One person was killed and 11 others were injured as a result of a Houthi attack on King Khalid International Airport in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, on Sunday, October 11. A day earlier, the General Authority of Civil Aviation announced that 12 people had been killed and 302 injured in another Houthi attack targeting the same airport on Saturday, October 10.
There have also been attacks on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, preceded by attacks on the airports of Abha, Jazan, and Najran. This means that the Houthi militias have targeted five Saudi civilian airports during October alone.
Through this focus on airports, the Houthis seek to create an atmosphere of fear among citizens and residents, increase the economic, military, and humanitarian costs for Saudi Arabia, and thereby undermine morale.
The Houthi group is also seeking to improve its position on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, particularly as it faces financial and social crises in the areas under its control. In recent weeks, it has been engaged in fierce daily battles with forces of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, with hundreds of its fighters killed.
Many of its ammunition depots and military facilities have also come under intensive daily airstrikes by the Coalition to Support Legitimacy, based on a precise and clearly defined target list drawn up using intelligence surveillance and information from sources on the ground. It is a fierce battle that will not be easy and may continue for a prolonged period.
The Houthis are attempting to counter this financial, social, and military pressure by targeting civilian infrastructure and energy facilities. They believe such attacks will push Riyadh to engage with mediators in an effort to persuade the Houthis to stop targeting the Kingdom.
The Houthis would then demand a price in return, creating a form of political and economic blackmail: money and influence in exchange for security.
There is another factor. The Houthi leadership in Saada believes that the previous “verbal understanding” reached between it and the administration of US President Donald Trump, under which the United States halted strikes against the Houthis in exchange for their pledge not to target American vessels, gives the group the ability to keep Washington on the sidelines.
The Houthis have also conveyed messages through the US Embassy in the Sultanate of Oman stating that they would not target American interests, in an attempt to neutralize President Trump and drive a wedge between him and Riyadh.
This is how the Houthis think. They hope their policies will enable them to achieve their objectives. If they succeed, such tactics could become a permanent pattern of behavior based on blackmail and the use of civilians as hostages to ensure their continued hold on power.
If we examine Houthi behavior and objectives calmly and through the lens of logical political analysis, we find that their assumptions are based on an unrealistic perception that fails to account for the major changes the region has undergone since October 7, 2023. These transformations have been profound.
The Houthis’ allies in the so-called “Axis of Resistance” – Hezbollah, Hamas, the Iraqi factions, and the Iranian regime that coordinates them – have lost many of their sources of strength and are now less capable of imposing their agendas, particularly following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the deaths of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.
It is true that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the so-called “resistance factions” retain the ability to inflict harm by launching drones and ballistic missiles. Yet despite the human and financial losses such attacks can cause, their costs can be absorbed, and they are unlikely to fundamentally alter the balance of power.
For its part, Saudi Arabia has prepared for such threats through its defense systems. Despite casualties among civilians, damage at airports and disruptions to oil supplies, as well as the widespread public anger these attacks have generated toward the Houthis, the interception rate of Saudi air defenses against ballistic missiles and drones remains high.
This demonstrates the efficiency and preparedness of the Saudi Armed Forces, despite attacks targeting several parts of the Kingdom and originating from multiple external actors: Iran’s IRGC targeting the Eastern and Central regions, Iraqi armed factions launching attacks from the Kingdom’s northern frontier toward oil supply lines, and the Houthis attacking the capital as well as southern and western Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is a vast country exposed to genuine threats from hostile actors using a variety of methods. Yet life continues normally across its provinces, cities, and villages. This gives citizens and residents a greater sense of security and strengthens their loyalty to their government. At the same time, it reinforces social cohesion and fortifies the domestic front.
This helps explain the anger that swept through Saudi society following the Houthi terrorist attacks. It was a form of anger that strengthened national identity without falling into the trap of sloganeering or populism. Instead, it deepened public alignment behind the leadership and confidence in its political and military decisions.
As for the Saudi government, anyone who follows the statements issued by the Cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Coalition to Support Legitimacy, in which Riyadh plays a central role, will recognize that the Kingdom is determined to deal firmly with the Houthis.
This is not because Saudi Arabia rejects a diplomatic solution. Quite the opposite: it has allowed years for peaceful solutions to work, but the Houthis failed to take advantage of those opportunities. Saudi Arabia has now become convinced that the Houthis cannot be allowed to continue killings and acts of terrorism without deterrence, lest such conduct become a permanent pattern.
Accordingly, Riyadh is supporting the military effort of Operation Dawn of Yemen and the forces battling the Houthis on the ground. At the same time, it continues to conduct precise air operations through the coalition, while the Saudi Armed Forces bolster those efforts by intercepting missiles and drones targeting the Kingdom.
Therefore, according to a measured political assessment free from wishful thinking, the Houthis will not achieve their objectives. Riyadh will not accept becoming hostage to terrorism, nor will the international community accept an outlawed group obstructing safe navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
As for the Saudi people, anyone observing public sentiment will find support for confronting the Houthis, weakening their capabilities, and compelling them to halt their attacks permanently. Saudi society understands very well that whatever price is paid today will be lower than the price that could be paid in the future if the Houthis and their allies among terrorist and outlawed groups are allowed to grow stronger.
Everything has a price. Security is safeguarded through strength that supports and accompanies diplomacy, enabling it to impose peace, stability, and respect for international law.
Militarily and politically, Riyadh will act according to its national and broader strategic interests, in a manner consistent with the objectives of Saudi Vision 2030, which seeks to advance development, build a diversified economy, and create a modern civil state.
Saudi Arabia’s response to Houthi terrorism will therefore be governed by its own calculations, with the protection of its interests coming first and foremost. Its objective will be to deter attacks against the Kingdom according to Saudi Arabia’s own rules, rather than those dictated by the Houthis or any other regional actor.
