Mocha is not on Lebanon’s border, nor does Mayun Island overlook the eastern Mediterranean. Yet Houthi control over both could have direct repercussions for Lebanon.
The transformation of the Houthis from an illegitimate armed group controlling key parts of Yemen into a more entrenched regional actor does not merely alter the balance of the Yemeni war; it also reshapes roles within Iran’s regional axis and raises questions about Hezbollah’s place within it after its recent losses.
Has Iran found in the Houthis a new primary proxy, or is it simply redistributing functions among its various arms, compensating for the decline of one through the rise of another?
Exhausted by its confrontation with the United States, Iran has nevertheless seized the opportunity to expand the military and strategic influence of its Houthi ally. The Houthis have targeted Saudi Arabia and even challenged sites of religious significance, at a time when the Kingdom seeks to balance national security requirements, the need to contain cross-border threats, and the desire to achieve an honorable political settlement that would end the Yemen war and restore state institutions.
Houthi advances along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab al-Mandab Strait have added a regional dimension to the conflict because of their impact on the security of the waterway and on global trade and energy flows.
The Houthi position at Bab al-Mandab complements Iran’s ability to exert pressure in the Strait of Hormuz, placing two of the world’s most important energy and trade chokepoints under threat from the same axis.
Control of strategic positions around these waterways does not necessarily enable a complete shutdown, but it does allow for raising the risks and costs of navigation and using them as bargaining chips in negotiations.
The importance of this leverage grows amid Washington’s reluctance to open a new front, with reports suggesting that US options range from non-intervention to an understanding that would protect American, and remarkably, Israeli vessels from attack. In this way, the Houthis not only expand Iran’s geopolitical reach but also elevate their own standing within Tehran’s network of proxies, prompting a reassessment of Hezbollah’s role.
This does not mean, however, that the Houthis have replaced Hezbollah. Each serves a distinct function. Hezbollah plays a role the Houthis cannot perform because of its presence on Israel’s border and its influence within Lebanon’s political system.
The Houthis, meanwhile, possess a different card: the ability to threaten an international maritime corridor whose security is vital to major powers. The more likely scenario is that Iran has moved away from relying on Hezbollah as its principal regional arm and toward a distribution of roles among various proxies, each possessing unique geographic and military value.
The differences between the two extend beyond function to the environments in which they operate. The Houthis control vast territory, governing institutions, ports, and strategic maritime locations. Hezbollah, by contrast, operates within a pluralistic state and faces government decisions that have stripped it of legitimacy, significant domestic opposition to its weapons, and sustained Israeli pressure on its support base.
Houthi gains may provide Hezbollah with political and psychological encouragement, but they do not solve its Lebanese predicament, rebuild its capabilities or militia legitimacy, or allow it to replicate the Yemeni model in Lebanon.
Nonetheless, Hezbollah may draw a lesson from the Houthi experience that encourages greater rigidity. If Washington’s reluctance to confront the Houthis ultimately leads to an arrangement that protects American shipping without dismantling Houthi weapons or control, Hezbollah could interpret this as evidence that the capacity to impose costs compels recognition and negotiation.
Houthi advances could then become an additional argument for maintaining its arsenal and hardening its positions regarding the Lebanese army and negotiations with Israel, betting that sustained pressure may eventually force others to treat it as an indispensable partner.
Conversely, the rise of the Houthis may reduce Iran’s dependence on Hezbollah and its willingness to bear the costs of protecting or rebuilding the group under previous conditions. The proxy that once spearheaded Iran’s regional project has become one arm among many, while the Houthis now possess the capacity to threaten both regional states and international shipping.
This development does not protect Lebanon. Rather, it increases the likelihood that the country will be used as a bargaining chip in broader negotiations or left under Israeli pressure as long as Tehran retains more effective leverage elsewhere.
Developments in Yemen also expose the limits of Lebanese hopes for decisive American support. If Washington is unwilling to deter Houthi expansion despite attacks reaching sensitive and strategically significant areas, and instead prefers accommodation or negotiation to avoid another war, there is no guarantee it will intervene decisively to resolve Lebanon’s weapons issue or restrain Israel.
Lebanese citizens may find themselves caught between Iranian and Hezbollah intransigence on one side and Israeli pressure on the other, while the United States confines itself to crisis management so long as its direct interests remain unaffected.
Lebanon cannot afford to wait for the outcome of US-Iranian confrontations or negotiations, nor for electoral results in either the United States or Israel. The rise of the Houthis will not reduce the cost of keeping Lebanon as a pressure point open to regional bargaining.
This reality requires the Lebanese authorities to move beyond the familiar pattern of hesitation and stalemate by implementing government decisions, strengthening state institutions, and building a network of Arab and international support. A state that fails to reclaim sovereign decision-making risks having its future determined in negotiations in which it has no seat at the table.
