Some observers have not shied away from admitting their bewilderment at Syria’s official stance on the war on Gaza which has, for what has become a long time now, been accompanied by the absence of President Bashar al-Assad, who is only making fleeting quick appearances.
Some of the observers attributed Syrian’s position to the history of the once turbulent relationship between Hamas and Damascus. Some attributed it to the “threats” aimed at deterring Assad that he is said to have received through intermediaries. Others find that Syria is in a difficult and critical position because of the battle it is fighting against Takfiri terrorism and the economic and financial war that the United States has waged against it.
But these arguments do not seem very compelling: the regime's relationship with Hamas has improved immensely, with the two parties now part of the same “Axis” and both becoming proponents of “uniting the arenas.” Besides, Damascus could see what is happening in Gaza, regardless of Hamas, as a devastating assault on the Strip and its people, and act accordingly.
As for the “threats” made by its enemies, they are supposed to come with the territory. They should not frighten a regime whose officials, as well as those in their orbit, have been repeatedly insisting, for years, is preparing to fight fateful battles on the side of justice. The same is true of the measures taken by the US and other Western countries; indeed, lifting the “unjust siege on Syria” is an added reason to join the battle.
As for the argument that Syria is still fighting a war against Takfiri terrorism, it is not consistent with the constant celebration of the defeat inflicted on these terrorists and their backers. Other arguments made along the same lines are no more convincing, even before accounting for the fact that Israel targeted Syrian territory 33 times between October 7 and December 12.
In the Syria of Assad we know, lip service is typically more vigorous and louder than artillery when it comes to Palestine. Today, we hear neither lip service nor artillery fire. In turn, anyone who remembers the extremely bloody campaigns to defeat “Arafatism,” “its capitulation,” and the “Lebanese isolationists allied with Israel,” or to crush the Syrian opposition that “serves the interests of Zionism and imperialism,” is left with the impression that Assad’s Syria is tantamount to terrible memory loss.
That much could be said before getting into the “liberation of Palestine” that the “beating heart of Arabism” had once been expected to propel, or the Baathist lineage of the regime currently in power, which had scorned Gamal Abdel Nasser for failing to liberate Palestine. Since President Assad is unlikely to suddenly transform into Olof Palme or Desmond Tutu, raising doubts and voicing rebukes becomes valid, as does allowing this skepticism to lead us to reassess some chapters of the past and some of its rhetoric through the lens of the present, with its experiences and discoveries.
The aim of this exercise is not to call for expanding the scope of the war through Syrian involvement, though Israel has not stopped expanding it through attacks on Syria. Indeed, artillery falling silent is always desirable, be it in Syria or elsewhere. Of course, plunging people into wars is not consistent with having affection for them or wishing them the best. However, that has no bearing here, as this is a dissection of how Syria's official position compares to its discourse and actions, and perhaps also because the regime understands what the brazen Israeli genocide of Gaza, which has reminded many of the Syrian regime's brazen genocide against its people, means better than most.
Nonetheless, more bizarre than the silence of Damascus is the silence around its silence. While many Arab countries that are geographically further and laid less of a claim to Arabism, liberation, etc. are constantly criticized and slandered for allegedly neglecting their duty to support Gaza, the Syrian president has not been blamed or even reproached. Instead, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah is tasked with justifying the Syrian silence and Assad's absence.
Hamas circles, in its leadership and grass roots, had complained of what they saw as Hezbollah not doing its duty by them, though these doubts were walked back on. However, no one said anything about the Syrian regime, though its non-contribution is not at all comparable to what Hezbollah has contributed and offered.
This, in turn, calls for a reexamination of the concept of solidarity, which is using Gaza as a pretext. It entails accepting factors that mitigate blame on a “strategic ally” that are only applicable to “strategic allies.” It is not an exaggeration to say that this silence around Syria's silence is an added reason to doubt many of the notions that had been presented as beyond doubt and self-evident.
As for the retrospective view, the developments we are now seeing allow us to reexamine the past few years and develop a reading that makes us understand that while killing Syrians and killing Palestinians may not necessarily be the same thing, these two things are certainly not contradictory.
