Some have found both the timing and implications of US special envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein’s trip to Beirut obscure. The visit’s ambiguity, or the fact that it was not constructive, further complicates things in the region generally and in Lebanon particularly. Indeed, no scenario can be ruled out. However, at this critical juncture, moments before a difficult solution or an even more difficult clash, Hochstein had nothing new to offer. He did not present any substantial new proposals to anyone he met with, no new initiative could be built upon. Hochstein merely reiterated what the United States has been saying for months, insisting on separating discussions for a solution in Lebanon from Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip.
Looking for anything serious or constructive in his public and private statements is futile. It is as though he is the trusted messenger of an unreliable interlocutor. He has shamelessly forsaken his role as a mediator, affirming his bias and allegiance to a party of the dispute. Thus, we can say that the visit is dangerous because of its timing and context in which it was made. Under unprecedented circumstances, he offered nothing new, a fatal mistake that disregards the fundamentals of negotiation and conflict resolution.
Those shocked by the visit can be divided into two groups: friends who feel betrayed, and resentful haters. Some in Lebanon took a positive negotiating approach to Hochstein's bias, spurred by their belief that he could build trust with the compatriots on whose behalf he has been negotiating. However, the outcome was his facilitation of a historic agreement tailored to the interests of these compatriots on the other side of the border but was scandalous from Lebanon’s perspective, what came to be known as the maritime border demarcation agreement. As for his new haters, who concealed their own negotiating mistakes and the flagrant shortcomings of this maritime border agreement, they are now worried about falling into a new trap- one that could potentially give rise to a new scandalous deal, on demarcating the land border this time. It seems that they have just realized that he is not a neutral arbitrator, as they have now decided to stop engaging with him as a mediator worth betting on.
The dilemma for both parties who feel that Hochstein had deceived them is that he has always been forthright about his allegiance. They, in turn, have always been aware of loyalties, as they were obvious from the moment he took on this role, and they went along with him regardless. It is those who have negotiated- or delegated this task to others- who find themselves in a real quagmire. They have been slapped with the same hand several times, but they continue to bet on a settlement or compromise.
To some, both the form and substance of Hochstein's visit to Beirut was clear. In terms of form, he made a round trip from a European capital on a commercial flight; if he were serious or sought to deliver a substantial message, he would have followed his visit up with a flight to Tel Aviv or gone there before heading to Beirut returned, to convey two sides’ messages to the other.
With regard to substance, he spoke in generalities, stressing the importance of negotiations, a ceasefire in Gaza, and ensuring that the conflict does not spill over into Lebanon. He did not discuss the day after, nor did he provide a roadmap or concrete steps; any negotiator could see that he lacks actionable information or a solid foundation for a solution that could be built upon. Essentially, his most significant message was a commitment to the ceasefire, suggesting that the Lebanese are to accept what the Palestinians are willing to accept. That is, Hochstein is effectively taking the negotiations back to square one, as if nothing had happened or changed on the Lebanese front since October 8th.
Thus, a fitting summary of the relationship between the Lebanese- who bet on his ambiguity and were divided in assessing it- and Hochstein, is that they are looking to a fire to protect them from a heatwave.
