"State weakness" or "complex domestic balances" can no longer encompass the current situation in Lebanon. We are facing something far more dangerous: a gradual, comprehensive collapse, as well as gaping vacuums in political and religious leadership.
This vacuum is the result of a long series of assassinations, beginning with the elected president Bashir Gemayel, followed by Prime Minister Rashid Karami, Grand Mufti Hassan Khaled, and then René Moawad. This trajectory peaked with the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the chain of eliminations remains intact to this day.
Between assassinations and the natural absence of leaders whose void was never filled, Lebanon’s national authorities have been laid bare, going from a sovereign reference point to an entity that does not make decisions on war and peace on its own soil, and sometimes even in its name, leaving it in limbo.
The end of the first "support war" through a ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel on November 27, 2024, along with the election of General Joseph Aoun and the designation of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister, appeared to represent an opportunity for the state to reassert itself. What followed, however, was less a restoration of sovereignty than a transitional phase that widened the gap between the state’s rhetoric and reality.
Hezbollah seems to have rebuilt capabilities under the direct supervision of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, which seems to have revamped the party's hierarchical command and split its structure into decentralized units. This reflects a shift toward direct Iranian participation in military decision-making inside Lebanon, raising the question of whether we are witnessing new breaches or a continuation of past breaches, and of what the new government has done to contain them beyond issuing vague statements.
Since February 28, we have seen more than the mere reactivation of a military organization. A structural transformation toward a decentralized model that is far harder to contain is underway, and it is informed by the lessons of previous confrontations, particularly the elimination of command centers. Its deeper significance, however, is political: Lebanon has been forced to go from an arena for others' conflicts to becoming a party to these conflicts.
The Lebanese state finds itself at a dead end. After declaring that it had begun implementing its commitments in the South, it has exposed itself as either unable or unwilling to control its own territory and protect its borders as the role of IRGC operatives becomes plain. The state did not so much permit this as fail to prevent these operatives. Either way, whether it is serious security breaches or complicity, this problem cannot be dismissed, and it raises an even more troubling question: where was Hezbollah's arsenal all this time?
This failure is not merely a problem of limited resources but of the state's loss of control over its borders and its monopoly on the use of force. It has gone from a weak entity into a façade for decisions made elsewhere. It issues statements and announces the fulfillment of commitments but does not steer the course of events, with functions assumed by parallel forces. This is no longer an exception; it has become a norm.
The authorities are in a state of denial. Some behave as though the priority still lies in formal negotiations that had become meaningless long ago. This detachment from reality is no less dangerous than the violations themselves. How can negotiations be proposed when decision-making is not in the hands of the state? And why are initiatives to restore even a minimum of political agency sidelined under the pretext of fragile domestic balances?
This is not the moment for shifting blame or pinning it on a single party. We must recognize reality. Political forces, preoccupied with their petty disputes, have all contributed to consolidating this situation, be it through negligence or adaptation. Responsibility is shared among those who confiscated decision-making, those who allowed it to be confiscated, and those who acquiesced it as a fait accompli.
While the state was announcing steps to assert sovereignty amid IRGC operations on Lebanese soil, political forces were consumed by electoral considerations and competing over authority they know to be paralyzed. What sharper contradiction could there be? Nor is society absolved. The silence of large segments of the public, their adaptation to this reality or even their occasional justification of the situations, have helped normalize the violation of sovereignty and transformed it from a shock into something familiar.
Lebanon has rarely faced such fateful days. There appears to be no way out without restoring the state. Who will begin taking this path, and from where? The problem is no longer just the loss of the state's standing as sole authority, but the erosion of society's trust in its ability or willingness to reclaim that role.
Between a retreating state, an advancing non-state actor, a political class that is either incapable or complicit, a silent public, and a vicious, reckless Israeli government, the future of a country is being written. Will the state be retained, or will the country learn to live with its absence?
