Amid the uncertainty surrounding the war in Iran, it is premature to speak of “the day after.” At this stage, it is more useful to draw lessons from six weeks of fighting and to assess the possible implications for the region’s future.
The war has confirmed what many observers already believed: Iran remains driven more by its revolutionary identity than by that of a normal state. Accordingly, the region will not achieve genuine peace unless the nature of the regime changes, either becoming a conventional state governed by law or having its capacity to project power curtailed, including through nuclear weapons, drones, missiles, terrorism, and proxy networks.
The first point is that, in this conflict, Iran still appears capable of prioritizing its ideological mission of regional dominance and religious rigidity over its population, its allies, its economy, and even its military losses, something most modern states cannot sustain. No matter the scale of losses across all fronts, non-state actors are deemed to have prevailed simply by not being eliminated. Iran’s capabilities will undoubtedly decline as a result of the severe damage it has sustained, but the ideologically driven leadership will not retreat. It will seek to rebuild its proxy networks and weapons programs to challenge the status quo again. There is also no guarantee of a popular uprising, nor that such an outcome would produce a normal state; the result could instead be chaos or a non-ideological dictatorship resembling the systems of Assad, Saddam, or Gaddafi.
The second point is the qualitative shift in Iran’s relationship with Gulf states. A return to the pre-war situation, or even to the recent phase of cautious de-escalation, appears unlikely. The targeting of vital facilities and civilian infrastructure, exceeding what was directed at Israel, has not been interpreted as a temporary response to the US presence, but as a direct attack on sovereign states.
Here, the meaning shifts. Iran is no longer accused merely of destabilizing the region through proxies, but of being prepared to strike states directly. This is sufficient to create a rupture in trust that may not lead to open war, but will translate into stronger deterrence, more solid alliances, and tougher conditions for any future arrangements.
More grave still, the war has exposed an old–new threat: the networked dimension. The idea of “sleeper cells” backed by Tehran in some countries is no longer just a security concern, but an established reality on which policy will be built. As the fighting subsides, the conflict will shift into a quiet internal confrontation, dismantling networks, controlling financing, and monitoring social environments vulnerable to infiltration. In other words, the war will move from a military phase to a long-term security phase, where sovereignty becomes synonymous with the ability to fortify the domestic front, not only deter external threats.
The third point is what Gulf states have demonstrated in terms of resilience and their ability to absorb shocks, not only by strengthening defensive capabilities, but by diversifying deterrence tools across military, security, and risk-management domains. Even so, the conflict remains open between two paths: escalation targeting vital infrastructure, particularly energy, with long-term regional and global consequences, or a shift toward negotiations that could produce a more durable settlement than mere de-escalation.
The fourth point is that military superiority does not guarantee decisive outcomes. Israel is not capable of ending the conflict on its own, highlighting the role of the United States as a decisive power whose deterrence credibility is being tested globally. It faces the challenge of adapting to low-cost threats, alongside a persistent gap between political objectives and military means, limiting its ability to translate this superiority into stable strategic outcomes.
The US–Israeli war against Iran has not reached a decisive moment. It continues to oscillate between escalation and containment. Paradoxically, however, the contours of the region’s future may now be clearer, as the events have broken existing balances and shattered long-standing illusions. This is a war that does not end a phase so much as it opens another, one defined by a redefinition of sovereignty in the region.
Most importantly, clarity has emerged after prolonged ambiguity in several states where the boundaries between state and non-state actors were blurred, and where the line between deterrence and chaos was unclear. The war has forcefully removed this ambiguity and posed a simple yet difficult question: who holds decision-making power within these states? The answer will shape the region in the years ahead more than the outcomes of the battles themselves.
In sum, the conflict will reshape the region and raise fundamental questions about the balance of power, the stability of the international order, and the role of the United States, whether it will endure or recede amid rising instability and the difficulty of achieving decisive outcomes. Arab states, meanwhile, will face a threefold test: safeguarding their sovereignty against external threats, the importance of partnership in settlements with Iran, and strengthening internal cohesion so they are not used as arenas for settling conflicts.
