Inside Israel’s Settler State and its Hidden Strategy

Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
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Inside Israel’s Settler State and its Hidden Strategy

Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)
Israeli settlers use bulldozers to pave a road for a new settlement on the outskirts of the occupied West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, north of Ramallah, on August 24, 2025. (Photo by Zain JAAFAR / AFP)

For decades, settler attacks in the West Bank were largely concentrated in “Area C,” under full Israeli control. But since the Hamas-led Oct. 7 assault on Israel, violence has spread deeper, reaching “Area B” and reshaping life across the territory.

The assaults, carried out day and night, have coincided with a surge in settlement activity. There are now 243 new settlement outposts that did not exist before the 1993 Oslo accords, and 129 additional “shepherding outposts” established since October 7, 2023, alone.

Officially, Israeli settlements cover 3.6% of the West Bank. But their de facto footprint — including roads, security zones and areas of influence — extends to nearly 10%, according to Palestinian monitoring groups.

Nature reserves are also part of the land Israel has moved to place under its control as part of a sovereignty plan driven by far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

In what analysts say could be the most decisive step yet toward blocking the creation of a Palestinian state, Smotrich in late August 2025 secured final approval for the long-stalled “E1” project.

The plan, frozen for decades due to international pressure, received a green light from the Civil Administration’s Supreme Planning Council, an arm of Israel’s Defense Ministry.

A Village Turned Into a Cage

In Sinjil, a town of 9,000 people about 21 km north of Ramallah, residents say daily life has come to resemble imprisonment. Fences, gates, settlements and military outposts ring the community, leaving villagers hemmed in and fearful.

The scars of a July 11 attack are still visible. On that day, settlers killed two young Palestinian men in one of the deadliest assaults since the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.

The victims were not from Sinjil but from the nearby town of al-Mazra’a al-Sharqiya. They had come to help defend their neighbors when hundreds of settlers stormed the village.

“It was a wide-scale assault,” said Mohammad Alwan, coordinator of the Popular Committee Against Settlements. “More than 300 settlers gathered in the mountains and attacked the village. It was a tough battle. Neighbors rushed to defend each other.”

Two young men went missing during the clashes. Hours later, villagers found 22-year-old Saif Musallat dead in a valley. “He had just come from America to visit Palestine ...

They hit him until he died,” Alwan said, his voice breaking. “The bruises were all over his body.”

The second victim, Mohammad Shalabi, was shot dead. “Criminals and savages were unleashed on us,” Alwan added.

Alwan, who has lived through decades of settler attacks, said the brutality has escalated sharply since Oct. 7. “After October they built fences, put up gates and seized the rest of the land - 8,000 out of 14,000 dunams. Look how they turned the village into a cage.”

Gates, Closures and Economic Strain

Beyond the human toll, villagers describe economic suffocation. Mechanic Gharib Khalil’s shop lies just behind a yellow gate sealing the village entrance. “Since they put the gate up a year ago, business collapsed. People can’t reach me anymore,” he said.

Nearby, Abed al-Nasser Alwan stood by his broken-down truck trapped on the other side of the gate. “It looks open, but cameras are everywhere. If you move it, they shoot you or arrest you. We’re stuck.”

Palestinian officials say these restrictions are part of a deliberate policy. The Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission counts 898 military checkpoints and gates across the West Bank, including 146 added since Oct. 7, 2023.

“These barriers reflect Israel’s closure policy since 1967,” said Amir Dawood, the commission’s publishing director. “They are designed to create a new geographic reality - one of exclusion and surveillance.”

Boundaries Drawn with Fire

The violence has spread to neighboring Kafr Malik, where settlers killed four men in July. Posters of the victims cover village walls, alongside slogans of defiance. Settlements loom from the hilltops above, expanding since Oct. 7.

“From there, they attack the village,” said activist Montaser al-Maliki. “Before October, attacks happened, but not like this. Now they are larger, more organized, and more violent.”

Almost daily, footage circulates of settlers blocking roads or pelting Palestinian cars with stones.

The Vanishing Oslo Map

Maps of the West Bank illustrate how Oslo’s partition into Areas A, B and C has eroded.

Area A, once under full Palestinian control, has become a patchwork of isolated enclaves.

“They’ve built a state within a state,” said Issa Zboun, head of GIS at the Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem. “Instead of giving Palestinians their promised state, they took the land and turned it into a settlers’ state.”

Figures compiled by Palestinian groups show the transformation:

1967: 69 settlements, 98,000 settlers, covering 0.2% of the West Bank.

1993 (Oslo Accords): 172 settlements, 248,000 settlers, covering 1.2%.

2025: 200 official settlements, 243 outposts — including 129 built after Oct. 7 — housing more than 940,000 settlers.

While settlements officially cover 3.6% of the West Bank, their effective footprint — including security zones, bypass roads and areas of influence — reaches nearly 10%.

Zboun said Israel once needed laws to seize land for settlements. “Today they do it without orders, without announcements, without laws,” he said.

In his office, Zboun displayed maps showing how every major Palestinian city is surrounded by settlements and bypass roads. “They turned Area A into isolated islands,” he said. “They’ve built something larger than the Palestinian state Oslo promised.”

