Israel’s Priority in its War on Lebanon

Israel’s war has significantly escalated, in terms of its geographic scope, targets, and firepower over the month. This escalation is open-ended, with Lebanon replacing Gaza as Israel’s priority. The war leaves us with the following options:
First: The continuation of the war, which is the policy of Netanyahu and his government, with phases of contained escalation and (possibly) de-escalation- a perpetual war of attrition aimed at achieving maximalist Israeli objectives, primarily to get rid of Hezbollah, or rather, destroy its capabilities and capacities. This would significantly reduce its ability to deter Israel and wage war against it. Achieving this high bar would mean removing Hezbollah as a military by striking all of its military, intelligence, and other capabilities.
One way in which this pursuit has manifested itself in Israel’s acts in Syria, incorporating it into the war, especially through attacks on Hezbollah and its allies' capabilities deep inside Syria, including their bases and arms depots. The conditions that could push relevant actors to end the war have yet to emerge. None of the capable parties are currently interested in completely halting the Israeli assault or taking practical steps to undermine those objectives, with the United States supporting some, if not all, of Israel’s regional goals. Other Western powers that could significantly influence Israel’s position also align back some of these goals to varying degrees, though they have made their push in this regard collectively.
Second: The conflict snowballs into a fully-fledged regional war between Israel and Iran and its allies, with the arena extending from the Gulf to the Red Sea and the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. This war would change the face of the region, and no one can anticipate its dimensions or its broad strategic repercussions for the Middle East. This scenario could emerge despite Iran's reluctance to be dragged into a direct or open war on one hand, and the US pressures on its Israeli ally to contain the scale of its "deterrence operations" against Iran, on the other hand. Such a war could redraw spheres of influence in the Middle East and end up giving rise to shifts of a largely similar magnitude to those that followed the fall of Iraq in 2003.
Third: A return to the status quo that had prevailed before the support war in the South- the unwritten rules that limited the application of US Resolution 1701, with Israel violating the terms of the Resolution by air, sea, and even on land while Hezbollah maintains an “invisible” military south of the Litani River, only becomes visible when necessary. The parties to the unity of the arenas are betting on this strategy’s ability to drain Israel and hinder it from achieving its goals, with hostilities ending through a new understanding regarding the “gradual” implementation of Resolution 1701, as had been the case before.
This understanding would add cosmetic changes to the previous arrangement. Such a development would create necessary, albeit insufficient, conditions for reshaping Lebanese politics, ending the deadly vacuum, electing a president, and forming a government.
Fourth: Full implementation of Resolution 1701, which for Lebanon, means Hezbollah removing military assets south of the Litani River, with the Lebanese army- with more robust cooperation with UNIFIL- taking control of the region. This would strip the party of, or significantly weaken, its most important strategic asset: the ability to escalate against Israel. Its capacity to do so has significant regional implications for Hezbollah and its ally or patron, Iran, as we have seen recently with the unity of arenas strategy, which has been practically implemented in the Lebanese arena amid minimal and symbolic involvement of the "arenas" of Iraq or Yemen.
Meanwhile, as a state, Syria has remained neutral, although its territories are part of the strategic combat theater of the "Lebanese arena." Meanwhile, the patron, Iran, has maintained a distance and avoided active participation. This option (the full and actual implementation of Resolution 1701) requires indirect agreement between the powers backing the parties waging the conflict, as well as mediation, incentives, and support from relevant international and regional parties. This scenario would engender a qualitative shift in the course and nature of the conflict for all parties. Lebanon would no longer be a theater for the exchanges of foreign powers, allowing the state to assume its national responsibility to make decisions of war and peace, with all the representatives of the country’s communities involved in this process, thereby reinstating the authority of the state and its institutions.