Only a thin thread remains of the Iranian-American memorandum of understanding, which expires on August 18, to borrow a metaphor from the diplomacy of the Umayyad Caliphate. Today, this thread is represented by the indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran, which mediators are keen to keep alive despite the dwindling chances of their revival or success.
Before the expiration of the 60-day deadline granted for the memorandum to reach a comprehensive agreement, both parties had announced, directly or indirectly, its failure, yet they avoided a joint declaration of abandoning it. The danger of this controversial memorandum lies not in the difficulty of interpreting it or the impossibility of implementing it, but rather in the inability to declare its death, because the alternative has become clear: a return to open confrontation. This option causes concern for everyone, even the United States, which possesses the capability to impose it but does not appear ready to bear its strategic cost and regional repercussions.
Washington, along with its sole ally in the region, Israel, entered the war against Tehran betting on the day after more than it bet on the war itself. However, it quickly backed down from many of the positions it announced at the start of military operations, finding itself captive to the time factor, torn between the urgency of achieving results and reaping gains. In contrast, Iran bet on consuming time and delaying the emergence of results until it could absorb the shock and rearrange its cards, which is exactly what the memorandum of understanding provided, even if temporarily.
Tehran's dilemma is that it overestimated the results it achieved and sought to convert the terms of the memorandum into gains; more seriously, it misread Washington with a traditional mindset, just as it misread Tel Aviv in the same manner, leading to negative calculations. Israel has been engaged in a continuous war since October 8, 2023, while the White House administration today appears more liberated from internal and external pressures in its management of the confrontation with it.
When US President Donald Trump announced that the interim agreement had expired, and Tehran responded that it had not requested the resumption of negotiations in the first place, it became clear that a return to a peaceful track had become more complex. The memorandum of understanding can no longer be revived except through a radical amendment of its terms and the establishment of a clear, binding interpretation for it - something that appears far-fetched under current circumstances. Consequently, the region seems to be heading toward a phase of major strategic risks that could redraw its balances anew.
Amid the caution of mediators, particularly the Pakistanis who have not abandoned their mission, and the support of neighboring countries for their efforts, the two parties to the conflict stand at the furthest possible point on the negotiation table, while the confrontation arenas appear to be the real field for managing the conflict.
From the Strait of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandeb, Tehran waves the threat of a waterway war and the possibility of disrupting the global economy through the Houthis, using Iraqi territory to pressure neighboring countries, and reconnecting the Lebanese track with its own through confrontation. It is holding onto all its cards because it considers that this battle will shape the future of the Iranian regime itself.
In contrast, the United States appears convinced that settling the confrontation is no longer a deferred option, but rather a necessity imposed by the balance of power it possesses, as well as by the new regional interests that have come to govern the equations of peace and war in the Middle East.
The failure of the memorandum of understanding has proven that major wars do not stop before reaching a moment of decisiveness. It has also proven that the "win-win" equation is no longer viable in this conflict, and that the region is likely heading toward a harsher equation based on a clear winner and an even clearer loser. In light of American miscalculation on one hand, and excessive Iranian self-confidence on the other, the risk of sliding into a wider confrontation becomes a real possibility.
