Once again, Lebanon is being dragged into the heart of a violent regional storm. After Hezbollah launched rockets toward Israel, Israel retaliated with extensive bombardment targeting villages in the South, the Beqaa, and Beirut’s southern suburbs, along with a deeper ground incursion into the South. These developments led the government to take the unprecedented step of condemning the attack as an assault on the state and its decisions and banning Hezbollah’s military and security activities. Notably, the Amal Movement, Hezbollah’s partner in the Shiite duo, did not object to the decision, signaling a strong shift in the domestic political balance of power. For its part, the American administration informed Lebanon that the ceasefire agreement concluded after the “support and distraction war” had become null and void and that Washington was no longer prepared to provide military support to the Lebanese Army before armament is monopolized by the state.
These developments open the door to a question that can no longer be postponed: if the ceasefire agreement was concluded between Israel and a non-state actor, with the Lebanese playing the role of an intermediary through Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, does the new reality not demand a different framework- an agreement between Israel and the Lebanese state itself? Such an arrangement would amount to an updated armistice agreement and rest on a clear principle: withdrawing Lebanon from the military conflict with Israel and bringing a definitive halt to cross-border hostilities. This proposal does not imply that Lebanon change its position on the conflict; rather, it would mean that the state is retrieving its sovereignty after decades of erosion.
This debate is grounded in realism and past experience. Repeated wars have shown that Lebanon pays costs far beyond its capacity, while lacking the means to influence the course of the conflict, thus becoming more a battlefield than a decision-making party. For that reason, a reformulated armistice with international guarantees is not presented as a leap toward a grand settlement or final peace. It is a choice grounded in the management of national risks: reducing existential costs and protecting domestic stability. Small states do not choose between war and peace; they seek bulwarks against collapse, and several Arab states have taken this approach after decades of confrontation. This approach also has historical legitimacy, as the 1949 armistice agreement did not amount to surrender. It was a sovereign choice aimed at protecting the nascent state. Today, Lebanon may be facing a similar moment. It needs political courage to adopt a rational option that protects society and the economy, without departing from the broader Arab consensus or retreating from the Palestinian cause, especially since wars have brought no real progress but instead weakened its institutions and deepened its divisions. By contrast, Lebanon’s stability could make it possible to support Palestinian rights through more effective political and diplomatic means.
This same realism demands the pursuit of a diplomatic track outside the conventional framework: direct talks under a comprehensive international umbrella that restores Lebanon’s international legitimacy. This would allow Lebanon to redefine its regional role, allowing it to go from a country that faces sanctions and pressures to a partner in regional stability. Such a path would have to be underpinned by steps to reaffirm the state’s authority over decisions of war and peace, with stability in the South linked to a plan for economic recovery capable of encouraging support and investment, and securing sustainable Arab and international guarantees. It would also require shifting Lebanese discourse away from the binary of resistance or surrender toward the concept of effective sovereignty, whereby the state is responsible for protecting society and preventing its territory from being turned into a battlefield for others’ conflicts.
This proposal also corresponds with recent regional transformations that suggest a profound shift in the structure of the conflict with Israel. Earlier agreements led to the military, political, and popular decline of non-state actors following the high costs of the Gaza and Lebanon wars. There is a growing conviction that militancy is not effective, culminating in the Arab–Islamic declaration in New York and Sharm el-Sheikh efforts to pave a path of peace. This shift is further reinforced by developments in Syria. Since the fall of the Assad regime, Damascus has been seeking stability, reconstruction, and economic openness instead of ideological manipulation and conflict. The repercussions of the war on Iran, including the assassination of the Supreme Leader which shook the regime, have also had direct implications for Lebanon, creating a strategic environment fundamentally different from that of the past few decades. Lebanon must now genuinely engage with the United States and friendly Arab states to convince Israel to meet Lebanon halfway. They must ask Israel a decisive question: does it truly want a sustainable regional peace, or does it prefer to manage the conflict without ending it?
Ultimately, the issue is more than a technical agreement. This is a test of Lebanon’s determination to become a state seeking stability, development, and a role in the new regional order, perhaps to become a center for dialogue between rivals. Historical junctures do not come around often, and we have a rare opportunity today.
