And Why Would Iran Change Its Behavior?

Unless Washington radically changes its strategy for dealing with Iran, after the attack on an American base in Jordan, there is no reason to expect another Qasem Soleimani to be eliminated, and by extension, that the US will rebuild deterrence vis-a-vis the Mullah regime.
If there's one thing Iran understands more than the language of force, it is the language of weakness. Iran believes that President Joe Biden’s administration is weak, confused, and ready to make unimaginable concessions because it has two illusions: the first is pursuing political rationality is the best way to arrive at an understanding. The second is that it can buy its way out of escalation by bribing the Iranians, through a money-for-hostages policy and by easing oil sanctions, as it believes that this is the safest route to avoid getting bogged down in the mud of the Middle East.
Both illusions stem from a major structural flaw in the United States’ conception of Iran's objectives in the region and its strategy for achieving them.
It's no coincidence that the Iranian militias’ attacks on US bases have coincided with debates in the US about plans to withdraw from Syria and Iraq. This is Iran's declared objective, and nothing could please the Iranians more than hearing the Biden administration explicitly discuss such plans, or seeing something similar in the discourse of the Republican candidate, Donald Trump - although Trump's line of thinking and actions are more decisive towards Iran and its threats.
Indeed, it is clear that Tehran's strategy to use attacks on American forces by militias allied with it in Syria and Iraq, as well as the actions of the Houthis in the Red Sea, the specter of opening a Lebanese front, and intervention in the Gaza war, to ramp up the pressure on US interests in several sites, and push the US to withdraw from the Middle East, in order to entrench Iran’s regional hegemony.
In addition, it is no coincidence that the Iranian lobby in Washington - which consists of Iranian-American academics, researchers, and journalists, whose ties to the Iranian government have been exposed, with some even finding their way into the American government through the diplomat ousted from the Biden administration, Robert Malley - is loudly arguing that the escalation of Iranian militias will end if a ceasefire is reached in Gaza.
Pushing this line of thinking, which ties the actions of Tehran's militias to a ceasefire in Gaza, is an effort to hijack the ongoing political process - the joint American, Arab, and Gulf push to establish a ceasefire as part of a political settlement for Palestine and ensure Israel’s security, ending the perverse state of affairs reinforced by Benjamin Netanyahu's governments. On the other hand, Iran wants the ceasefire in Gaza to solidify Hamas' standing in Palestine and give credence to the idea of armed struggle across the region, as it sees that as a gateway to regional dominance.
Those in the US who are convinced that an understanding with Iran is possible overlook the fact that this would require Iran to discard the only cards it has to play. Indeed, Iran has none of the strengths that rivals in the region can depend on, be it economic power, the strength of the social model, prosperity, welfare, openness, or peace.
So, why would Iran abandon the pillar of its strength through dialogue and understanding?
1. What are Iran's alternatives to exploiting regional conflicts, like the situation in Gaza, or supporting attacks on American forces and threatening the interests of Washington and its allies in the Red Sea region?
2. What are the other tools for influencing the United States’ policy on Iran, its revolutionary ideology, and its worldview, that Iran has at its disposal and could encourage Iran to agree to abandon its current tools?
3. What other avenues could Iran take besides further escalating tensions on various fronts, to divert attention away from its nuclear program and weaken the international community’s resolve to address this issue?
4. What options for enhancing its regional or domestic standing does Iran have, other than constantly harassing the United States and showing that it can play with the big boys without Washington daring to hit it with a strong military response?
5. What tools does Iran have, even in the midst of negotiations with the US, to influence nuclear and non-nuclear diplomatic negotiations, besides blackmailing it with regional destabilization?
6. How else could Iran compel the US to withdraw its military forces from the Middle East, if not by using militias to increase the costs of its military presence in the region and creating domestic pressures for withdrawal?
7. What are Iran's other tools for ensuring that the regime has a seat at the table in which the region’s political and security issues are discussed, other than its network of militias and allied states, which allow it to showcase its power and safeguard its interests?
Iran's immediate and critical interests are intricately linked to what the United States calls Iran’s behavior. Thus, calling for a change in behavior is akin to demanding that Iran stop being Iran. Imposing such a change on any nation through dialogue and negotiation is not realistic.
Nazi Germany did not transform through dialogue and appeasement, nor did Japan turn its back on its military imperialist doctrine through political understanding and goodwill. Fascism wasn't defeated through a swing in public opinion. These regimes are acutely aware of their interests, and they do not hesitate to protect the pillars of their power.
Washington's insistence on refusing to understand what Iran represents and what its behavior implies is the primary reason for the decline of US influence in the Middle East. Indeed, because of this insistence, the US finds itself facing adversaries who are not intimidated by it and allied with actors who do not trust it.