Interpretations of the “framework agreement” reached between Lebanon and Israel on June 26 differ by political camp. Each side reads it through its own understanding of Lebanon's supreme national interest. Yet a national consensus is beginning to form, above the usual divisions and alignments, in support of confining weapons to the state and granting it sole authority over decisions of war and peace.
This climate should surprise no one. A basic function of any state is to hold a monopoly over weapons and to defend its territory. In Lebanon's case, it would also mean the delayed implementation of the Taif Agreement. All Lebanese militias surrendered their weapons in the early 1990s. The exception was Hezbollah, which was expected to disarm once the liberation of Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation was completed in 2000.
The old tripartite formula - the army, the people, and the resistance - was celebrated and upheld for years. It collapsed together with the "balance of deterrence," beginning with the 2024 war. The balance of power changed entirely, and the Lebanese state must now put another formula in its place.
Lebanese officials may be convinced that a military confrontation with Israel is impossible and genuinely unequal -and it is, given the balance of power -and that negotiation is the best route out of the present situation and toward stability. That conviction does not absolve the state of its responsibility. It must marshal every resource to build a national security strategy, and from it a defense strategy, especially now that parts of southern Lebanon are again under occupation.
There is no alternative to rebuilding domestic unity would strengthen the state's negotiating hand, not weaken it. An inclusive national dialogue to steer the country through this period is a necessity, all the more so as the difficulties mount to an unprecedented degree. That dialogue cannot rest on superficial reconciliation or verbal understandings. It must equip the state to perform its proper role.
There is also an urgent need to steady the pace of hasty political positions. Not by curbing free expression, of course, but by bringing the national mood into line with events. That means resisting a rush toward normalization - whether dressed in religious labels, such as visits or pilgrimages never once invoked in the 70 years since the Nakba, or in slogans more trivial still.
Those racing toward peace forget that the occupation has not paused its bombing, killing, and destruction. It benefits from an atmosphere of internal division, feeds it, and works to deepen it. All the more reason to put the Lebanese house in order before it fractures further.
Some also forget that Israel gave no weight to the Arab Peace Initiative adopted at the 2002 Beirut Summit and acted as though it had never existed. Can Lebanon afford a separate path to peace? If Israel ignored a collective Arab position, will it heed Lebanon's alone?
Securing an Israeli withdrawal and ending the war is one thing. A peace agreement and normalization are another. Lebanon must avoid that path. It must equally avoid the opposite temptation: attaching itself to Tehran's axis, which has built a network of cross-border armed movements that hollow out central states, and has fed them an ideology whose consequences are not easily undone.
The Israeli occupation needs no pretext to unleash its long hostility toward Lebanon. Even so, the insistence on dragging Lebanon into futile wars beyond its capacity to endure was a reckless decision, and it serves no Lebanese interest.
In the end, Lebanon, with its plural composition, can withstand neither course. It should rebuild its Arab relations, which remain its natural strategic depth whatever the circumstances, and it should not stray from the broader Arab framework. Lebanon is not Egypt, with its political weight and influence. Nor is it Jordan, with its political system, its social composition, and its place on the map.
A little realism and historical perspective can help, from time to time.
