The Turkish-Israeli tension is no longer merely a reflection of the disagreement over Gaza or of the political enmity between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Developments in Syria and Lebanon reveal that the relationship has moved to a deeper level of competition over shaping the balance of power in the Middle East after the US-Iran war and the decline in Tehran's ability to play its former regional role. So will Türkiye become Israel's principal regional competitor? Or will the rivalry remain governed by a ceiling that prevents direct confrontation?
The question came to the fore after the Israeli strike on the Abu al-Duhur air base in northern Syria, following a visit there by a Turkish delegation. Israel justified the strike on the grounds that the base could be used to station Turkish forces, while Damascus denied this, and Ankara accused Netanyahu of pursuing an expansionist policy that threatens the region's stability. The incident showed that the competition is approaching the point of military friction that could lead to wider escalation if either side misjudges the other's intentions.
Syria is at the center of this competition because the two sides proceed from opposing visions of its future. Ankara wants a unified and stable Syria with a central government close to it, one that controls its borders and prevents the emergence of an independent or semi-independent Kurdish entity. It also sees the rebuilding of the army and the economy as an opportunity to expand its influence, facilitate the return of refugees, and consolidate its position as the most influential power in the new Syria.
Israel, by contrast, is concerned about the emergence of a strong Syrian state or a Turkish military presence close to its borders. It wants to preserve its freedom of action in the air and prevent the emergence of capabilities that would restrict its freedom of movement. It therefore tends to favor keeping Syria militarily weak and subject to security arrangements that limit its sovereignty, particularly in the south. The disagreement thus extends beyond any particular military base to the very nature of the Syrian state itself: Türkiye wants to rebuild it, while Israel wants to constrain it.
The competition extends to Gaza, where Türkiye uses its defense of the Palestinians to strengthen its standing in the Arab and Islamic worlds, while Israel regards these ties as a threat. Lebanon has also entered the equation, with Ankara seeking to expand its political and security role and signaling its readiness to participate in security arrangements that would replace UNIFIL forces in the south. These contacts do not amount to a rapprochement, particularly after the rivalry between the two sides in Syria, but they point to an intersection of interests driven by a shared interest in curbing Israeli moves. Israel sees any Turkish presence in the Lebanese arena as an extension of Ankara's influence and an attempt to restrict its own freedom of military action, adding a new front to the tension.
In the eastern Mediterranean, the dispute is tied to gas, maritime boundaries, and Israel's alliance with Greece and Cyprus, which Türkiye regards as an attempt to encircle it and isolate it from energy projects. Its military dimension has also been reinforced by an Israeli-Greek deal worth about three billion euros to establish a multilayered air and missile defense network, deepening the strategic partnership and fueling Ankara's concerns.
Iran's retreat does not end the struggle for influence. Instead, it may gradually shift its center toward Turkish-Israeli competition. But Türkiye is not another Iran. It is a NATO member with a large economy, a strong military, and extensive relations with the West and the Arab states. It also builds its influence through political, military, and economic presence, rather than through the model of armed groups alone.
Israel therefore finds it difficult to use against Türkiye the instruments it relied on against Iran and its allies, given that Türkiye is a state closely tied to the West and deeply interconnected with it economically and in security terms. Nor will Washington readily allow two of its allies to slide into war, which helps explain the creation of deconfliction channels in Syria. These channels do not indicate that the tension is receding. Rather, they show that the possibility of friction has become real and requires permanent mechanisms to contain it.
The better outcome, therefore, would be a balance that prevents either side from monopolizing leadership of the region. The coming Israeli elections may affect the level of escalation. Netanyahu's continuation in office would make an approach based on force more likely, while new leadership might allow for more realistic security arrangements, without ending the structural contradiction of interests.
A direct war is unlikely. Economic interests, relations with the West, and the fear of attrition all impose limits on escalation. The likeliest outcome is a continuing relationship that combines political enmity, regional competition, and the security coordination necessary to prevent an explosion. The question, then, is not whether Türkiye and Israel will go to war, but what kind of regional order each seeks to build. Türkiye seeks a stable neighborhood led by central states tied to it; Israel seeks a weak neighborhood on its borders, one that guarantees its superiority and freedom of movement. Between the two projects, Syria remains the most important test, while Lebanon opens an additional arena that may make managing the competition considerably more difficult.
