The sole common factor between Saudi Arabia and Iran is China. As the largest buyer of crude oil from both nations, China has also felt the economic sting of the conflict due to supply disruptions and their broader fallout. While domestic gasoline prices have surged by nearly a third and Chinese exports to Arab markets have contracted, China's economy continues to register growth.
China is the nation most invested in the energy security and maritime navigation of the Middle East, as it stands as the region's primary oil importer. This contrasts sharply with the United States, which no longer purchases Gulf oil and has instead emerged as the world's largest producer and exporter. Despite the vast scale of its interests in the region, Beijing pursues a policy vastly different from that of the US, to a degree that we sometimes find difficult to understand.
The US has long maintained a well-defined policy that, specifically since the British withdrawal from "East of Suez", has aligned with its own interests, the protection of energy flows, and countering communist expansion. President Richard Nixon adopted a strategy of regionally backing both Iran and Saudi Arabia. This was subsequently followed by the well-known Carter Doctrine, which established a commitment to utilizing military force to protect the Gulf.
The Middle East is crucial to China, however, Beijing does not act as a protector of its own interests there just yet. Despite possessing the world's largest tanker fleet, its vessels sit waiting outside the Strait of Hormuz. Similarly, while China maintains a naval presence in the Gulf of Aden near areas controlled by Yemen's Houthi militia, Chinese forces have refrained from engaging them despite ongoing attacks, leaving its tankers waiting out in the ocean.
Chinese politicians likely prefer to avoid involvement in the US-Iran conflict, and it may suit their interests to weaken the Trump administration by refraining from intervening against Iran. Tehran has currently decided to permit some Chinese vessels to transit the Strait of Hormuz, but this concession arrived late, coming after the Americans established a maritime corridor in the waters of Oman that is less vulnerable to Iranian attacks.
This maritime workaround prompted the Iranians to travel to Baghdad last week to convince officials that they would exempt their oil tankers from targeting and that they should use the Iranian sea lane, following the desertion of most tankers from this route in favor of the Omani corridor.
Whether the conflict concludes now or in a year, China will, over the long term, adopt the same strategy previously deployed by major global powers like Britain and the US to defend their interests - by constructing a larger fleet, establishing more military bases, forging defense pacts, and pursuing a more aligned foreign policy.
However, this is not imminent. Today, China coexists with American hegemony, primarily because it benefits from the guaranteed, continuous flow of oil, and secondly, because its geopolitical priorities lie elsewhere, specifically in Taiwan, the South and East China Seas, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is for this reason that former US President Barack Obama famously labeled China a "free rider," as it capitalizes on American protection of international shipping lanes.
China’s policy appears somewhat foreign to us. Historically, we have been accustomed to navigating the old international polar system by aligning with a single camp, whether the French or the British, the Axis or the Allies, or the Soviet Union or the US. However, China is rapidly ascending as a superpower and has not yet reached the stage of forcing geopolitical positioning and alignment. This does not imply that Beijing is a country devoid of alliances or stances, as it maintains its own animosities within its immediate geopolitical periphery.
In the Middle East and Africa, Beijing is a "friend" to all, making its policy easy to deal with, yet simultaneously difficult to understand. China appears contradictory; it stands as the largest buyer from the warring Gulf nations and is the premier trading partner for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Furthermore, China is Israel's second-largest trading partner, while also remaining a supporter of the Palestinian cause!
The tedious Chinese neutrality observed today is expected to diminish as its interests expand and occasionally conflict. The war with Iran has come to test Beijing's policy. Thus far, China has not been forced to shed its public neutrality, though it may do so if the scope of the conflict broadens and prolongs. This does not deny the fact that Beijing is currently assisting Iran covertly and to a limited extent, without directly defying the American blockade. Beijing wishes to see a defeat for Trump, while simultaneously recognizing that the Tehran regime, by its very nature, fosters chaos that harms Chinese interests.
For its part, Iran considers China its sole ally and seeks its support, while viewing Russia as a temporary friend of convenience due to deep-seated historical grievances.
Meanwhile, countries in the Arab region, specifically the Gulf states, have constructed substantial interest-based relations, seeking to win Beijing over or at least neutralize its stance, a strategy that has proven partially successful.
China "does not want to be another America" - meaning a hegemonic power - a stance it has repeatedly declared, yet there are ample indications that the "Dragon Empire" is ascending. It established its first military base in our region in Djibouti, south of the Red Sea, and maintains warships at the gateway of the Red Sea that previously helped in combating Somali pirates. Following an American withdrawal, Beijing will find itself compelled to fill the vacuum.
