There is much that can be said about the Saudi nuclear agreement with the United States, whether in terms of its strategic value, political implications, potential risks, cost, economic and scientific importance, or military utility.
Among the criticisms leveled against President Trump is that he favors Saudi Arabia at the expense of the supreme interests of the US. However, the facts indicate otherwise. The deal itself is considered, from the perspective of US state institutions, part of those supreme interests, and has been negotiated by three US presidents and four successive administrations.
The first Trump administration, in 2017, initiated contacts and granted American companies the necessary licenses to negotiate with the Saudi side, but the process faltered due to the unfulfilled expectations of both parties. Subsequently, the administration of former President Biden agreed to resume negotiations, elevating them to a higher political level, before the October 7 attacks led to their suspension. Last year, the negotiations were revived during the Saudi Crown Prince's historic visit to Washington.
Ten years of technical, legal, and political negotiations represent a long history that leaves no room to claim the agreement was rushed due to the war with Iran, or that the Trump administration ignored supreme American interests. Nevertheless, opposing voices remain in Washington due to political, ideological, or electoral considerations.
What is meant by supreme interests here? Washington realizes that Riyadh is moving forward with its nuclear project, and that refusing to cooperate would prompt Riyadh to search for an alternative partner, whether in Europe, China, or Russia. This would weaken American influence and potentially risk losing a strategic partner the US is keen to maintain over the next two decades. From this perspective, the agreement constitutes a cornerstone of the strategic relationship between the two countries, rather than just a commercial deal.
The same logic applies to the Saudi side. It is also in Riyadh's interest to maintain its partnership with the major global power. One can understand the skepticism of some regarding the value of this relationship, given that the US did not achieve a halt in Iranian attacks in the current war. Regardless of differing assessments, this war has proven Washington's readiness to activate the concept of defending its supreme interests, rather than retreating from them.
The war is not yet over, and it represents a significant test of American resolve. Two days ago, Congress approved approximately $100 billion in additional financial allocations to support military operations, reflecting a continued US commitment. Conversely, the war has also exposed the limits of China's role, despite it being Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner, highlighting the difference between economic influence and the willingness to shoulder security burdens.
The Saudi nuclear project remains important in its own right, even if political readings miscalculate the outcomes of the relationship. More than ten years ago, the Kingdom made a decision to diversify its energy sources, and the nuclear program is one of the pillars of Saudi Vision 2030 to support the medical, industrial, electricity generation, and scientific research sectors.
Why is Saudi Arabia pushing toward building a nuclear program, which has a "high cost", than using oil? Because it is a larger and more widely applicable energy source.
In terms of cost, the Carnegie Center estimates that Iran has paid nearly half a trillion dollars attempting to build its nuclear project since the 1990s, with estimates taking into account economic sanctions and the high cost of procurement and clandestine construction. This is an astronomical figure, yet the project has still not been built.
These losses were not due to construction costs themselves, but rather resulted from political decisions made by Tehran. Its nuclear program, like its military programs, is not aimed at generating electricity, but is instead a tool for regional influence and hegemony. For this reason, its facilities were established in secret, with large parts of them buried under mountains. As US Secretary of State Rubio stated: "If the program is peaceful, why is it hidden underground?"
Among the factors that reinforced the Saudi push toward nuclear energy are its growing discoveries of uranium ore during recent exploration operations within the Vision project. Preliminary results indicate uranium reserves sufficient to cover the needs of the two planned reactors throughout their operational lifespan.
Of course, we cannot discuss any nuclear project while ignoring a frightening scenario, which is Iran's success in producing a nuclear weapon!
We cannot compare Saudi Arabia to geopolitically stable countries like Sweden. We live in a jungle and a region with the highest levels of tension in the world. Looking at the current war, it has proven wrong the bets on Iran's rationality. It has targeted the shipping of seven countries in the Strait of Hormuz and launched missile and drone attacks against eight regional countries even though they have not taken part in the war. It has also targeted vital facilities, such as power plants, desalination stations, and airports. If this is the behavior of the Tehran regime without a nuclear weapon, it is only natural that anxiety over it would intensify should it acquire one in the future.
The question remains: Could the peaceful Saudi nuclear project turn into a gateway for a military program? The current agreement is based on building civilian reactors and transferring American technology for peaceful purposes under strict US controls.
Nevertheless, the theoretical question remains: What if we wake up one morning to the announcement that Iran possesses a nuclear weapon? Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously stated that the Kingdom would then seek to achieve a deterrent balance. It is important to distinguish here between a civilian nuclear program and strategic deterrence options, as possessing a nuclear capability for deterrence does not necessarily require converting the civilian program itself into a military one; rather, different pathways and choices exist to achieve that.
