The US administration considers that it won the war with Iran. But this has reinforced the prevailing impression, particularly across much of the media, that Washington has not yet achieved its objectives, especially since the confrontation continues in various forms.
That does not mean Iran won, given the enormous losses it has suffered, which are difficult to assess because of the scarcity of information and the information blackout. Military, nuclear, and vital installations have been destroyed; its missile and naval capabilities have been damaged; a large number of its commanders have been killed; and sanctions and the blockade have worsened the deterioration of living conditions. What the regime's officials, its media, and its proxies repeat about "victory" is therefore nothing more than bravado, for which a people exhausted by war, sanctions, and repression pays the price. But how has Iran managed to portray itself as the victor? And why could a halt to the war, if it comes, be presented as an American retreat when the balance of power and losses suggests otherwise?
The answer begins in Washington itself. Donald Trump's administration fought the war without a precise definition of victory. It declared its objectives to be destroying Iran's missile and naval capabilities, cutting Tehran's supplies to its proxies, and preventing it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. But it did not reinforce the regional situation with a political track addressing its crises, nor did it establish a mechanism to ensure that Tehran's capabilities could not be rebuilt. If military results are measured by the number of sites, missiles, and ships destroyed, then permanently preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, ending its regional influence, and stopping the arming of its proxies require an enforceable agreement, a monitoring regime, regional security arrangements, and allied states capable of protecting the results. That is what Washington has not yet accomplished.
In April, the American administration announced that major operations had achieved their objectives within 38 days, and that Iran had agreed to a ceasefire and to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. But the continuation of the conflict and the inability to reach a settlement revealed that the declaration of victory had been premature. As American efforts turned toward reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps later securing Bab al-Mandab, the war's objectives narrowed to guaranteeing freedom of navigation. All of this revealed the absence of a clear American strategy for ending the war. What is the United States' objective: disabling the nuclear program or destroying the missiles? Ending the network of proxies, changing the regime's behavior, or bringing it down? Securing the sea lanes? And can all of this be achieved through bombing alone?
The portrayal of Iran as a victorious state by its allies and by some media outlets rests on the two sides' differing standards of victory. Washington needs a quick war that achieves its declared objectives and produces a clear accomplishment that can be marketed at home, while Tehran is betting on prolonging the confrontation, raising its cost, and shifting its effects onto Washington's allies and energy markets. Thus, Washington's inability to achieve a decisive political outcome becomes material for Iranian propaganda, even if Iran emerges from the war shattered and drained.
All of this has been reflected in other issues. The Gaza plan is stalled, the Palestinian track has stopped, and Lebanon is stuck in negotiations that neither halt Israeli attacks nor address Hezbollah's weapons. Iraq and Yemen remain arenas for militia activity and proxy wars against the Gulf states, amid disruption to energy routes and sea lanes. An ally does not measure success by the number of Iranian installations destroyed, but by how much more secure it has become after the war.
The truth is that the defeat of the Iranian project is not achieved by striking its center alone, but by closing the arenas through which it expands. Here, the error in the ordering of priorities becomes clear, including cutting off the resources of militias that have returned and regained strength, as well as addressing the Palestinian issue, which Tehran has exploited for decades, along with other such issues.
Added to this is the domestic American division and the polarization that has extended to public trust in institutions, the judiciary, the media, and elections, making the war part of the political struggle over Trump. His supporters portray it as a victory, while his opponents see it as an extension of his style of governing. The American media, along with some of the European media, reflect this polarization, drawing on the gap between the administration's declarations and its results.
Other fronts have also opened that have diverted attention from Iran. Tensions with Canada, European countries, and NATO, the tariff war, the dispute over Ukraine, and the threats concerning Greenland have all generated negative reactions. When a superpower fights a complex regional war, its relations with its allies become part of the balance of power, not a marginal matter.
Iran has not won. It is a state suffering heavy losses, whose regime markets its survival as a victory. But Washington, which possessed the power needed to inflict a military defeat on Iran, did not have a policy capable of capitalizing on that defeat through a settlement that protects its allies and builds a more stable regional order. Between Iran's losses and America's confusion, a vacuum emerged that Tehran now portrays itself as having filled with its victory.
