States’ objectives are not always the problem in major conflicts. Often, the problem is they enter the confrontation fighting with different objectives. That is precisely why the relationship between the United States and Iran, for years, has been trapped in a vicious cycle of escalation, negotiation, sanctions, and mutual threats without ever reaching a decisive conclusion. Washington and Tehran are not actually fighting the same battle, though they are speaking the language.
Since President Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement in 2018, it has been clear that his concerns do not stop at uranium enrichment levels or the centrifuges. He also has a political and personal goal. Trump built much of his narrative on Iran around his claim that Barack Obama’s agreement with Iran was “the worst deal in history.” Accordingly, his objective is not simply to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, as he is intent on proving that he can get a “better” and tougher deal and that he was the president who forced Tehran to make more concessions.
This helps explain the apparent contradictions of American policy toward Iran. Unprecedented economic pressure, repeated military threats, and direct assassinations have been accompanied by open channels for negotiation and talk of the possibility of a grand bargain. It is as though Washington has yet to determine whether it wants to change the behavior of the Iranian regime or change the regime itself, and whether the problem is limited to the nuclear program or extends to ballistic missiles Iran’s regional influence and its web of proxies.
Israel remains a crucial factor in determining the trajectory of escalation. It views Iran’s transformation into either a nuclear state or a dominant regional power as an existential threat. Accordingly, it cannot stop at containment and has pursued a strategy of attrition and preemptive strikes while continuously pressuring Washington to go further, eventually leading it to war.
Iran has managed to adapt to a way conventional regimes would not. It does not treat sanctions or pressure as temporary crises but as a permanent feature of the system. While they weaken the country, these sanctions have also engendered a regime with experience in managing pressure that has integrated isolation into its survival framework. Since the 1979 Revolution, the regime has been built around the concept of “long-term endurance,” with sanctions leveraged to mobilize domestic support. Sanctions have not led to its collapse; instead, they have reshaped its economy, security apparatus, and even its political discourse, with the nuclear program rendered an element of a philosophy of survival rather than merely a military project.
Does Iran actually seek to acquire a nuclear bomb? Here, the picture becomes more complex. Tehran’s goal may not be to manufacture a nuclear weapon in so much as it is to become a “threshold nuclear state,” a country with the capability and technology needed to build a bomb within a short period without officially declaring itself a nuclear power. This provides two strategic advantages: effective deterrence while avoiding the costs of becoming an openly nuclear state.
Acquiring the bomb could trigger a full-scale military confrontation or a broad regional arms race. Remaining on the threshold, by contrast, allows for strategic ambiguity, forcing Iran’s adversaries to approach it as a power that cannot easily be ignored or attacked. For Tehran, the ability to build a bomb may be more important than the bomb itself.
This may explain why Iran endures despite all the strikes and losses it has suffered. Discussions of its military and economic losses should be considered, but its adversaries’ problem is that, despite their overwhelming superiority, they have failed to translate those losses into total defeat. Tehran has lost facilities, commanders, and influence, but it has succeeded in preserving the core of the regime and ensuring its continuity.
At the same time, Iran’s project has not expanded because of its capacities alone, but also because of the mistakes of its opponents. The American invasion of Iraq, the Syrian war, Arab divisions, and Washington’s oscillation between war and negotiation all created vacuums that Iranian influence filled. Even Israel, despite its immense military superiority, fell into the trap of excessive force. The prolonged wars and widespread destruction in Gaza and later in southern Lebanon transformed military campaigns from instruments of deterrence into fuel for the narrative of “resistance.” Scenes of war and devastation reinforced the political and psychological environment in which the Iranian regime and its proxies operate. Thus the paradox: Iran today appears weakened, but it is more convinced than ever that its enemies cannot break it.
The dilemma in the American-Iranian conflict is that America has overwhelming might but lacks clarity of purpose, while Iran is more consistent in its adherence to “steadfastness.” As a result, the conflict continues without a decisive conclusion. Washington, despite its immense tools, has failed to impose a final settlement because it lacks a clear regional vision. Iran, meanwhile, has been unable to transform its capacity to absorb losses and wear down its opponents and achieve victory.
The region may have entered a new era in which all actors are capable of preventing their own defeat but incapable of producing a decisive victory. The age of decisive wars may be giving way to an age in which conflicts are constantly managed but never resolved.
