A new narrative that deserves careful scrutiny is seeping into the debate over weapons in Iraq. The discussion is no longer about “disarming” the non-state actors that fall under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) but rather about “controlling” these weapons and “placing them under the authority of the state.”
The fundamental distinctions between the two concepts should not be overlooked: disarmament implies dismantlement and termination, whereas control implies containment and repurposing. Strikingly, this shift in terminology is reportedly known to the United States. It is part of the framework of an “undeclared truce” that has prevailed since April 8 grounded in a simple principle: “Don’t threaten us, and we won’t attack you.”
The obvious question is: why would Washington, which has long championed the slogan of ending the “militias”, accept a formula that leaves the weapons intact and merely formalizes their link to the state?
The most persuasive answer, though it remains speculative, is that Washington seeks not so much to dismantle these forces as to domesticate them. A dismantled faction creates a vacuum that could be filled by groups that are even more radical and less controllable. A contained faction, as it is gradually integrated into a new security institution linked to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, can be monitored and engaged with.
This would not represent a defeat for the factions in the traditional sense. It would recalibrate their position within the framework of the Iraqi state and perhaps the broader regional equation.
The broader context lends this hypothesis credibility. According to officials within the Coordination Framework, indirect talks between Baghdad and three or four armed factions are proceeding in two stages: first, a halt in attacks, and this has already been achieved; second, restricting weapons, not confiscating them. These officials insist that the decision is “purely Iraqi” and not the result of external pressure.
Yet, the very fact that foreign pressure is being denied proves that is a key element. If this were truly Iraq’s sovereign decision, there would be no need to make repeated assurances of its independence.
Washington publicly warned against allowing factions that had continued to launch attacks to join the new government. It also intervened openly to veto the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki before the premiership was ultimately entrusted to Ali al-Zaidi. When outside powers are drawing red lines around government formation, it is hard to imagine that the question of arms, the most critical issue of all, has been left entirely to domestic hands.
Yet, the most intriguing picture is neither in Washington nor in Baghdad, but in Tehran. These factions emerged and evolved as regional proxies of Tehran, and they reportedly carried out hundreds of attacks in support of Iran during the 40 days of the most recent war. The lingering question, then, is this: what if this arm is no longer treated as an untouchable strategic asset, but as a negotiable card?
Here, a harsh but apt metaphor comes to mind: sacrifice at the altar of uranium.
Iran is now engaged in difficult negotiations with Washington. We have seen consistent reporting on a framework based on extending a 60-day truce and reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for an Iranian pledge, "in principle," to relinquish its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Tehran, for its part, has been quick to deny any firm commitment to surrender this stockpile.
Whatever the truth may be, the nuclear program is no longer merely a technical issue. It has become something akin to the soul of the regime, the central pillar of its survival, the source of its bargaining power and strategic resilience.
With the nuclear question imbued with this sanctity, everything else becomes expendable. In this cold calculation, the Iraqi factions may be among the first offerings, not through outright abandonment but through a form of containment that reassures Washington while allowing Tehran to save face. No explicit dissolution, no public surrender, but rather a slow absorption into Iraqi state institutions that strips them of their function as offensive instruments and turns them into managed entities.
In this way, Tehran lays its sacrifice on the altar: giving up what appears to be its most valuable in the hope of receiving American flexibility on uranium enrichment.
Ultimately, however, this remains a speculative hypothesis rather than an established fact.
It is entirely possible that current developments reflect an Iraqi decision born of the Shiite community's exhaustion with bearing the costs of unchecked arms and of the emerging Zaidi government's desire to reassert the state's authority and legitimacy. Others will argue that Tehran does not, in fact, exercise decisive control over every faction, and that some groups may resist absorption and defy their patron.
All of these outcomes remain plausible, and none should be discounted in favor of a single narrative.
Taken together, the indicators - the shift in terminology from disarmament to control, the quiet truce with the Americans, Washington's role involvement in the formation of Iraq’s government, and the fact that this is all happening during a decisive moment in nuclear negotiations - form a thread that is hard to ignore.
What appears to be happening behind the scenes is a reshuffling of the cards: Washington is containing the proxies rather than breaking them; Tehran is bargaining rather than defending them; and Iraq, as has so often been the case in its modern history, remains the arena on which others draw their maps.
