The Gulf-American ministerial meeting, held in the Bahraini capital Manama on Thursday, June 25, and its discussion of the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran, reflect that the Gulf states do not view the memorandum of understanding as a bilateral matter between Washington and Tehran. Rather, they see it as a process whose outcomes will directly impact the region's security, stability, and vital interests.
The initial understanding represents an important step toward de-escalation, ending military operations, and shifting from confrontation to negotiation. However, its true value will be measured by its ability to transform into a permanent agreement that addresses the root causes of the crisis and prevents its recurrence.
Therefore, the Gulf states' welcome of the memorandum of understanding and their support for the mediation and de-escalation efforts by Pakistan and Qatar do not mean simply stopping the war or waiting for the outcome of negotiations. Instead, it underscores the importance that any future arrangements must take into account the interests of the Gulf states, restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz to its normal state, enhance regional and global security, and respect state sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs. Gulf security must be an integral part of the final agreement, not a subsequent result of it.
Consequently, the important and fundamental question is not only what Washington wants from Tehran, or what Tehran seeks to extract from Washington, but what the Gulf states want from this agreement. Although these states were not direct parties to the war, they were at the heart of its security and economic repercussions, because the region is the direct arena where the effects of any agreement, whether successful or failed, will manifest. Hence, any sustainable settlement should view Gulf security as part of the agreement's core, not an issue deferred until afterward.
Therefore, the first Gulf demand is for the Gulf states to be present in consultations related to the agreement and informed about the negotiation tracks and their developments, not for mere symbolic participation, but because any understanding between Washington and Tehran will have effects that transcend the two parties, directly impacting Gulf security, freedom of navigation, energy markets, and regional stability.
Thus, regular consultation with Gulf states and their participation in any meetings will not hinder the negotiation process; on the contrary, it will give it greater pragmatism and ensure that future arrangements are formulated in a way that considers the interests of the states most affected by the consequences of escalation.
Gulf states do not want the agreement to be a temporary bilateral settlement that halts the war and leaves neighborhood concerns unresolved. Rather, they seek a broader framework that places regional security at its core, making stability a shared outcome, not an arrangement decided far from those who will bear its cost.
We do not want a repeat of what happened with the 2015 nuclear deal, concluded during the era of former President Barack Obama. Those negotiations took place between Iran and the '5+1' group, while Gulf states were absent from the negotiating table, despite being geographically closest and most exposed to the repercussions of Iranian behavior in the region.
Consequently, the deal was incomplete, addressing one aspect of the nuclear file while leaving out important issues more connected to the security of Gulf states, such as support for armed groups, regional interventions, and the development of ballistic missiles and drones. Therefore, it proved fragile and later faltered, because any agreement with Iran reflects not only on the international balance of power but also on the security of its direct neighborhood.
Furthermore, freedom of passage in the Strait of Hormuz is at the top of Gulf demands, being a vital artery for regional security and the global economy. What is required here is not just reopening the Strait after its closure or threat, but ensuring that navigation remains normal, safe, and stable under all circumstances, and that it does not become a bargaining chip or a tool of pressure used in every crisis.
The Strait is an international passage connected to the interests of Gulf states and the world, and its freedom should not be linked to any political discussions, temporary arrangements, or exceptional restrictions. Accordingly, any final agreement should explicitly enshrine freedom of passage, regular movement of ships, energy, and trade, and reject any attempt to impose unilateral control over it, or to levy direct or indirect fees or financial arrangements that grant Iran practical control over the passage. The real danger lies not just in closing the Strait once, but in transforming its security from a fixed international right into an issue open to bargaining and political blackmail.
There is also the threat associated with Iran-linked armed groups, which continue to represent one of the most prominent sources of concern for Gulf and regional security. We have seen how these groups can transfer tension and chaos from one arena to another, as happened in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries. And how missiles, drones, and military technologies have been transferred to these groups, to be used in threatening ports, vital installations, the energy sector, and internal stability.
Therefore, any serious agreement must include a clear commitment to stop transferring missiles, drones, and military technologies to them, and end the forms of financial, logistical, and training support that enable them to continue as tools for pressure and threatening regional security.
The fourth demand relates to addressing the damages incurred by the Council (GCC) states due to the recent war, a right guaranteed by the principles of international law, as an extension of states' right to claim reparation for damages suffered as a result of unlawful acts. These states were neither party to nor supported the war, yet they were subjected to Iranian targeting, resulting in security and economic damages, disruption of trade and energy movement, and an increase in risk levels for vital installations.
No settlement can open a new page of good neighborliness while ignoring the cost borne by the Gulf states in their security, stability, and vital interests. Moreover, addressing these damages should not be viewed as an obstacle to peace, but as part of recognizing the damage, establishing responsibility, building trust, and creating a more stable environment for relations based on good neighborliness and respect for sovereignty.
Finally, what the Gulf states want from any agreement with Iran is simple and clear: to build a broader framework for peace and good neighborliness, based on respect for sovereignty, rejection of interference, and preservation of the region's security, passages, and vital interests.
It should be a real agreement that addresses the root causes of the crisis and opens the door to a more balanced relationship built on shared interests, economic and security cooperation, and investment in opportunities that serve the peoples of the region.
Therefore, Gulf security must not be a marginal issue in any settlement, but rather one of its foundations and a guarantee for regional stability and its transition from crisis management to peace and prosperity creation.
