In a climate of disputes reflected in positions and statements over the past few days, several Sudanese political forces have gathered for consultative meetings in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, from June 3 to 5. Their stated aim is to try to make progress on efforts to end the war and launch a new political process.
The truth, however, is that these meetings organized by the “Quintet mechanism” (the European Union, the African Union, the United Nations, the Arab League, and IGAD) are unlikely to succeed, given the outcomes of previous scattered attempts, the scale of the sharp divisions among political forces, the exclusion of influential parties, the attempt to marginalize the army, the prevalence of an exclusionary mindset, and the majority of participants’ lack of popular support.
Since the war began, dozens of meetings, conferences, and gatherings have been held, turning in a vicious circle and never becoming anything more than a platform for speeches and statements that have no tangible impact on the ground.
This vicious circle is fed by several fundamental factors, foremost among them a crisis of representation and legitimacy. Most of the political forces involved are deeply divided and have no real popular mandate, making their participation akin to an attempt to remain on the political map, not a real effort to end the war.
The contradictory and ambiguous positions toward the two warring sides further complicate the scene. Without trust, it is hardly surprising that the Sudanese army views these meetings as an attempt to bypass and marginalize it, and it therefore rejects them.
The skepticism deepens amid a broad impression that these meetings are sometimes to cover for regional arrangements among foreign actors whose interests intersect in Sudan, not as a process aimed at forging a genuine and sustainable peace.
In the end, despite the repeated final statements, the greatest missing element remains an implementation mechanism. Recommendations are announced, rounds of talks follow one another, while the war continues to impose its own rhythm on Sudanese reality.
Is there a way out of this vicious circle?
Yes, but it requires political courage and a frank acknowledgment that the exclusion dominating the scene is not merely an obstacle to a solution, but one of the deep roots of Sudan’s chronic crisis. This approach helped create the atmosphere that led the country to war, and it is perpetuating it. Politically, some parties, such as the “Sumoud” alliance, have made the exclusion of Islamists a central demand, while Islamists and their supporters respond in kind and seek to exclude their opponents from any possible settlement. Political disagreement is thus rendered into an existential struggle, with each side seeking to eliminate the other, as though the success of any solution hinged on the complete disappearance of the adversary. However, Sudan’s experiences, as well as those of other countries that have endured similar conflicts, affirm that total exclusion is not a recipe for stability but a path to reproducing crises.
The persistence of the “either us or them” equation makes talk of a comprehensive settlement a mere illusion and turns every political initiative into a new battle. And as long as excluding the other remains a condition for dialogue, war will remain, for many, a means of staying in the arena.
Any realistic solution begins with the recognition that no party can monopolize Sudan, and that the people alone have the right to exclude or bring to power whomever they choose through the ballot box, within the framework of a political system founded on the peaceful transfer of power, not recourse to arms.
That is, exiting the crisis demands ending the precursors of exclusion and accepting inclusive national dialogue that excludes no one. It also demands agreement on the principle of justice and accountability, so that those involved in war crimes and corruption are held accountable under the law, without turning intellectual or political affiliations into an accusation. Sudan now must develop a “transitional political identity” that postpones disputes over the civil or religious nature of the state to a later stage through an elected constituent assembly, while for the time being, settling for a declaration of principles that safeguard the rights and freedoms and imposes no coercive guardianship. That, in turn, compels everyone to move from “me first” to “the nation first.”
Sudan needs realistic approaches and solutions that place the country’s interest above partisan and ideological calculations. The country is facing an exceptional war by every measure, amid foreign interventions that are no longer hidden from anyone. This stage demands clear positions, adherence to national fundamentals, defending Sudan’s unity and sovereignty, and rejecting foreign interventions that fuel the war with the aim of weakening or dividing the state.
Ultimately, any viable settlement must be Sudanese. The international community can help and support, but it cannot make a genuine peace on behalf of the Sudanese. This means that fateful choices, such as how to end the war, the shape of the next authority, and the future of those bearing arms, must be made in Sudan and determined by the Sudanese will.
