After Oil-Rich Babanusa, What Will the Rapid Support Forces Target Next?

A circulated photo shows part of the destruction caused by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drones in the city of El-Obeid in the Kordofan region. 
A circulated photo shows part of the destruction caused by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drones in the city of El-Obeid in the Kordofan region. 
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After Oil-Rich Babanusa, What Will the Rapid Support Forces Target Next?

A circulated photo shows part of the destruction caused by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drones in the city of El-Obeid in the Kordofan region. 
A circulated photo shows part of the destruction caused by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drones in the city of El-Obeid in the Kordofan region. 

After more than two years of intense fighting, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced on Monday that they had seized full control of the Sudanese Army’s 22nd Infantry Division, the military’s last remaining stronghold in Babanusa, the capital of West Kordofan.

Analysts say the fall of the strategically located, oil-producing city, which is also known for its dairy industry, could serve as a launchpad for further RSF advances into northern and southern parts of the state.

The Sudanese Army has issued no official statement more than 48 hours after the RSF announcement. However, pro-army social media pages reported that the military had withdrawn substantial forces from the city to Heglig, another key location in West Kordofan.

Pressure from the RSF has left major cities across the three Kordofan states increasingly vulnerable. The army now holds only El-Obeid and Um Rawaba in North Kordofan, and Heglig in West Kordofan, following the fall of Al-Nuhud and Babanusa.

In South Kordofan, the army retains control of Kadugli and Dilling, while the RSF holds Al-Dibabat. Their ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz Adam al-Hilu, controls Kauda in the Nuba Mountains.

Babanusa lies about 600 kilometers southwest of Khartoum, near the East Darfur border. It is one of Sudan’s most important railway junctions, linking the west to the east and north, and is regarded as an economic hub due to its livestock industry and significant oil reserves.

Although the RSF has not publicly outlined its next objectives, former Sudanese officers say the city’s fall creates multiple avenues for further advances. A retired army officer, speaking anonymously, said Babanusa’s military and geographic significance could mark a turning point in the conflict, potentially opening the path to RSF attempts on major cities in South Kordofan, including Kadugli and Dilling.

He noted that the RSF has long listed El-Obeid as a priority target and has repeatedly attacked it; with RSF positions now nearby, a large-scale assault “is possible at any moment.”

The officer added that although the RSF declared a unilateral ceasefire, it did not adhere to it, continuing its assault on the 22nd Division until it captured the base – is an indication, he said, that the group’s military objectives remain far from exhausted.

Military experts say the RSF’s presence in Babanusa provides a strong platform for further operations, including support for its ally al-Hilu’s SPLM-N faction to push toward Kadugli, especially after recent army gains in several strategic towns in the state.

Mohamed Bashir Suleiman, former Deputy Chief of Staff and former army spokesman, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Babanusa’s fall was predictable. He said controlling the city grants the RSF “a wide operational maneuvering space.” Its economic value, particularly its oil, along with its social environment, which includes communities sympathetic to the RSF, also give the group political advantages as it expands its territorial hold in both Kordofan and Darfur.

Suleiman said RSF control of Babanusa places it in a stronger position to counter the army’s gains in North Kordofan, despite the military’s recent advances around El-Obeid and in the Nuba Mountains.

According to Suleiman, the Sudanese Army must adopt sound operational planning across all fronts in North and West Kordofan. This will require significant troop reinforcements, logistical support, and reserve forces to avoid costly setbacks. The army’s broader strategic goal, he said, remains the recovery of Darfur.

He added that the RSF’s seizure of Babanusa serves several aims, foremost among them driving the army out of areas where it traditionally enjoys social support in West Kordofan.

He noted that holding the city allows the RSF to maintain secure supply routes for fighters and weapons, expand its territorial control, and continue positioning itself for a future assault on strategically and symbolically important El-Obeid.

Suleiman said the RSF’s timing reflects an effort to strengthen its military and political leverage ahead of any renewed negotiations, particularly as the Quad, which comprises the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, continues discussions over a proposed three-month humanitarian ceasefire.

 

 



Formation of Lebanese-Syrian Higher Business Council to Revive Economic Relations

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in Damascus (Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in Damascus (Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office)
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Formation of Lebanese-Syrian Higher Business Council to Revive Economic Relations

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in Damascus (Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in Damascus (Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office)

Lebanon and Syria are expected in the coming weeks to translate the agreements and understandings reached during the recent visit of the Lebanese prime minister to Damascus into a series of measures and decisions to be issued successively, underscoring a clear decision by both states to move their relationship to a new level of cooperation and coordination after years of a strained relationship that negatively affected both sides.

