What is happening inside the area beyond the so-called “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon?
The question resurfaced when Israel conducted early voting for soldiers deep inside the occupied area of southern Lebanon. The Israeli command selected the city of Bint Jbeil and the town of Zawtar al-Sharqiya as two main polling centers.
While the event was portrayed as reflecting Israel's sense of confidence and ease, it constitutes an unprecedented development in the south, which had previously endured a long occupation between 1978 and 2000. Yet the event drew neither condemnation nor serious objection from Lebanon's political establishment.
The New York Times investigated the situation within the “Yellow Line” area and found that 48 towns and villages have suffered extensive destruction that is still ongoing. The damage extends beyond homes and infrastructure, including roads, water, and electricity networks, to agricultural lands, particularly olive groves that have been bulldozed or destroyed by fires.
The newspaper also documented an increase in Israeli military sites and the construction of a network of roads and bridges linking the area to northern Israel, creating the initial impression that Tel Aviv is preparing for a long-term occupation.
Considering that approximately 270,000 Lebanese residents have been forcibly displaced, the violations taking place on the ground suggest that Israel intends for this displacement to become permanent.
Among the most alarming findings highlighted by the newspaper is that the destruction has not been limited to geography, buildings, and farmland. It has also affected the area's religious and demographic composition.
The 48 towns now deemed uninhabitable and lacking even the minimum conditions for normal life were predominantly inhabited by Shiite citizens, whom Tel Aviv accuses of providing a support base for Hezbollah. These residents remain barred from returning despite ceasefire announcements.
Meanwhile, other towns inhabited by members of different sects, located west, central, and east of the occupied zone and in the Arkoub region, have become isolated enclaves. Once the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) ends in the south, their fate may be left exposed to the dual criminality of the Israeli enemy and proxy militias backed by the Iranian regime.
Even more dangerous is Israel's intention to expand the occupied area in pursuit of what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called a “deeper and more robust security zone.” The justifications remain available as long as illegal weapons have not been removed. Under this rationale, the Israeli military could advance from areas such as Shaqif and Ali al-Taher toward Jabal al-Rayhan, the Sajd Hills, and Iqlim al-Tuffah to destroy what Tel Aviv claims are Hezbollah tunnels and weapons depots.
Such moves would represent practical steps toward implementing Israel's new security doctrine, recently announced by Netanyahu, which advocates shifting directly from containing threats to confronting them before they become an immediate danger. The doctrine endorses preemptive operations whenever Israeli national security is deemed to require them.
The danger of what is happening behind the “Yellow Line” lies in what it may signal: preparations for Israel to annex this occupied territory as a form of “forward defense area.” More troubling still is the fact that the longer the occupation persists, the harder it becomes to recover the land.
Given the accelerating pace of events, the question is no longer whether war will occur, but when. The most likely scenario is one involving enormous destruction, with all possibilities remaining open.
Although reports suggest that Washington prevented Tel Aviv from launching strikes on October 10, the Israeli Air Force has continued military exercises reaching as far as Iran's borders. The latest drills coincided with a meeting between Netanyahu and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. Shortly afterward, US President Donald Trump stated that Washington is not currently negotiating with Iran and added that “something is going to happen one way or another soon.”
The next war would involve Iran and its regional axis, and from a Lebanese perspective it may not lead back easily to the “framework agreement” that Israel accepted reluctantly. Hesitation and ambiguous policies have slowed serious implementation of that agreement, which is based on a formula that leaves no room for compromise: “land in exchange for weapons.”
Accordingly, the real test for rescuing Lebanon goes beyond decisions to limit arms possession. It requires the army to dismantle military and security structures outside state control, while the government must dismantle the financial, economic, and educational networks of the “state within a state,” ending the abnormal situation that has weakened the Lebanese state and removing Israel's stated justifications.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was reportedly explicit with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, emphasizing that the framework agreement established a three-step sequence: disarmament first, then the deployment and empowerment of the Lebanese Army, followed by Israel's withdrawal beyond the border. Disarmament, he stressed, applies to all of Lebanon.
In this context, the official handling of a shipment of explosives seized in Dahr al-Baydar, more than three weeks after its confiscation, exposed a deep gap between commitments and implementation. It also raised questions about the authorities' reluctance to use state legitimacy against those operating outside it.
“Disarmament and the dismantling of the infrastructure associated with it” are the only path to freeing Lebanon from both Israel's occupation of its territory and Iran's efforts to preserve its armed regional proxy.
