegation.

Field sources said the younger Hamad had been active in the Qassam Brigades and had graduated from the Rabat Military College run by the Hamas government before the war, later becoming an instructor.

He was killed alongside his cousin Ahmed Saeed Hamad, the son of Ghazi Hamad’s brother, while they were in a tunnel with Qassam commanders and other fighters.

The sources said Saeed Hamad had lost three daughters in Israeli strikes on their homes. The daughters were killed after their husbands took part in the October 7, 2023 attack and in other operations during the war.