These days, memories of August 1990 are being revived, when Saddam Hussein’s regime invaded Kuwait and plunged the Gulf into the greatest danger it had faced up to that point.
Was that invasion a surprise? Perhaps in terms of its timing, but not in terms of its ideological and political roots. Baathist hostility toward the Gulf monarchies had long been embedded in the political discourse of the Baath Party. Likewise, the expansionist ambitions of the Iraqi regime had already become evident through its war with Iran and its attempts to establish itself as the dominant power in the Gulf.
According to many assessments at the time, the occupation of Kuwait was merely the first step in a broader project to reshape the regional balance of power through force. It was therefore no coincidence that the Gulf states had established their own council a decade before the invasion without including Saddam’s Iraq.
Perceiving threats from both Iraq and Iran, they founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 as a framework for political, security, and defense coordination in an exceptionally volatile region.
Saddam Hussein did not hide his displeasure at the Gulf states’ creation of an exclusive bloc and later sought to establish a rival Arab grouping through the Arab Cooperation Council. However, that alliance was short-lived and effectively collapsed following the invasion of Kuwait.
On the other side, the Islamic Republic of Iran was not very different in its regional ambitions, even if its ideology differed. Since its establishment in 1979, Iran has promoted a revolutionary doctrine centered on exporting the revolution and has expanded its influence by building networks of allies and armed groups across several Arab countries. Over the past four decades, its regional project has become one of the principal sources of instability in the Middle East.
For that reason, the anniversary of Kuwait’s occupation this year should not be merely an occasion for remembrance, but an opportunity to reflect on the lessons of history.
What happened in 1990 demonstrated that the collapse of Kuwait’s sovereignty immediately threatened Gulf security and quickly became a regional and international crisis that affected the global economy and energy security. That reality remains true today and may be even more apparent amid the complexities of the current strategic shifts.
Iran appears increasingly aggressive and malicious, with its attacks extending even to Jordan and Egypt. Today, Tehran is engaged in a struggle to preserve both its regime and its regional influence, making it potentially more inclined toward risk-taking than in previous periods.
To understand Iranian behavior, one must first understand its local calculations, which are of paramount importance to the regime.
Accepting a settlement that could be interpreted domestically as a defeat might weaken the regime’s legitimacy among both supporters and opponents, particularly after years of economic pressure, domestic protests, and setbacks in Syria, Lebanon, and its wider regional project.
As a result, Tehran may seek to compensate for its losses through other means. Following these setbacks and Israel’s success in weakening Hezbollah’s capabilities in Lebanon, Iran appears intent on repositioning itself regionally. In my view, Iran will place greater emphasis on Iraq and Yemen, where it enjoys direct influence over armed militias and the Houthis, using these arenas to exert pressure and compensate for losses suffered elsewhere.
This places the Gulf states before an extremely serious strategic challenge. The most likely scenario may not be a direct conventional military confrontation, but rather a return to the model of proxy warfare, in which Iran manages conflict through its allies and opens multiple fronts against Gulf countries rather than Israel, under various banners and slogans.
At the same time, if the United States chooses not to confront Iran today, it would be unwise to assume that Washington will return in the future to fight another war in defense of its allies in the same manner it did in 1991, even if security partnerships remain intact.
Therefore, the most important lesson to draw from the anniversary of August 1990 is that Gulf security cannot rest solely on assumptions or external guarantees. It must be built upon greater self-reliant military strength, deeper defense integration, the development of a stronger industrial and military base, and higher levels of political and economic preparedness to confront a period that may prove more dangerous and complex than anything experienced in recent decades.
After this war, the Gulf will be on its own.
