The Palestinians, through their legitimate representatives, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian National Authority, have decided to disarm. In full cooperation with the legitimate Lebanese authorities, they are seeking to hand the Palestinian factions’ arms in the camps to the state, bringing them under Lebanese sovereignty and the rule of law.
Although it came late, this was a sensible decision. These weapons had been misused in ways that make maintaining them untenable. A source of fear in the camps, they have often been used to settle intra-Palestinian power struggles, tied to the broader competition for influence in both Lebanon and the region.
Rehashing past arguments to defend these arms has become pointless. Circumstances have changed in ways that have created a need for a new, more cautious approach.
After every armed faction, agenda, and arena became embroiled in a disastrous conflict in which they were crushed by the Israeli army, which did not merely dominate the skies and make use of its superior technology. Indeed, the war also reflected the significance of Israel’s strategic alliances, not only through funding and political cover but also through direct participation whenever needed.
This Palestinian policy, which ought to be binding for all factions and even individuals, was indeed prudent. Not only is it a moral position that strengthens solidarity and reflects gratitude to a country and people who have sacrificed so much for the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian national and revolutionary struggle; it is also the right thing to do strategically.
The Palestinians, who seek a political settlement that liberates them from occupation and paves a path toward g their long-sought state, have an interest in investing their assets in places that could integrate them into their settlements.
Events far beyond the Palestinians’ control had already initiated disarmament. Its primary and central stronghold in the South was betrayed by Syrian geography, which, in the blink of an eye, shifted from being “with” to being “against.” The strategic implications of losing Syria’s geography should not be underestimated, both for the arms struggle and potential political settlements. This raises the same question in Gaza. How are the arms there to be addressed? The scale of armament in Gaza is incomparable to that of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the goal of the Israeli enemy and its American ally is the same: disarming Gaza, in tandem with the disarmament of all the non-state actors in Lebanon.
The question of Gaza’s arsenal is a major theme of discussions around the framework for administering the enclave’s future- the so-called “day after.” Complicating matters further is that Israel can prevent any political resolution for Gaza, which is not an issue for the weapons in the camps or those of Hezbollah. The Jewish state can call the shots on governance in the territory, Hamas’s arms, and the future of its ties with the West Bank. In fact, Israel is reoccupying the West Bank to create new realities on the ground that make establishing an independent Palestinian state even more unattainable.
Even if we assume that Hamas will take Hezbollah’s approach to its arms- and if efforts to have them handed over to the legitimate authorities succeed and follow President Mahmoud Abbas’s stark and firm advice to hand over its arms to the Palestinian Authority- this would not be enough. Israel does not want to be confronted by a peaceful Palestinian Authority or the resistance of Hamas. This not only makes potential solutions less likely; it also renders any settlement increasingly out of reach.
The Americans helped the Lebanese state get back on its feet and reestablish order. They continue to diligently and consistently follow efforts to turn the page on arms in Lebanon, seeking to usher in a new phase that presents an absolute contrast to the era when Lebanon had been a battleground for conflicts and wars, particularly with Israel.
However, the Americans are not doing the same with the Palestinians, neither with regard to Hamas’s weapons in Gaza nor the role of the legitimate Palestinian authorities in Gaza. In effect, shaping the agenda has been left entirely to Israel, with the US allowing the current round of the conflict to dictate things.
Another important point to consider is that Abbas has more sway over the Palestinian factions in Lebanon than he does in Gaza. The entire world continues to see Hamas as the sole Palestinian force in the Gaza Strip.
Everyone is now waiting for the implications of the war, which have yet to fully crystallize, to become clear. One shift that applies to both the camps in Lebanon and Gaza is this: armed non-state actors’ survival in the Middle East is no longer taken for granted. Their armament has become the subject of serious debate, which is swinging in favor of affirming the need for states to impose a monopoly on armament.
