Mohammed al-Rumaihi
TT

The Public Relations War

Many around the world remain deeply committed to a medieval mindset. It is too early to predict how the situation in the Middle East will develop following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and the public relations war reflected by Iran's retaliation last Wednesday night.

The Iranian narrative is that the attack damaged critical institutions in Israel. In contrast, the Israeli and Western narrative is that the missiles had little to no impact. In both camps, we find that those who are riled up firmly believe in their side's narrative.

The truth, as we all know, is the first casualty of war.

I recently learned, from reports by Western military analysts, that anti-missile defenses are costly. If the recipient (in this case, Israel) is certain that a missile will land in an open field or far away from populated regions, its defenses do not intercept it because doing so would incur greater costs than allowing it to land. This might explain why an Iranian missile killed a Palestinian in Jericho - the Palestinians certainly don't need more killing - and another landed in Jordan!

The retaliation for both Nasrallah and Haniyeh through a volley of missiles had probably been agreed upon beforehand, to allow for deflating the rage of segments of Iranians, Lebanese, and Arabs. That is to be expected in conflicts, as it gives decision-makers the opportunity to reassure their base: "We have done what needed to be done!"

However, the situation on the ground is entirely different. The Americans, British, French, Germans, Spaniards, and others have condemned the barrage and held Iran responsible. Thus, the attack has left Iran more isolated despite the prior agreements regarding the timing and targets.

The clash stems from the actions Israel has taken against Hezbollah's force in Lebanon. Israel sees Hezbollah as Iran's first line of defense against genuine threats. The damage that has been done to the party has embarrassed Iran, prompting it to seek a way out, albeit superficially.

When Iran's financial and military support for Hezbollah was at its peak, the party burned many bridges with those around it. It hallowed out the Lebanese political scene, which had long followed the formula of "no victor, no vanquished."

Hezbollah burned the bridges that linked the party to its national partners by assassinating a large number of Lebanese politicians and even intellectuals from its own sect, whom Nasrallah once called "the Shiites of embassies" to the boisterous applause of a clueless audience.

Hezbollah also burned its bridges with the Arab states through a fierce campaign focused especially on the Gulf states, in a clearly misguided step in service of a foreign agenda.

Within Lebanon, the specter of violence was ever-present. Every time it succeeded in silencing others, it became more confident that the tactic yielded results.

In our era, which has been upended by the communication revolution, we often see individuals from the party's community voicing their distress and complaining about the party. However, within a few hours or less, we would see them returnn to line, making humiliating apologies to the leadership. This phenomenon became a pattern, almost routine, one whose implications the party failed to recognize, doubling down on coercion and intimidation instead.

The party became brutal domestically, leaving it exposed. It was only a matter of time before Hezbollah would eventually be heavily targeted and lose its most prominent leaders, including Nasrallah.

The crucial question is: can the new leadership that takes over learn from the harsh lessons of what the party and Lebanon have undergone, or will it continue along the same path? This question cannot be answered today. Everyone is still waiting, analyzing, and observing, especially Lebanese politicians and Arab neighbors.

For Lebanon to emerge from this crisis in the future, it must take four major steps. Iran's missile barrage is certainly not among them. First, the Lebanese army must be the only armed actor in the country, with other forces operating as unarmed political parties that compete peacefully under a unified national banner.

Second, the state must be re-embraced, through the reinvigoration of institutions and by filling the vacancies of the presidency and the prime minister's office. Third, Lebanon must adopt a neutral posture with regard to regional issues. Fourth, the economy must be rejuvenated, as it has been devastated, pushing broad segments of Lebanese society to the brink of poverty.

These four steps are requisites for saving the country and ending the cycle of bloodshed in which Lebanon's young men are turned into pawns for regional projects that certainly do not entail liberating an inch of Palestine. The enormous technological gap, the lack of proper organization, and the absence of domestic support have turned the party into easy prey that Iran's coordinated missile attack will not save.

It is not easy to predict what will happen in the coming months, but the stark reality is that maintaining the policies of the past will only lead to total bankruptcy and further destruction. This is a critical historical juncture.

A final remark: The formula that trapped the party in this predicament was its reliance on its immense force domestically, which signaled weakness abroad and reflected overindulgence in the denial of reality.