On the ground, the Iranian regime has begun executing its threats to expand the conflict by igniting two new border fronts. The first is in the southern Red Sea, threatening to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait via the Houthis. The second is in the northern Arabian Gulf, through direct and unprecedented threats directed at Kuwait.
The gravity of this shift is not confined to Kuwait or the Red Sea; it extends to the entire regional security architecture. Iran is no longer limiting the confrontation to its original adversaries, namely, the United States and Israel, but is instead shifting the conflict toward neighboring countries and strategic waterways. This behavior does not represent a defensive reaction as much as it reflects a strategic trajectory that the Iranian military project has been building for decades, grounded in expanding influence and geopolitical control over surrounding nations.
Statements issuing by Iranian institutions warrant close attention, as the intensity of threats against Kuwait has escalated. The Tasnim news agency has released statements that closely mirror those issued by Baghdad prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Tehran cites the limited American military presence in Kuwait as a pretext for an attack, completely ignoring the fact that this presence dates back decades and serves primarily a deterrent function against any potential invasion, rather than acting as a major base for recent US operations against Iran.
The question raised today is: how can Kuwait, and the Gulf states along with it, deal with this threat?
The challenge surpasses individual national capabilities and demands a return to the concept of collective action, through building a cohesive regional front backed by an international alliance that explicitly rejects any pretexts for expanding the war or legitimizing aggression against neighboring countries. While Washington, amid its preoccupation with managing the military confrontation, may not be expected to lead the diplomatic initiative, it can draw clear red lines confirming that the security of the Gulf and its maritime waterways falls within its vital strategic interests. Iran has not confined itself to verbal threats against Kuwait; rather, it has repeatedly struck water and electricity facilities and expanded the circle of threat to include Bahrain as well.
It appears that Tehran realizes that the tightening naval blockade on its ports, along with the potential expansion of US operations along its coastlines, could strip it of its influence over Hormuz - the most critical leverage it has utilized in both war and negotiations. Consequently, it is attempting to manufacture alternative leverage; among these efforts is transforming Bab al-Mandab into a strategic blackmail point through the Houthis, and seeking to impose a new security reality in the northern Gulf - an attempt that invokes, despite differing circumstances, some features of the fait accompli policy pursued by Saddam Hussein's regime in 1990.
It is notable that Iranian behavior has become cyclical; whenever it loses a strategic card, it hastens to open a new front to reproduce tools of pressure and blackmail. To mitigate the political and legal costs, and to avoid appearing as a direct aggressor state, it is highly likely to rely more heavily on its regional proxies, such as the Yemeni and Iraqi militias.
What are the prospects for the success of this new Iranian positioning?
The answer is not easy, because analyzing Iranian behavior cannot rely solely on assumptions of traditional rationality. The Iranian leadership also faces complex domestic equations, and it fears that any impression of defeat could destabilize its internal position, after spending the country's resources for decades building military capabilities and financing wars.
It appears that the Houthis in Yemen have been tasked with transforming Bab al-Mandab into an operational alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, given Iran's declining ability to use the latter as leverage due to American military strikes. With the Houthis already rushing to threaten navigation, Yemeni forces, alongside the coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, are highly likely to find regional and international support to prevent the disruption of one of the world's most vital trade arteries.
The expected response is not confined to the military dimension; rather, the diplomatic arena could be wider in this specific front. Major powers relying on navigation in the Red Sea - foremost among them China and India, in addition to European nations - possess a direct interest in ensuring freedom of navigation. Consequently, any military action aimed at ending the Houthi threat to the maritime waterway may enjoy a broader international consensus, because it would be a defense of the principle of international freedom of navigation, rather than an extension of the ongoing war in the Gulf.
In any case, building this regional and international bloc is no longer a political option, but has become a strategic necessity - not only to confront current threats, but also to deal with any arrangements that the outcomes of the war may impose in the future. Iran is not merely seeking to manage a temporary crisis; rather, it is attempting to redraw the strategic map of the region according to its new narrative, so that it emerges from the war, even if it stops early, with zones of influence and rules of engagement different from those that existed before the war. Consequently, the discussion is no longer just about how to end the war, but about the shape of the regional order that will form next.