For villagers like those in Sinjil and Kafr Malik, the map is redrawn not with ink but with blood. Boundaries, they say, are now “drawn with fire.”

Restricted Zones for the Palestinian Authority

Palestinian security forces are formally allowed to access parts of Areas B and C of the West Bank only with Israeli coordination. Yet even when entry is possible, analysts and residents say it is unthinkable for Palestinian officers to confront armed settlers or the Israeli army directly.

Israel’s military is often present during settler raids, ostensibly to keep order, but Palestinians say soldiers routinely shield settlers rather than restrain them. Many Palestinians have been killed during these attacks, with no record of Israeli law enforcement prosecuting settlers beyond brief detentions.

US Pressure Eased Under Trump

Since the start of the occupation in 1967, no Israeli settler has been jailed for killing Palestinians in West Bank attacks, despite periodic US pressure. The Biden administration sought to curb settler violence by imposing sanctions on settler leaders and their political backers. But President Donald Trump revoked those sanctions on his first day in office, a move that emboldened settler leaders and the Israeli defense minister to scrap a policy allowing administrative detention of violent settlers.

Trump’s arrival in power marked a turning point for both Israel’s right-wing leaders and the settler movement, who viewed his presidency as a rare chance to entrench Israeli sovereignty across the West Bank.

The period after Trump’s election saw what Palestinians describe as “unprecedented terror.” Settler raids became more frequent, larger, and more violent.

According to The Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, Israel carried out 11,280 attacks in the first half of 2025, of which 2,154 were by settler militias, killing six Palestinians.

The Trump administration remained silent even after high-profile killings, including that of Musallat.

Only after Musallat’s family launched legal action and US media spotlighted the case did US ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, call for accountability.

This was a criminal and terrorist act, Huckabee said, before visiting the nearby Christian town of Taybeh, where settlers had recently torched an old cemetery.

Despite his words - calling the attacks “absolute terrorism” and the desecration of holy sites a “crime against humanity” - no arrests were made, and settlers continued their assaults, including fresh raids on Taybeh.

The Desert Raids

Settler attacks have also spread to remote desert communities near Bethlehem, in what locals say is a campaign of intimidation.

In the village of al-Minya, council head Zayed Kawazba pointed to burned-out cars as evidence of recent raids. “They can come at any time,” he said. “Wherever they go, destruction follows.”

Nearby Kisan and the desert hamlet of Deir al-Ahmar have also faced near-daily violence. Residents describe settlers beating villagers, burning homes, killing livestock and then accusing Palestinians of theft.

“Before Oct. 7, the attacks were limited, but afterwards the orders came,” said Adnan Abayat of Deir al-Ahmar, showing a scar from a settler beating. “Now they are relentless. People can’t defend themselves, many have already left.”

A Secret Plan in Plain Sight

Palestinians and rights groups say these raids are not random but part of a broader Israeli strategy led by Smotrich, who also holds sweeping powers over the West Bank’s Civil Administration.

Since being appointed in 2022, Smotrich has overseen what critics call the most dramatic transformation of West Bank governance since 1967. By transferring powers once reserved for the Israeli military to civilian officials loyal to him, Smotrich has blurred the line between military occupation and outright annexation.

Though Israel denies officially annexing the West Bank, Smotrich has openly declared his aim of blocking any Palestinian state and entrenching Jewish settlement. A leaked recording captured him calling the process “a dramatic shift that changes the DNA of the system.”

In August 2025, Smotrich secured final approval for the long-stalled E1 settlement plan, linking Jerusalem to the vast Maale Adumim bloc. The project, frozen for decades under international pressure, will effectively bisect the West Bank, severing north from south and crippling the territorial viability of a Palestinian state.

“This is historic,” Smotrich said. “The Palestinian state has been erased from the table — not with slogans but with deeds. Every settlement, every house, every neighborhood is another nail in the coffin of that dangerous idea.”

Israeli rights group B’Tselem warned that the move cements a system of apartheid by entrenching “a bi-national state of separation.”

The E1 approval followed a July 23 Knesset vote endorsing annexation of the West Bank - condemned by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas alike. Netanyahu framed the decision as “a response to Western recognition plans for Palestine” and vowed to accelerate settlement expansion.

Infrastructure work on E1 could begin within months, with housing construction starting as early as next year, Israeli officials said.

B’Tselem argues that Israel has already created a dual system of governance in the occupied West Bank, with separate legal regimes for settlers and Palestinians, amounting to apartheid.

Smotrich has made little effort to disguise his intentions. His 2017 manifesto openly called for dismantling the Palestinian Authority, preventing statehood, and forcing Palestinians to choose between emigration, second-class citizenship, or resistance.

In two years of the current government, observers say Smotrich has delivered a historic shift, consolidating Israeli civilian rule over occupied land and accelerating settlement expansion at a pace unseen in decades.

As settlers push deeper into Palestinian villages and deserts, residents say they are left with only three choices: flee, submit, or resist.

“Their plan is to erase us,” said Abayat. “They beat us, burn our homes, kill our sheep and the world says nothing. We have nothing left but survival.”



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.