So far, Hamas has spoken in the language of justification for what it did. Some believe its account, while others reject it. This is a natural state of affairs for a political movement that went through a complex experience: governing an isolated and blockaded territory, then entering a military war against a power with overwhelming superiority over it, not only in weaponry but also in geography and alliances.
By its own calculations, Hamas embarked on the most dangerous military operation carried out inside Israel since its establishment. After successfully executing an operation whose success would have been beyond even the wildest imagination, it began looking for allies or partners to enter the post-October 7 war, under the banner of liberating Al-Aqsa and inflicting a strategic defeat on Israel.
To preserve the credibility of Hezbollah's doctrine, Hassan Nasrallah responded to Hamas's call and entered what became known as the "support front", a war he waged without sufficient Lebanese backing and amid an Iranian neutrality that surprised Hamas more than anyone else.
Halfway through, Hezbollah withdrew its support, leaving Hamas alone to confront Israel. Israel, for its part, did not stop where it had stopped in previous wars. Instead, it seized the opportunity to wage a war aimed at Hamas's physical destruction and at radically reshaping the Palestinian cause politically.
Given American backing for Israel's war in Gaza, as well as its wars that expanded to other fronts, it became clear that ending Hamas's military and governing presence in Gaza was merely a matter of time.
Hamas resisted for as long as it could, inflicting significant losses in personnel and equipment on the Israeli ground invasion. Yet, as Gaza's de facto ruler, it was unable to provide even the most basic necessities for the millions under its rule. This placed it in an extraordinarily difficult position and forced it into a series of reluctant concessions, beginning with the release of the first group of hostages it held and continuing to the present, when those concessions have reached the point of declaring its abandonment of governance in Gaza and agreeing to end the role of its armed forces, either by handing over its weapons or placing them in storage.
Israel, meanwhile, which occupies three-quarters of Gaza's territory and controls the whole of it through blockade and firepower, rejected the formula, seeking instead the image of an absolute victory.
The initiatives, which are the more palatable term for concessions, lose their value once an adversary becomes certain that they are made under duress and that there are no alternatives, or that they concern appearances rather than substance.
The image Hamas seeks is to preserve its dignity in the wake of its decision to relinquish its weapons. Israel, however, will not allow it that. It is eager for the opposite image: humiliating Hamas in a manner that gives Netanyahu a platform for boasting and lends credibility to his claim of an absolute victory, a victory he promised Israelis from the earliest days of the war.
Hamas was forced, based on its reading of the balance of power between itself, or what remains of it on the ground in Gaza, and Israel, to agree to everything demanded of it. Much of what it has now accepted, it had previously described as red lines from which there could be no retreat. This rendered its concessions meaningless, because they were offered before Israel's response had been established and before Israel had accepted the principle that concessions should carry a price.
Israel pocketed everything Hamas offered and treated it as credit that could be used in its pursuit of further and greater concessions. Even the latest concession, made at Trump's request through his senior envoy, Mladenov, and described as a historic breakthrough, was rejected by Israel. Israel claimed that the agreement had been reached between Hamas and Mladenov and that it had no involvement in it.
The question that no one but Hamas can answer is this: What will it do after its reluctant surrender of governance in Gaza, as well as its relinquishment of the use of arms? The question concerns not only its present and future existence, but inevitably the Palestinian condition in all its dimensions.
Will it voluntarily announce its transformation into a political party or political organization, under whatever name, with no present or future connection to armed activity?
Will it compete for leadership of the Palestinian people after having been given an opportunity to govern Gaza for many years, with all that transpired during that period?
Does what happened to Gaza qualify it to lead the Palestinian national movement in all its breadth?
And will it accept, without reservation, Mahmoud Abbas's conditions for partnership? The most important of these, of course, is a commitment to the obligations undertaken by the Palestine Liberation Organization, without overlooking the conditions imposed by others, which may prove even harsher than Abbas's.
These are the questions of the post-Gaza-governance phase. They were put to Hamas in the past, before the Al-Aqsa Flood, and Hamas refused to answer them. Now, however, there is no room left for refusal. Whatever the answers may be, they will be both decisive and unavoidable.