Among the most prominent steps already under way is the formation of the “Lebanese-Syrian Higher Business Council,” aimed at revitalizing economic and trade relations between the two countries and involving the private sector.

Economy and Trade Minister Amer Bisat explained that “talks on establishing this council began some time ago, and it was agreed that its first meeting would be held at the end of June.” He noted that “it will comprise representatives from the private sector, while the Economy Ministry will oversee it, support and monitor its work, help set its agenda, and provide guidance.”

Bisat stressed to Asharq Al-Awsat the “importance of Lebanese-Syrian relations given that the two countries are bound by geography and history, and therefore advancing these relations is a strategic objective for our government.”

He added: “Institutional economic relations with Syria require modernization, or even a rebuild from scratch. It can now be said that matters have been placed on the right track, and we have embarked on a path that may be long.”

Bisat said the Syrian state had met Lebanon’s desire to improve bilateral relations with “welcome, commitment, and positive will,” explaining that “both sides are convinced that Syria’s success is part of Lebanon’s success, and vice versa, and that the relations being built today are based on shared interests, new and healthy foundations, and mutual respect.”

Abolishing the Higher Council

In October 2025, Syria announced the suspension of the Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council, a body established under the “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination” between Lebanon and Syria, signed in 1991. The treaty marked “a major turning point” in relations between the two countries, as it entrenched “Syrian tutelage” over Lebanon, which continued until the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005.

According to an official Lebanese source, the treaty and the council “are effectively no longer in existence, although legal steps are still expected to be taken in this regard.”

Professor Maroun Khater, a writer and researcher in financial and economic affairs, said that “talk of establishing a new higher business council between Lebanon and Syria goes beyond the technical economic dimension to reopening the broader question of the nature of bilateral relations themselves.”

He noted that “Lebanon’s experience with the Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council, which emerged under the Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination Agreement signed in 1991, remained highly controversial in Lebanon because of the major imbalance in power relations and the political and security overlap that, in most cases, undermined the concept of a normal relationship between two independent states.”

“Based on that,” he added, “no new economic or institutional framework can succeed unless it begins with a deep critical review of the experience of those agreements and the flaws that accompanied their implementation.”

He continued: “Any attempt to conclude new agreements or establish modern frameworks for cooperation will remain incomplete unless the issue of revoking and abolishing the Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination Agreement in its current form, which is unfair to Lebanon, is clearly addressed.”

Organizing Economic Relations

Khater stressed to Asharq Al-Awsat that “the need to organize economic relations between the two countries is realistic and necessary given geography and the deep strategic economic interconnection.”

He explained that “higher business councils are usually established to provide a permanent institutional platform for dialogue between the public and private sectors and to follow up on issues related to trade, investment, energy, transport, border crossings, and customs coordination, in addition to removing obstacles to the movement of goods and capital.”

As for the outstanding economic issues between the two countries, Khater said they are “numerous and accumulated, foremost among them the smuggling of weapons, goods, and money, as well as illicit trade through illegal crossings and tunnels, which has drained the Lebanese economy for decades.”

He added that the issue of overland transit, which represents a vital artery for Lebanese exports to the Gulf, also remains key.

“Energy, and the imports of gas and electricity through Syrian territory, also stands out, in addition to customs cooperation, fees, and financial coordination, which has become complicated and opaque following the international sanctions previously imposed on Syria,” he said.

“Among the most prominent issues are the exchange of security information and the issue of Syrian refugees, which remains one of the most sensitive matters given the heavy economic, social, and financial repercussions it has imposed on Lebanon,” he added.


Israel Strikes Southern Lebanon, 8 Dead in Attacks on Cars South of Beirut

Lebanese rescuers and army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a vehicle that was hit in an Israeli strike in Jiyeh town, south of Beirut, Lebanon, 13 May 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese rescuers and army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a vehicle that was hit in an Israeli strike in Jiyeh town, south of Beirut, Lebanon, 13 May 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
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Israel Strikes Southern Lebanon, 8 Dead in Attacks on Cars South of Beirut

Lebanese rescuers and army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a vehicle that was hit in an Israeli strike in Jiyeh town, south of Beirut, Lebanon, 13 May 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese rescuers and army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a vehicle that was hit in an Israeli strike in Jiyeh town, south of Beirut, Lebanon, 13 May 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

The Israeli military said it launched a new wave of strikes across southern Lebanon Wednesday, despite a truce with the Lebanese government to halt fighting with Hezbollah.

