Can healthy, normal relations be built between the Arab Gulf states, along with other Arab countries such as Jordan and Yemen, on the one hand, and Iran under the ideological rule of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the other?
This question did not emerge only today, amid the exchange of strikes between Iran and the United States. It has existed since the birth of the Khomeinist regime, founded on the doctrines of Wilayat al-Faqih, the export of the revolution, and the "support of the oppressed," an Iranian euphemism for interfering in the affairs of other states and violating their sovereignty.
The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the region's leading power, have repeatedly sought to build bridges of goodwill with the Iranian regime and to overlook sources of tension, as they did after the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in eastern Saudi Arabia. We also remember the remarkable period of rapprochement during the presidency of the late Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani and his relationship with King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, when the latter was Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. Yet these "exceptional" moments failed to put relations with Iran on a lasting path toward calm, peace, and normal state-to-state ties. That is the record of 47 years, and this is where it has led: an ideological regime that has grown more aggressive, more defiant, and more heavily armed.
Professor Radwan al-Sayyid, one of the Arab world's foremost scholars of the intellectual roots of Islam in the Middle East, including Iranian thought, has studied the subject for decades. Two weeks ago, he wrote an article in this newspaper titled "Iran, the Arabs, and the Relations of the Coming Era," in which he observed: "Only after years of following the Iranian way of thinking did I conclude that the Iranian plateau, unified under a single state, harbors imperial ambitions, whether in the name of nationalism, sectarianism, or both."
Reflecting on the current war, he added: "We kept reassuring ourselves that the costs of militias and the nuclear program were far too high and did not appear to enjoy broad support among the Iranian public. The more optimistic among us continued to assume that all this was merely leverage against the United States and the Arabs, and that it would end after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or following the 2015 nuclear agreement with the Obama administration."
This means that the military capabilities of the Gulf states must be at least as formidable as Iran's, if not superior. Yes, I recognize that Iran lags behind in air power and even in the quality and modernization of its land and naval forces. However, it has compensated for these shortcomings by making highly sophisticated investments in its ballistic missile and drone programs, explosive-laden boats, swarms of fast attack craft, and the cultivation of loyal militias in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.
Accordingly, the Gulf states must rise to the level of the Iranian challenge, which shows no sign of receding in the foreseeable future. One essential condition for doing so is cooperation and unity among the Gulf countries on these strategic matters, at the very least. If a Gulf diplomatic breakthrough with the Iranian regime succeeds in establishing healthy, normal relations, so much the better. That is precisely the desired outcome.
As Professor Radwan asked: "Is it not possible to reach an arrangement with Iran from which both sides stand to gain? After all, what does Iran gain from spreading instability around itself, unless the matter is ideological, in which case the situation is truly alarming?"
