On the centenary of the Lebanese Constitution, Lebanon’s Minister of Culture Dr. Ghassan Salame addressed the Lebanese people, as individuals and communities, sects and parties, emphasizing that “the Constitution is a supreme text, but it is not a sacred book.”
He acknowledged the legitimacy of contemplating constitutional amendments, provided that the objective is national and comprehensive, aimed at strengthening institutions rather than serving sectarian interests or temporary political bargains.
Yet, with his characteristic realism, Salame conceded that Lebanon’s reality has left the country with what might be described as a “composite constitution,” as its history has been marked by a constant tug-of-war between the logic of citizenship and loyalties to communal groups.
In practice, this duality has weighed heavily on what could be called the syndrome of the state and its governing formula, whereby each community has at some point felt disadvantaged, or sought to preserve particular privileges. The Shiite community is no exception. At this critical juncture, it is once again revisiting the question of its relationship with the Lebanese entity, its political formula, and the constitutional framework that governs them.
To this day, the elites of the ideological Shiite right remain attached to a narrative of the “injustice” supposedly suffered by the community at the founding of the Lebanese state in 1920. They hold the traditional Shiite elite responsible for marginalizing the community’s role and presence in the state established at independence in 1943, without adequately considering the community’s own evolution, from traditional political families before independence, through the rise of leftist, nationalist, and communist movements afterward, and ultimately to the era of Imam Musa al-Sadr.
Since independence, Shiite elites have participated actively in constitutional life, seeking to improve representation, participation, and development from within the state rather than outside it. As social transformations unfolded, Shiite influence expanded beyond traditional leadership circles to encompass a new political society whose core grievance centered more on deprivation and inequality than on opposition to the state itself. Imam Musa al-Sadr later gave this trajectory a clearer Shiite political and social framework.
The Taif Agreement brought an end to the civil war at a moment when the Shiites had emerged with far greater social, political, and military strength than they possessed in 1943. Yet the agreement did not translate this transformation into equivalent changes in the structure of power.
Consequently, the Shiite relationship with Taif remained a matter of intra-Shiite debate, particularly among elites who viewed it as a settlement that neither fully reflected a previous dominance nor adequately accommodated a new rise in power.
Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine accompanied this transformation by evolving from viewing Taif as an “agreement of necessity” to considering it an “agreement of choice.” He called for correcting its shortcomings and implementing it faithfully, stressing that the Shiites are an essential component of Lebanon as both homeland and state, not an exceptional community with a special relationship to the state.
Meanwhile, Hani Fahs focused on the other side of Shiite ascendancy. He advocated restoring the primacy of the state, preserving Lebanon’s political formula, and rejecting sectarian domination over it. He posed the more difficult question: What happens to Lebanese society when a community moves from a position of perceived weakness and grievance to one of power?
Since 2005, a new question of power has emerged in the literature of the ideological Shiite right: if weapons constitute surplus power outside the state, can they be transformed into constitutional power within it? Thus appeared, in some circles, the equation of “weapons in exchange for the Constitution” - namely, surrendering arms to the state in return for expanding Shiite representation within its institutions, thereby compensating for a past imbalance or for a rise in influence that, in the eyes of proponents of this view, has not been reflected in the structure of power.
Accordingly, from the height of its ascendancy to the question of retreat, the sectarian and ideological Shiite right now faces the dilemma of a declining political narrative, while the Shiite community bears the cost of its adventures. As for the state and the Constitution, they remain texts and institutions open to amendment and expansion, but only away from the test of force.