"The IDF has begun striking Hezbollah terror infrastructure in several areas in southern Lebanon," the military said, hours after issuing fresh evacuation warnings for six villages in the Tyre region.

 

Smoke billows from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern area of Burj al-Shamali, as seen from the city of Tyre on May 13, 2026. (Photo by KAWANT HAJU / AFP)

 

Israeli strikes also targeted several cars on a major highway linking Beirut to southern Lebanon, state media reported.

The attacks took place near Jiyeh and Barja. Eight people, including a woman and her child, were killed in the attacks, the Public Health Emergency Operations Center said.

On Saturday, similar strikes targeted two other cars in the same area.

Israel has kept up airstrikes in Lebanon against Hezbollah despite a truce since April 17 aimed at halting the fighting.

On Tuesday, 13 people were killed in attacks on towns in the south, according to Lebanon's health ministry, which said a total of 380 people had been killed since the start of the ceasefire.

The violence came with Lebanon and Israel due to hold a new round of direct negotiations in Washington on Thursday, brokered by the United States.

 


Defections Hit Sudan’s RSF … Has the Breakup Phase Begun?

Sudanese Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan welcoming Major General Al-Nour Al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces (Sovereignty Council)
Sudanese Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan welcoming Major General Al-Nour Al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces (Sovereignty Council)
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Defections Hit Sudan’s RSF … Has the Breakup Phase Begun?

Sudanese Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan welcoming Major General Al-Nour Al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces (Sovereignty Council)
Sudanese Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan welcoming Major General Al-Nour Al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces (Sovereignty Council)

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are facing a growing wave of defections, raising questions over the future of the paramilitary group’s military cohesion and tribal alliances as the conflict with the Sudanese army enters its fourth year and turns into a prolonged war of attrition.

The latest and most prominent defection came from senior field commander Ali Rizqallah, known as “Al-Safana,” one of the RSF’s leading battlefield commanders in Darfur and Kordofan.

His departure follows a series of similar moves in recent months, including the defection of Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, known as “Al-Nour Al-Qubba,” and field commander Bishara Al-Huwaira, who left RSF ranks in North Kordofan weeks ago. Before them, Abu Aqla Keikel, commander of the Sudan Shield Forces, became one of the first high-profile defectors in late 2024.

Observers say Al-Huwaira’s defection carries particular military significance because of his position in the Bara area near El-Obeid, the Sudanese army’s main stronghold in North Kordofan. The area is a strategic junction linking western Sudan with the east and center of the country and serves as a key corridor for supplies, fuel and fighters.

Local reports said Al-Huwaira joined the Sudanese army with a force of between 11 and 15 fully equipped combat vehicles, in what was seen as another blow to the RSF despite efforts by its leadership to downplay the impact.

After Al-Nour Al-Qubba defected in April, there was speculation that Al-Safana would be the next commander to leave, especially after reports emerged that he had withdrawn from the battlefield and traveled abroad. He later appeared in a video denying those reports before formally announcing his defection weeks later.

Sources said Al-Safana had left the frontlines for Uganda before traveling to India for medical treatment. He later appeared in a video from an undisclosed location believed to be in India, announcing he had left the RSF.

Although Al-Safana said he was not aligning himself with any armed faction, sources close to the Sudanese army expect him to formally join the military. RSF sources, meanwhile, insisted that the move posed no real threat to the force or to the “Sudan Founding Alliance” project run by the RSF in areas under its control.

RSF leaders say the departure of some commanders has not altered the balance of power on the ground, stressing the group still controls territories it captured during the war and that field units linked to those commanders continue to fight under its banner.

But analysts say the defections carry significance beyond their immediate military effect because of the RSF’s structure, which relies heavily on tribal loyalties, local alliances and influential field commanders, particularly in Darfur.

Unlike conventional armies with centralized command structures, the RSF has relied since its inception on tribal alliances and armed groups with overlapping loyalties. While that structure helped it expand rapidly, it also left it vulnerable to internal divisions and shifting allegiances as the war dragged on.

Analysts also attribute the defections to growing tensions within the RSF leadership, where commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and his brother Abdel Rahim Dagalo control military decision-making, reportedly sidelining some field commanders.

While the defections are unlikely to immediately shift the military balance, observers say they could deepen internal instability within the RSF and gradually weaken its military and tribal cohesion.